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ABSTRACT
The thesis analyses US policy to Pakistan between 1947 and 1960 by using a 
theoretical framework beyond the positivist-empiricist nexus that dominates much of 
International Relations and especially its dominant school, Realism. This nexus 
considers the world to be self-evident, which requires independent observers to 
passively pick up. The thesis rejects this epistemological position by demonstrating 
that reality is interdependent between subject and object, that knowing reality depends 
on the subject that is analysing as much as the object that is being analysed. The first 
part of this thesis thus develops a framework to accommodate this interdependence, 
one based on identity narratives. Identity narratives are accounts of how the self came 
to be, where it came from, what it is and where it is going. These stories explain how 
political subjects categorise, attach meaning and ultimately engage reality. Thus, four 
American identities, with corresponding narratives, are selected: exceptionalism, 
capitalism, Anglo-Saxon and missionary. Further, a meta-identity in anti-communism 
is also used.
This framework is applied on archival and other material relating to US policy to 
Pakistan between 1947 and 1960. The thesis demonstrates Washington’s exclusive 
deployment of its anti-communist narrative to understand Pakistan since America 
could only categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan in the context of communist 
issues and could not fit into any other American identity narrative. Initially in 1947, 
American failed to make sense of Pakistan given the speed of Pakistan’s creation, 
American distraction elsewhere and its inability to place Karachi into any of its 
identity narratives. However, as the anti-communist identity intensified, as it did 
during 1950-1954, Pakistan was attached meaning as a supporter of America’s anti­
communist narrative and therefore was engaged as an ally, located in the communist- 
vulnerable Middle East. When American anti-communism eased and Pakistan overtly 
abandoned its anti-communist guise, both of which occurred during 1957-1960, 
Pakistan lost meaning to America, which led to American attempts to disengage 
Pakistan. Interestingly, neither of America’s two policies, being the engagement and 
disengagement of Pakistan, was especially dependent on calculations of Pakistan’s 
military or economic contribution to the Cold War. In contrast, policy to India 
reflected the dialectic deployment of anti-communist and missionary narratives for 
Washington re-located the continuation of its missionary identity narrative through 
India after China’s sudden rejection of its aged role within that narrative.
PREFACE
One underlying personal trait that has perhaps been reflected in this thesis is that there 
is probably no human consensus that has universally and historically stood its ground 
without fundamental change or rejection. This belief has manifested itself in two 
strands during the subsequent analysis of US foreign policy to Pakistan prior to the 
Kennedy administration. First, there is the rejection of the dominant Realist approach 
to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis -  a rejection incidentally 
which dates back to the 1980s at least. That the methodological, epistemological and 
ontological assumptions of the power politics framework oft associated with Hobbes, 
Machiavelli and in modem times, Morgenthau, were dismembered several years 
before I started my thesis means that I therefore add little value to this debate.
The second manifestation of my anti-consensus bias forms the crux of this thesis, 
being the constmction of a way, alternative to Realism, of analysing American policy 
to Pakistan. Few ‘facts’ of political life are as embedded in the fabric of Muslim 
reality as is the notion of a Western conspiracy premised on hard Realist assumptions 
either against Islam or the Muslim ‘Ummah’. The pervasion of this consensus is a 
global Muslim phenomenon, which is harnessed by the savvy urban Western 
metropolitan Muslim as much as the illiterate villager in the deep outback. In fact, the 
Rushdie case and the Gulf War, prime evidences in the conspiracy argument, 
triggered my own ruminations in this direction and eventually drew me into the 
subject matter of International Relations proper. I have however demonstrated in this 
thesis that not only is the power politics prism for US policy to Pakistan severely 
lacking during the selected period in which archival material is plentiful and 
available, but that an alternative understanding outside of the positivist-empiricist 
bankruptcy can yield a more effective insight into Washington’s policy -  one which 
clearly avoids the entire conspiracy debate. Why for instance, I ask my Realist 
colleagues, did Washington ally itself from 1950 to 1954 with a Pakistan that was 
militarily, politically and economically weak and in the process incurred the wrath of 
the more powerful India?
That Pakistan represents the object state of US policy in this thesis is not surprising 
given that aside from its large Muslim population, not only did my own parents 
emigrate from there, but also my frequent interaction with its society and culture. 
There is much good in the people of Pakistan but whether I should be expectant of 
Pakistan’s upper societal or foreign policy strata to assess or engage anything of what 
I have written is however a different case, since Pakistan’s ‘educated’ classes, both 
indigenous and expatriate, have tended to exemplify neatly Einstein’s concerns about 
capitalism’s corruption of education,
“The crippling of individuals I consider the worst evil of capitalism. Our 
whole educational system suffers from this evil. An exaggerated 
competitive attitude is inculcated into the student, who is trained to 
worship acquisitive success (and the glorification of power) as a 
prerequisite for a future career.”^
A Einstein, “Why Socialism” Monthly Review, Volume 1
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE SUBJECTIVITY OF OBJECTIVITY: OPENING SPACE
International Relations academia (‘IR’) has been dominated by a single 
methodological and epistemological commitment, giving rise to a particular 
understanding of political reality. None of the subject’s great debates, being those 
amongst Idealism, Realism and Bebaviouralism ever involved detailed discussions of 
epistemology.^ Underlying these theories is a nexus of Empiricist epistemology and 
Positivist methodology, a hugely unreflective and insolvent commitment, which 
suffocates traditional IR. Thus, this chapter’s early part -  to critique the nexus and 
open space for alternative analysis of international relations. From this, follows the 
chapter’s mainstay, which is to provide an alternative construct to understand 
international relations and to deploy in the understanding of US policy to Pakistan 
between 1947 and 1960. This approach, it is intended, will provide explanatory 
insight beyond the traditional nexus by integrating into policy engagement the 
subject’s role in constructing its object reality. The hub of this framework, as is later 
demonstrated, is identity and identity narratives, and specifically the stories we tell 
both others and ourselves to create and protect the self.
Before continuing, one issue confronting the current critical theories is the absence of 
stable terms. The flexible use of terms is confusing and thus needs immediate 
clarification.’ Positivism is a methodology to understanding knowledge, and combines 
Objectivism and Naturalism. The latter is the commitment to understanding scientific 
and social reality through identical methods and assumes the existence of regularities
' For instance, Positivism is used in three ways in IR -  as Empiricism, as a methodology and finally as 
Behaviouralism.
in both worlds. Objectivism claims that objective knowledge of reality is humanly 
possible. The most influential variant of Positivism in the social sciences moved away 
from Logical Positivism’s insistence that all knowledge should be based on the 
principles of physics, and is based on four canons. First, that objective confirmation of 
scientific theory should conform to deductive logic. Second, that empirical 
verification is scientific. Third, that there is a distinction between fact and theory, with 
facts being theoretically neutral. Finally, the idea that establishing a causal 
relationship is a matter of discovering the invariant temporal relationship between 
observed events.
Positivism however must rely on a theory of how reality is known, an epistemology, 
and for this, it relies on Foundationalism’s dominant strand. Empiricism, which 
grounds knowledge of reality purely on experience." Foundationalism more broadly 
assumes the integrity and neutrality of the human senses, insisting in Man’s infallible 
knowledge of certain first principles, which can be used to build (secondary) 
knowledge. Epistemology should not be confused with ontology, being the study of 
the nature of reality and its principal categories even though the pair are closely linked 
-  the categories used to filter reality, being an ontological issue, inevitably reflect and 
impact epistemology.
The Foundationalist will to knowledge, developed within modernity, reinforced an 
ancient Greece embryo into collective wisdom -  the subject’s independence from the
“ The second but unfashionable Foundationalist epistemology is Rationalism. Originating largely with 
Descartes and Leibniz, it insists that the senses cannot conçrehend the mechanisms behind the 
observables. Rationalists thus use reason to link observations with laws. Aside from the difficulties of 
subject stability, which is later addressed, there is also the problematic notion o f reason within analysis 
given that it is itself constitutive of and by the reality that it is trying to comprehend. There is thus more 
than a single ‘reason’, a highly intuitive concept, behind everything.
object/ During the Enlightenment, especially given science’s development within 
Foundationalism, political modernity distanced subject from object. Acutely aware of 
its historical moment, the Enlightenment renewed confidence in mankind’s ability to 
know the world, a transition from medievalism and into reason, a project which Kant 
described as mankind’s ‘dare to know’. Henceforth, the sciences and social sciences 
assumed that the rational and autonomous subject could objectively understand the 
knowledge of reality, being independent and stable. Thus at modernism’s core was the 
distinction between fact and theory. The ontological and arbitrarily selected dualities 
within which reality developed, such as individual/society, capitalism/socialism, 
negative/positive, rational/irrational, mind/body, dominated the knowledge arena so 
extensively that deliberation beyond was stifled and disintegrated.
Most epistemological discussion until the 1960s focused on how this autonomous and 
independent subject could rely on sense perception to know reality. Thus, the focus 
was on the integrity, not the neutrality, of the human senses. Within this framework, 
the standard definition of knowledge became ‘justified true belief, often called the 
tripartite account. Even Gettier’s counter-example to this definition, and Nozick’s 
Conditional Theory assumed a neutral subject, passively reacting to reality.^ 
Perceptual Realism, distinct from IR Realism, still persists in the belief that the 
objects that we perceive have at least some basic natural qualities to them, that at least 
part of their nature is independent of the perceiver.
Criticisms of modernism, and Foundationalism in particular, stem ultimately from 
Nietzsche, and can be presented in two related themes."  ^Firstly, an attack on 
modernity’s universalism. Modernism defines itself as an era of rational and objective
thought despite its epistemological stagnation and resemblance, in Foundationalism, 
to pre-modemity. Yet Adorno and Horkeimer argued that far from reason and science 
promoting liberty, they actually encourage false absolutisms between truths and 
falsehoods, influencing popular perceptions of the socially abnormal and justifying 
cruelties to misfits such as the old or sick who are desegregated into institutions/
The second and more germane theme is the attack on the concept of the independent 
and neutral subject. In this regard, two epistemic tensions remained unresolved until 
Nietzsche, being faith in reason as an instrument to discover reality and the existence 
of a foundation of knowledge, a starting premise to build knowledge from. The 
Positivist-Empiricist nexus closed thinking space and suffocated alternative analysis, 
by making objective claims about reality, when in fact objectivity is impossible.^ 
Reality lacks self-evident qualities that enable it to define or identify itself,
“An enquiry into a series of facts to discover the relations between them 
presupposes a ‘concept’ that permits one to distinguish that series from 
other possible series of facts. How can there take place a choice of facts to 
be adduced as proof of the truth of one’s own assumption if one does not 
have a pre-existing criterion of choice? But what is this criterion of choice 
to be, if not something superior to each single fact under enquiry?”^
Einstein, Heisenberg and later Kuhn undermined Empiricism and Foundationalism 
from within science.^ Each cast doubt on the notion of an objective factual world as 
the foundation of knowledge or as the basis of scientific inquiry. Heisenberg 
explained.
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“In atomic physics, observations can no longer be objectified in such a 
simple manner; that is they cannot be referred to something that takes 
place objectively or in a describable manner in space and time (thus) the 
science of nature does not deal with nature itself but in fact with the 
science o f nature as man thinks and describes if" (emphasis added).^
This critique was further explored in Willard Quine’s essay Two Dogmas of 
Experience’, which summarised two fundamental objections to the Empiricist view. 
First, that there was little to differentiate analytical and subjective statements since 
even basic analytical statements were not immune to revision by experience. Second, 
Empiricism’s claim to rest on pure observation was simply chimerical. Even basic 
observations require a web of belief that is more complex than the simple act of 
observation. There are no pure truths, no facts without interpretation, which in turn 
always and implicitly invoke a theory. Wittgenstein also touched exactly this issue 
through Foundationalism’s ‘Regress Problem’, by noting that, “at the foundation of 
well-founded beliefs lies belief that is unfounded”.
Put simply, irrespective of the selection of epistemology and methodology, there can 
neither be objective observation nor raw experience. Conceptual commitments, 
ontological categories, and sub-theoretical fi*ameworks always affect observation and 
experience. There is no continuous stmcture of truth since knowledge has a historical 
dimension, which has no grounded principles. Reality as understood is a discursive 
reality, the construction of which reflects a subtle, functional and diffuse power form, 
stemming^ow and within all human relationships; analysis outside of this discourse
risks being marginalised.^^ Thus, the commanding relationship between power and 
production in which knowledge is not power, but a function of power. Truth is not 
reality, but o f  subject and reality, and reflective of particular discourses. The subject is 
implicated in the same power relationships, which allow the theoretical analysis to 
function, tightening the self further into the network of knowledge and power. Adorno 
noted science’s terrorisation from this platform of philosophy, as also of religious 
thought. Scientific truth is not philosophical or religious truth, nor is there a hierarchy 
of truth amongst the three. Subjecting philosophy or religion to scientific 
investigation or criteria is analogous to analysing cricket with golfing laws and 
practice."’
There is neither a quick fix solution, nor a dais from which to redeem the truth -  for 
none exists. Those who suggest that objective and pure analysis is possible, who insist 
on an Archimedean privileged point, cannot however provide it. At best, the subject 
can be aware of its limitations and seek to develop more sophisticated approaches, 
which in themselves while making ontological and epistemological assumptions, can 
be distinguished only in their pluralism, heterogeneity and self-consciousness, not 
their certainty. This thesis does not dispute reality’s existence, but the assumption by 
 ^ most scientists and social analysts of the existence of an independent, stable and 
objective reality. If in reading this, one can within a specific framework 
simultaneously hold a collection of atoms, a thin object, a fuel and a weapon, a 
smooth object and even a rough object, the plethora of further ‘objective’ 
observations is immense, a point well articulated in a lesson given by George Lucas’s
Those for instance who seek to demonstrate scientific proofs for their religion or philosophy do their 
cause no favour, for science’s own methodological, epistemological and ontological commitments 
render its search for the truth as meaningless.
venerable Jedi Master, Qui-Gon Jinn to the young Anakin Skywalker, “Your focus 
determines your reality”.M in e r ’s account further illustrates the point,
“The daily body ritual performed by everyone includes a mouth-rite.
Despite the fact that these people are so punctilious about care of the 
mouth, this rite involves a practice which strikes the uninitiated stranger 
as revolting. It was reported to me that the ritual consists of inserting a 
small bundle of hog hairs into the mouth, along with certain magical 
powders, and them moving the bundle in a highly formalized series of 
gestures.”
That Miner chose to describe the common modem Western routine of teeth bmshing 
is not instantly obvious. Yet his particular categorising and attaching of meaning to 
the everyday process changes not reality itself but having altered the subject’s 
dominant discourse framework, reveals an analysis that bears no resemblance to how 
teeth bmshing is commonly understood as.
This broad critique has significant implications for the humanities. For instance, the 
project of Mohammed Iqbal, the Indian poet-philosopher, shatters in its search alone 
for seeking, “nothing less than a direct vision of Reality”. In assuming the modernist 
neutrality of the subject who accesses from the fountain of knowledge, a pure insight 
of God, Iqbal’s project, like those of almost every modernist philosopher, is stillborn. 
His insistence that thought is, “incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned” 
and is therefore able to understand the infinite, ignores the subject’s categorising and 
attaching meaning to reality, or put differently, reality’s partial creation by the
8subject. There is in Iqbal, as in nearly every modernist thinker, scant if any notion of 
the subject in creating the reality that it engages. It is all too evident that Iqbal is 
caught in his own goldfish bowl.
The Empiricist-Positivist nexus’s closing of space is not mere coffee table chat.’'" 
Realism’s dominance, which relies on this nexus, has encouraged theory into practice. 
Practitioners have predominantly employed Realist notions of the international order 
as justification for war, genocide and to reinforce a variety of human silences. 
Realism’s reality, obsessed with power, anarchy and the privileging of the state as the 
primary agency in human relations is based on Positivism’s distinction between facts 
on one side and theories and values on another, which has also helped practitioners 
accept search engines with Realist assumptions for Realist policies.
Not only does the subject craft the object, but clearly the object places limitations on 
the definition and meaning imparted by its subject. That the subject’s epistemic and 
ontological frameworks mediate reality does not mean that reality consists exclusively 
of the subjects’ understanding of reality. The mere physical characteristics of an 
object create an outer perimeter, however vague, within which the subject enjoys 
immense cognitive scope. Consequently, all analysis reflects an interdependence of 
subject and object. Yet none of the Foundationalist epistemologies, nor Positivism, 
accept the active role of the subject in categorising and attaching meaning to object 
reality. The rejection of the stability of the subject-object nexus initiated the
''' One further consequence is the irreconcilable nature of the inter-paradigm debates. Realists and 
Pluralists see different realities and test their theories against different sources and meanings. Each 
theory filters political reality into different concepts and categories, preventing a genuine dialogue. 
Using Kuhn’s paradigms, each paradigm constructs its own basic units of reference and tensions, with 
its own language and criteria for judgement. The theories to talk at, and not with, each other.
deconstruction of the subject, which Genette, Foucault and Barthes described as the 
‘death’ of the author, or the shattering of the unity of the subject. From this, space is 
opened in IR for re-assessing political reality.
Re-Constructing Realities
Given the interdependence of subject and object, analysis, including of foreign policy, 
must recognise the subject’s role in seeing and giving meaning to its reality, before 
engaging it. Hence, the rejection of the final stages of the Foucaultian project, to 
reconstruct the subject by untying the, “knots that historians have patiently tied” to 
produce “pure description”.^  ^A conceptual problem with this project is that it ignores 
its own new subject-object interdependence problematic. The conversion of a subject 
located in its own dominant socio-intellectual epoch with its ontological framework 
into a new object, merely creates a new subject -  object relationship in which the 
‘Foucaultian’ analyst assumes the role of subject. As post-positivist approaches insist, 
there is no Archimedean point to redeem analysis from since analysis is inherently 
trapped in particular regimes and can only operate from within specific terrains. The 
first person perspective, fundamental to objectivity since Augustine’s inwardness of 
identity in search of God, is no more truthful than the second person perspective. 
Despite the wave of quasi-religious Foucaultism which has swept parts of the 
humanities, it is therefore impossible to develop a pure description of events by 
reconstructing the ordering of knowledge in a given epoch to understand the 
possibility for the emergence of any particular statement.
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Foucault’s ambition to pure objectivity also confronts a less conceptual obstacle, one 
that parallels Popperian concerns about totalitarian oppression and is succinctly 
described by Bloom:
“The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was mad in 
the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, 
persecutions, slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism. The point is 
not to correct the mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you 
are right at all.”^^
The twentieth century is abound with examples of extensions of the Enlightenment 
project’s knowing of and will towards romanticised exemplars, individual, societal 
and otherwise. The transition from believing in such ideals, then desiring them and 
finally obliging them on non-consenting others has a lengthy and painful subscription. 
Hitler’s extermination of Slavs, Jews, homosexuals and gypsies is perhaps the premier 
twentieth century example of this aspect of the Enlightenment’s logical conclusion. 
Yet notwithstanding its unusual crudity and scale, it is not isolated. Nehru’s 
imposition of an artificially constructed India on dissenting minorities, Israel’s 
expelling of Palestinians from Biblical Judea and West Pakistan’s massacre of East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 were or are each premised on the imposition of 
romanticised ideals upon those unable to effectively resist.
Despite the impossibility of overcoming the subject-object interdependence, by 
refocusing analysis towards a subject that is responsible for seeing and attaching 
meaning to a reality, analytical tools enable a more refined insight. This, to
11
emphasise, does not mean that objective analyses is attainable; the subjective nature 
of objectivity is inherently a dissent for pluralism. To reposition is not to substitute,
“it is rather to enrich one form of analysis with the insights of another”.^ ® The 
destruction of a neutral analytical position leaves IR with bracing challenges because 
if analysis depends on a subject first categorising, then give meaning to and finally 
engaging a reality, foreign policy analysis can be re-analysed as the actors’ 
constructions of their reality, followed by reality engagement -  the more conventional 
landscape of foreign policy analysis. To incorporate the subject-object 
interdependence, foreign policy academia must explore the first two stages of this 
problematic, the categorising (or seeing) and the attaching of meaning to political 
realities, critical stages that have hitherto attracted sub-skeletal study. That this is so, 
is paradoxical, since it is within the two earlier stages that realities are created and 
policy motives crystallised, which any subsequent ‘strategic’ engagement 
(conventional foreign policy) is hostage to. The cognitive construction of reality, not 
its engagement, is the primary policy consideration.^*
Precisely how subjects construct realities is an intellectual black hole, which deserves 
exploration beyond this thesis’s remit. There is no all-encompassing explanation of 
how mankind sees or attaches meaning to reality as it does. Nor can there be, since the 
subject-object interdependence problematic would intrude even here. No single 
discipline can provide the solution, not least since these disciplines have themselves 
been categorised and developed within evolutions of and within particular subject- 
object terrains (often Western European culture and academia). The prisms of, for 
instance, physics as Kuhn has demonstrated, are contingent upon ‘paradigms’, which 
are akin to whole fi*ameworks of subject-object interdependencies.^^ Given these
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insurmountable tensions, and the distraction from the thesis’s focus, the alternative 
proposed is the construction of a coherent mechanism that furthers insight into how 
subjects categorise, give meaning to and finally engage reality.
Conventional foreign policy analysis skirts the problem of constructing reality. 
McMahon, as a typical example, concludes that Washington’s Cold War policy was 
driven not by, “material gain or geopolitical advantage”, but by,
“amorphous - and largely illusory - military, strategic, and psychological 
fears.. .the threats to American interests by Moscow and Beijing were 
greatly exaggerated seems, in retrospect, blindingly obvious.”^^
Kovel takes further this explanation of America’s policy through the creation and use 
of a shapeless, unexplored yet highly convenient “overriding black hole”.^ "^  
Subjectivists offer a different gloss by coating the black box with a misperception- 
truth dialectic, thereby insisting that the Cold War was a function of mutual 
misreadings of various truths but stops short by failing to explore the ontology and 
discourse of the misreading in any significant detail.^  ^These, as are most foreign 
policy analyses of America’s Cold War policy, are spurious explanations for a US$8 
trillion military investment over forty years and eight presidents.^^ Yet it is precisely 
this convenient box of illusions that also holds the genesis of an alternative analysis -  
one that emphasises the subject, with closer analysis thereof, at the object’s expense. 
Central to this framework is identity.
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Identity
Despite identity’s widespread discussion in psychology, and in the works of three of 
the most prominent social theorists of the last half-century in Habermas, Giddens and 
Parsons, identity as either a cognitive filter or behavioural imperative is rarely used in 
IR, being largely confined to discussions of ethnicity or nationalism and removed 
from explanations of the seeing of reality and the attaching of meaning. Yet identity 
provides considerable explanatory insight into international relations within the 
challenges of the subject-object interdependence.
Psychology has four major uses of identity. Experimental social psychology assumes 
the self can recognise itself as a unique processor of information, an awareness that 
emerges after about the age of two.^  ^Within this approach, self-perception, and not 
introspection, is used to achieve self-knowledge. However, experimental social 
psychology, popular in North America, is premised on Watson’s behaviouristic 
paradigm, with its curious obsession with hard ‘scientific’ facts and theories. Watson 
insisted that psychology could only study aspects of human behaviour that could be 
both measured and observed by more than one person -  that is, psychologists should 
confine themselves to behaviour and ignore private mental processes.^* Even in its 
most qualitative format, being Smith’s Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(‘IPA’), which focuses on how people feel, the commitment to an (externally) 
knowable domain of facts about human experience persists.^^ The behaviourist basis 
of this approach leads Freeman to paradoxically describe it as the lifeless study of 
lifeless human beings.^®
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Humanistic psychology, represented in the works of Abraham Marlow, Carl Rogers 
and George Kelly, has a greater focus on individual psycho-dynamics, and especially 
the uniqueness of meanings and perceptions within human experience.^^ This branch 
of psychology seeks to capture the individual’s subjective and perceptive 
understanding of self and environment. Using more qualitative approaches than 
experimental social psychology, such as auto/biographical and individual case-study 
methods, humanistic psychology places a strong emphasis on the individual.
However, in doing so, it also over-emphasises human agency in the self’s conception 
since implicit in humanistic psychology is that a true, stable and real self exists 
within.
Third, psychoanalytic or psychodynamic psychology makes extensive use of identity 
with its two base identification paradigms based on Freud’s work.^^ The first, in 
which identity is used as survival, notes that parents are a vulnerable infant’s only 
means of survival. When a parent threatens the infant by not satisfying a need or 
important want, the infant’s ultimate fear is of death. The infant mitigates this fear by 
defensively internalising the parental ideal as a source of survival. Freud’s second 
paradigm was more sociological. The ‘super-ego’, though unique to each individual, 
identified with the super-ego of other individuals. Individuals thus shared common 
identities and inner censors of behaviour and consequently developed group identity 
and loyalty. Psychoanalysis nonetheless also has its own limitation, especially, “its 
implicit alliance with a juridical model of knowledge, which allows it to function in 
the schema of avowal, confession and interiorization.”^^
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The final approach, social constructivist theories led by Potter and Wetherall, extend 
into social theory, with ontological and epistemological implications beyond the 
traditional realms of psychology.Developed over the last decade, this approach 
critiques the three older psychological approaches which each assume the existence of 
a stable self that awaits ‘discovery’ or realisation and can be described like an object 
in the natural or physical world. In contrast, social constructivist approaches 
emphasise linguistic practices that,
“displace attention from the self-as-entity and focus it on the methods of 
constructing the self. That is, the question becomes not what is the true 
nature of the self, but how is the self talked about, how is it theorised in 
discourse?”^^
Furthermore, narrative psychology places an emphasis on human experience, self­
reflection and especially meaning systems and structures of meaning that produce 
both the self and reality. The extreme focus on attaching meaning, with its qualitative 
nuances and interpretation, replaces quantitative ‘scientific’ methods for the study of 
self and identity.^^ It is this broader and richer approach in psychology that relates to 
the use of identity in this thesis.
Bertrand Russell’s interpretation of Aristotle’s logic of identity, specifically its third 
law of ‘excluded middle’, which insists that everything must either be or not be, 
presupposes the existence of essential identities.Such do not exist. Race, gender, 
citizenship and religion, some of the seemingly unmistakable categories through 
which people self-categorise, are neither universal nor ahistoric.^^ The responsibility
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for identity’s construction lies within the individual, in society and the spaces in 
between, “We are, not what we are, but what we make of ourselves.”^^  And what we 
make of ourselves is not a universal process. David Novitz hence rightly compares the 
production of the self with that of a work of art."^ ® Identities and the meanings attached 
are fluid, reactionary and to use Giddens’ phrase, “reflexive”."^  ^They are also not 
exclusive, as demonstrated by Virginia Woolfs fictional “Mrs Dalloway” a character 
through which Woolf perspicaciously conveys a profound depth and range of 
identities at varying moments.'*  ^That this is so is hardly surprising given that the 
human personality is neither stable nor consistent. Identity’s evolving configuration is 
neither achieved through a founding act nor is it merely given. Identity requires 
creation and sustenance through continual interaction within the feedback and 
evaluations of others.'^  ^Giddens suggestion that, “Self identity is the self as 
refiexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” is thus 
limited.' '^  ^Identity is not only an ongoing and adaptive process functioned by an 
interaction within the perceived self, but is simultaneously a process between that 
interaction with that of a constructed and fluid reality. There is for instance the 
tendency of tourists to associate themselves more strongly with their originating state 
when on foreign travels.
Within this construction, identity need neither be ‘individual’ nor ‘group’ as Western 
ontology fences. Indeed, no categories of identity have remained historically and 
universally at the forefront of human consciousness."^  ^It may seem that few people are 
sufficiently self-absorbed to create their identity, but in a less strenuous form than 
envisaged by Nietzsche, “self-creation is almost universal”."^  ^Baumeister’s research 
suggests that even the category of ‘individual’ did not exist in the pre-modem era, and
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demonstrates that the writing of (individual) autobiographies corresponds with the 
march of Enlightenment’s individuality, being a recent historical and modem 
European event/^ Likewise, Foucault traced the transformation of homosexuality 
from a crime in as recently as the nineteenth century to an identity in the late 
twentieth century/^ Even gender is protean, corresponding to different peoples. Many 
feminists, whether cultural, radical, liberal or post-structuralist, agree that women are 
constructed and not bom, that gender (unlike sex) is manufactured."^  ^Gender, as other 
identities, has no ontological status other than various acts that constitute its reality.
To attribute female essences, as essentialists do, is misleading since essentialism is 
merely a constmcted re-vision of an initially constmcted identity - hence the rejection 
of essentialist identity by post-stmcturalists and discourse theorists.^° The 
implications of this for understanding and analysing the self are vividly articulated by 
Foucault’s, “how is the I that I experience myself as constituted or fabricated?”^^
Self-identity consequently depends either on complicity with or reaction to a pre­
existing treasured stock of imperial identities. Against this background, Plato’s 
mastery of unified self through reason transforms to Nietzsche’s enslavement, a point 
which Iqbal’s chilling forecast of post-colonial South Asia precisely touched upon.
Your light is only Europe’s light reflected:
You are four walls her architects have built,
A shell of dry mud with no tenant soul 
An empty scabbard chased with flowery guilt.^^
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Even though privileging a victim merely perpetuates the hegemon’s identity 
framework, in which the victim remains both encapsulated and an unaware yet willing 
contributor to, grounding an identity in nature can nonetheless be an effective strategy 
to insulate it from political interference/^ Speaking as an individual, homosexual or 
as a woman, while in themselves ontologically hollow, are important positions of 
varying political mobilisation and carry with them emotional meaning - 
notwithstanding the distance created from speaking for oneself/"^ Such identities and 
their meanings consequently cannot be ignored,
“we can conceive of the subject as yet nonessentialized and emergent 
from a historical experience and yet retain our political ability to take 
gender as an important point of departure. Thus we can say that at one and 
the same time that gender is not natural, biological, universal, ahistorical, 
or essential and yet still claim that gender is relevant because we are 
taking gender as a position from which to act politically.”^^
Identity Narratives
Having demonstrated that identities are constructed, the importance of creating and 
maintaining identity needs exploration.^ Erikson, who first made explicit the 
relationship between contentment and a secure sense of identity, argued, “man’s need 
for a psychosocial identity is anchored in nothing less than his sociogenetic 
evolution”.^  ^Erikson insisted that identity’s “basic trust”, the linking of self with
'' Despite these convincing and wide-ranging explanations for the construction and maintenance of 
identity, a caveat should be issued. It is difficult to prove that identity creation and maintenance is an 
inherent human need. Aside from Karl Popper’s proof problematic, Dennis Sandole has stressed the 
ambiguous nature of human needs, against the resurgent interest in human needs theory.
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object world and the original nexus of orientation, was formed through identity. 
Without trusting self-identity, no differentiation or relationship with the external 
world could be relied upon.^  ^Similarly, Giddens’s “ontological security” is anchored 
in a framework of reality, which identity sustains. In order to engage our hves, 
existential issues such as time, space and identity are taken for granted -  issues which 
conventional psychology and quantitative approaches neglect. Ontological security 
proceeds conscious and unconscious answers to fundamental existential questions, of 
which the prime question in early childhood is not time nor space but self-existence, 
against Kierkegaard’s, “struggle of being against non-being”.^ * Giddens drew on 
Garfinkel’s experiments to demonstrate the chaotic disorganisation emotionally and 
cognitively in the absence of such existential stability.^^ The chaos becomes 
Kierkegaard’s ‘dread’, an overwhelming anxiety that questions even self-existence, 
which Kristeva in turn relates to social breakdown.^®
Habermas and Sullivan elucidate two separate treatments of identity that can also be 
drawn upon. Habermas derived his epistemology for identity from philosophy. 
Complemented by anthropological and ethnomethodological observations of man’s 
need to make meaningful sense of his environment, Habermas replaced Erikson’s 
‘ideology’ with an ‘identity-securing interpretative system’ and placed identity as 
philosophy’s pivotal concern, and the central impetus of Hegelian philosophy, as 
individuals and groups seek to locate themselves and find their true selves. In parallel, 
Sullivan used a Freudian framework to explain why the need for identity security is, 
“much more important in the human being than the impulses resulting from a feeling 
of hunger”. Sullivan suggested that anxiety stemmed from parental disapproval, 
which in turn led to a sense of helplessness.^^
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The cultural technology of identity, specifically for its maintenance and creation, is 
the identity narrative. Narratives, derived from the Indo-European root ‘gna’, which 
means ‘to telT, have parallels with conventional storytelling.^^ Disassociated with 
concepts of truth, they are often described as paradigms, capsule views of reality, 
interpretative devices and even worldviews.^^ They enable communication about 
complex events and explain sequences in simple and effective form. Indeed, the un­
narrated action is impossible.^"  ^Narrative construction is not simple -  there may be 
contradictions, time gaps and inconsistencies -  thereby allowing for contingencies.^^ 
Ricoeur even suggests, “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated 
through a narrative mode.”^^  This explains the existence of different concepts of time 
across different peoples.
Narratives as search frameworks, not only define the cognitive search and selection 
but also link the selected facts and are thus used not only in the humanities, but also in 
science. For instance, Nye illustrates the use of narrative to help make sense of 
technologies such as the nineteenth century railroad or the telephone.^^ Likewise, 
Kuhn demonstrates the extensive use of narrative-like paradigms within which all 
scientific work is undertaken, to select and bring together scientific facts. Also in this 
vein, Landau reveals the use of narrative in biology and geology, which both display a 
temporal and sequential structure analogous to conventional history.^^ Narrative 
theorists, as demonstrated by Kuhn, “use ‘storytelling’ to shift knowledge from a 
centre that purports to be impartial.. .to a margin that acknowledges the heterogeneity 
and inevitability of any standpoint.”^^
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The narrative of identity, a particular narrative type, plays a critical role for identity - 
giving an importance to human experience in contrast to both post-modern and 
scientific approaches. Carr classifies identity narratives between first-order narratives, 
being about the self and therefore important, in contrast to second-order narratives in 
which the subject is more detached from events such as in a scientific study or 
economic analysis.^® Incidentally, Crites also distinguishes the two narrative classes, 
although he terms them as ‘sacred’ and ‘mundane’.T h e s e  first-order or sacred 
narratives, of which many cohabit within in an individual or community at any 
moment, often contradict each other, hence precipitating an inherently schizophrenic 
human existence. Further, they can be highly dynamic. Bruner’s study reveals that the 
Amerindian narrative of the 1950s was one of cultural decline and assimilation, which 
compared to their narrative of the 1990s of resistance and renewal.^^
The relationship between identity narratives and reality is noteworthy. Narratives are 
not “historical half-truths”, complete truths in any case being an epistemologically 
bankrupt concept.^^ Nor are they chronologies or annals, both of which fail to 
explain. "^  ^Susan Stephenson’s analysis of Graham Swift’s, ‘Waterland’ gives some 
insight into the relationship between narrative and reality, “Historical data, common 
knowledge and myth become difficult to separate”.^  ^Likewise, identity narratives, as 
Giddens explains, cannot be totally removed from the prevailing discourse-produced 
knowledge for they, “must continually integrate events which occur in the external 
world, and sort them into the ongoing ‘story’ about the self.”^^  Recent and classical 
literature highlights the tendency to interpret reality to sustain prevailing identity 
narratives, hence assuming Bachelard’s work of imagination.^^ Given that identity 
narratives are engineered, reality is often imaginatively reconstructed and
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reinterpreted for narrative continuity and existential ease. Rigid traditionalists who 
avoid readapting identity narratives, thus filter reality through unyielding narrative 
accounts. Another type, which Erich Fromm calls the “authoritarian conformist”, 
evaporates into what, “all others are and as they expect him to be”.^  ^Neither extreme 
offers sustainable ontological security.
Narratives perform two functions for identity. First, they create identity, “the self is 
not a thing in the metaphysical sense of being a substance, residing beneath 
experience.”^^  Identity narratives are an account of how the self came to be what it is, 
and where it is going, and to establish what that self is, “Stories are the womb of 
personhood.” ®^ They are therefore constitutive of identity’s space and the technique 
fi*om which the self is rendered and which is why constructed history plays a central 
role in conceptions of national identity. Self-identity cannot rely on generalities such 
as being friendly or wise; the imprecision neither defines nor consequently identifies. 
Mere description is insufficient. Instead, identity is demonstrated through narrative,
“A self without a story contracts into the thinness of its personal pronoun.” *^ Knowing 
someone means to know where they came from, where they stand and where they are 
going. James Adams’s description of ‘The Epic of America’, dedicated 371 pages on 
the (constructed narrative) history of Americans and only in a fourteen page Epilogue, 
did he introduce, even if most unconvincingly, the characteristics of Americans, “He 
loves humour and a good joke.. .He likes a good time and to be a good fellow and to 
have all around him enjoy themselves.”^^  Identity’s unity is in its narrative not its 
actuality, stemming from narrative’s ability to re-contextualise fragments. Frank’s 
“narrative wreckage” occurs when a narrative cannot contain the significant 
fragments.^^
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As well as creating the self, narrative is also identity’s cocoon and prevents questions 
about self-existence, Erikson’s trust or Giddens’s ontological security. Narratives 
assume the role of Goffinan’s ‘Umwelt’, a core of normalcy that we surround 
ourselves that orders environments and with which we move forward. Identity 
narratives thus cocoon the self from existential instability. To readapt Giddens’s 
acquired routines and lifestyles, narrative protects the existence of one’s emotional 
acceptance of the external world to ground oneself in.^ "^  Ethnomethodologists have 
demonstrated that when people’s worlds are breached, they become angry and 
defensive. Similarly, psychologists suggest that babies of about six months suffer 
from stranger anxiety as an ontogenetic phenomenon, which indicates the baby’s 
insecurity of anything unfamiliar. In both cases, both environment and self- 
understandings are challenged and meaning systems can no longer by relied upon, 
leading to anxiety, a personality breakdown and, in adults, even suicidal pressures. 
One such individual whose future narrative disintegrated after being diagnosed with 
HIV recalled, “Absolutely everything, everything that you have in life just breaks 
down, becomes dust, power, you know, and you become completely naked and utterly 
lost.”^^  Without narrative and its continuity, the ontological reference points required 
for life to go on, crumble, “If all my memories were obhterated, this would obviously 
have a disastrous effect on my sense of who I am.”*^
Identity Narratives: Categorising and Attaching Meaning
Reverting to the subject-object interdependence framework and specifically how 
actors categorise, attach meaning and engage reality, the use of identity narratives
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redresses the subject-object imbalance of the Positivist-Empiricist nexus since 
narratives reflect the structures and meaning systems that constitute cognition.
Though the separation of categorising or seeing and attaching meaning to, which 
parallels Clarke’s ‘art-culture’ system that, “classifies objects and assigns them 
relative value”, is awkward, identity narratives provide the basic analytical filters with 
which to compartmentalise reality.^^ The framework of auto-identification is 
necessarily that of allo-identification. Such ontological categories, those at the 
forefront of self-representation and consciousness though not necessarily biologically 
programmed, are also and simultaneously the filtering categories used to define 
others.
One example to illustrate the impact of this categorisation is found in classical Islamic 
theories of IR. The introduction nearly a century after the prophet Mohammed’s death 
of the Dar al Islam (abode of Islam) and Dar al Harb (abode of war) duality to filter 
the world fundamentally altered the cognitive outlook of the early Abbasid period.^^ 
Notwithstanding the further and later invention of a third category, in Dar Al Ahd 
(abode of pledge) especially by Shafi jurists, this conceptual prism governed the 
Islamic polity’s foreign policy in its various applications, transcending the traditional 
affiliation to tribe or sect, for more than a millennium.^® The internalisation of the 
Muslim identity served to, amongst other effects, more clearly define others into 
various categories of non-Muslim.
Beyond categorising reality into manageable blocks, identity narratives also attach 
meaning to reality and as such are forms of discourse. Though Bennett is over- 
optimistic in hoping to eventually identify all forms of discourse, he insists that
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identity narratives are amongst the most pervasive of discourse genre.Attaching 
meaning to the present can occur only against an analysis of the past and expectations 
of the future; the solitary note is meaningless without the melodious sequence. 
According to Husserl, even the most passive of meaning experience is charged with 
the significance from narrative’s constructed past and future expectations.^^ Using 
Sarbin’s ‘narratory principal’, identity narrative frameworks enable human beings to 
think and make choices, and in doing so, attach meaning. In treating narrative as the 
“organising principal for human action”, meaning systems that reverberate across 
generations, Sarbin gives identity narratives an advantage in explaining persistent 
meanings or continuities of belief across generations.^^
Narratives, particularly through storytelling and fables give counsel and create 
choices:
“It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, 
good but misguided kings, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but 
must make their own way in the world and eldest sons who waste their 
inheritance on riotous living and go into exile to live with the swine, that 
children learn, or misleam, both what a child and what a parent is, what 
the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been bom 
and what he ways of the world are. Deprive children of stories and you 
leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their action as in their words.
Hence, there is no way to give an understanding of any society, including 
our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial
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dramatic resources. Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of
things.” "^^
By becoming a grid of intelligibility, identity narratives and particularly the analysis 
that they yield, reflect more the subject than the object of inquiry. The grid after all is 
not a product of the object. Anthropological research by James Boon concludes that 
knowledge of other cultures and eras, “depends on the cultures and eras doing the 
knowing” and that cultures meet, “according to conventional expectations of the 
cultures themselves.”^^  In E M Forster’s ‘A Passage to India’, jfrom the moment they 
set foot in India, Mrs Moore and Miss Quested search for the ‘real’ India, the India 
beyond the colourful aspects that charm superficial tourists. Miss Quested’s quest 
takes her beyond what her colonial fiancé can offer her and what her Indian host. Dr 
Aziz, feels would cater to her English exoticism, and to the Marabar caves. There, she 
only finds an echo -  for her object India only returns the sounds of the subjects who 
investigate it, evoking, in her case, a blind sexual anxiety.
Two techniques of identity narrative categorisation and discourse are especially 
prominent. The first is the subject’s categorising and attaching meaning to the object 
as conforming to or within the identity narrative. Given that the object does not 
therefore challenge the selfs production and cocoon, the object is imparted a more 
optimistic meaning, and engaged within the articles of the identity narrative. By being 
located into the subject’s cognitive narrative, the object, inadvertently reaffirms the 
subject’s self-identity and existential security. In achieving an understanding of the 
object, the subject can then proceed to engage the object within the specific narrative.
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A second technique is alterity, where the analysed object cannot be located within the 
subject’s identity narratives and is consequently feared because, if significant, and as 
an unknown, it threatens both the self and the cognitive grip on reality. The 
destabilising of narrative by non-locatable objects leads to anxiety though not 
necessarily fear. Anxiety is free floating, diffuse, and constitutes, “unconsciously 
formed emotive tensions that express ‘internal dangers’ rather than externalised 
tensions”.^  ^It therefore disregards the object. In contrast, fear involves an imparting 
of meaning to a specific and definite ‘external’ object. Freud suggested that 
individuals displaced their deepest anxieties from their private lives and into political 
Others. Objectification can thus become an attempt to convert an inner stimulus into 
an outer stimulus, an inner enemy into an outer enemy. Relating this insight into the 
narrative framework, the Other is not a description of reality, but the inversion or 
contradiction of a formulation and idealisation of particular and internalised 
constellation of identity narratives. It is thus that identity, and not the subject or self 
whole, enjoys alterity - itself often as a code to reinterpret and reinforce identity.^'
Europe’s interaction with non-Europeans from the fifteenth century provides a rich 
source to demonstrate the effects of both narrative categorisations and discourses. 
Given the cognitive dissonance caused by non-Europeans to European narratives, the 
former were initially categorised outside of the latter. Therefore as the earliest 
colonists set foot in foreign territories, European identity narratives enabled 
categorising of natives, through alterity, with hostile and fantastic terms of reference. 
Marco Polo described Javans with, “heads like dogs, and teeth and eyes like dogs; for 
I assure you that the whole aspect of their faces is that of a big mastiffs”.^  ^ The
Eugene Hartley demonstrated in 1946, that Americans who held prejudices against Hispanics, Afro-
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fourteenth century English Sinologist, Sir John Mandeville, wrote of his visit to Java 
where he found people with lips,
“so big that when they sleep in the sun they cover all their faces with it. In 
another there are people of small stature, like dwarfs, a little bigger than 
pygmies. They have no mouth, but instead a little hole, and so, when they 
must eat they suck their food through a reed or pipe.. .In another isle there 
people who walk on their hands and their feet like four-footed 
beasts.. .There is another isle where the people live just on the smell of a 
kind of apple; and if they lost that smell, they would die forthwith.”^^
In the case of the earliest portrayals of Amerindians, the explorer, Walter Raleigh, in 
his, 'The Discoverv of the Large. Rich and Beautiful Empire of Guiana* in 1596, 
described, “a nation of people, whose heades appeare not aboue their shoulders...” 
with, “ eyes in their shoulders, and their mouths in the middle of their breasts”. 
Columbus’s letter to Giuhano Dati in 1493 reported that men were bearded, which 
while not according with ethnographic reality, did conform to the European alterity of 
the Wild Man. Similarly, Vespucci’s depictions in 1504 of Amerindian women as 
sexually lascivious cannibals stemmed exclusively from a variety of European 
alterities and only the widespread European belief in anthropophagy prepared the 
European imagination’s location of it in the New World.
Americans and Orientals held identical prejudices against Wallonians, Perineans and Danireans, none 
of which actually existed.
Shakespeare, who often rearranged words, placed ‘Caliban’ (for cannibal) in the New World of ‘The 
Tensest’
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The one identity that non-Europeans were most easily categorised with, albeit clearly 
outside of, was religious. Medieval Europeans strongly internalised Christianity 
identity, which offered a narrative cognition placing all non-Christians as either 
heathens or savages. This unambiguous categorisation became the, “central 
organising category governing much of Europe’s early relationship to the New 
World.” ®^^ From the outset, Amerindians were denied culture and history and were 
nearly always described as savages or wild men, for, “there was indeed little in 
European traditions to support any other kind of understanding of Amerindians”.^ ®^ A 
whole generation of explorers accordingly patronised Amerindians.*®  ^De Sepulveda’s 
1550-1551 ‘Démocrates Secundus’ described the Spanish as adults, gentle, 
reasonable, good and human in contrast to the Amerindians who were children, 
savage, unreasonable, bad and animal. Very few Spanish philosophers, such as Jose 
de Acosta, imparted rationality to Amerindians.*®  ^Puritans, whilst also believing that 
natives were culturally blank, were worse than the Spanish by attributing to the 
Amerindians a religion of evil.
In contrast to its inhabitants, the New World itself was categorised and given meaning 
from within European identity narratives. Though these narratives had no place for 
non-Europeans, with resultant anxieties often translated as fear, those same narratives 
nonetheless helped Europe categorise and understand the land of the American 
continent. Middle Ages Europe had long believed in the existence of a place, not a 
people, to the west of Europe, a place that lacked the corruption of the Old World, yet 
represented a continuation of its future.*®^  Todorov notes for instance that Columbus 
was more interested in the geography and places of North America, which he could 
cognate, than in the people, who resided outside the European story. *®^ While Thomas
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More invented Utopia in 1515-16 and located it in the Atlantic, utopian writers such 
as Jonathan Swift constructed from within Europe’s narrative past and representing its 
narrative future, their Atlantis, their City of the Sun/^^ By the mid-sixteenth century, 
America had acquired precisely this utopian flavour, becoming an arena for European 
narrative enactment. The Enlightenment originated in Europe, but progress had 
reached a zenith in America. Europeans exchanged their ideal world lost in time, for 
one remote only in space.
Identity Narratives: Engaging
An economy of the discourses of truth, of which narratives as elucidated above are an 
important feature, is a pre-condition for engagement. However, not only is the 
distinction between categorising and attaching meaning to reality deceptive, but that 
between these two categories on the one hand and engaging reality is equally murky. 
Such engaging within the identity narrative framework is deeply intertwined with 
narrative’s cognitive functions,
“It is not the case that we first live and act and then afterward, seated 
around the fire as it were, tell about what we have done.... The 
retrospective view of the narrator, with its capacity for seeing the whole in 
all its irony, is not an irreconcilable opposition to the agent’s view but is 
an extension and refinement of a viewpoint inherent in action itself... 
narration, intertwined as it is with action, (creates meaning) in the course 
of life itself, not merely after the fact, at the hands of authors, in the pages 
of books.”^^ ^
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While acknowledging this subtlety, identity narratives determine human engagement 
at two levels. First is the enactment of the identity narrative, as an impetus for 
motivating human behaviour. As Giddens notes, identity is not found in behaviour, or 
in others’ reactions, but in keeping a particular narrative going}^^ As such, identity is 
not a stagnant given but requires, as Stryker emphasised, continual interaction, 
validation and affirmation. For this identity draws upon its narrative, the enactment of 
which hence is identity’s living existence. As a behavioural imperative, identity 
narratives remind the self of its articles for repetition and pursuit, “The story of my 
past merges into the commentary I make on the present” and enables the self to 
colonise both the present and future.'Identity narratives, being partially scripted, are 
performed in accordance with the modes of thought that give unity to the self, 
“knowing who we are.. .is the ground for knowing what to do.”"^ Self-identify thus 
shapes and regulates human behaviour, so much so that Foote believed that all 
motivation was derived from identity as an expression of identity.""' It is thus that 
mankind, as Sartre noted seeks to live his life as though he were telling a s to r y .T h e  
popular lack of awareness of this motivation may be explained by Mead’s T -  Me’ 
dichotomy in which the less conscious T’ is not refiexively aware of the ‘me’, being 
the conscious self in the past, present and future, identity narratives assume the role of 
‘I’, leaving ‘me’ to engage dominant discourses."^
Narrative enactment is expressed and reinforced in even the most minor of everyday 
actions though the extent to which identity narratives affect behaviour is often 
underestimated despite the few attempts to relate performance and behaviour with 
identity."^ James Morris, a member of Edmund Hillary’s expedition that climbed
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Everest, underwent a sex-change operation and her insight as Jan Morris into the 
different world that men and women occupy is interesting. She noted not only that 
people treated her differently when she was a woman than as a man but,
“The more I was treated as a woman, the more woman I became. I 
adapted willy-nilly. If I was assumed to be incompetent at reversing cars, 
or opening bottles, oddly incompetent I found myself becoming. If a case 
was thought too heavy for me, inexplicably I found it so myself.”'*^
The Morris case strikes at the centre of the debate on whether behaviour between men 
and women is biologically determined or socially constructed, and thus also at the 
impact of gender narratives on behaviour. Few dispute the existence of biological 
differences between men and women, though their physiological origins are yet 
unidentified. However, it would seem that, “biological differences become a signal 
for, rather than a cause of, differentiation in social roles.”^^  ^It was Morris’s 
enactment of female identity, through established Western female narratives, such as 
relative physical weakness or spatial disorientation, that caused behavioural or 
capability differentiation. Likewise, during World War Two, Japanese kamikaze pilots 
were not merely defending Japan by volunteering for suicide missions. The pilots, 
most of who were aged between seventeen and twenty-three, being an age group 
especially seeking new identities, vociferously internalised an ancient Japanese 
identity, the ‘sacred shield’ typhoon or kamikaze, and its narrative of protecting Japan 
in 1281 firom China. In enacting and giving life to the typhoon identity, the pilots 
privileged the survival and maintenance of identity above that of their own.^^°
33
Identity narrative’s second determination of human behaviour is through engagement 
to eliminate narrative anomalies or threats, which otherwise generate anxiety. Such 
narrative elimination often accompanies the vociferous reassertion and enhancement 
of the original identity narrative - to protect the self’s creation and cocoon it firom 
existential questioning. This reassertion often leads to a more rigid identity 
construction and deeper internalisation of the threatened identity, such as 
demonstrated by the Islamist revival after the publication of ‘The Satanic Verses’ in 
1988 and America’s attack on an Iraq that, after more than two decades of Ba’ath 
fascist doctrine and an invasion of Islamically identified Iran, astoundingly and 
conveniently reclaimed the Shahadah and declared war on the infidels in 1991. '^" In 
both cases, Muslim populations worldwide felt a threat to their Islamic identity and 
responded by seeking to eliminate the threat, which for many meant killing Rushdie 
or Jihad against the West.'* Both events were accompanied by the deepening 
internalisation and coagulation of Islamic identity, which proliferated a range of 
Islamic narrative enactments ranging from prayer to the pursuit of an inadvertently 
Westernised, Islamic political structure.
International Relations and Identity Narratives
The first step in addressing some implications of identity narratives in international 
relations draws comment on the transfer of individual identity and narrative to group
Shahadah refers to the declaration of Islamic faith, specifically in the existence of the Oneness of 
God and in the prophet-hood of the Mohammed
“ The Arabic term Jihad means ‘exertion’. However, most non-Muslims and even Muslims mistakenly 
define it as ‘holy war’
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level/ The distinction is however cosmetic. Most people’s concept of identity 
involves reference to a community, which is often the state. In Pynchon’s ‘The Crving 
of Lot 49’. the identity of Oedipa Mass, the ordinary Californian housewife, is 
strongly challenged with resultant angst when American narratives are disputed.
The point that McIntyre cogently makes is that one’s life story, unless one is a citizen 
fi*om and of nowhere, is intertwined with the story of one’s community. In turn, the 
community’s stories constitute and are constitutive of the individual’s. The
Hinchmans express differently the same relationship, “Our micronarratives are 
typically ‘nested’ within, and inseparable firom, cultural macronarratives that shape 
their possible outcomes and meanings.”^^  ^Hence, the properties and discussion of 
individual identity, the prevailing focus of this chapter hitherto, are also applicable to 
group identity with subsequent parallels in dynamics. For instance, narratives create 
individual identity just as they create group identity. The nation can only exist when a 
narrative of ‘we’ exists; Barthes observed, “there does not exist and never has existed, 
a people without narratives.”^^"^ Without the backbone of narrative, the nation cannot 
construct itself.
The impact of an identity narrative fi*amework in IR is potentially considerable. The 
Realist approach to foreign policy assumes a state with a stable, fixed internal identity 
that interacts with another stable state, and thus the foreign policy. This 
interpretation, as Campbell demonstrates, is based on a nineteenth century romanticist 
account, which depicts the state system’s rise as a natural development following the 
Westphalia Treaty in 1648 - that suddenly, states existed and gave form to pre­
existing identities.^^^ Historical sociologists reject this clinical transition, insisting that
The use of narratives, let alone identity narratives, in IR is a recent phenomenon. Millenium, the
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state structures were diverse, and that their dynamics were non-linear. Furthermore, 
the state, Iqbal’s ‘conjuror’s art’, only developed potency two centuries after 
Westphalia. Hegel, Fichte and other romanticists insisted on the metaphysical 
nature of nationhood, that the clearly identified nation sought self-governance via 
statehood. Yet most state creations have however preceded the existence of single 
or dominant nations within them. Indeed, state creations may have destroyed more 
nations than they have created or protected. Even those European states, which Seton- 
Watson misleadingly terms ‘the old continuous nations’, were formed prior to the 
creation of dominant national groups.
State elites sought to enact their new state identity narratives. Simultaneously, 
whereas the church saw the devil everywhere, state elites saw Hobbes’s anarchy. The 
combination led to the use of foreign threats to justify the state’s identity narrative 
enactment and protection. However foreign threats described and often objectified 
identity narrative threats, including anomalous domestic populations. Foreign policy 
thereby becomes the legitimising of one narrative over another, to confirm ones 
identity and reality over that of another. Countries hence compete to impose and 
defend their identity and narrative visions. In this regard, identity narratives have had 
a powerful impact on foreign policy. Harff and Gurr suggest that identity and territory 
have been the two major causes of conflict since 1945, while Sivard supports their 
conclusions using a research database originating from 1700.^ ^^
One such demonstration may be found in South Asia. Machiavellian power politics 
fi*ameworks barely explain Pakistan’s near pathological antagonism towards India.
leading publication of IR theory over the last two decades, held its first conference on narratives in IR
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Diarrhoea and cholera have killed and pose a greater threat to Pakistanis than do the 
Indian armed forces. Clean water and sanitation are the principal enemy weapons, not 
military hardware, yet military generals have dominated the country's political 
landscape. Nor can Pakistan’s commitment to Kashmiri human rights be explained by 
liberal or Islamic ideology given the grossly systemic flagrant violations of those 
rights within Pakistan.^' Pakistani antagonism towards India and support for Kashmiri 
self-determination reflect identity anxiety. Pakistan’s identity was carved in 
opposition to India. Furthermore, the legacy of India’s early questioning of the 
Pakistani identity’s legitimacy, breed Pakistani insecurity for which anti-‘Indianism’
' thus becomes the protection of Pakistani narratives. Preventing India from acquiring 
Kashmir is a first step to thwarting India’s supposed de-legitimising designs and 
reaffirming the Pakistani self.
Foreign policy as a mechanism of identity enactment and protection, simultaneously 
within and outside of the state, has posed an acute problem for the state. Western 
ontology and discourse have disseminated globally so extensively that categories such 
as race, language, religion, state and gender now dominate identity, defining for most 
people their real self. Yet within this classification, very few states have possessed a 
single unifying feature exclusive to their citizens. One result of this has been the 
creative distinction between ‘blue-blooded’ nationals and immigrant pretenders, upon 
whom states use their monopoly of legitimate force and infrastructures, “those who 
are dominant within the State often wish to prevent people from adopting damaging
as recently as May 2001, and planned its first bespoke publication on the subject for December 2001 
Amnesty International noted in its May 2001 survey of Pakistan for the year 2000, that torture in 
police cells and custody and sexual abuse of detainees was widespread. During 2000, it was aware of at 
least twenty-five deaths in police custody. While General Musharaff s unaccountable government’s 
focus on Kashmir increased, the survey concluded that Pakistan’s commitment to human rights was 
weakening.
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or potentially dangerous narrative identities.”^^  ^Given that the enactment and 
protection of dominant state identity narratives embraces foreignness as a function of 
identity, and not politico-military security or state citizenship, the identity narrative 
approach consequently reveals the superficiality in the domestic-foreign dialectic, 
thereby enabling foreign policy analysis to incorporate a more organic interaction 
between the two areas.
There is however the continued fibre of a relationship between the Realist and identity 
narrative accounts. Identity narrative threat and assertion as foreign policy 
imperatives not only fundamentally challenge post-Enlightenment political discourse, 
but also require the sort of patience and conceptual depth that a discussion cloaked in 
self-interest presently does not. Modem political discourse simply cannot digest an 
identity narrative driven policy justification. For instance, Pedersen’s study of this 
phenomenon, termed ‘action theory’ emphasises the serious exclusionary 
consequences of breaking the dominant discourse. Notwithstanding this, politicians 
compete to best articulate the sense of identity enactment or threat, using political 
rhetoric, often sprinkled with vague concepts of national interest and power, to give 
form to the vague and disordered narrative anxieties and enactments.
Modernity and Identity
Finally, and the last element within this alternative theoretical framework, the onset of 
modernity has created difficulties for this identity framework which, while not 
notably affecting US policy to Pakistan prior to Kennedy, is nevertheless worth 
briefly visiting. Modernity is an awkward term. Its use in sociology, art, architecture
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and philosophy has added specificities to each that do not fit across disciplines. 
Nonetheless, one of its chief characteristics is a fragmentation of authority, where 
even the most reliable authorities are trusted only till further notice, “In this new 
Babel, whilst a multiplicity of voices claim authority, each is questioned and doubted: 
none can establish its hegemony.”^ D av id  Gross’s observation that the traditional 
Western socio-cultural framework of 1650 became modem by 1850 is a sensible 
timeframe to start modernity’s incursion in the West.^^  ^A part of this is the 
intensification of de-traditionalization, Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft. Traditional 
societies are characterised by established authoritative orders, “sacred” in the 
Durkheimian sense, in which identities are inscribed and stable. In traditional 
societies, though the change in identity narrative from adolescence to adulthood is 
clearly marked out, the identities and narratives within those stages remain confined.
Modernity differs from the traditional society’s treatment of identity by challenging 
the unity of both identity and narrative. Fragmentation of authority becomes 
fragmentation of self. The process of self-identity creation becomes more open-ended 
and reflexive, “The normal biography becomes the ‘elective biography’, the ‘reflexive 
biography’, the ‘ do-it-yourself biography’  ^ Self-improvement manuals blossomed 
in the early modernity of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, focusing on 
individual identity building. In contrast to traditional societies, modem societies 
demand the altered self to repeatedly reconstruct self-identity and narrative amongst a 
multitude of choices when “it is now all too easy to choose identity, but no longer 
possible to hold it.”^^  ^What to wear, eat and how to behave - all become identity 
narrative choices, who we want to be.
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The increasing fluidity and defragmentation of identity narratives has a particular 
impact on foreign policy, especially in the US. If identity narratives demand articled 
repetition to constitute their reality, and given identity narrative’s importance to the 
selfs creation and stability, those who locate themselves within the older authentic 
narratives, are impelled to enact and protect those narratives and precipitates two 
noteworthy effects. First, the tension between those who subscribe to the older 
‘authentic’ identity narratives and those of the newer anomalous narratives increases. 
Though an identity narrative elite, whether one person or many, is responsible for 
articulating a particular set of state identity narratives, it is not necessarily able to 
control the identity’s permanence. Officialdom, which tends to rest with the former 
group, acts to protect ‘authentic’ identity narratives, and dedicates increasing energy 
and focus to combating the foreign within. This occurs simultaneously to an 
intensified enactment of precisely those authentic narratives within and more often to 
compensate for the anxiety outside the state’s borders.
Second, modernity’s proliferation destabilises narrative’s anchorages. Without clarity 
and acceptance of narrative, political discourse and engagement become fickle. 
Foreign policy, both within and outside, suffers from inadequate supporting narrative 
to grid reality and engage policy with. Those who undertake the task of preserving 
authentic narratives by engaging the foreign within, do so with increasing blindness. 
The combination of these two dynamics is a growing anxiety and destabilisation for 
those who identify with and position themselves within the older narratives. Concerns 
of identity narrative homogeneity, such as those raised recently in America by 
Schlesinger, Bloom et al become important consequently for the Balkanization of 
‘foreign’ pol icy .Pol icy  engagement relies on reality cognition. Without the
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existence of dominant identities and identity narratives in a state, discourse and 
engagement disintegrate.
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CHAPTER TWO 
IDENTITY NARRATIVES: AMERICA
The use of identity narratives may be particularly useful for Americans given their 
interpretation of their short history as a lack of identity and narrative, \yhich thus 
needs greater internalisation/ However, harvesting common American identities in 
any period of history, let alone narratives specifically for the onset of policy to 
Pakistan, is difficult.’ The search for the ‘American’ neither leads into an 
etymological study of medieval Latin sources nor an Indo-European root. Indeed, 
given identity’s fluidity, capturing any collective American identity irrespective of era 
is taxing since American identities are unstable for they, as Kristeva stressed of all 
identities, are always in process.^ Bloom seeks to answer, “what it means to be an 
American?” with the proposition that it is the acceptance of man’s natural rights.^ Yet 
most Americans have denied these nebulous rights to non-Caucasians. Further, his 
natural rights are dominated by, “Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, the US Founding 
Fathers, inter alia”, to whom non-Caucasians are principally unattached.^ Even before 
the legitimation of various American identities during the twentieth century especially 
after the Vietnam War, Tocqueville noted that there was no exclusive unifying feature 
that identified all Americans, “the Union is an ideal nation which exists, so to say, 
only in men’s minds” and not Zelinsky’s “genuine ethnic group”.^
However, some conceptions of identity are so central to a community’s self­
perception, though not to all its members, that Gordon refers to them as ‘factual self- 
conceptions’.^  Examples include the Jewish identity for Israel, despite the non-Jewish
' While ‘America’ or ‘American’ strictly used refers to the entire western hemisphere, it is however and 
unless otherwise specified, used in tiiis thesis synonymously with the US.
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population officially constituting eighteen percent of the country/ To analyse 
American policy to Pakistan, this thesis will select American self-identities that fit 
Gordon’s definition and that were internalised as exemplar American by mainstream 
American society, media and culture before 1947 and thereafter. These identities, 
henceforth and through this thesis repeatedly referred to as real American identities 
with corresponding real American narratives, represented a romanticised America and 
American, which implicitly excluded the, “existence of hyphenated Americans, or 
Native Americans or any other qualified kind”.* Real American identities were 
learned on street comers, in city parks, club meetings and saloons. The work of poets, 
novelists, artists, playwrights and academics reflected and reproduced these identities 
in a multitude of forms, in all aspects of social existence.^ Johnson’s study of 
American history is typical of accounts that place this real American as an 
unacknowledged neutral subject.However, no identity narrative can dominate a 
society, as discourses can never achieve suture. Consequently, those Americans, 
external to these identities, were mere citizens for only Anglo-Saxon Americans who 
identified with an amorphous mission, America’s exceptionalism and a commitment 
to wealth acquisition were real Americans.
There is a reductionist danger that any identities, such as the aforementioned, can 
misleadingly be elevated. The impression should be resisted that the selected 
identities and narrative interpretations, as expounded during this chapter, were 
exclusively those internalised by real America. Clifford’s analysis of high art also 
applies to identity, “representing a culture, subculture, or indeed any coherent domain 
of collective activity is always strategic and selective.”'  ^Hence there is a strong case 
that other self-identities also constituted real America. Coker’s analysis for instance
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stresses America’s revolutionary identity, while Gibson’s study harnesses America’s 
masculine identity. '^*
The advantage in restricting to four identities goes beyond its mere manageability, 
though it is that too, and lies in its sufficiency for elucidating policy to Pakistan. 
Though Pakistan, for reasons explained in the following chapters, did not itself 
directly and affirmatively feature in any of real America’s identity narratives; these 
narratives still dominated policy to Pakistan at two levels. At a global level, Pakistan 
was entirely categorised in, attached meaning to and engaged within American anti­
communism. This fifth American identity, a meta-identity, which pre-dated the 
Bolshevik revolution, was a fimction of communism’s defiance of each of real 
America’s four identity narratives, with anxiety objectified into fear, first of 
communism and after 1917, Russia. The use of the four selected identities sufficiently 
demonstrates the precipitation of the anti-communist meta-identity and meta-narrative 
in which policy to Pakistan was chiefly executed. At a more regional level, America 
variably deployed and engaged its missionary narrative, beyond anti-communism, in 
policy to India, Pakistan’s archenemy. America’s categorisation of India within the 
American mission pre-dated Pakistan’s creation, and assumed urgency after China 
rejected the role that America had imparted it for over a century. Such categorisation, 
meaning and engagement of India was acutely felt in Karachi, and intermittently 
featured in policy to Pakistan.
A final caveat before exploring four identities of real America - the distinction should 
be made between American self-identities and identities imparted to America by non- 
Americans.^^ This distinction is important since if foreign policy is a competition to
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impose and defend identity narrative visions, the identity that non-Americans impart 
to America assumes significance within the reality that non-Americans eventually 
engage. Heidegger identified America as man’s greatest alienation, his profoundest 
loss of authenticity, obsessed with, “the same dreary technological firenzy and the 
same unrestricted organization of the average man”.*^  " Edward Said observes that the 
most American of elements in America’s heritage are the sources of the repression of 
difference. The plunder of Moorish wealth including the destruction of Granada’s 
libraries and museums financed Columbus’s famous voyage.That such 
identification of America is widespread, with different emphasises, in South and 
Central America, Asia and Afiica inevitably affects the environment of America’s 
own self-identity narrative engagement and protection.
The Mission
A glance at presidential inauguration speeches would detect the theme of America’s 
quasi-secular mission to act, in Lincoln’s words, as “the last, best hope of man”.*^  
Generations of Americans have celebrated Herman Melville’s claim, “we Americans 
are the peculiar chosen people; the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties 
of the world”.^ ° This mission has since enjoyed various mutations but at core remains 
a responsibility assumed by Americans for the progress of mankind. Wilson equated it 
with achieving the Fourteen Points, Franklin Roosevelt with the Four Freedoms.^*
The Depression’s working classes interpreted it as extending social justice, while 
Carter synonymised it with spreading human rights. Hungtington’s contemporary spin 
defines it as the spreading of individual liberty, property and market-based solutions.
" This forefather of anti-technological ecology identified America as, “the land of the living dead”; J W 
Ceaser (1997:9)
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Though the missionary narrative has had such varying endings, as with much of real 
America, its genesis lies in Jamestown. Early colonists identified themselves as part 
of a biblical epic mission to redeem mankind. They narrated their emigration fi*om the 
Old World to establish God’s Creed, a pure community in the New World. The 
objective of the Virginia Company which organised the Jamestown settlement was,
“to preach and baptise the Christian Religion and by propagation of the 
Gospell, to recover out of the arms of the Divell, a number of poure and 
miserable soules, wrapt up into death, in almost invincible ignorance.”^^
The contract that these colonists agreed in 1620 was based on God’s Covenant with 
the Israelites,
“they were not ordinary pilgrims, travelling to a sacred shrine, and then 
returning home to resume everyday life. They were perpetual pilgrims, 
setting up a new, sanctified country as a permanent pilgrimage.”^^
God was not only a witness but also a symbolic contractual co-signatory with 
Winthrop comparing the second Puritan mission in 1623 and the third in 1628 to 
Moses’s fireeing of the Israelites.^"^
Closer inspection of the colonists’ motives reveals a quasi-theological and economic 
blend, yet the overt ceremonies and institutions that bound the settlers and imparted 
identity narrative depth, were immersed with missionary resonance. In Salem, each
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household’s head pledged, “to bynd ourselves in the presence of God, to walke 
together in all his waies.” The Windsor community elected to, “erect a particular 
ecclesiastical body, and kingdom^ and visible family and household of God”/^
Writing in 1705, Joseph Easterbrooks described Puritans as people who were asked 
to, “remove from the places of their nativity, into a country afar off...when they 
cannot live comfortably where they are, and have a plain prospect of mending 
themselves in another land.”^^  The map of Philadelphia’s map reveals a plethora of 
missionary associated town names - Edenville, Freedom, Harmony, Liberty, New 
Hope, New Jerusalem and Paradise.
Most Puritan traditions were discarded by 1789. Democracy, with argument, was 
acutely disturbing for the colonists. Secularism was prohibited, individuahty crushed. 
Winthrop, Puritan America’s outstanding figure, and the first great American, dictated 
a theocracy tougher than that of Khomeini’s.^  ^Nor were Puritans evangelists. Cotton 
Mather’s “Magnalia Christi Americana” in 1702, one of America’s mission’s earliest 
articulations, stressed the exclusive obligation upon Puritans. Yet, the missionary 
identity, the Calvinist notion of the Elect, God Choosing a select few to lead, was 
transformed during the eighteenth century’s Great Awakening to a belief in pan- 
America’s election.^^ One Englishman who visited America in the 1750s, noted, 
“every one is looking forward with eager and impatient expectation to that destined 
moment when America is to give law to the rest of the world”.^  ^With the mission 
internalised, partly to differentiate America from England, Joel Barlow’s “The 
Columbiad” in 1807 crystallised its new post-revolutionary secularised version.
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Integral to the missionary narrative was the metaphysical concept of ‘the Frontier’, 
the imaginary line separating civility from what Puritans initially called wilderness.
As colonists spread across the eastern seaboard, the Frontier gradually referred to the 
westward civilising of ‘empty’ land. Even before the eighteenth century, Americans 
assumed their manifest destiny was to use their God-Given resources to extend the 
Frontier, thus the capital’s physical location in the midst of a swamp for its proximity 
to the base of the westward Potomac River. With manifest destiny concepts in 
ascendancy, one journalist described the ongoing Frontier as, “the civilised world has 
been rolling westward; and Americans of the present age will complete the circle.” ®^ 
Likewise, De Tocqueville noted that the westward frontier march, “has something 
providential in it: it is like some flood of humanity rising constantly and driven by the 
hand of God.” '^
After the continental Frontier closed in 1890, Americans looked to Asia as their next 
Frontier. In 1891, six thousand students pledged to enact the national missionary 
identity by becoming missionaries and travelled to Asia. During the next decade, the 
movement grew larger. One leading historian asked, “Who can doubt that the purpose 
of the American people is not only to make this nation felt as a world power, but also 
to spread western civilisation eastward?”^^  Though the missionary narrative’s 
enactment and the Frontier’s extension into Asia were privately led, by amongst 
others, the Rockefeller Foundation, Washington eventually joined in. Months into his 
presidency, Theodore Roosevelt announced that the Pacific was an American lake and 
East Asia was its new Frontier.^^
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It was from this narrative that China derived importance to America, as the American 
mission and Frontier’s next fulfilment, with particular implications for policy to India 
after 1949, and therefore Pakistan. China was a special promise for successive 
American generations,
“China, so ancient, so vast, so rich, always beckoned in imagination with 
something which Americans wanted and needed.. .the oldest empire 
awaiting the completion of the newest to complete the transit of 
civilisation.” "^^
Missionaries, despite their exploitation of China, convinced themselves and fellow 
Americans of China’s role in the national mission.^^ Asia became a missionary 
ferment,
“When I turn my eyes to the East, two considerations strike my mind with 
great force. The one is, the multitude of people who inhabit these regions, 
most of who mare sitting still in darkness, and in the region and shadow of 
death.” *^
Missionaries were convinced that, “China needed Christianity not to destroy its old 
hfe but to complete it and, where necessary, to reshape its valuable parts into a more 
valuable whole.”^^  American expectations of China cradled an emotive baggage, 
which despite Acheson appreciating, “Hardly a town in our land was without its 
society to collect funds and clothing for Chinese missions”, he himself would 
nonetheless become victim to in 1949.^*
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Capitalism.
A second important identity of real America is that of a liberal, wealth acquisitive 
identity, and broadly termed as capitalism. Private enterprise and hard work, not 
ruthless impersonal big business, comprised real America, a distinction evidenced by 
Emerson’s objections in the nineteenth century to America’s industrialisation and 
commercialisation.^^ That capitalism is deemed a real American identity is not 
surprising. Jamestown was financed by private capital, hi return for their investment, 
stockholders received land both when the grant was taken and when men were 
transported to America.'*® As with the missionary identity, capitalism was internalised 
to differentiate Americans. The revolution was itself triggered by the British threat, 
through taxation to American property while colonists had rallied around the cry of 
“no taxation -  no representation”. The French Revolution in 1793-94 and fear of the 
mob persuaded European liberals to prioritise liberty above economic equality well 
into the next century, and hence their rejection of property rights as a useful 
philosophic concept. Americans reacted with aghast at this dissociation from property. 
America’s founding elite, Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison and Adams held 
closely to Locke’s connection between property and freedom, “Property must be 
secured, or liberty cannot exist”.^ * Hamilton even defined the newborn America as a 
“commercial empire”.^ ^
Two major narratives have supported this identity. Weber noted Puritan America’s 
appetite for material wealth was religiously and not materially driven. Protestant 
fundamentalists eagerly searched for God’s Assessment of them and, without other
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signs, used material wealth to indicate His happiness with them. Furthermore, the 
Puritans were haunted by man’s sinfulness and the need to tame man’s passions. As a 
solution, they determined to complete their earthly duties with such dedication and 
discipline so as not to allow for sin to enter their lives. Hence, wealth acquisition’s co­
existence with frugal living."^  ^Unlike in Europe, the struggle to earn a livelihood 
became spiritual nourishment and America’s hardworking became virtuous, an 
identification which persisted in America throughout the 1947-1960 period.^ For 
example, in 1958, three-quarters of Americans interpreted laziness as a sin and 
categorised anybody who did not demonstrate the utmost commitment to his work, as 
undeserving of respect."*^
The second and broader narrative is the ‘greed is good’ view, which co-habits with 
societal betterment through a skewered interpretation of Adam Smith's ‘invisible 
hand’, which theoretically moderates individual self-interest pursuit for societal good. 
Profit-driven private individual gains are viewed as societal gains, overlooking 
Smith’s advocacy of government intervention since the ‘invisible hand’ would by 
itself be ineffective for society.Capitalism is often viewed as an ideological 
framework to a better existence. However, Erikson’s definition of ideology is in this 
context particularly useful. He defined ideology as, “not merely high privileges and 
lofty ideals”, but the necessary social institution which guarded identity, and 
legitimised identity requirements within a society’s discourse.'^  ^Erikson thus treated 
ideology itself as a quasi-narrative, providing policy prescription and requiring 
protection when threatened. It was incidentally specifically this concept that 
Habermas later converted to an identity-securing interpretative system.
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The very nature of America’s major exports, grain, machinery and mass-market goods 
compounded capitalism’s association with the good life. American entrepreneurs 
consistently preached that exports could democratise medieval economies and raise 
living standards. Trade became a leveller of both country and class, overcoming 
Malthus’s predictions of scarcity and Marx’s of class conflict. Even Roosevelt, 
probably the most sociahst twentieth century American president and after the worst 
economic crisis in American history, continued to link progress to capitalism’s 
success. For this reason, Acheson supported lending money to Britain in 1946 not as a 
diplomatic exercise but to support the economic system which is the very basis of our 
life. Though not an economist, he grasped that lending money would help maintain 
America’s capitalist identity narrative, “to help people who believe the way we do, to 
continue to live the way they want to live”."^^
Exceptionalism
Americans are not unique to have defined themselves as exceptional - not least since 
criteria can be selected to distinguish any people as exceptional. Implicit within the 
Japanese hakko ichiu, ‘the eight comers of the world under one (Japanese) roof is a 
Japanese exceptionalism -  uniqueness amongst unique.^^ Likewise, the Jewish 
concept of God’s Chosen People and Hindu concept of Hindutva are embedded with 
exceptionalism.^® Lipset, perhaps the most persistent contemporary exponent of 
American exceptionalism, nevertheless insists that America is exceptional because it 
originated from, “a revolutionary event and defined its raison d ’etre ideologically. 
Other countries’ sense of themselves is derived from a common history and not an 
ideology.”^^  Aside from the American ‘revolution’ resembling less a revolution and
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more a change in political format, with existing internal relationships unchanged, 
Lipset’s definition would also necessarily impart exceptionalism upon post-1979 Iran 
which few Americans would feel comfortable with.'" An alternative account of 
American exceptionalism is Adam’s, ‘American spirit’ derived from the, “electrically 
charged air which makes people walk faster, act more emphatically”, stressing that, 
“America itself, that new environment which started so many strands of influence at 
work to make the world of character, outlook and institutions which we call 
‘America’”/^
Though American exceptionalism originated before 1492, its narrative invokes at its 
origin Columbus, who ‘discovered’ America in mythical proportions.'^ For the 
Puritans, amongst whom was Winthrop, the author of the widely appropriated “City 
on a hill”, America combined exceptionalism and a mission as the ‘redeemer 
nation’. A  Boston clergyman in 1639 described the Massachusetts Bay colony, “a 
special people, an only people -  none like thee in all the earth.” '^^  Economic resource 
and success reinforced exceptionalism’s narrative. The east coast’s annual rainfall of 
forty inches and warm temperature was and remains ideal for farming. In fact. North 
America has amongst the world’s best soil for regular food crops, which has meant 
the absence of famine in America for three centuries.^^ Timber was massively 
abundant. In the early seventeenth century there were 822 million acres of timberland 
in America.^^ In 1700, America’s economic output was only five percent of Britain’s. 
By 1775, it was forty percent^^
Lipset’s claim in the following pages that, “Americans are utopian moralists who press hard to 
institutionalise virtue to destroy evil people, and to eliminate wicked institutions and practices” is 
highly contentious.
Eleventh century Vikings were the first European observers of America. Columbus, an Italian, 
ençloyed by Spain, who spoke no English, never saw the American continent and died with the 
conviction that he had seen India.
56
The exceptionalist narrative was also romanticised in the nineteenth century/^
Though science’s racial proofs supported American exceptionalism, it was 
nonetheless historians, writers and artists such as Hawthorne, Whitman, Scott and 
Melville, who gave depth to exceptionalism narrative depth were consequently 
institutionalised for their architecture. Alexis De Tocqueville claims pride of place 
based on his early affirmation of American exceptionalism, one that rested on 
egalitarianism and individualism, notwithstanding the plight of non-Caucasians.^^ For 
De Tocqueville, America was modernity’s leader, the only country in which the great 
revolution of democracy was taking place, “Working back through the centuries to the 
remotest antiquity, I see nothing at all similar to what is taking place before our 
eyes.” °^ The French aristocrat, who became France’s foreign minister soon after his 
nine-month tour of America, advised his European compatriots in 1848,
“I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought the image of 
democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its 
passions, in order to leam what we have to fear or hope from its 
progress.”^^
Ralph Waldo Emerson also features prominently because of his portrayal of American 
exceptionalism, “Separated from the contamination which infects all other civilised 
lands, this country has always boasted a great comparative purity.”^^  There was also 
Frederick Jackson Turner who converted the basis of America’s exceptionalism from 
the Anglo Saxon antiquity (Teutonic) theory, to the ‘Frontier’ as Americans’ defining 
experience. Americans, he insisted, were exceptional because of their experience at
57
the Frontier, which ignored both the issue that very few Americans ever experienced 
the Frontier, as well as its barbarism. American Romanticists, whose dialogue 
incidentally never absorbed non-Caucasians, relied on a common migratory 
experience. Immigration was portrayed as deliverance from misery to American hope. 
Puritans were persecuted from England in the seventeenth century; the Irish escaped a 
nineteenth century famine, while the Germans fled Europe’s revolutions.
Aside from the strategic criteria of selection, that the American exceptionalist identity 
has remained strong is paradoxical given the dilute nature of exceptionalist claims. 
While the Founding Fathers roamed in holes to survive and ate, “dogs, cats, rice, and 
mice”, a colonist reported,
“One of our colony murdered his wife, ripped the child out of her womb 
and threw it into the river, and after chopped the mother in pieces and 
salted her for his food, the same not being discovered before he had eaten 
part thereof.... a savage we slew and buried, the poorest sort took him up 
again and ate him.”^^
Further, during a raid on Amerindians, the venerated early colonists, “put the Children 
to death.. .by throwing them overboard and shooting out their brains in the water.”^
In England, these great Americans were viewed as human offal,
“It is ... most profitable for our state to rid our multitudes of such who lie 
at home (inflicting on) the land pestilence and penury, and infecting one 
another with vice and villainy worse than the plague itself.
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White Anglo-Saxon
The most visible real American identity, hence the most articulated, was Caucasian 
and specifically Anglo-Saxon. Race is a benign term given that there is only one 
human race albeit a range of physical variations.^^ Even the term Anglo-Saxon is 
misleading since it denotes an ethno-racial homogeneity which does not exist. The 
German tribes which migrated to England in the fifth century and integrated with the 
Celts, were not homogeneously Anglo-Saxon. Furthermore, the later Viking invasions 
and Norman conquest ftrrther diversified these people.'" That the early Virginian 
bloodline merged with Amerindians when an English colony of May 1657 was never 
traced and firom the inter-racial breeding such as Jefferson’s fathering of children with 
black mothers, complicates American claims to Anglo-Saxon identity.
Yet America has remained strongly committed to a Caucasian Anglo-Saxon identity, 
the celebration of which has been a persistent theme in and of American history. Only 
one of the eight paintings inside the Capitol’s Rotunda, Chapman’s B^aptism of 
Pocahontas at Jamestown. Virginia. 1613’ treats a non-Anglo Saxon as a subject, and 
even then only converting to the Anglo-Saxon way.^  ^The constitution reserved 
citizenship for Caucasians; blacks did not get automatic citizenship rights until after 
1865 and Amerindians not till 1924.^  ^Architecture too reflected this identity. The 
capital’s buildings could easily have been uprooted only from one of many Western 
European cities. The interior of Congress’s dome was based on Rome’s Pantheon, 
while nearly every bust in Capitol Hill is of a Caucasian. Two Amerindians, a
For instance, even the author of England’s famous ethnic cricket ‘test’ should note that the names 
‘Norman’ and ‘Tebbit’ do not have particularly English origins.
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Hawaiian King and an Afro-American are meek contributions to racial diversity/^ ^ 
Beyond the capital and more generally, it took more than three decades after 
Eisenhower’s administration for Disney to let Afro-Americans portray Afro-American 
characters in an animation movie and for Peter Pan’s savage and unusually red 
‘Injuns’ of 1953 to become Pocahontas’s spiritualistic defenders of the eco-system/^
America’s Anglo-Saxon identity’s differed from England’s for the colonists were 
more aware of their contrast with Amerindians and the racial narratives were 
reinforced for anchorage in a new world. Race was the hardest currency to 
articulate the uncertainties that colonists felt. The British, distanced by the Atlantic 
and therefore less threatened, were more sympathetic towards non-Anglo Saxons, and 
discontinued slavery ninety years before its abohtion in America. The contradiction 
between the Declaration of Independence and treatment of non-Caucasians only 
swayed America from environmental racism to biological racism, a process begun 
before European scientists, using the same methodological and epistemological 
commitments as they still do, ‘proved’ Caucasian superiority. Science thus further 
placed inequaUty’s onus on the Negro. From the 1830s, Americans led Europeans in 
providing scientific evidence for Anglo-Saxon superiority, “the jarring note of 
rampant racialism that permeates the debates of mid-century”.^  ^In 1840, one ex- 
Govemor repudiated, “as ridiculously absurd, that much lauded but nowhere 
accredited dogma of Mr Jefferson, that ‘all men are bom equal’.W h i l e  ethnologists 
insisted there were irreversible differences amongst the races. The Democratic
The term ‘Amerindian’ or ‘Indian’ is not indigenous to America’s natives. It is a term imposed from 
outside by real Americans.
Irrçlicit in even the ‘Afro-American’ classification is America’s Caucasian identity. There is no 
corresponding ‘Euro-American’ category that Caucasian Americans are categorised with.
The term ‘proved’ is appropriate only to the extent that twenty-first century scientists share the same 
methodological and epistemological commitments, and hence concepts of proof, that were used by 
nineteenth century scientists.
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Review noted in 1850, “none now seriously adhere to the theory of the unity of 
races»/"'"
The narrative of Anglo Saxon identity was embodied in the racial hierarchy, which, 
with the exception of the Amerindian, remained stagnant. Initially, Amerindians were 
ill-ranked - American hero, William Sherman wrote, “The more we can kill this year, 
the less will have to be killed the next war, for the more I see of these Indians the 
more convinced I am that all have to be killed”.^  ^Those Amerindians who assimilated 
into European ways, such as the Cherokees, never became real American. As 
Amerindians dwindled after a holocaust of several million people, their threat to 
Anglo-Saxon narrative reduced, and they were promoted to just below the real 
American, as the noble Amerindian savage. In contrast, Afro-Americans remained, “a 
few generations removed from the wildest savagery”. Franklin, a slave owner, defined 
Negroes as the most horrendous race and opposed Negro immigration while Jefferson 
wanted Negroes expelled to Africa and Haiti.^^ Even Lincoln, under whose memorial 
Martin Luther King proudly delivered his powerful T Have a Dream* speech in 1963, 
was,
“not in favour of bringing about in any way the social and political 
equality of the white and black races.... There is a physical difference 
between the black and white races which I believe will forever forbid the 
two races living together on terms of social and political equahty”.^ ^
“ A minority rejected the biological hierarchy. Politician, Charles Anderson, rejected Anglo-Saxon 
superiority, citing that racial pride was a common historical phenomenon. Furthermore, the English 
were not homogeneously Anglo-Saxon and Americans were the most heterogeneous stock of people on 
earth.
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The commitment to Anglo-Saxon and not merely Caucasian identity became evident 
vis-à-vis Latinos, who included the French, Spanish and Italian. The early Spanish 
“carnage and plunder” of Amerindians, initiated America to impart Latinos a 
reputation for hypocrisy, cruelty and misgovemment. John Quincy Adams observed 
that Latinos, “have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary 
power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their 
habits, and upon all their institutions.” Furthermore, shockingly to American society. 
Latinos openly mixed with non-Caucasians to produce degenerate mongrels.^^
Finally, Asians ranked below Latinos. Ordinarily and within the Anglo-Saxon 
narrative, they were unfeeling, cunning and evil. However, when placed within the 
missionary narrative they were also a people of promise, close to dispelling medieval 
culture. Americans thus felt on the one hand a responsibility to tutor and protect 
China into civility yet on the other hand with the arrival of Chinese labour after the 
1850s, and the threat to Anglo-Saxon narratives, Americans enforced deportation 
while Sinologists who could neither speak Chinese nor had travelled to China, 
portrayed a yellow tide of rat huddled and sexually demonic Chinese about to 
debauch vulnerable white women.^^
Anti-Communism: America’s Meta-Identity
In America’s economy of identities, including the aforementioned four identities, 
more than any other identity, the most pervasive was, and perhaps still remains, anti­
communism. Its segregation from the other four lies not because it is an identity built 
primarily in opposition to something though a case from this alone could be made, but
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in that its origination was a function of the four aforementioned identities. The anti­
communist narrative’s importance in this thesis lies not only in America’s privileging 
it to understand and engage the world after 1946, but also in that the anti-communist 
narrative was the exclusive narrative through which America understood and 
interacted with Pakistan. Accordingly, Washington recognised and engaged Pakistan 
during the high periods of anti-communist identity subscription and sense of 
communist threat, such as from 1950 to 1954, and failed to understand Pakistan, and 
sought to disengage it after 1957 when Eisenhower led a graduated détente.
America’s anxiety about communism originated not from hostility to political 
radicalism, for nineteenth century America was a hotbed of radicalisms, appropriating 
the ‘revolution’ for legitimacy.Furthermore, communism was neither a military or 
economic threat to America, especially not before 1945, nor was it exclusively a 
synthetic mechanism to preserve American identity as Noam Chomsky suggests.^* As 
early as 1871, the Paris Commune, a mere political speck, drew hysterical American 
denigration.^^ That it did so can be coherently explained within the identity narrative 
framework since auto-identification’s framework, being also that of allo- 
identification, sensitised America to communism’s threat to American identity 
narratives. Friction and unease were generated from communism’s proximity to 
American narratives, as well as its opposition to those narratives.*^ * Communism had 
its own global mission in the emancipation of the proletariat, and not the hardworking 
entrepreneur. With Marx describing the capital “beast” as corrupt as Babylon’s Whore 
and treating it as transitory evil, communism offered its own economics framework
* Though communism’s manifestations can be dated to Plato’s ruling ehte, it was Marx and Engels who 
gave expression to communism. The term, in currency before the pair subscribed to it, was modified by 
their “scientific socialism”, and came to mean as Geoffrey Stem suggests, “a society without private 
property or wealth accumulation” (G Stem, “The Rise and Decline of Communism”, 1990, London: 
Edward Elgar Publishers, 60)
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that frowned upon individualistic hardworking wealth acquisition. There was also 
communism’s belief in its exceptionality as a historical agent for modernity, a point 
that Marx stressed in describing communism as, “the solution of the riddle of 
history.” "^^ Finally, though communism did not rigorously challenge Anglo-Saxon 
(economic) imperialism until Lenin, America’s Anglo-Saxon hierarchy was 
nevertheless threatened by communism’s association with Eastern Europeans.
Gilman has demonstrated a whole series of alterities in the history of European 
identities -  blacks, the insane, women, Jews and homosexuals.*^ Communism’s broad 
threat to American narratives promoted communism to America’s alterity, that anti­
communism was not primarily about communism but, “a way of being American” - 
the quintessence American identity, and synonymous with un-American.*^ This is 
especially apparent given communism threatened the American self and its 
ontological security by destabilising America’s stories about itself. As anti­
communism became real America’s primary identity, the defeat of communism 
became real America’s primary narrative. Communism’s vortex was it could, “change 
our way of life so that we couldn’t recognize it as American any longer”.*^  “The very 
existence of the Soviet Union constituted a nightmare”.** A journalist revealingly 
commented during the Depression that the unemployed were, ‘“right on the 
edge.. .that it wouldn’t take much to make Communists out of them.”*^  As the alterity, 
communism also became a depositary term for anomalies to real America and it was 
upon this basis that Kovel described Amerindians as the, “primal communist of 
American history.” ®^
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It is precisely the metanarrative of the anti-communist meta-identity that replaces 
Kovel’s nebulous anti-communist ‘black hole’, and assumes the function of 
America’s categorising, attaching meaning to and engaging in world politics in this 
thesis.^* Clearly therefore Francois Lyotard’s suggestion that metanarratives ended 
with postmodemity necessitates qualification for anti-communism remained 
America’s metanarrative into early postmodemity during the Reagan administration.^^ 
That this was so, may have reflected Jacques Derrida’s idea that the monolithic Other, 
as alterity, furnished substance to the rhetorical illusion of an essentialist and unified 
identity.^^ It also however reflected the impact of communism’s perpendicular 
location to American narratives, and the semiotic gravitas that the term acquired not 
only after 1946, but from the nineteenth century. That communism did not challenge 
the dominant identity narratives of other peoples, and thence did not precipitate the 
anxiety that it did in America, became painfully evident to Washington throughout the 
1950s. For instance, in 1954, despite the anti-communist hysteria in America, 
Churchill refused to investigate communism in Britain.^ "^
The Bolshevik Revolution was the first state legitimised communist threat to 
America. Washington was unprepared for any state, itself a technology of modernity, 
to repudiate American narratives by adopting communism. Ordinarily, this would 
have necessitated policy to eliminate the narrative threat. However, America’s 
distancing from Europe after Versailles left the paradoxical engagement of 
communism within during the Red Scare of 1919-20, while a refusal to engage it 
outside. One mayor described a shipyard strike as an attempt, “to take possession of 
our American government and try to duplicate the anarchy of Russia,” while a senator 
announced that since from Russia the strike leaders had come, “to Russia they should
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be made to go.”^^  The Wall Street Journal described the police industrial action in 
1919 as, “Lenin and Trotsky are on their way.”^^  Negroes, including soldiers 
returning from war, were lynched during the ‘Red Scare’. T h e  administration’s first 
commitment to congregating narrative anomalies with communism demanded, “the 
preservation of a God fearing Anglo Saxon America in which property was 
sacrosanct.” *^ This anti-communism was the frenzied protection of real identity 
narratives, “several movements (arose) to restore tranquillity, old fashioned ways, 
old-time religion, undiluted patriotism, and unhyphenated Americanism.”^^
That communists worked with anomalous identities, further attested to and identified 
their un-Americanism. In the 1930s, communists organised the defence in many 
prominent black cases such as the Scottsboro Nine in Alabama. The American 
Communist Party, reflecting Stalin’s concerns about Hitler, changed strategy in 1935 
and supported unions such as the United Auto W o rk e rs .In  parallel, John Lewis of 
the United Mine Workers facilitated blacks into the unions. The Communist Party’s 
fronts included the National Negro Congress, the Labor Press Committee and the 
Defense of the Foreign Bom.^ ®^  The Civil Rights Congress, a communist 
organisation, denounced, “the shame of white supremacy ... It is time to wipe the 
scourge of Jim Crow from the face of America”. The Communist Party had no less
than ten commissions seeking to appropriate non-Anglo-Saxons while Blacks 
constituted a fifth of the Communist Party’s membership in some regions.^^^
With real American identity narratives crippled during the Depression, the 1930s 
witnessed a growth not only in anomalies to real American narratives, such as the 
civil rights movement and the challenge to American exceptionalism and capitalism
66
in the Depression, but also in American communism. Sidney Lens, a Trotskyite, 
recalled the 1930s when, “history was ready for quantum leaps”.C o m m u n is t A1 
Richmond remembered the, “exhilarating sense of being on the offensive, 
ideologically and morally.”^ I n  1931, the Communist Party had nine thousand 
members. By 1938, it had seventy-five th o u sa n d .In  1933, Roosevelt ignored 
Americanism organisations by recognising Russia and appointing communists in 
governm ent.In  1938, after Roosevelt secured US$3.7bn for public spending, even 
communist leader Earl Browder conceded that where socialism was unattainable, “it 
is a thousand times better to have a liberal and progressive New Deal.... than to have 
a new Hoover.” ®^^ One communist reflected that, “the Communist Party was very, 
liberal, and very much the same kind of a sociological and political program as the 
Roosevelt administration... it didn’t seem to be too different.
During this ‘Red Decade’, attempts to enact and protect American narratives with and 
through anti-communism began with economic recovery. The New Deal was labelled 
communistic in 1934 during congressional hearings to police the stock exchange. 
Elizabeth Dilling’s ‘The Red Network’ in 1934 was one of many anti-communist 
books that listed members firom anomaly organisations such as the NAACP.^^° The 
American Legion’s study in 1936 of foreign threats dedicated 256 pages to 
communism, in contrast to only fifteen to Nazism and three to fascism. Yet Russia’s 
benign foreign policy contrasted with German and Italian aggression. While Father 
Coughlin labelled the New Deal communistic to the world’s largest radio audiences, 
the Hearst newspapers, Du Pont and General Motors executives joined conservative 
Democrats to form the American Liberty League, ‘to combat radicalism’ and the Klan 
in 1936 subordinated race issues for communism. The American Legion, and blind to
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the Nazi march, issued a study in 1936 entitled, “Isms: A Review of Alien Isms. 
Revolutionary Communism and Their Active Sympathisers in the United States"/
One important instrument of narrative protection was the House Un-American 
Committee (‘HUAC’). Created in 1938 originally to counter anti-Jewish attitudes, 
HUAC was hijacked by Martin Dies to enact anti-conununism through the New Deal, 
unions, the Labour Department, socialists and non-Caucasians. Interestingly however, 
communism did not dominate the anti-communist committee for America’s 
significant un-American elements, especially given the quasi-isolationist policy, were 
Afiro-Americans and unions. Dies chairmanship was therefore apt. In 1942, the fixture 
chair of HUAC had noted in, “the South today subversive elements are attempting to 
convince the Negro that he should be placed on social equality with white people.”  ^
Later another committee member during office noted, “If someone insists that there is 
discrimination against Negroes in this country, or that there is inequality of wealth, 
there is every reason to believe that person is a Communist.”'
And thus briefly to the Cold War. At the war’s end, real America underwent a 
reaffirmation of faith in itself that ended the cognitive dissonance of the Depression. 
Confidence permeated the national aura.""' In 1945, America owned two-thirds of the 
world’s gold reserves, three-quarters of invested capital, more than half of the world’s 
manufacturing capacity and produced more than a third of the world’s goods. 
America’s GNP trebled Russia’s and was five times Britain’s."^ Art mirrored the 
buoyancy and American artists who had looked to Europe for inspiration, looked 
instead to New York. Jackson Pollock and Mark Roktho’s response came in the 
confirontational aesthetics of Abstract Expressionism."^ Veterans, whose
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understanding of protecting America was transformed during the war, committed to 
reviving America by expressing and protecting Anglo-Saxon and capitalist narratives, 
converged on race and labour. Black veterans were lynched across Am erica.^So 
pronounced did racism become in the armed forces, that even the NAACP supported 
segregation.^*^ Meanwhile, Congress dissected the New Deal and passed the Taft- 
Hartley Act, ending the Wagner Act’s advantages to unions.
This America of 1945 had little anxiety about ‘Uncle Joe’s’ Russia, “American 
officials did not regard the Soviet Union as an enemy and were not fiightened by 
Soviet military prowess”.* Public discussion focused more on fi-ozen orange juice, 
unemployment and homecoming than world politics. However with the desire to 
reaffirm and relocate self and renaissance ontological security by reaffirming 
American narratives, America extended the narrative enactment arena well beyond 
America hence magnifying communist Russia’s prominence. In the extended arena, 
instead of attaining security, America’s policymakers progressively noticed their 
American narratives’ antithesis.*' Furthermore, Roosevelt, who intended to work with 
Russia, left an ill-informed Truman, whose lessons of ‘appeasement’ were ideal for a 
State Department sceptical of Moscow, with America’s most centralised federal 
government. The anxieties firom decades of narrative anomalies, including 
communism, originating from before the war, were thus converted to fear by 
objectifying communist Russia with a politico-military discourse. The anti-communist 
ontological and discourse framework stabilised America, “Cognitive dissonance was 
reduced and choices made easier by attributing to the Russians the most malevolent of 
motives and the most sinister of goals and by denying that their grievances had any
The American Communist party’s rigid rhetoric under William Foster further scared Washington,
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legitimacy.”^^* Keiman’s observation is especially poignant - enmity has little to do 
with reality but everything to do with the requirements of the group that invents its 
enemy.
America’s politico-military articulation of communism’s threat contrasted with Stalin 
having neither pretence nor capability for global conquest. Montgomery noted in 1945 
that, “Devastation in Russia is appalling and the country is in no fit state to go to 
war.”^^  ^In 1945, Russia was demobilising and was, “too backward economically, too 
badly hurt by the Nazis, and too demoralized to contemplate war for a long time.”^^"^ 
Reports emphasised Russia’s economic weakness, its inability to strike America, lack 
of aviation gas, administrative and airfield deficiencies and low defence budget.
Stalin reduced the armed forces fi*om twelve million in 1945 to three and a half 
million in 1947. An intelligence report in 1945 outlined Russia’s defence gaps would 
take fifteen years to ftilfil.^^  ^Years later, Kennan recalled he saw no evidence, “of any 
Soviet desire to assume the burdens of occupation over any extensive territories” 
beyond those occupied in the war.^^^
The communist state’s prominence and threat articulation encouraged the protection 
of real American narratives. McCarthyism began before February 1950 as, “a 
banner around which various segments of the population could marshal their 
preservatist discontents and their general uneasiness”. One moderate Republican 
believed, “we can’t continue to make mistakes with the people who are trying to 
destroy our Way of Life”. In 1947, fifty-seven percent of Americans saw ‘a great 
many’ communists -  thus Godden’s logistical problem of communists, “almost
*“ Nietzsche’s warning was pertinent, “He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby 
become a monster.” J Kovel (1994:77)
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everywhere and almost nowhere”.H o lly w o o d  stopped movies that propagated 
(communistic) racial and wealth equality. The civil rights initiative was labelled 
communistic. While American hero, Walt Disney, produced films supporting the 
racial hierarchy and private individualistic enterprise, Robin Hood stories, with the 
‘firom the rich - to the poor’ theme, were banned jfrom lib raries.E ven  Democrats, 
such as Hubert Humphrey, purged the un ions.L illian  Heilman noted about HUAC
“confusions of honest people were picked up in space by cheap baddies 
who, hearing a few bars of popular notes, made them into an opera of 
public disorder, staged and sung... in the wards of an insane asylum.”*^^
The FBI interfaced anti-communism with real American narrative protection inside 
America. That John Edgar Hoover told Richard Nixon in 1950 that he had never 
heard of Browder, the former American Communist Party chief, attests to the lower 
priority of communism itself to domestic anti-communism.^ Moreover, the 
communist paranoia did not resemble its threat. There were as many communists in 
America as there were members of the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran church.
Despite twenty-six thousand investigations, the FBI did not detect a single communist 
espionage act. However, Hoover, who sought to protect real American narratives, 
despised socialists and blacks and propagated American’s real identity.*"' The FBI 
“had a devastating effect upon the cause of blacks’ civil rights and civil liberties”.
Not surprisingly, one of Hoover’s first investigations in 1919 was against “a certain 
class of Negro leaders” who had demonstrated an “outspoken advocacy of the 
Bolsheviki or Soviet doctrines.”
**“ Ironically, this high priest of American security and identity during the era of conformity, lived only 
two days of his entire life outside of America and was a practicing homosexual and paedophile. Ibid, 
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Identity Narratives and India
The second and perhaps lesser impact of real identity American narratives on Pakistan 
originated in America’s cognition and engagement of India. Pakistan’s partition from 
India and the subsequent importance of India to Pakistan meant that US policy to 
India inevitably intimately impacted Pakistan. America’s Anglo-Saxon identity 
narrative guided America’s categorisation, meaning and engagement of India into the 
nineteenth century. America saw the Raj as a civilising force, a cognition strongly 
supported by America’s Anglo-Saxon brethren in London, while the Indian cow, caste 
and religion were criticised for medievalism and symptomatic of racial regress. With 
Britain assuming direct authority in India from 1773 and resentful of foreign 
influence, Washington’s disinterest in India insulated the missionary categorisation 
and discourse. Therefore, during the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, a few missionaries 
excepted, Americans sympathised with Britain’s harsh response. Ulysses Grant was, 
“very much pleased with English rule” while the American consular defended the Raj, 
stressing Indian immaturity for self-government. Theodore Roosevelt portrayed 
British rule as,
“one of the most notable achievements of the white race during the past 
two centuries.... If the English control were now withdrawn from India, 
the whole peninsula would become a chaos of bloodshed and violence”.
In view of this, initially, the six thousand Punjabi ‘Hindus’ (irrespective of faith) who 
migrated to west America after 1898 were an Anglo-Saxon narrative anom aly .O ne
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Senator declared, “We don’t want these Hindus and they should be barred out just as 
the Chinese are excluded.. .There is plenty of room for good citizens, but there is no 
room at all for fakirs and mendicants.” "^^  ^Before 1907, only a tenth of Indian 
immigration applicants were rejected. Assisted by the Immigration Act and the 1924 
National Origins Quota Act, the ratio of rejections increased to half.^^  ^In 1923, the 
Supreme Court ruled that “Hindus” were ineligible for citizenship since they were not 
“white persons”.R abindranath  Tagore, the Nobel laureate poet, noted in 1916 that 
even Jesus would be denied entry to America since, “he would not have the necessary 
money and .. .he would be an Asiatic.” "^^
At the century’s turn however, America’s missionary identity narrative replaced its 
Anglo-Saxon equivalent for understanding India. Central to this transformation was 
not only the closing of the continental Frontier, which initiated the westward 
missionary movement into Asia, but also the Indian presence in America, especially 
California’s Sikh community, which led India’s embryonic independence struggle 
against Britain. Har Dayal formed the Ghadar Party to help overthrow the Raj while 
Lala Lajpat Rai founded the India Home Rule League of America. They, and many 
other Indian political nationalists in America, located India within America’s 
missionary narrative by drawing parallels with America’s own independence. '^*  ^
Furthermore, nineteenth century philologists had created the myth of a special people, 
the ‘Aryan’ Indo-Europeans, who migrated west from India to build civilisation.*^^ 
The prospect of connecting American modernity with India’s ancient spirituality, of 
completing the missionary circle, was especially attractive. Indian independence 
suddenly stimulated American sympathy. The missionary narrative’s growing 
application for understanding India was reflected in mounting American missionary
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work in India. From 1813 to 1892, only 393 American missions were established in 
India. However, between 1893 and 1922,2,085 enacted the missionary narrative. 
Andrew Carnegie and William Jennings Bryant criticised British rule of India, 
insisting that an Anglo-Saxon hierarchical development could not substitute self- 
governance. ^ I n  December 1921, thirty-eight Americans including a few 
Congressmen sent a Christian message of sympathy to the Indian Congress while 
throughout the 1920s, the American consul’s account of the independence movement 
and those of American articles became more upbeat.
That the inter-war years marked a transition of America’s privileging the missionary 
narrative above the Anglo Saxon narrative for categorising, attaching meaning and 
engaging India meant that the latter narrative was still though infrequently employed 
used to understand India. Hollywood continued to emphasise Indian stereotypes, such 
as the rebellious tribesman or the soldier loyal to the British.K atherine Mayo’s 
‘Mother India’ in 1927, America’s most widely read book about India, described 
India’s “inertia, helplessness, lack of initiative and originality, lack of staying power 
and sustained loyalties, sterility of enthusiasm, weakness of life vigour itself’, hence 
justifying the Anglo-Saxon hierarchy and colonialism.'^^
However, by the war’s onset, America had predominantly locked India’s 
categorisation within America’s missionary narrative with implications for America’s 
treatment of India’s growing stmggle for political identity and expression. The 
nucleus of the cementing of this cognitive privileging was Mohandis (‘Mahatma’) For
This was so despite the American press having to contended with British censorship and dominance 
of India’s information production through Reuters 
Gandhi described Mayo’s work as “a drainage inspector report”, while an Indian professor asked if, 
“I wrote only of what I found in your slums, your night club dives, and your divorce courts, it would 
also be a shocking story, wouldn't it?” (See C Bowles, 1954:78)
74
most Americans, Gandhi personified David complete with loincloth, defying the 
British Goliath and re-enacting America’s own inception. This depiction of Gandhi’s 
posture resonated not only with America’s narrative past, but its narrative future in the 
westward mission to emancipate, civilise and progress mankind. Gandhi’s oddity also 
fixated America. His centrepiece Jain doctrine of Ahisma (non-violence) fascinated 
America, as did his civil disobedience, such as his 241-mile march to make salt on 
India’s coast in 1930 that was, in America, compared to the defiance of the Boston 
Tea Party. While Haridas Muzimdar, an American Indian, read the Declaration of 
Independence at Independence Hall, Americans mobilised behind Indian 
independence. A hundred clergymen petitioned Ramsay McDonald to accord with 
Gandhi, while ninety-nine students petitioned Hull to intervene.
Engagement Suppressant
War delayed America’s engaging India within the missionary narrative.* "^* The 
tension between India’s categorisation within America’s mission and America’s 
support of its British ally intensified during the war. Indian nationalists, already 
inflamed after New Delhi declared war without consulting a single Indian, demanded 
Indian independence in return for supporting Britain’s war effort and rejected offers 
of ‘eventual’ dominion sta tus.B rita in  in turn was reluctant to grant independence.
In any case, Churchill’s assumption as prime minister in 1940 complicated matters 
because Indian ‘disloyalty’ infuriated him perhaps more than it did any other senior 
British politician.Indian nationalist cries in America thus initially competed against 
war’s demands so when in 1940 Churchill imprisoned thousands of Indian Congress
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party members for their non-co-operation in war, Washington was restrained while 
some newspapers criticised Nehru for betraying the war effort.
Hitler’s racism nevertheless placed limits to the overt use of Anglo-Saxon narrative 
which meant that Britain’s portrayal of India, led by Ambassador Lord Halifax, 
stressed Indian Congress’s non-representation and the Japanese war, not 
independence’s legitimacy nor Anglo-Saxon superiority. Britain stressed a 
fragmented India, unrepresentative Congress and the Japanese war.*^  ^Churchill 
explained in detail in 1942,
“Outside that party and fundamentally opposed to it are 90 million 
Muslims in British India...50 milhons depressed or untouchables.... and 
95 million subjects of Princes.... In all there are 235 millions in these 
large groupings alone out of the 390 millions in all India.”’
Though American official support for Indian nationalists was consequently severely 
restricted, India’s role in the missionary narrative continued to entice engagement. In 
May 1941, Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle proposed Britain seek India as 
an equal partner, Washington’s first serious attempt to reconcile the dispute and first 
policy proposal in favour of Indian nationalists.’^^  Roosevelt, who held deep concerns 
about British colonialism, privately stressed to Churchill during the lend-lease 
programme negotiations to grant greater autonomy to India. Thus Roosevelt’s 
direction of the Atlantic Charter’s third resolution especially at India, “the right of all 
people to choose the form of government under which they will live” which 
epitomised America’s policy boundary between war’s demands and the missionary
76
narrative engagement. Though Churchill interpreted this resolution as applying 
only to Nazi areas, Roosevelt eventually pressured Churchill into allowing the Indians 
to sign the UN Declaration in December 1941.^
Pearl Harbour, Japan’s conquests in early 1942 of Singapore and Burma and the 
attack on Ceylon and India, all of which came after the German conquest in the 
Middle East, helped re-balance the war’s military impact on America’s engagement of 
India. India’s military value rose during 1942 in line with the prospect of the Axis 
powers controlling India, linking Germany and Japan. Roosevelt noted,
“From all I can gather the British defense will not have sufficiently 
enthusiastic support from the peoples of India themselves.... in a strict 
sense, it is not our business. It is, however, of great interest to us from the 
point of view of the conduct of the war.”^^ ^
Furthermore, there was the growing risk that India’s categorisation and meaning 
within the missionary narrative could be blown off course, as China’s would later in 
1949. Subhas Chandra Bose’s pro-Japanese decrees vexed America, especially so 
after he met Ribbentrop and Tojo in 1942 and 1943 with a view to expelling Britain 
from I n d ia .B o s e ’s Azad Hind government, while ineffective, made headlines by 
boldly declaring war on America and Britain in 1943.^ ^  ^Even Gandhi, who barely 
distinguished between Japanese and American morality, gestured goodwill to 
Japan.^^^
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The combination of less restricted engagement of India within the missionary 
narrative, and protection of that narrative through India, increased, as Malik reveals, 
American pressure for Indian independence in 1942.*^  ^It mattered not that in that 
year, sixty percent of Americans could locate neither China nor India on a map/^^ 
Nor that America’s trade with India accounted for a marginal two percent of its 
overall t r a d e / I t  was however important that while Consulate General Thomas 
Wilson, America’s de facto ambassador in India, criticised Britain for not taking, “a 
realistic view”, a member of the Cripps delegation to India noted the,
“interest of the American public in India is enduring and widespread... it 
is persistent; there is almost everywhere and #  almost any period an 
audience for speakers or writers on India.., interest in India arises from 
the seeming similarity between the relations of Britain to Indian 
independence and of Britain to the independence of the Thirteen 
Colonies”.'™ ™
Hull summarised the administration’s new tension,
“any change in India’s constitutional status would be brought about only 
if Great Britain were in agreement, and we realized full well that, with 
Britain for her life, we should take no step and utter no words that would 
impede her struggle. We also knew that the British Government, and 
Prime Minister Churchill in particular, considered India their own 
problem, and that any attempt by the United States to bring pressure to
The New York Times, Readers Digest, Newsweek, Time, Congress and the State Department were 
all strong Indian independence supporters
78
solve it might give rise to controversy between our two governments and 
peoples. It was a therefore a delicate question how far we could go in any 
representations to the British to grant independence, or in any actions that 
might encourage the Indians to demand it immediately.. .But in private 
conversations the President talked very bluntly about India with Prime 
Minister Churchill... for the sake of good relations with Britain we could 
not tell the country what we were saying privately, we were saying 
everything that the most enthusiastic supporter of India’s freedom could 
have expected, and we were convinced that the American people were 
with us.”^^ ^
Till 1942, Churchill had used the Muslim voice to stall independence negotiations, 
insisting that he would not, “take any step which would alienate the Muslims”. 
However Japan’s conquest of Rangoon in March 1942 and ongoing American 
pressure compelled Churchill to open negotiations through the subsequent Stafford 
Cripps mission, the American media’s most closely followed event ever in India. 
Roosevelt resumed direct petitioning by suggesting to Churchill that an interim Indian 
government would be useful as had been the Articles of Confederation for 
America. Roosevelt maintained involvement by appointing a representative in
April, Louis Johnson, who assumed de facto chief mediator responsibilities between 
Indians and the Raj.
In March 1942, Cripps offered India dominion status, with secession after the war -  
an offer that was made public simultaneously in London, New Delhi and 
Washington}^^ Congress rejected the plan, as Churchill knew it would, because
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Britain retained defence responsibilities and Gandhi was in any case reluctant to join 
the war before independence.'^^ However, Japan’s bombing of India’s coast in April 
enabled Johnson to win Linlithgow and Wavell’s support to enlarge the Indians’ 
defence role. Roosevelt again comparing India with, “the inception of the 
Government of the United States”, pressed Churchill,
“The almost universal feeling is that the deadlock has been due to the 
unwillingness of the British Government to concede the right of self- 
government to the Indian people.... If the current negotiations are allowed 
to collapse and if India were subsequently to be invaded successfully by 
the Japanese with attendant serious military defeats for the Allies; it 
would be hard to overestimate the prejudicial effect of this on American 
public opinion”.
However, Churchill terminated Cripps’s mission when Hopkins advised Churchill,
“Johnson’s original mission to India had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the British proposals and ... he was not acting as the representative of the 
President in mediating the Indian business... Cripps was using Johnson 
for his own ends, Cripps being very anxious to bring Roosevelt’s name 
into the picture”.
Johnson, hence redundant, was recalled in May 1942 and aside from the cosmetic stay 
by Roosevelt’s confidant, William Philhps, to India from December 1942, Roosevelt 
halted attempts seeking to engage India within the missionary narrative. In fact, the
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Cripps mission was Roosevelt’s last opportunity to resolve the tension between 
engaging India in the missionary narrative and committing to Anglo-Saxon unity in 
war. With this proving irreconcilable and focus scarce because of war, Roosevelt 
preferred to delay the entire independence issue. In July therefore, though Roosevelt 
discussed strategy with the Indian leadership to obtain a British pledge for Indian 
independence, he outright rejected Azad’s request for American involvement.'^^ By 
the same token, when Churchill draconianly imprisoned a hundred thousand Indian 
Congress members after the ‘Quit India’ campaign in August, Washington maintained 
public s i lence.From 1943, Washington’s focus on the war intensified and in 1944, 
Washington also had elections. India was so removed firom the American agenda 
during the second half of the World War that it was not even discussed at the Yalta or 
San Francisco conferences in 1945.'*'
Nonetheless, throughout the war, America’s broader political fabric continued to 
privilege the missionary narrative to make sense of India, over and above the 
categorisation and meaning derived fi'om the alliance between war and the Anglo- 
Saxon narrative. In August 1942, Senator Robert Reynolds requested the Senate to 
support mediation while in September, fifty-five leading Americans and South Asians 
signed a New York Times fiill-page advertisement, ‘Time for Mediation Now’, urging 
Roosevelt to re-open negotiations.'*^ Days later, two hundred prominent Americans 
signed a letter to the Senate expressing concern about Indian independence’s 
slowdown bearing on the Asian war.'*^ In October, Wendell Wilkie, the Republican 
presidential candidate of 1940, spoke to a radio audience of thirty-six million, 
criticising inaction in India, “When the aspirations of India for fireedom were put aside 
to some future unguaranteed date, it was not Great Britain that suffered in public
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esteem in the Far East. It was the United States.”’ At the war’s end, and despite his 
abstinence from India, even Roosevelt had clearly though privately rejected the 
Anglo-Saxon for missionary narrative for understanding India, “there are over 
1,100,000,000 brown people. In many Eastern countries, they are ruled by a handful 
of whites and they resent it. Our goal must be to help them achieve independence.”’^^
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CHAPTER THREE 
TRUMAN PART I: PAKISTAN AND COGNITIVE TEETHING
Having developed a theoretical framework in the first chapter, and expanded it during 
chapter two in the context of American policy with specific scrutiny of the two 
American identity narratives which governed policy to Pakistan, being the anti­
communist and, less directly, missionary identity narratives, the analysis of US policy 
to Pakistan until 1960 thus commences. American policy to Karachi during the 
Truman administration and prior to the Korean War reflected two contrasting and 
opposed themes with quite differing kismets within the identity narrative framework. 
On the one hand, America failed to categorise and attach meaning within its narratives 
to a Pakistan that materiahsed too quickly in a cloud of considerable uncertainty, 
except the sparse negative meanings derived from Pakistan’s threat to the unity of the 
India through which America had demonstrated an appetite to fulfil its missionary 
narrative. Even when Pakistan was partitioned, America could understand it little 
beyond neatly wrapping it with the country it had been carved out of. Since 
Washington had little neither understanding of nor interest Pakistan and given 
London’s lead for South Asia, America consequently sought to avoid Pakistan all 
together.
Whereas such non-cognition inaugurated early policy to Pakistan in the ascendancy, it 
was well eroded by the time of the Korean War by a second contrasting theme within 
the identity narrative framework. The growing understanding of the world through the 
anti-communist narrative extended to South Asia -  and specifically sources of 
potential communist growth, deemed to be depravation and conflict. The American 
antennae were thus acutely sensitive to Pakistan’s conflicts with India, specifically
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Kashmir, and to a lesser extent with Afghanistan. This focus was accompanied by the 
further extension of anti-communist cognition from late 1948 with the threat and 
anxiety posed to the anti-communist and missionary narratives by China’s conversion 
and then to the anti-communist narrative by troubles in the British Middle East. While 
India rejected supporting America’s narratives in Asia, Pakistan responded 
enthusiastically to the anti-communist narrative. The coincidence of America’s 
concerns about communism in the Middle East and Washington’s emerging 
understanding of Pakistan within anti-communism meant that America geographically 
re-located Pakistan into the Middle East, as an anti-communist ally, and aside from 
South Asia -  thereby reversing both its earlier location of Pakistan in South Asia and 
its cognitive difficulty with Karachi.
Non-Cognition
Focusing on Truman’s America and Pakistan as subject and object respectively, with 
implications for the classification of and discourse relating to Pakistan, is particularly 
appealing since Truman’s administration was the first American government to 
address Pakistan. Pakistan emerged during an intense period of American global 
cognition fuelled by and reflected in the politico-military reconstruction of communist 
Russia. By the time Mohammed Ali Jinnah was appointed Governor General in 
August 1947 of the then largest Muslim country in the world, the Truman Doctrine 
and Marshall Plan had been announced, and the Cold War was underway. It was 
within this environment that Washington first responded to Pakistan.
88
Early American policy to Pakistan was severely restricted by an inability to classify 
Pakistan. Jinnah himself was aware of the cognitive difficulties that Pakistan posed 
for Washington.^ Chaudhri suggests a secular-religious origin to this impediment, the, 
“idea of dividing a country on the basis of religion was alien to their (American) 
secular psyche”.^  This is in itself unconvincing since America’s own manufactured 
origins are religious, in the Puritan fundamentalists, and Washington’s support for 
religiously identified states in Israel and Saudi Arabia is well catalogued.' Nor was 
America’s inability to understand Pakistan a function of distance. With America’s 
globalised focus fi'om late 1946, physical distance diminished as a factor in 
classifying and attaching meaning to object states. For instance, the Truman Doctrine 
focused five thousand miles away on Greece and Turkey.
America’s cognitive difficulty with Pakistan can be elucidated via America’s identity 
narratives. Unlike India and China, territories that Americans knew very little about, 
but which nonetheless gravitated with roles within American narratives, specifically 
in their cases - the mission, and excepting America’s glances to Pakistan during the 
Cripps mission to India in 1942, American narratives initially neither categorised nor 
applied meaning to Pakistan, hence denying any subsequent engagement. The anti­
communist narrative only gained strong overriding currency in late 1946, and only 
spread beyond its application in Europe in 1948. Real Americans’ stories about 
themselves, that needed reaffirmation through enactment and protection, had little to 
declare about and thus engage Pakistan through. Key to this shortfall was Pakistan’s 
swift and uncertain birth, a shortfall widened by America’s distracted attention during 
the early Cold War, for whereas India had resided in the American consciousness
' Two particularly good studies in this regard are C Mansour, J A Cohen, “Beyond Alliance: Israel in 
US Foreign Policy”, 1994, New York: Columbia University Press, and T G Fraser, “The USA and the 
Middle East since the World War 2”, 1989, London: Palgrave
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since Columbus’s error of eight thousand miles, Pakistan’s residency barely extended 
to four years.
Object Emergence: Pakistan
Washington, though familiar with the Indian independence movement, was 
unprepared for the decolonisation process’s speed and within that, Pakistan’s sudden 
and ambiguous emergence. Europe and America treated the war’s conclusion as an 
end that required rest and reflection. In contrast, 1945 was a beginning for India’s re­
energised nationalists, who were lifted by three unexpected accelerations to 
independence over consecutive years.
First, was Attlee’s shock defeat of Churchill in the 1945 election. Against forecasts of 
a Conservative victory by seventy seats. Labour won by a majority of a hundred and 
forty-six.^ In fact, the Attlee household only considered moving from Stanmore to 
Westminster on the election night itself."^  The new Labour government had a strong 
pro-Congress contingent including Secretary of State for India, Pethick-Lawrence, a 
friend of Gandhi’s since 1926, and President of the Board of Trade, Stafford Cripps, 
as well as a commitment to Indian independence in its manifesto. Though doubts were 
expressed till June 1947 about Britain’s commitment to Indian independence, few 
seriously queried whether Britain would soon leave India.^ Nonetheless, Labour did 
not initially accelerate devolution. Unprepared for government, it was paralysed in 
India for lack of a clear agenda.^ Furthermore, key government members had no 
ambition to wreck the empire. Imperialists such as Attlee, Bevin and Morrison, 
though less zealous than Churchill, dominated Labour’s foreign policy.^
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The second unexpected thrust came from the Indian mutinies in 1946. This triggered 
an urgency in London to solve India’s tensions, reflected in the sending of a Cabinet 
Mission to India in March 1946, in its selection of members and its terms of 
reference. Cripps, Pethick-Lawrence and Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
were sent to India for an indefinite period with a cabinet mandate to agree 
independence.^ They went, “out with a new and almost exasperated determination to 
finish the business, ” and though they failed. Viceroy Wavell, who had pushed 
Churchill to expedite independence, suddenly felt London was rushing too fast. ^
The final momentum arose in 1947 when a difficult winter hit Britain’s economy. 
Electricity was rationed daily for a few hours, nearly all industry was shut and 
unemployment rose to six million. This amplified the disarray surrounding the 
Labour-Congress attempt to suppress Pakistan by creating a pan-Indian government. 
The combination of weakness and disarray precipitated a panicked withdrawal. In 
February 1947, Attlee announced the decision to leave India by June 1948. Louis 
Mountbatten, Viceroy from February, was concerned about India’s communal 
violence, brought forward the deadline to August 1947.^° The final separation and 
independence deal was struck in May 1947 with most minor issues cleared in June.^  ^
The 1935 India Act had taken six years to complete. The 1947 Indian Independence 
Act was completed in six weeks.
If India’s rushed independence hampered Washington’s understanding of events, 
Pakistan’s creation was a whirlwind that even Whitehall had difficulty grasping. The 
Muslim League, formed in 1906, remained dormant till the late 1930s. It even had
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difficulty raising its quorum of seventy-five members at the famous 1930 Allahabad 
session when Iqbal petitioned for a Muslim state. Though the intellectual origins of 
a separate Muslim state in India date at least to 1887, the political drive to Pakistan 
emerged late - the name ‘Pakistan’ was invented only in 1933.^  ^Further, in the 1937 
Indian elections, only 4.4% of India’s Muslims voted for the League and its 
separatist.
Yet ten years later, the drive to Pakistan had become almost unstoppable. Congress’s 
mismanagement of Indian Muslim identity sensitivities immediately after the 1937 
elections, and the League’s revitalisation through the Cripps Mission and Churchill’s 
use of Pakistan to smother Indian independence, turned the League’s fortunes. In the 
1945 election, the League won 89% of the Muslim vote in the Central Assembly, 
hence all Muslim reserved seats. In the provincial elections, the League won 442 out 
of 509 Muslim seats. Though the League won only Bengal and Sindh and lost to 
Congress in the North-West Frontier Province (‘NWFP’), Punjab and Assam, the 
British uncritically accepted the League’s claim to all these territories.^^ Precisely 
during this mercurial rise, Washington was focused on the European war and its only 
focus on South Asia was on India’s independence and not its partition.
The difficulties that the League’s rise presented were compounded by the reluctance 
of both Britain, from whom Washington took its lead, and the Indian Congress to 
accept Pakistan, a concept disadvantaged at birth by its synonymy with communalism 
in contrast to Congress’s politically correct nationalism.'^ London did not want to 
partition its imperial jewel into a “hopeless patchwork”, for within the empire, the Raj 
was especially honoured, “The whole thing is and always has been a love affair”.'*
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Even the June 1947 White Paper, which outlined Britain’s departure and India’s 
partition, barely identified itself as a partition plan. Viceroys Linlithgow, Wavell and 
Mountbatten, and the British generally, were strongly opposed to the emergence of 
Pakistan. Wavell, who was Commander in Chief of India in 1942 and despite 
remembering the League’s wartime support that contrasted with Congress’s 
disruption, went so far as to reject the viability of Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission 
preferred to give India to Nehru and ignore Pakistan, the central impediment in 
various guises throughout the independence process.^® London also underestimated 
the League despite Wavell’s warnings about the Pakistan demand’s muscle.^' In 
March 1946, reflecting Whitehall’s view. The Economist hence fi'owned, “the case for 
a complete partition of India has not been made out and is steadily being disproved by 
the hard facts of economics and strategy.”^^
Only after ‘Direct Action Day’ in August 1946, when five thousand died in Hindu- 
Muslim clashes in Calcutta and which ignited massacres across India, including the 
killing of seven thousand Muslim children and women by Hindus in October in Bihar, 
did London seriously consider the possibility of Pakistan.^^ Even then, London was 
undecided though The Economist reversed its earlier analysis and noted the Muslim 
demand, “was something more than factional strife within a single nation.” "^^ Weeks 
later it added, India’s “division into two or more separate states would accord with, 
rather than outrage, normal expectation by European standards.”^^  Yet at this time, 
Cripps was adamant that Britain should leave India exclusively to Congress.^^
Further, when Mountbatten flew to India as late as March 1947, he did so quite 
uncertain of Pakistan’s eventuality.^^
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Congress, which had developed good contacts with Washington during the war, was 
even more reluctant than London to accept Pakistan. Gandhi made clear that Congress 
would accept partition only, “over my dead body”.^ * Nehru pursued a united India of 
a weak federation with strong provinces even as late as April 1947.^  ^ Congress’s 
Maulana Azad, a devout Muslim, rather hopefully expected as late as May 1947 that 
India would avert partition. Many Congress members felt in any case that Pakistan 
would collapse after partition and revert to Indian control.^® Britain’s reluctance to 
accept Pakistan partly reflected Labour’s close associations with Congress. When the 
Cabinet Mission arrived in 1946, Wavell was “horrified at the deference shown”.^  ^
Pethick-Lawrence requested, “penitence for Britain’s misdeeds in the past” fi*om 
Gandhi.^^
“When he (Gandhi) expressed a wish for a glass of water, the Secretary 
was sent to fetch it himself, instead of sending for a chaprassi; and when 
it did not come at once Cripps hustled off himself to see about it.”^^
Within this Anglo-Indian resistance to Pakistan, conflicting reports made 
Washington’s understanding of events more difficult. British warnings that the 
Pakistan, “movement had now gained so much momentum that (it was) doubtful if 
Jinnah or anyone else could apply the brakes” contrasted with British confidence in 
solving the Pakistan tension.^^ Even the key players repeatedly misled. In April 1946, 
Jinnah tended towards the Cabinet Mission’s plan ‘A’, a federal India that Congress 
then rejected.^^ In October 1946, he gave the impression that he would join the Nehru- 
led interim government. Two months on, he held out the prospect of a federal India if 
Congress accepted London’s interpretation of the Cabinet Plan.^^
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Along with the speed of South Asia’s devolution, uncertainty of Pakistan’s partition 
and resistance to Pakistan was also Pakistan’s self-definitional ambiguity. What 
exactly Pakistan stood for then, nor incidentally since, was not very clear. In the 
1930s, Iqbal thought an Indian Muslim state should consist of Punjab, NWFP, Sindh 
and Baluchistan -  hence ignoring East Pakistan.^^ Syed Abdul Latif s scheme 
published in 1939 outlined ‘four Muslim cultural zones’ in an Indian federation. 
Professors Syed Zafarul Hasan and Muhammed Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh 
conceptualised an India of three sovereign states -  Muslim Bengal, Muslim North- 
West India and Hindu main India. In 1939, the Punjab Muslim League president 
advocated an Indian federation of five states, including two Muslim states.^ ® The 
March 1940 Pakistan Resolution, so named by the Hindu press, sketched a weak 
federal Pakistan with strong provinces.^^ Even this resolution was written in vague 
language to group at least six versions o f ‘Pakistan’ Pakistan’s ambiguity continued 
to 1947. In April 1947, Jinnah refused to define Pakistan beyond a meaningless 
‘sovereign Muslim state’ However, unlike his predecessor ideologues, his was an 
ambiguity of choice. An astute barrister, Jinnah avoided committing to a single 
Pakistan interpretation until the summer of 1947. Indeed, even territorially, Pakistan 
was defined only after partition when India took Calcutta and Pakistan took Lahore.'^^
The effect of Pakistan’s rushed and ambiguous emergence was compounded by 
America’s scarce contact with the League and Jinnah.'" In 1939, Time described 
Jinnah as a Hindu by birth and in 1940, the American press virtually ignored the
" Given Punjab’s dominance of Pakistan, some argue that it was Lahore that took Pakistan in 1947.
The scarce contact between American society and Pakistan continued throughout the period of study. 
The first book published in the US on Pakistan was by Norman Brown as late as 1963.
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Pakistan resolution/^ America first acknowledged an Indian Muslim political voice 
only during the 1942 Cripps Mission though, even then. The New York Times 
journalist Herbert Mathews was surprised when he visited India by the strength of the 
Pakistan movement, which contrasted to the perception of Pakistan in America.^ The 
League’s first unofficial representation in America came in 1944 with Mubarik Ali 
Khan, editor of The New India Bulletin, while its first official representatives in 
arrived in November 1946 with Mohammed Hasan Ispahani and Begum Shah 
Nawaz/^
In contrast, the Indian Congress had an America presence since the early 1920s and a 
familiarity with America’s polity and public alike. Nehru published ‘Unity of India’ 
in Foreign Affairs in 1938.'*^  Anup Singh’s, ‘Nehru: The Rising Star of India’ and 
Krishnalal Shridharani’s, ‘Mv India. Mv America’ in 1939 and 1941 respectively 
were bestsellers in America."^  ^Madam Pandit, Nehru’s influential sister, was a lecture 
celebrity and friend to Eleanor Roosevelt well before 1945.^  ^With Jinnah hardly 
heard of in America, American newspapers consistently presented the Congress 
viewpoint, such as the 1946 Time cover story which portrayed Jinnah as an aloof and 
wealthy troublemaker."^^
Not only could Washington not locate Pakistan within American narratives, but 
America was also reluctant to partition India, and hence disturb its missionary 
narrative through New Delhi. Pakistan was not alone in confronting America’s 
demands for Indian unity. Secretary of State George Marshall discouraged officials 
from contact with India’s princely states to avoid, “any action that might interfere 
with the sound objective of avoiding further Balkanization of India.” °^ When
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Hyderabad resisted joining India, Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson feared a, 
“fragmentation process which might have far reaching effects on any plan for ultimate 
Indian un ity .M arshall thus strongly encouraged Hyderabad to join India.^  ^In 
response to the Indian invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948, his only and meek 
instruction to American officials was to, “avoid any act which might be interpreted as 
a recognition of Hyderabad’s sovereignty or of right to conduct external affairs 
independently of GOF’.^ ^
Understanding Pakistan: Early Strategic Limitations
Given that both America could not understand Pakistan and Pakistan’s destabilising 
of the missionary narrative through India’s dismemberment, America initially 
categorised and attached meaning to Pakistan as an anomaly of the missionary 
narrative, with adverse and hostile implications for the application of meaning on it. A 
variety of gloomy categorisations and meanings were subsequently applied to make 
sense of Pakistan.’^  The least subscribed to though earliest American cognition of 
Pakistan came in the State Department’s first serious assessment of the Muslim 
League in March 1942, which equated the League with hostility to self-government.^^ 
Though Americans seldom employed it, even as late as March 1947, Jinnah was 
compelled to tackle Washington’s misperception that he preferred a continuation of 
British rule to independence.^^ That this perception developed was in part related to 
Jinnah’s fear that American pressure for immediate independence might force London 
to abandon the League.
The Indian Congress did not hesitate to spice America’s search for meaning in Pakistan. Professor T 
P Sinha, a Congress member and Chicago academic, portrayed League members as Nazis, despite ex- 
Congress president Subas Chandra Bose’s working with precisely those Nazis to end British rule.
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In 1942, a local American official reported from India,
“The Muslim position in a few words is that their leaders say that they can 
afford to wait.. .the League will accept an interim arrangement providing 
nothing is done to ‘torpedo or prejudice the Muslim claim for a national 
homeland’ ... All of which in my personal view is ... put forward for 
trading purposes.”^^
This, America’s bargaining chip theory of Pakistan, in contrast, persisted throughout 
the independence struggle. In 1943, George Merrellm the senior State Department 
official in India, described Pakistan as, “the greatest, if not the only, bargaining point 
the League has”.^  ^Four years later, despite his involvement in the independence 
discussions, Merrell still felt Pakistan was only a, “bargaining point” which Jinnah 
again inadvertently fuelled.^  ^Better known for his Savilie Row suits, ham sandwiches 
and bourbon than for religious adherence, Jinnah had in 1923 even supported the 
renewal of Hindu-Muslim unity and a return to Gandhi’s swaraj.^^ The stubborn 
Muslim Khwoja himself once addressed the oddity of his leadership of the League,
“Have I ever told you that I am your leader as a Mussulmans? I am an 
advocate, pleading the cause of Mussulmans, taking the part of 
Mussulmans, fighting the fight. Nothing more, nothing less.” °^
Given this, it was easy for distanced Americans to see Jinnah as an unprincipled 
political shark for whom the demand for Pakistan was mere rhetoric.
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America’s third early meaning of Pakistan as an anomaly to the missionary narrative 
was as a British stooge, an understanding which was strongly supported by Nehru, 
Azad, Bose and Gandhi who repeatedly emphasised Congress’s role as the 
subcontinent’s sole representative and insisted that the League who, in basing their 
claims on religion, were bigots. Jinnah was labelled a foreigner unlike natives Nehru 
and Gandhi.^^ In April 1942, Louis Johnson, advised,
“I have not dealt with Moslem League represented by Jinnah because I 
know from Cripps’ talk and actions and otherwise that the Moslem 
League has been used as a counter force to the Congress.”^^
That Churchill used the League to delay Indian independence is well documented and 
hence the analysis of Johnson and the later Cambridge school of Indian historiography 
has partial validity.However, such analysis ignores the League’s growth before both 
serious Anglo-Indian discussions about independence and Churchill’s term as prime 
minister, and slights Muslim India’s identity insecurity, which paralleled the growth 
of the Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) movement. Frightened Muslims flocked to the 
League after the 1937 elections not because of London but Hindu cultural and 
political nationalism. Ignorant of this, Americans tended to understand Pakistan as 
London’s synthetic creation, “exploiting communal and native state issues to prolong 
British control”.^ ^
As a result, given these meanings of Pakistan, America was initially reluctant to 
accept Pakistan’s creation. In 1946, Washington felt that the ‘Pakistan’ concept was 
unsound and Acheson hoped that the Executive Council would lead to a pan-Indian
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government with Muslim involvement.^^ Washington even looked to Azad to become 
India’s first leader in the spectacular hope that he could bridge the Congress-League 
gulf. The American Charge d’Affaires in London held a press conference in 
December 1946 still hoping for a united federal India. Similarly, Merrell believed 
until at least February 1947, that a federal Indian government was possible.^^ 
Washington only conceded the separate Muslim state after February 1947, when 
Attlee aimounced India’s partition though even then Acheson continued to hope in 
April for a united India.^  ^More so, in December 1947, Grady, encouraged briefly by 
Mountbatten, even hoped for an Indo-Pakistan federation, instigated by a customs 
union.^^ Only rarely prior to 14^  ^August 1947, did an American official, and only at 
junior levels, impart positive meaning to the League or Pakistan.^^
Though America’s reluctance to accept Pakistan remained only a very secluded 
feature of American policy to Pakistan after its partition, it was lent ongoing 
credibility by Pakistan’s precarious post-independence circumstances. In October 
1947, America’s senior diplomat in Karachi, advised that Pakistan’s economic and 
political difficulties were of, “such proportions as to threaten the very existence of the 
New State”.^ ® Pakistan lacked funds, had border disputes with India and Afghanistan, 
a massive immigration problem, incompetent government structure and a thousand 
miles of enemy territory dividing its population, “our first reaction is ‘this can’t 
work’”.^  ^Likewise, Britain expressed concerns in November 1947 that India was 
trying, “to smother Pakistan in its crib before it can get going on a practical basis.”^^  
Therefore, in December 1947, the State Department’s chief for South Asian affairs, 
Raymond Hare, asked Ambassador Grady, “Should we be thinking still in terms of an 
eventual return of Pakistan to a united India?”^^  It was not surprising then that Malik
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Feroz Khan Noon, a prominent Pakistani, felt compelled in December 1947 to stress 
to local American staff that Pakistan was a permanent entity/"^
South Asian Regionalism
There is nothing ‘natural’ about South Asia as a region, as perhaps some argue, is of 
Africa/ Regions are problematic terms given the various heterogeneities within them. 
Two region’s borders tend to share more with each other than with their respective 
regional centres, an issue which Braudel raised in the context of the Mediterranean. 
Regional boundaries to some extent therefore falsify realities.^^ After Pakistan’s 
creation, Washington’s reluctance to accept India’s partition and inability to pro­
actively place Pakistan within a narrative meant Washington treated Pakistan 
intimately with the country from which it had just emerged. Unable to comprehend 
Pakistan, Washington placed it with India into a single South Asia region. This 
cognition coincided with Indian aspirations,
“The All-India Congress Committee earnestly trusts that, when present 
passions have subsided, India’s problems will be viewed in their proper 
prospective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be 
discredited and discarded”.^ ^
If that was mere public political rhetoric, Nehru repeatedly predicted privately that 
integration will inevitably come. Even many Pakistanis, as Faiz Ahmed Faiz 
demonstrated, regretted partition.
'' Even then, V Y Mudimbe’s study, “The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of 
Knowledge”, 1988, Indiana University Press, reveals the construction of Africa as a European object of 
Otherness and exotic projections.
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This stain-covered daybreak, this night-bitten dawn,
This is not that dawn of which there was expectation;
This is not the dawn with longing for which
The friends set out (convinced) that somewhere they would meet
Hence, throughout 1947 and 1948, America treated Pakistan exclusively within South 
Asia/^ For instance, in September 1948, the CIA appraised Pakistan only within the 
context of South Asia -  specifically India/^ This report emphasised the most apparent 
aspect of treating Pakistan within South Asia - advising against the unilateral 
favouring of either India or Pakistan, which would be a, “very dangerous approach.”*® 
The commitment to impartiality between Indian and Pakistan was broadly sustained 
throughout the first Truman administration, “Our policy is to remain impartial in all 
Pakistan-India disputes”.*^  One committee reported, “We may defeat our own 
purposes if by extending fiiendship to any one country in this area we alienate the 
fiiendship of one or more of the other South Asian countries”.*^  That Americans did 
not blame Jinnah alone for India’s dismemberment made impartiality easier for as 
Merrell felt, “the present situation is as much a result of Congress leaders’ political 
ineptitude and lack of vision as of Mr Jinnah’s intransigence.”*^
Indeed, impartiality was pursued with bizarre zeal. In October 1947, during partition’s 
mass migration of fifteen million people, Nehru requested ten transport planes from 
America to airlift from Pakistan, fifty thousand refugees who had fled in panic from 
Punjab to the NWFP. New Delhi feared a bloodbath particularly after four hundred of 
these refugees had been massacred by Pakistanis in September.*"  ^However, Truman
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rejected the request since Pakistan had not acquiesced to such request nor would it 
likely do so. Truman’s solution, that a joint Indo-Pakistan request be submitted, left 
Grady with the awkward explaining to New Delhi, “If we made a loan to Pakistan, 
India would resent it unless we gave the same to India. This applies to all matters 
right down the line.”^^
Though Washington failed to recognise it, defining Pakistan intimately close to India, 
was strategically fortunate for the Truman administration, even if the inadvertency 
itself masked problems for later administrations. Fear of Indian Hinduism was, and 
remains, the nucleus of Pakistan’s self identities and narratives. Attempting to engage 
Pakistan without recognising this, contends with a (identity narrative based) reahty 
that does not correspond to that of Pakistan -  and as such constitutes engaging 
Pakistan outside of its reality. Given the huge implications on American policy to 
Pakistan, especially felt during the Eisenhower presidency, it is worth dwelling on 
Karachi’s political reality in some detail.
When Marshall first met independent India’s first ambassador to Washington, the 
conspicuously Muslim Asif Ali, he admitted that, “my knowledge of India was not 
very great.”^^  America’s lack of detailed familiarity with India was important. In 
seeing parallels between Indian and American independence, Washington neglected 
Indian nationalism’s Hindu origins and nuances, in contrast to Nehru who was aware 
that India’s mass living and thinking was not secular.Hindutva  provided Indian 
political nationalism its backbone, and preceded by many decades the demand for 
political independence. In the 1820s, Rommohan Roy, who many consider modem 
India’s father, founded the Brahmo Samaj to purify Hinduism.^^ The Society for the
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Promotion of National Feeling among the Educated Natives in Bengal was formed in 
1861 to promote Hindu culture and medicine while concurrently, the Arya Samaj 
sought Hinduism’s purification firom foreignisms.^^ The celebrated 1857 rebellion was 
itself largely a religious not political reaction.^® Soldiers were disciplined for refusing 
to bite cartridges greased with cow and pig fat -  excruciating to Hindu and Muslim 
respectively.
In contrast, Indian political nationalism began later and was actually originally pro- 
British. When Disraeli proclaimed Victoria as Empress of India in 1877, Indians 
rejoiced.^' Nineteenth century Indian political leaders including even Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak were loyal to the crown.^^ Congress’s inaugural meeting in 1885 ended with 
Allan Octavian Hume leading three cheers for the empress and on her diamond 
jubilee, Gandhi celebrated by planting a tree and distributing presents.^^ Indian 
nationalism’s founding fathers, Roy, Dayananda and Vivekananda never engaged 
British imperialism and Gandhi only did so in 1909 when London rejected improving 
Indian rights in South Afiica. British nationals such as George Bernard Shaw in fact 
led Indian political nationalism’s criticism of imperial rule before indigenous Indians 
did.^ "^  It took the Amritsar massacre to provoke Nehru to independence. Dyer’s 
massacre in 1919, of nearly four hundred unarmed civilians in an enclosed garden, 
denying them warning and medical assistance, shocked Nehru, “I realised then, more 
vividly than I had ever done before, how brutal and immoral imperialism was and 
how it had eaten into the souls of the British upper-classes.”^^
This developing political nationalism demanded an Indian past in which to root 
nationhood, exemplified by Chattopadhyay’s “We have no history! We must have
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history”.^  ^Hindu nationalism provided that history and backbone, “Indians were now 
speaking for themselves about their past and carving out an autonomous space in the 
decolonisation of the mind”.^  ^Hindu culture disseminated into Congress, which held 
its first session in a Brahmin institution. Among Congress’s seventy-two founding 
delegates in 1885, only two were Muslim despite Muslims constituting a fifth of 
India. ‘The Cow Protection Society’, formed in 1882 to prevent Muslims, though not 
Britons, fi*om killing cows, a Hindu symbol of fertility, was supported by many senior 
Congress members. The Society’s meeting in 1893 was held in Congress’s pavilion 
after its annual session at Nagpur. Tilak, the leader of Congress’s larger faction at the 
century’s turn, took a key role in reviving Hindu festivals. Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj 
protest against India’s Anglicisation in 1909 was immersed in Hinduism, as were his 
use of terms such as swadeshi for boycotting foreign goods.^^
“Congress’s inclusive nationalist ideology lacked reassurance on two 
counts: firstly, because of the presence of Hindu communalists in its 
ranks; and, secondly, because of the influence of Hindu cultural symbols 
in the nationalist political discourse.”^^
India’s construction, imbued with Hindutva, thus had strong anti-Muslim elements, 
“Hinduness has been constantly constructed in opposition to the attributes of the 
Muslim ‘other. The construction of the mythical Vedic golden age characterised 
by pristine Hinduism, marginalized Muslims. It reduced India to a Hindu civilisation,
“Hindus are the true, legitimate children of the bharat Mata. No matter 
who confiscates their wealth, their dignity, their fi-eedom, their princely
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States, their landed property; the Hindus will still retain the right to use the 
adjective ‘National’.
Deep-seated European fears of Islam combined with the work of Hindu reformers to 
popularise the perception of Muslims as cruel and depraved through works such as 
Kisorlal Goswami’s novel ‘Tara’ in 1902.^°  ^The Benarsi writer Bharatendu 
Harischandra enabled Chatteijee in 1932 to oddly enough view Clive’s defeat of 
Muslim Siraj-ud-Daula at the 1757 Battle of Plassey, inaugurating British rule, as 
liberation from tyranny.V inayak Domodar Savarkar’s ‘Hindutva: Who is Hindu’ in 
1923 insisted Muslims were foreigners and the Hindu nation’s future lay with a Hindu 
state. Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar’s ‘We. or Our Nationhood Defined* even praised 
Nazism’s purging of Semitic races as a, “good example for us in Hindustan to learn 
and profit by”.^ °^  Resistance to Muslim Mughal rule metaphored resistance to Britain. 
The seventeenth century Shivaji Bhonsle, who fought Mughals, became an Indian 
hero. In contrast, the Muslim emperors Jahanghir and Aurangzeb, who banned Hindu 
festivals and the building of Hindu temples, were extensively vilified.^®  ^The foreign 
races, insisted Golwalkar,
“must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect 
and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of 
glorification of the Hindu race and culture.”^
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Washington was totally oblivious to Pakistan’s origination from Muslim India’s fear 
of Hindu identity, as demonstrated in America’s early cognition of Karachi/' The 
Muslim response to this insecurity paralleled Hindutva’s growth, not Indian political 
nationalism, with significant implications for America’s attempted geographic 
location of Pakistan as a Middle East state from 1950 to 1954. As early as 1860, Syed 
Ahmed Khan felt British colonial rule was needed to protect India’s Muslims.’®^ 
Khan, the intellectual inspiration for the Aligarh Movement and credited with the 
two-nation theory, advocated an Indian Muslim state in 1887 -  decades before 
Congress demanded independence. Muslim groups flowered years before Congress 
was established, but only after Hindutva’s renaissance - ‘The Muhammadan Literary 
Society’ and the ‘Central National Muhammadan Association’ were formed in 1863 
and 1877 respectively. The Muslim League was formed in 1906 to oppose Hindu 
swadeshi riots, and to involve Muslims in the ongoing constitutional reforms after 
Hindu revivalists had used the limited devolution in municipal committees to great 
advantage.
Though early twentieth century Muslim fear of Hinduism remained subdued, the 
Hindu-Muslim schism was never far from the surface. Ten thousand Molaphs, 
fanatical Muslims, rampaged in 1921, killing and forcibly converting thousands of 
Hindus, which triggered riots throughout the 1920s.^^° Insensitive Congressional 
decisions coincided with the growing tension. From 1920, Congress conducted its 
affairs in Hindi while Gandhi campaigned to make Hindi’s Devnagrahi script, India’s 
official language. Whereas at the 1916 Lucknow Pact, Congress recognised the 
League’s representation of India’s Muslims, the Nehru Report of 1929 rejected
A contemporary underestimation of this fear’s role in defining Pakistan and its ‘national interests’ is 
found in Buzan’s, “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis” in G Rizvi and B Buzan (1986).
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outright the claim. At the September 1931 round table conference in London, Ramsay 
MacDonald welcomed, “My Hindu and Muslim friends” to which Gandhi inteqected, 
“There are only Indians here.”^^^
One key catalyst for Muslim insecurity was Congress’s insensitivity after the 1937 
elections, which flooded Muslims to the League. Congress excluded the League 
from the UP provincial government where the League and its allies captured twenty- 
nine of the thirty-five seats for Muslims.^ New provincial Congress governments 
banned the killing of cows or eating of beef. Hindu patronage, restrained by two 
centuries of the Raj, returned with a vengeance, inadvertently reviving the League. In 
October 1937, Jinnah traded his Savile Row suits for sherwanis. In the three months 
to October, the League established a hundred and seventy new branches and recruited 
a hundred thousand members -  mostly from Muslim minority areas; thus Jinnah 
boasted, “Within less than six months we have succeeded in organising the 
Musalmans all over India as they never were during the last century and a half.”^^  ^In 
1939, while Muslims accused Congress of imposing a blasphemous national anthem, 
‘Bande Mataram’, Jinnah pronounced partition the only solution.^
Consequently, Aitzaz Ahsan’s suggestion that Pakistan was the culmination of a long 
established cultural Indus tradition that created a distinctly Pakistani personality 
echoes Ayesha Jalal’s description of Pakistan as a, “veritable intellectual 
wasteland”.^ T h e  Pakistan demand was strongest in precisely those areas removed 
from the Indus - such as Bombay, Aligarh and UP; and least pronounced in the areas 
of the Indus such as Sindh and Punjab.* Indeed, the majority of Pakistanis (in 
Bengal) were almost a thousand miles away from the Indus. Nor was Pakistan, “an
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Islamic state to save Moslems from Hindu Raj.”^^  ^Syed Abul A’la Maudoodi, who 
founded the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, opposed 
Pakistan’s creation, using the vacuous argument that Islam prohibits nationalism.^ 
Iqbal, who helped legitimise Pakistan within Islam, emphatically repudiated Pakistan 
as a theocracy, “Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim 
states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states”. Jinnah 
also emphasised, including in his Independence speech, Pakistan’s secularism.^^^
Pakistan was the outcome of Muslim India’s reaction to identity anxiety stemming 
from Hindu India’s development.*^^ Anxiety was compounded by partition’s brutality, 
in which a million people died. Hindu India was integral to Pakistan’s identity and 
creation. All identities use a narrative contrast as a technology for self-definition, but 
in Nehru’s observation of Pakistan, “a nation created out of opposition to things”, this 
was particularly so.*^  ^Resultantly, Pakistan’s policy was guided by its 
overwhelmingly dominant identity narrative, anti-Indianism.^" Beyond using the anti- 
India lens, Pakistan could seldom and scarcely understand the world nor engage it. 
Other Pakistani identities were insufficiently internalised for Pakistan to categorise 
reality and attach meaning with.^" Hence the Bengali agitation in the 1950s, based on 
West Pakistan’s stifling discrimination against East Pakistan, was seen by Karachi as 
exclusively a Hindu conspiracy.* "^* The animosity continued throughout the Truman 
and Eisenhower period; for instance, the Indian Muslim actor Dilip Kumar avoided 
any Muslim role till the 1960 blockbuster, “Mughal-E-Azam”.
At the nucleus of Pakistan’s reality, fifty years after its creation, the Indian presence remains 
dominant, Islamabad’s obsession with India continues to vastly exceed its concern for the welfare of its 
own population,
A secondary Pakistani identity narrative existed in Islam but this was unpopular with Pakistan’s 
unelected Westernised ehte who viewed the Islamic framework as impractical and medieval.
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That the Truman administration stumbled into Pakistan’s reality by locating Pakistan 
close to India was highly fortunate. America’s cognition of Pakistan in South Asia, 
however derived, coincided with Karachi’s reality. Washington’s analysts, who never 
doubted the intensity of the Indo-Pakistan relationship, did nevertheless fail to 
appreciate its strength and centrality for Pakistan until the mid-1950s. They 
demonstrated only a starved understanding of Pakistan’s driving impetus. This veiled 
a cognitive strategic failure that would later cost Eisenhower, by way of military and 
economic aid engagement, more than a billion dollars and immensely frustrated 
Kennedy and Johnson who had to contend with a Pakistan that America had already 
committed to outside of Karachi’s reality, through the anti-communist SEATO and 
CENTO.
Lack of Interest
America’s inability to categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan was intimately tied 
as cause and effect of America’s distraction elsewhere. In its overall global policy, 
Washington had insufficient will, which extended into an opposition to engage. 
Resource was central to this reluctance, and was reflected in Truman and Congress’s 
campaigns prior to July 1950 to reduce budget deficits and taxes by controlling 
military spending and foreign commitments. Truman was strongly committed to 
balancing budgets and was disinterested in foreign affairs. In January 1948, his 
request to Congress for a 1949 military budget of US$10bn implied a thirteen percent 
reduction in personnel. In April 1949, when presented with a US$3bn-US$5bn 
budget deficit forecast for 1950, and US$6bn-US$8bn for 1951 and 1952, Truman 
fixed the 1950 defence budget at US$13bn, US$2.5bn below his advisors’ counsel.
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Congress’s antipathy to engaging foreign states impacted key policy. Eden has 
revealed that the senators elected in 1946, such as McCarthy, Bricker and Ecton, 
joined other isolationist leaning and tax-cutting Republicans whose, “antipathy to 
foreign entanglements and financial sacrifices was pronounced”. Congress severely 
criticised the Truman Doctrine for drawing America into a British problem and its 
eventual support was not an endorsement, “We are confironted with the fimdamental 
fact that if we desert the President of the United States at (this) moment we cease to 
have any influence in the world forever.”^^  ^Congress remained unresponsive for 
another priority, the Marshall Plan, which it deliberated for over three months while 
seeking spending reductions to control inflation. Likewise, Congressional 
opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty (‘NAT’), a later centrepiece, forced even the 
JCS to campaign at Capitol Hill.’ °^ Senator Connally, the Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, supported by Senators Donnell and Vandenberg, hesitated 
about America’s ‘automatic involvement’ in Europe.
One consequence of this was America’s lack of resources even where it had political 
will. In early 1948, defense officials advised that they had only 29,000 troops to meet 
emergencies in Europe and the Middle East, and therefore insufficient troops to 
protect their bases in global war.’^  ^The War Department doubted the country could 
support its obligations in Latin America, China, the Philippines, Iran, Western 
Europe, Greece, Turkey and Japan. After the Czech crisis, the JCS pleaded for a 
“rock-bottom” US$6bn to which Truman acceded only half. Armed forces’ planners 
repeatedly complained about the resource gap.' '^  ^Byrnes, Marshall and Acheson 
concurred that the erosion of military strength was undermining policy. Even
I l l
Eisenhower, whose presidential defence policy was parsimonious and marked by his 
warnings of a military-industrial complex, complained about the resources gap/^^ Yet 
NSC 20/4, endorsed in November 1948, defined policy as global anti-communism. 
Truman was interested in neither increasing resources nor reducing commitments, and 
hence the origin of massive retaliation.
Washington’s unwillingness to engage overseas and its restrictive funding closely 
intertwined with America’s inability to make sense of the globe. For a people whose 
identity narratives included only three regions -  Europe, East Asia and the American 
continent, the globe’s sudden opening posed considerable cognitive challenges.'* No 
systemisation process, such as Marshall’s in the State Department during 1947, could 
prepare Washington,*^®
“Not only was the future clouded, a common enough situation, but the 
present was equally clouded. We all had far more than the familiar 
difficulty of determining the capabilities and intentions of those who 
inhabit this planet with us. The significance of events was shrouded in 
ambiguity. We groped after interpretations of them, sometimes reversed 
lines of action based on earlier views, and hesitated long before grasping 
what now seems obvious.”*
America’s unwillingness to engage and inability to cognate the world reverberated in 
a planning famine. Army officials received no answer when they asked Byrnes in 
November 1945 fi*om what areas in Asia and Europe, they could not retreat.*^ ** Four
The American media were not immune to this. Acheson’s speech to the Delta Council in May 1947 
in which he highlighted Europe’s economic crisis, “was received with rather monumental indifference 
and silence in most of the papers.” It only attracted interest after Europe strongly focused on it.
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years later, Kennan and Bohlen confronted the military’s increasingly devious 
attempts to define goals-and-measures.^^^ The Pentagon repeatedly demanded a 
strategic and prioritisation review, and clashed with the State Department and the 
NSC who insisted this was impossible. In fact, Washington’s first global strategic 
plan, NSC 20/4, came out only as late as November 1948. The Pentagon thus 
unusually conducted its own strategic studies, including the first study of aid 
programmes in April 1947.^ "^ ^
Within this restrictive policy framework, Americans focused on the two territories of 
narrative past and future -  Europe and Asia. A JCS study in April 1947 listed the 
overseas priorities - Britain, France and Germany on top, followed by Italy, Greece, 
Turkey, Austria and Japan.W ashington was disinterested beyond Asia and Europe. 
The difficulties in securing aid for Turkey and Greece, despite Greece’s vibrant 
communist community and Turkey’s strategic location, curtailed the executive’s 
appetite beyond Europe and Asia. Numerous Latin American aid requests in 1947 
were rejected, only for a non-committal pact to be offered instead. Nor does the myth 
that America’s tough stand in 1946 drove Russia from Armenia and Iran bear close 
scrutiny. In 1947, American officials warned that if Russia attacked Iran, “it is not 
believed that at present any assistance could be brought to Iran which would 
appreciably enhance Iranian resistance.” "^^"^
Anti-communism and Acheson, Truman’s most influential foreign policy official and 
especially sympathetic to Anglo-Saxon identity, converged Washington’s focus on
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E u r o p e .* Washington’s three aims -  Western Europe’s recovery, binding Germany 
to the West and eliminating Western European communism were respectively 
reflected in the Marshall Plan, NATO and the Truman D octrine.Europe’s recovery 
dominated America’s agenda in 1946-47. Freezing conditions accentuated food and 
fuel shortages and impeded Europe’s fragile recovery. By early 1947, Washington 
committed to the recovery of Europe, “a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding 
ground of pestilence and hate.” "^^  ^Pakistan emerged precisely within this tumult. 
Before Pakistan’s partition, American energy was dedicated to preparing the Marshall 
Plan. After partition, Kennan reported Britain’s economy was, “deteriorating with 
terrific rapidity.. .tragic to a point that challenges description.” "^^® Intelligence reports 
concluded that America had, “to provide Europe with food and fuel this winter if the 
major European countries are to remain sufficiently strong that the basis will survive 
upon which to erect the Marshall Plan”.^ ^^  Marshall, Lovett, Kennan and Forrestal 
speculated whether Europe would survive the winter, and Truman requested Congress 
for aid for Europe before legislative debates.
America’s second European focus was to bind German into the West. Unlike the 
economic crisis, which peaked in 1947-8, Germany reached crisis levels in 1948- 
49.^ ^^  Concerns heightened in 1949 when Schumacher won the election, promising to 
move to independent neutralism .T he CIA warned that West Germany could look 
east for markets and gravitate into Russia.G erm any’s priority for America was 
reflected by Washington’s solution. Ireland’s study demonstrates that America 
supported NAT not to deter Russia but to allow for German rehabilitation.
* While Acheson was Undersecretary of State from August 1945 till June 1947, Byrnes was absent 
from Washington for 350 of his 562 days in office, and Marshall for two of his five months. Acheson’s 
tenure as Secretary of State throughout Truman’s second term came during a critical period of 
American pohcy.
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America’s third focus on Europe was European communism especially in Italy and 
France. Concerns about Italian communism ended through the CIA and Papal rigged 
elections in April 1948.^ ^  ^However, concerns about French communism continued 
America well into 1948. The October 1947 elections gave the Guallist Right and the 
communist Left over seventy percent of the vote, reflecting France’s polarising and 
encouraging Washington to believe that Paris faced either a civil war or a communist 
takeover.
Beyond Europe, East Asia, the America’s missionary narrative westward Frontier, 
was the only region that attracted American focus. Acheson’s perspective on this 
region contrasted with his views on Europe, he, “gave only glancing attention to the 
mass of the world’s population who did not have white skins, advanced industrial 
economies, and homes in western Europe or the United States.”'W h i le  campaigning 
for the Truman Doctrine, he even sidelined China’s collapse.Nonetheless, Capitol 
Hill especially and some administration officials maintained an interest in Asia, 
principally in Japan, China and Indochina. In 1947, growing concerns about Russian 
expansion and European economics encouraged Washington to focus on Japan as an 
engine for regional recovery, preserving the American presence’s beacon.C ongress 
insisted on including US$275m of technical and US$125m of military aid to China, as 
part of the Marshall aid programme, threatening to otherwise block the package.
South Asia
In 1947, Washington recognised South Asia as home to a fifth of the world’s 
population, and Pakistan as the world’s most populous Muslim country, with links
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into the Middle East/^° Washington, especially the JCS, noted Pakistan’s strategic 
value before partition. In July 1947, Marshall noticed that Pakistan, “occup(ied) one 
of the most strategic areas in the world”, proximate to Russia’s industrial heartland 
and oil supply. Middle Eastern oil and as an important communication link in the 
Indian o c e a n . A  colonel, Nathaniel Hoskot, in 1948 stressed Pakistan’s importance 
for long range bombing. Faint mentions of Pakistan’s intelligence value were also 
made in Washington, as were South Asia’s economic assets recognised,
“it ranks first or second in world production of such critical materials of 
war as cotton, mica, manganese, monazite (a source of thorium) and beryl, 
and is a major source of raw materials, investment income, and carrying 
charges for the UK”.*
Despite this. South Asia, including Pakistan, was ranked in fourth and last place of 
priority in a CIA report of September 1947. Within Washington’s post-war reluctance 
to engage overseas and what attention there was in this regard diverted towards 
Europe and the Far East, Washington had little interest in South Asia. Even India’s 
meaning within America’s missionary narrative could not compare with Europe’s 
importance to America’s stories of their past nor with East Asia’s, and especially 
China’s, gravity in their future. In September 1947, Grady rejected Nehru’s request 
for loans, and directed him to US Ex-Im and the IBRD.*^  ^A month later, Acheson 
rejected an Indian request for grain citing Marshall Plan requirements.*^^ In April 
1948, and after repeated appeals for American aid, when Giija Bajpai noted 
America’s lack of interest in the region, Henderson outlined, “Unfortunately, at the 
moment the United States found it necessary to concentrate its efforts and resources
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on resisting aggression in certain other parts of the world.”*^  ^The point was later re­
iterated,
“because of the multitudinous aspect of our overall relations, the 
American Government had not found it practicable in the past to conduct 
comprehensive over-all discussions of bilateral relations.. .it would not in 
all probability be desirable to establish a formal blueprint of relations in as 
much as a blueprint would imply detailed implementation, and possible 
failures of implementation.”^
As late as 1951, there were fewer State Department employees at the Athens embassy 
than at the embassies of New Delhi and Karachi combined, “Some of the employees 
had come to look on their assignment to New Delhi as an unpleasant ordeal, a 
stepping stone to a more congenial post in Europe or South America”.
With interest in South Asia very restrained and given America’s famiharity with India 
in the missionary narrative. New Delhi dominated America’s minimal interest in 
South Asia. Without being able to categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan, 
Washington refrained from engaging it. State Department officials, “were clearly 
aware that the Secretaries of State and Defense attached no high priority to the 
location and exploitation of opportunities for a major American role in Pakistan.”  ^
When illness forced the first ambassador to Pakistan, Paul Ailing, to return to 
Washington after four months, his replacement, eventually Avra Warren, was not 
appointed for two years. This contrasted with the presence of experienced 
ambassadors to India, in Grady and Loy Henderson. There may in fact be merit in
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Venkataramani’s suspicion that Truman would not have been able to locate Pakistan 
on a map/^^ None of America’s major strategic plans from 1945 to 1948 featured 
Pakistan. The JCS’s first definition of primary and secondary bases in September 
1945 only mentioned South Asia for its air transit and landing rights to connect the 
Atlantic and Pacific bases.^^' Even as the value of foreign bases grew with military 
spending reductions, and as strategic planners realised that flights over the North Pole 
were prohibitive, American planners ignored Pakistan. In December 1948, the JCS’s 
list of facilities for advancing security objectives did not feature Pakistan.
However, American apathy did not discourage Karachi or New Delhi from inviting 
American interest in South Asia. India, despite its uneasiness with America, Wanted 
aid and even indicated interest in military collaboration with Washington.^^^ 
Pakistan’s finances were more perilous than India’s since India withheld considerable 
financial and defence assets from Pakistan at partition. Pakistan was also more 
isolated because it distrusted Cripps and Mountbatten’s London, thereby compelling 
Pakistan almost exclusively towards America for aid.^^^  In October 1947, Jinnah 
offered to align Pakistan with America in the Cold War for an enormous US$2bn aid 
over five years, a package that compared to the Marshall aid of US$1.5bn to Italy and 
US$1.4bn to G erm any.Before receiving the rejection, Jinnah requested a further 
five-year US$305m military aid programme -  which was also rejected.With 
expectations plummeting to realism, a US$45m loan was rejected in November 1947, 
with ambassador Ispahani advised to consult the IBRD, Ex-frn or philanthropic 
organisations. Truman was fortunate to hide behind the Mutual Defense
Karachi distrusted Mountbatten because of his delivering Kashmir to India, his closer bonding with 
the Indian Congress and terse relations with Jinnah. To this day Pakistani civil servants, such as Akbar 
Ahmed, continue a popular pohtical pastime of ‘Mountbatten bashing’ - A S  Ahmed, “Jinnah, Pakistan 
and Islamic Identity”, 1997, London: Routledge, 117
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Legislation, in which Congress approved aid only to specific countries, which did not 
include Pakistan, as he was fortunate that Pakistan was still in Britain’s sphere of 
influence/
London and the Lack o f Access
America’s lack of interest was intertwined with its lack of access to Pakistan, 
remaining a mutually reinforcing feature of policy until late 1950. A major aspect of 
America’s restricted access was the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, special 
because of Britain’s place within the Anglo-Saxon hierarchy and crystallised in a 
series of reciprocal preferential arrangements.^^^ The relationship had developed 
during the war, and involved full military cooperation, coordination of alHed strategy 
and production, joint planning, training and intelligence efforts, and was only briefly 
arrested in late 1945. By March 1946, Churchill and the Cold War had resumed it in 
the joint extensive mihtary planning, such as Britain’s agreement to accommodate the 
American air force bases. ^
An important feature within the special relationship was Britain’s sensitivity to any 
encroachment on the Raj. In 1791, an American, William Duane, founded a Calcutta 
newspaper dedicated to the belief that, “all subjects whatever, ought, of right, to be 
publicly, openly, and undoubtedly discussed”. Britain deported him immediately.^*^ 
During the nineteenth century, Britain used Afghanistan, as buffer against Tsarist 
leanings into India in the ‘Forward P o l i c y D u r i n g  the Second World War, the Raj 
and Churchill especially, prevented India’s provincial governments from contact with 
American officials and refused diplomatic representation for American diplomats in
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I n d i a . In September 1942, Churchill even denied Merrell’s request to forward a 
letter from Roosevelt to the imprisoned Gandhi. Linthlithgow scorned American 
interference in India, “their zeal in teaching us our business is in inverse ratio to their 
understanding of even the most elementary of the problems which we have to 
deal.”^^  ^In 1943, he prevented Phillips from seeing Gandhi, who was near death, and 
also denied the American United Press wire service a presence in India.
After war, with continued British pretensions as a global power, reflected in the 
pursuit until 1949 of an independent British-led European and Commonwealth group, 
British hostility to American access in South Asia continued.Grady noted,
“The fact is that His Majesty’s Government feels competitive toward the 
USA in India and does not look with favor on American cooperation with 
the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan”.
Britain pressured America, with the special relationship leverage, to refrain from 
South Asia, which in turn Washington merrily abided with.
Another key part of America’s restricted access to the region was Washington 
recognised Britain’s familiarity with the region derived from a historical association, 
the intimacy between South Asia’s leading politicians with Britain and Britain’s 
continued role in the region. Orientalism existed parallel to Occidentalism. British 
frameworks were standardised across South Asia, demonstrating the imitative nature 
of ‘independence’. When Jinnah and Nehru read their respective independence 
speeches, they did so with upper crust English accents and with English titled offices
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in Governor General and Prime Minister. Britain’s relationship with South Asia, 
especially India, but assumed by Americans with Pakistan too, remained strong -  a 
relationship, and cormection which extended well beyond colonial history.*" The post­
partition Commanders in Chief of India and Pakistan were both British, in General Sir 
Robert Lockhart and General Sir Frank Messervy.^^^
America also relying on Britain’s multi-racial Commonwealth network as an indirect 
policy route, conducted every major American policy under Truman to South Asia 
with close British involvement. America felt no compulsion to acquaint with Pakistan, 
whose ministers lobbied hard for invitations.*’" In fact, Washington, underestimating 
the crunch on British resources, resources that the British government exaggerated, 
pushed Britain to lead in South Asia.^^° Washington encouraged the UK to, “continue 
to assume responsibility for meeting the military requirements of the South Asian 
area”.^ ^^  Five years after deepening American cognition of South Asia, America still 
advised Britain that the, “UK and Commonwealth should continue to have 
responsibility for seeking a solution to problems on the Indian subcontinent.”^ E v e n  
when London invited Washington into South Asia, Truman declined. In January 1948, 
Washington rejected London’s request that Washington lead Kashmir’s conflict 
resolution because, “the familiarity which the British have with the problems of the 
area” and, “in essence the present situation is a further development in the evolution 
of the political problems connected with the British withdrawal from India.”^^ ^
The LSE for instance linked Philip Noel-Baker, Pethick-Lawrence, Clement Attlee and Harold Laski 
who inspired Nehru’s entire generation of Indian sociahsts, to Indian leaders in Krishna Menon, Braj 
Kumar (B K) Nehru, Tarlok Singh and Bhimrao R Ambedkar who wrote the Indian constitution 
During his visit in 1949, Ghulam Mohammed was unable to see either Truman or Acheson while 
Za&ullah Khan managed an audience with Acheson only after extensive can^aigning.
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Anti-Communism
America’s inability to categorise and attach meaning to post-partition Pakistan within 
a narrative and lack of interest in South Asia contrasted with the increasing 
internalisation and intensification of the anti-communist identity narrative in America 
from late 1946. This escalated America’s (anti-communist) classification and 
attachment of meaning to reality worldwide and imposed an increasing degree of 
meaning on South Asia, sensitising Washington’s realities to a framework of 
communist opportunity. That Washington tended not to focus on Russia’s military 
opportunities reflected the widespread belief until 1949 that Moscow would not risk 
confronting the American bomb. This left tension, depravation and conflict as the 
main communist opportunities -  which American anti-communist identity narrative 
sought to eradicate. Given the prominence of South Asia’s political disputes, 
Washington focused on these even if the underlying substance was often immaterial, 
and even the participants themselves were marginalized. Conflict elimination, not 
necessarily conflict resolution, was the prime anti-communist directive. When India 
invaded Junagadh in October 1947, Washington maintained silence to let the conflict 
dissipate. Similarly, Washington remained uninvolved when India invaded Hyderabad 
in 1948.'^"
As a result, America’s growing understanding of South Asia through anti-communism 
had little in common with the realities of anti-India Karachi. Washington’s anti­
communism narrative exclusively dealt with sources of potential South Asian 
communism. The engagements therefore derived from this identity narrative were not 
specifically to Pakistan, for the anti-communist narrative directed policy to sources of
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communism. Indeed, Washington’s attention and policy to Pakistan in the first 
Truman term was dwarfed by its anti-communist focus on Pakistan’s conflicts about 
which Washington aimed accordingly to,
“bring about as great a degree of political, economic, and military stability 
in the South Asian countries, and (2) to prevent any encroachments with 
the Soviet Union may have in mind with respect to the area.”*^^
In this sense, America’s pro-active policy to Pakistani actuallypreceeded 1947, as 
America worried about the implications of decolonisation’s delays on South Asia. The 
American chargé in India focused on communism as early as January 1943.^^  ^
Immediately after the Simla talks in June 1945, Washington pressed Britain to 
accelerate resolution of India’s status. America’s disappointment at the talks’ failure, 
when the League refused Congress’s assurances, carried meaning only within 
America’s conflict elimination aims.^^  ^Anti-communism’s growing political currency 
and the Congress-League deadlock intensified America’s anti-communist focus on 
India. Local American officials needed to reassure Washington that Indian riots 
involved but were not instigated by communists.Later reports emphasised that 
despite anti-imperialist Russian broadcasts in Hindi, there was no, “direct contact 
between Moscow and Indian Communists”. In early 1947, the local embassy again 
calmed Washington, “Congress and Muslim League leaders in GOI recognise danger 
infiltration Indian political scene of outside totalitarian influences’’.^^
Washington’s anti-communist narrative, as was the missionary narrative, was initially 
not conducive to Pakistan. If conflict elimination curtailed communist expansion.
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eliminating the Pakistan conflict was reasonable policy. In September 1946, 
Washington recognised the Nehru-led interim government hoping to bulldoze 
Pakistan -  unaware of the potentially resultant ensuing communal bloodbath.^®  ^In 
December 1946, Acheson wrote,
“early establishment of India Federal Union by peaceful means would be 
great step forward towards world stability at a time when there are so 
many dark clouds on the horizon elsewhere”.^ ®^
However and consistent with the anti-communist framework, and notwithstanding 
America wanting to preserve India for its missionary role, Acheson’s overt support 
for Indian unity lasted only until Pakistan’s seemed inevitable. On independence, 
congratulatory messages were promptly sent to Karachi, local officials instructed to 
establish fidendly relations and US$10m was donated for refugees, who may be 
otherwise susceptible to communist influence.
While America’s anti-communist identity and narrative intensified. South Asia’s 
conflicts continued after partition. The rushed partition spun-off a plethora of 
disputes, pursued by the disputants with unusual vehemence. Of South Asia’s three 
interstate tensions, two involved Pakistan -  the dispute with Afghanistan that centred 
on Pushtunistan and various disputes with India of which Kashmir was the most 
important.*'^ Kashmir deserves elucidation given its importance to American - 
Pakistan relations. At partition, India’s princely states had the option of joining India 
or Pakistan, or remaining independent. Kashmir and Jammu, where a Hindu
The third dispute was between India and Ceylon concerning 900,000 Indian Tamils in Ceylon.
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Maharajah governed four million people of whom eighty percent were Muslim, opted 
for independence. In October 1947, the Maharajah’s Hindu army, Hindu 
fundamentalist RSS members and Sikh jathas killed thousands of Kashmiri 
Muslims.^®  ^Muslim Pathan tribesmen, supported by Pakistan, invaded Kashmir,
“they quite rightly saw that the killings were not random but formed a policy of 
‘ethnic cleansing’”, a view which London shared.^ "^* The tribesmen helped 
temporarily establish an independent Kashmir government.
With the tribesmen close to capturing Srinagar, the Maharajah pleaded for Indian 
help. Mountbatten insisted that Kashmir must first begin acceding to India, subject to 
a later plebiscite.^®  ^The Maharajah panicked and on 26^  ^October acceded to India. In 
November 1947, Nehru offered a plebiscite on condition that the tribesmen leave 
Kashmir -  India’s bargaining position since, knowing that Pakistan would not leave 
Kashmir’s Muslims to Hindu troops and potentially rigged elections. Moreover, had 
the tribesmen withdrawn, India’s military position would have become impregnable. 
Meanwhile, parallels with Junagadh poisoned the waters. Under a Muslim leader, 
Junagadh acceded to Pakistan despite eighty percent of its population being Hindu. 
However, Nehru ignored the leader and invaded Junagadh in October 1947. Hence 
Rizvi’s assessment of Nehru’s Kashmir policy as, “sheer hypocr i sy .Kashmir  was 
immediately an emotional issue for Nehru and Jinnah. Nehru located secularism at 
India’s core. To preserve Indian identity against India’s heterogeneity, he did not want 
religious affiliation to obstruct loyalty to an Indian identity. In contrast, Jinnah created 
Pakistan from India’s Muslim majority areas; the aberration of which questioned the 
embryonic Pakistan identity.
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War erupted in Kashmir in November 1947 after Pakistan supported the tribesmen to 
disturb the status quo. The first Security Council breakthrough in April 1948 created a 
five-man autonomous commission, the United Nations Commission for India and 
Pakistan (‘UNCIP’), and instructed that tribes withdraw from Kashmir, India reduce 
its troop presence and a plebiscite be conducted under an impartial commission or 
plebiscite administrator. When the UNCIP arrived in territory in May 1948, it learned 
that Pakistani troops were in Kashmir. While stating this presence improper, the 
UNCIP however accepted Karachi’s case that without these violations, India would 
have taken positions vital for Pakistan’s defence.
Initially, Washington viewed the tension, as a minor legalistic dispute. But after the 
brief war, Kashmir gradually crystallised the two competing forces that shaped post- 
August 1947 American policy to Pakistan. On the one hand, Washington lacked 
sufficient cognition and interest to engage South Asia. On the other, given the . 
internalisation and spread of anti-communist identity and narrative, some engagement 
was necessary for not only was, “Close economic and strategic cooperation between 
India and Pakistan ... essential if stability and progress to be attained”, but disputes 
such as Kashmir would otherwise invite communist expansion.^^^ The tension fi'om 
the two competing forces was modestly reconciled through the UNCIP, which 
Marshall supported and relied on.
The UNCIP fulfilled Washington’s anti-communist engagement by trying to resolve 
the dispute, even if it did not succeed. Throughout the Truman presidency, 
Washington supported every UN policy on Kashmir, neither undermining nor 
superseding it bilaterally. Washington paid for sixty percent of the UNCIP’s costs and
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loaned it a plane for its missions/°^ Marshall expedited the UNCIP to the region, and 
encouraged it to persist when it wanted to return in exasperation.^®  ^America’s few 
bilateral and lacklustre undertakings supported the UN effort as for instance, in March 
1948, with London fearing a holocaust, Marshall placed a low-key arms embargo on 
India and Pakistan, relaxed only for spare parts and non-offensive equipment and only 
after both countries contemplated purchasing Czech hardware, but which otherwise 
lasted until April 1949. Ambassador Ispahani learned that America,
“would like to be able deal with Pakistan's requests for military material 
on their intrinsic merits, but this is not possible as long as the Kashmir 
dispute with its explosive potentialities continues”.^ ®^
After the UNCIP obtained agreement on a ceasefire and elections in December 1948, 
Indian implementation delays attracted American pressure throughout 1949. Truman 
urged the use of independent arbitration, which India rej ected.
Simultaneously, the UN gave expression to America’s lack of interest by buffering 
America firom Kashmir. Throughout 1948-49, Washington exhibited scant interest in 
the UNCIP or Kashmir’s ground realities so much so that until 1950, America did not 
offer a single original proposal for the conflict,
“In formulating proposals for Kashmir settlement we do not have in mind 
US formal initiative in SC but have rather attempted to incorporate 
suggestions made by various members SC as well as GOI and GOP 
reps”.^ ’'
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This, the first American proposal in February 1948, only summarised existing ideas -  
a truce under UN auspices, the tribes leaving, a neutral interim Kashmir government 
and the UNCIP and plebiscite administrator to oversee a plebiscite?^^ When the 
UNCIP stalled, Washington worked behind London, “Although we wish to cooperate 
to maximum extent with UK we do not wish to take over lead in SC consideration”.^  
Though Marshall reluctantly allowed an American to serve as the plebiscite 
administrator, he strongly resisted appointing an American on the more politically 
exposed UNCLP.^ '"^  Eventually however after extensive international pressure, he 
appointed J Klahr Huddle to the UNCIP in May 1948.^^^
Though Kashmir dominated America’s focus on Pakistan’s conflicts, anti-communist 
cognition was extended to other conflicts. The border dispute with Afghanistan, 
centring on the 1893 Durand Line, was the second Pakistani dispute that concerned 
America. Kabul claimed that this ‘arbitrary’ boundary had split the Pushtun nation 
between British India and Afghanistan, which Pakistan’s partition merely reinforced. 
Kabul wanted a referendum to allow Pakistan’s Pushtuns to remain in Pakistan, join 
Afghanistan or create a new state, ‘Pushtunistan’. Despite the Pushtun not constituting 
Afghanistan’s majority, their claim had merit. Pushtun nationalists had dreamed of a 
united Pushtun polity long before Pakistan’s conceptual development.^^^ London had 
accepted, in the 1921 Anglo-Afghani treaty, a limited Afghani interest in those same 
tribes that Kabul disputed after 1947. A Pushtun nationalist journal was launched in 
1928.^^  ^The overall problem was complicated by Afghanistan and India supporting 
each other’s position against Pakistan and especially by India, despite its weak 
financial position, even giving Kabul funds for anti-Karachi propaganda.^^*
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That America lacked interest in the Pushtun dispute, as it did across South Asia, was 
apparent, “We did not possess the depth of experience in the complexities of tribal 
affairs -  particularly in their psychological aspects -  to intervene directly in a matter 
as involved as the ‘Pushtunistan’ dispute.”^^  ^ However, unlike in Kashmir, the 
Pushtunistan dispute could not counterbalance America’s lack of interest with a 
mechanism to provide the minimalist anti-communist engagement that Washington 
achieved through the UN. There simply was no UN or British involvement in the 
Pushtun dispute for Washington to work behind. Furthermore, again in contrast to 
Kashmir, Washington felt it was possible that the conflict could be ignored into 
oblivion, as had been Hyderabad and Junagadh, by accepting Karachi and London’s 
interpretation of the Durand Line as Pakistan’s legitimate border, which Washington 
did in 1947.“ “
Consequently, early American policy to this dispute was inattentive while wishfully 
promoting reconciliation.^^^ Beyond Marshall’s encouraging Karachi to dialogue with 
Kabul, while discouraging Kabul from raising the issue with Pakistan, and asking 
America’s allies to do likewise, Washington remained clear of the dispute. For 
instance, Pakistan’s trade embargo with Afghanistan in January 1950 attracted little 
criticism.^^^ Indeed, “Pakistan had been quite reasonable in their relation with the 
Afghans” despite jeopardising American aid to Afghani economic development, 
especially the Helmand water irrigation project, which aimed to improve Kabul’s food 
supply.^ ^^
America’s primary experience with tribal conflicts had been through Amerindians, and the policy 
pursued was, in being akin to genocide, not especially productive for this situation.
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Emerging Meanings
In early 1949, the application of missionary and anti-communist categorisation and 
discourse intensified on India and South Asia respectively. Central to this 
development was China. China’s importance to America was as an arena for 
missionary narrative enactment and as an integral part of America’s colonised future. 
While American television serials depicted American adults adopting Oriental 
children for guidance and tutelage, Chiang commanded immense respect in 
missionary circles as, “the finest flowerings of the Protestant missionary tradition in 
the far east.”^^ '* China’s loss, effectively firom the end of 1948, was felt as America’s 
missionary narrative’s destruction. Daniel Poling, editor of The Christian Herald. 
demanded that Washington reclaim China.^^  ^Though Truman viewed the Toss’ as a 
setback, hoping to recognise Mao after a settling period, the axis of American anxiety 
remained acute given, “(T)he recalcitrance of events in China in refusing to conform 
to any preconceived pattem”.^ ^^  In contrast. Republican’s portrayed the Toss’ as a 
narrative breach firom which they generated significant political capital.* '^ Just as in 
1900, when the Chinese Boxer Rebellion had gripped America like no single issue 
since 1865, the America of 1949 was gripped by China’s revolution.^^^ The China 
debates firom February 1949 when Republicans accused Truman of assisting the 
KMT’s collapse were vociferous and soon engulfed the administration’s agenda.^^*
Mao’s success also extended American anti-communist categorisation and discourse 
into China and the region. With Europe’s economy stable, America increasingly 
focused on Asia fi*om late 1948, contrary to Tucker’s suggestion that the focus
Though Chiang’s strongest supporter in the Senate, Alexander Smith confided that, “further aid to 
the Nationalist government would be money poured down the ‘rat hole’”. Congress objected to 
Truman’s proposal in February 1949 to suspend US$60m of mihtary aid to the KMT.
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developed in late 1949.^^  ^Washington feared that Stalin was using Mao to expand in 
Asia and Moscow’s overtures to the Vietminh and support for China in international 
forums frightened Washington/^^ In February 1950, Stalin and Mao signed a thirty- 
year mutual assistance treaty, and Russia gave China a US$300m loan while 
Washington was shocked by the belhcosity of Chinese anti-Americanism.^^* This 
popular perception that China was, “at the beck and call of the Kremlin”, lasted into 
Eisenhower’s second term.^^^
Beyond China, the anti-communist prism spread across Asia. Policy Planning Staff 
(TPS’) paper 51 revealed that in 1948, Moscow established a Bangkok embassy and 
sent Musso to lead a communist rebellion in Indonesia.^^  ^In 1947, America beheved 
it could establish relations with the Vietminh but then after the anti-communist 
narrative’s application in Asia, rejected Ho’s requests for better relations in 1948.^^  ^
NSC 48-1 in December 1949 reflected, “If Southeast Asia is also swept by 
communism, we shall have suffered a major political rout, the repercussions of which 
will be felt throughout the rest of the world.”^^  ^In South Asia in 1949, American 
analysts noted Russia’s establishment of an India embassy, diplomatic agreements 
with Pakistan, Czech commodity agreements and the visit of a Czech technical 
mission to South Asia.^^  ^Further, communists organised the Southeast Asian Youth 
Conference in Calcutta in 1949.^ ^^
The Russian bomb compounded American concerns, as Kissinger explained,
131
“no conceivable acquisition of territory - not even the occupation of 
Western Europe - could have affected the strategic balance as profoundly 
as did the Soviet success in ending our atomic monopoly.”^^ ^
Russian power suddenly became alluring. Washington’s perceptions of Russian 
audacity changed too. Johnson’s cost-cutting campaign ended immediately while 
American sensitivity to communist subversion grew.^^^
Washington tentatively engaged Asia to protect its missionary and anti-communist 
narratives. In 1950, US$40m was allocated for Southeast Asia, an Ex-Im loan for 
US$100m was arranged for Indonesia and further funds were directed from the Point 
Four programme. "^^ ® PPS 51, approved in December 1949, urged greater American 
regional involvement and the, “development of an interdependent and integrated 
counterforce to Stalinism in this quarter of the world”, the impregnation of SEATO. 
In April 1950, Truman viewed South East Asia under immediate threat, and 
prioritised the protection of American regional concems.^ "^  ^Concerned about Japan’s 
economy and affiliation, after China’s change, Acheson addressed Tokyo’s post-war 
status by advocating Japanese independence lest it otherwise drift to communism.^"^  ^
Against Pentagon advice, which demanded bases in Japan, and Australia’s angst, 
Acheson proceeded towards a Japanese peace settlement in 1950.^ "*^  To America’s 
existing goals in South Asia, being the region’s Western orientation, prevention of 
communist expansion and London’s continued leadership, another was introduced,
“b) Economic development in South Asia of a type which would .. .also assist 
those countries to contribute to economic recovery in the Far East
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Nehru: Independence and the Creation o f India
The threat to America’s anti-communist and missionary narratives from 1949 further 
induced South Asia’s immersion within the two categorisations and discourses, and 
India’s especially into the missionary narrative. That America’s concerns for the sub­
continent were not those associated with traditional Realism, needs emphasis. 
Washington did not particularly value South Asia’s economic assets,
“denial of South Asian resources would not necessitate any significant 
reduction in defense and essential civilian consumption in the US.. .in the 
short run. Communist control of South Asia would provide few economic 
benefits to the rest of the Soviet Bloc”.^ '*^
Nor was South Asia militarily threatened. In April 1949, the JCS suggested that,
“the inaccessibility of the area from the north and the fact that more 
remunerative objectives exist in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, 
make it unlikely that in the event of war, the USSR would expend any 
substantial military effort in South Asia”.^ "^^
Washington thus sought to place South Asia and especially India within the two 
narratives. To do so, Washington needed geography to locate the two countries for 
without such, any narrative based understanding could not be translated into policy 
specifics. America thus re-located South Asia into the amphitheatre of both anti­
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communist and missionary anxiety -  being Asia. In February 1948, a PPS report on 
‘Asia’ examined only the Far East and ignored South Asia.^^  ^Less than two years on, 
the narrative unease propelled the re-location of South Asia with East Asia.^^* The 
growing application of anti-communist discourse on South Asia meant that by 
December 1949, India and Pakistan became with Japan,
“the only major Asian power centres remaining outside the Soviet orbit.
Should India and Pakistan fall to communism, the United States and its 
friends might find themselves denied any foothold on the Asian 
mainland”.^ "^^
However, it was China’s fall that became the primary background for America’s 
cognising of India, and from which Indian democracy became critical.^ ^® America’s,
“long lost love affair with China had coming to a crashing halt, leaving 
Americans stunned and bewildered. Like many a jilted suitor, the 
American public sought to erase its bad memories of China by embracing 
India.”^ '
America demanded that India assume meaning by replacing China in America’s 
missionary narrative, and to a much lesser extent within the anti-communist narrative, 
to surrogate a century of American stories about their missionary westward Frontier 
by becoming America’s chief lieutenant in Asia. Acheson noted of Nehru that if he, 
“did not exist -  as Voltaire said of God -  he would have to be invented.”^^  ^The first 
policy paper on South Asia, in April 1949 noted.
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“Recent developments in China, which point to the probability that the 
greater part or even the whole of China may fall under the domination of 
Chinese Communists, increase our interest in and possible future 
dependence on South Asia.”^^ ^
However, placing India within the anti-communist and especially missionary 
narratives had two obstacles. First, anti-Americanism was prevalent in India. 
Henderson’s suggestion that anti-Americanism reflected low American aid and a 
Pakistani bias seem doubtful since anti-Americanism predated Pakistan and the Indian 
press seldom prioritised aid.^^^  In fact, three decades of unmet expectations of 
American policy had left a searing mark upon India. Indian nationalists had 
appropriated the Declaration of Independence for inspiration for more than a century. 
The Calcutta Gazette had in 1785 acclaimed George Washington as a great hero.^^  ^
During the American civil war, Bombay’s citizens financed a Union hospital.^^^ 
Indian nationalists drew on Wilson’s national self-determination in their struggle. Yet 
from Wilson’s racially selective self-determination, Indian nationalist expectations 
were met with successive disappointments -  manifesting deep resentment. During the 
war, appeals to Roosevelt such as by the Maharaja of Indore in May 1942 in the 
Indian press were common, as were the subsequent disappointments.^^^ Even Gandhi, 
suspicious of America, appealed to Roosevelt in July 1942 to mediate 
independence.^^^ These expectations of America contrasted with Roosevelt’s outward 
policy of silence and restraint.^^^
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Roosevelt’s deference on India to Churchill occurred during one of the more tragic 
episodes in the war. The Bengali famine, which started in 1942, was India’s worst 
famine of the twentieth century - killing three million people. In 1943, Churchill 
refused to accept war-specific UN funds for the famine since it had not been caused 
by the war - untrue since Burma’s collapse reduced the rice supply to India. Capitol 
Hill changed the aid rules so that India could access funds. Yet Churchill, who felt 
Indians would breed “like rabbits”, refused to authorise the necessary request.^^^ In 
exasperation, private American efforts were organised. J J Singh summarised Indian 
sentiment, “India will survive this famine as she survived famines in the past. But the 
memory of the hundreds of thousands who died because no help came from their 
allies, will be a ghost not quickly laid.”^^ ^
Washington simply failed to honour its publicised and rhetorical expectations at the 
critical hour. The Calcutta University riots in November 1945, though primarily anti- 
British, also targeted Americans. Thirty-three American soldiers were injured and an 
American army hospital was besieged.^^  ^In February 1946, Madam Pandit accused 
US officials of conspiring with Britain to conceal the independence struggle from 
America’s public.^^  ^During riots that month, thirty-seven Americans were injured in 
Calcutta, a Bombay mob attacked an embassy building, ransacked American vehicles 
and demanded America ‘Quit India’. At the San Francisco conference, it was left to 
Molotov to fulfil the role that Indian leaders had expected from America, by 
condemning Britain in India and declaring the Raj’s delegation unrepresentative.^^"^
Given the built up expectations from America, and unlike the pre-independence 
hostility towards Britain, anti-Americanism persisted after 1947,
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“We have always had great expectations about your country, while we 
have expected little from Soviet Russia.... You led us to believe in those 
standards. So when we think that you failed to live up to them we are 
disappointed and say so.”^^ ^
This resentment manifested in a variety of issues,
“our treatment of American Negroes, our tendency to support colonialism 
and to strive for continued world supremacy of white peoples, our 
economic imperialism, superficiality of our culture, our lack of emotional 
balance as evidenced by our present hysteria in combating Communism 
and our cynical use of ‘witch-hunting method’ in promoting domestic 
political ends, our practice of going economic and other assistance to 
foreign peoples only when we believe such assistance will aid in our 
struggle against Communism, our assumption of superiority merely 
because we have higher standards of living, our hypocrisy etc”.^ ^^
Had Nehru distanced from anti-Americanism, the undercurrent may not have mattered 
such was his dominance in India. But Nehru’s own views on America were not 
flattering given his accusing America during the war of, “a passive and sometimes 
even an active support of British propaganda” in India.^^  ^America also irritated 
Nehru. Influenced by the LSE professor Harold Laski, Nehru was a socialist with a 
Brahmanical disdain for capitalistic business.^^^ His Labour firiends were socialists, in 
contrast to his right wing antagonist, Churchill, and he had socialist ambitions -
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reflected in Russian-styled Planning Commission?^^ The Brahmin, Hinduism’s 
highest Varna, told Bowles, “you can’t see what Asia has in mind because of this lack 
of ability to imbibe anything outside yourselves, because you are so full of 
yourselves.”^^  ^Nehru’s views baffled Washington. Henderson, with echoes of 
Freudian psychiatry, traced Nehru’s anti-Americanism to his childhood days at The 
Harrow School,
“that the US was an overgrown, blundering, uncultured and somewhat 
crass nation, and that Americans in general were ill-manned and immature 
people, more interested in such toys as could be produced by modem 
technique and in satisfaction of their creature comforts than in 
endeavouring to gain an understanding of the great moral and social 
trends of the age.”^^ ^
This antagonism was in itself probably insufficient from preventing India’s role 
within America’s anti-communist and especially missionary narratives. Nehru’s drive 
for an independent India was though. India was a highly heterogeneous state,
“there never was a united, single, homogenous India in the cultural, 
ethnic, linguistic and religious sense of the word. It has always been a 
multinational subcontinent that thrived on diversity, with short-lived 
interludes in its history when a partial political unity was superimposed by 
administrative means.... the northern subcontinent has a political history 
which is quite different from its southern counterpart.”^^ ^
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Nehru feared this heterogeneity could disintegrate India, especially after Pakistan’s 
creation. As a result, he prioritised building ‘Indian’ identity for distribution and 
internalisation amongst the masses, for instance, by encouraging those Indian writers 
who reverted to the third century BC Mauryan empire, for the last example of a 
central, pan-Indian, indigenous government authority, and introducing the Mauryan 
emperor Ashoka’s wheel into the Indian flag.^^  ^With this aim, Nehru emphasised 
India’s existence based on its independence, without which, there was little value to 
the cry of hundreds and thousands of Congressmen who had been subjugated to 
beatings and imprisonment by the British. Specifically, Nehru demanded recognition 
of an Indian existence through respect for its right to independent policy, which would 
itself be bed-rocked by India’s international and economic policy.^^  ^Alliances 
encouraged military costs and hampered economic growth, thus restricting 
manoeuvrability and independence. Nehru thus co-opted atomic development to 
emphasise independence. Before India could feed its starving and homeless millions, 
and two decades before India’s military requested for its military use, Nehru pursued 
India’s atomic programme firom 1947.^ ^^
However, American narratives did not lend towards cognitive third ways since 
bipolarity helped make sense of America’s brave new world. Others were either anti­
communist or communist, associates of America’s mission or impediments. America 
was thus sensitive to Indian independence well before India’s devolution.^^^ Asian 
independence and ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ movements were also firowned upon, and 
viewed as immature. Even Foggy Bottom’s Asia experts, those officials most 
sympathetic to decolonisation, treated Asian neutralism antipathetically.^^^ Likewise, 
policymakers feared Germany and Japan’s neutralism as much as their communist
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conversion.^^^ Nehru acutely disrupted America’s anti-communist and missionary 
narratives since his commitment to independent policy meant he had no intention of 
fulfilling America’s mission, nor of fighting communism,
“the world might be far better off if there were a few less of these moral 
crusaders about. Everyone wants not only to carry on the moral crusade in 
his environment but to impose his moral crusade on others.”^^ ^
In March 1947, Nehru announced,
“ we propose as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of 
groups, aligned against one another, which have led to in the past to world 
wars.... The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others 
. . .we do not intend to be the plaything of others”.^ *®
Weeks later he added, “India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from 
the power politics of groups” *^^
Nehru’s neutralism was inexplicable to America. Henderson, a vituperative anti­
communist, found the refusal to chose sides incomprehensible.^^^ Grady complained 
that Nehru, “often talks as though he regards the great struggle going on in the world 
today as one merely for power between two groups, particularly between Russia and 
the United States”.^ ^^  In 1947, Grady told Nehru, “this is a question that cannot be 
straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately”.^ "^^  Concerns 
about Nehru’s oft-rumoured Asian bloc increased during the January 1949 Asian
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conference on Indonesia/^^ Philippines’ Quirino told American officials that Nehru’s 
‘Asian Organisation of States’, planned for September 1949, was an anti-western 
platform.^^^ American unease was compounded by the Kashmir impasse, for which 
Washington rightly blamed Nehru, who had delayed a plebiscite on dubious 
technicalities, thereby inviting doubts about India’s good faith/^^
Washington, stuck with bipolar cognition, also under-appreciated the Moscow - New 
Delhi rift. Initially, Nehru was highly impressed by Russia.^^  ^However, Stalin’s 
prism, as rigid as Washington’s, filtered reality between revolutionaries and 
imperiahsts, interpreting nonalignment as an, “imperialist device... to slander the 
USSR by placing it on the same level with American imperialism.”^^  ^The Great 
Soviet Encyclopaedia consequently described Gandhi as, “a reactionary who... 
betrayed the people and helped the imperialists against them”^^ ° Stalin quickly 
dismissed Nehru as capitahst stooge and relations unsurprisingly deteriorated. In 
1948, the Indian Communist Party’s protests infuriated Nehru for their, “lack of 
integrity and decency”.^ ^^  Nehru was especially annoyed that Russia’s ambassador 
seemed more involved in, “directing clandestine secret movements of Indian 
communists” than in meeting Congress leaders.^^^
With Asia dominating America’s agenda and despite India’s intransigence to play its 
part within the anti-communist and missionary narratives, America continued to hope 
on India, albeit through a more extended route - in the autumn of 1949, policymakers 
focused on, “the education of Indian leadership to the imminence of Communist 
danger”.^ ^^  Washington hoped Nehru would change to accept America’s story of 
itself, an aim which the SANAAC paper of April 1949 articulated as its third goal.
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“b) Cooperation among the nations of South Asia for constructive purposes.. 
(meaning, “guide any regional or Asian movement which may develop in the 
direction of constructive participation in UN activities”).^ ^^
America’s confidence in India’s education, itself part of America’s mission, enabled 
Washington to plan engaging India as the centrepiece of America’s Far Eastern 
defence plans.^^  ^A State Department report in September 1949 listed “The central 
position of India in the Far East” as the first of four pillars of Far Eastern policy. 
Another State Department study in November for Truman, defined India as, “the most 
important existing centre of non-Communist strength in Asia.”^^  ^Against this 
background, Nehru’s visit to America in October 1949 was particularly anticipated. 
Politicians and press gave glowing attributes to India and Nehru, corresponding less 
to realities than to American post-Mao narrative needs. The Washington Post 
characterised India as, “an island in a continent of turmoil”. Nations described Nehru 
as, “a figure of immense significance to the whole world”, and Time described him as 
“Asia’s key man”.^ ^^  In August 1949, Acheson told the Indian ambassador that both 
he and Truman considered Nehru, “a world figure of great influence and that we 
looked to him to assume the leadership in the rehabilitation of Asia”.^ ^^  Nehru’s 
address to a joint session of Congress was lauded with praise -  Representative Celler 
described Nehru’s, “transcendental quality.. .an aura of the spiritual seems to hover 
over him.” °^°
However, Nehru’s tour was a disaster for America. He firmly asserted independence 
and non-alignment, “In short, Nehru’s visit jolted Americans into the realization that
142
India would resist playing the Cold War role that the United States hoped to assign 
it»» 301 pei*sonal Motions did not help. Acheson later noted, “I was convinced that 
Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship.. .he was one of 
the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal with.” ®^^ Truman did not 
connect with Nehru either, who in turn felt Americans were gregarious, uncivilised 
and uncouth, upset that they, “expected something more than gratitude and 
goodwill”.^ ®^ Interestingly, Indian diplomats saw the visit, in restating independence, 
as a success, “If anything, it has fortified general conviction of the rightness of non­
involvement and made any change in that policy difficult”.^ '^^  Weeks later, Nehru 
forcefully demonstrated his independence through China.^ ®^  He hoped that fiiendship 
with Mao would lead to Asian prosperity and viewed the Chinese revolution as a 
democratic improvement on decades of turbulence.^®  ^New Delhi’s first ambassador 
to China shared with his prime minister,
“a deep feeling of sympathy for the Chinese people, a desire to see them 
stand united, strong and powerful, able to stand up against the nations 
which had oppressed them for a hundred years, a psychological 
appreciation of their desire to wipe out humiliations which followed the 
western domination of their country and to proclaim the message of Asia 
Resurgent.”^^ ^
Thus, India was the first non-communist state to recognise China on 30^  ^December 
1949, for which Acheson described Nehru as highly deluded.^ ®^
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Nehru’s rejection of American narratives came during a sensitive period when 
American bipolarity toughened and anti-communist narrative insecurity grew. 
Truman’s rhetoric had been blistering in the 1948 election and the Democrats had 
reduced the Republican representation on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.^®  ^
Bipartisanship faded despite Acheson’s inclusion of Dean Rusk and John Foster 
Dulles for policy in Asia. Congress even raised concerns about Acheson’s anti­
communism when he was nominated as Secretary of State in January 1949.^^° 
McCarthy’s political entrée in February 1950 charged Washington’s atmosphere 
further. He and MacArthur brought anti-communist focus to Asia, accusing, in what 
Acheson would term, “the attack of the primitives”, the State Department’s ‘pinkos’ 
of selling Asia to the communists.^
Consequently, at the end of 1949, Washington was disappointed and frustrated with 
India. Henderson noted, “India was making no contribution to world problems, was 
unlikely to do so as long as the present policy persisted and that Nehru displayed little 
sense of the practical realms”.^ A s  a result, Acheson rejected India’s request for 
US$500m in aid and a million tons of wheat. NSC 48/1 in December 1949 
euphemistically outlined, “it would be unwise for us to regard South Asia, more 
particularly India, as the sole bulwark against the extension of communist control in 
Asia.”^^  ^With India’s rejection of its role in Asia, and narrative anxiety growing, 
Washington geographically divorced South Asia from East Asia. There was no longer 
any reason to classify South Asia with East Asia. The Jessup mission in February 
1950 on the Far East reversed PPS 51 and NSC 48 by advocating treating South Asia 
distinct from East Asia.^ '^*
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Pakistan: Asiatic or Muslim Arab
While, “the Indians spat in America’s eye”, Pakistan placed itself firmly within the 
anti-communist narrative, “Compared with the wishy-washy neutralist Indians, they 
were a breath of fresh air”.^ ^^  The Pakistani political leadership’s consistent 
acceptance and support for America’s anti-communism made Pakistan a rare 
unequivocal American supporter. Karachi not only supported the anti-communist 
narrative but also presented it as its own political blood and soul. That Pakistan 
looked to America reflected the views of a powerful highly westernised clique 
consisting of Zafrullah Khan, Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan and 
Ikramullah: Karachi’s campaign to cloak itself in anti-communism and attract 
American interest stemmed from insecurity about the new state-legitimised identity. 
India’s doubting o f ‘Pakistan’, partition’s bitterness and Pakistan’s economic and 
military weakness precipitated hysterical fears of India.^’^
Chaudhry’s suggestion that Jinnah, “preferred to pursue an independent course in 
world affairs” is markedly incongruous.^ Jinnah wanted to align Pakistan with 
America to receive aid and repeatedly stressed Pakistan’s anti-communist identity and 
agenda.^ In December 1947, Malik Feroz Khan, a prominent Pakistani, stressed to 
American officials that Pakistan needed aid to facilitate its anti-communist policy, as 
the West’s eastern bastion in the Middle East, complementary to Turkey, the western 
bastion.^In similar vein, Jinnah alerted American officials about Russian agents’ 
activities in Kalat and Gilgit, and aspirations for Afghanistan and a port in Kalat.^ ^® 
Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed emphasised in 1947 that the burden of India’s 
defence against Russia fell on Pakistan, the only route to fridia.^ ^* Pakistani politicians
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visiting the US heralded their anti-communist diet. Foreign Secretary Mohammed 
Ikramullah met US officials in June 1948 and advertised Pakistan as a Western 
bulwark in a deteriorating Asia.^^  ^Throughout his American tour, Liaquat Ali Khan 
publicised Pakistan’s willingness to align with America.^^^ In November 1949,
Ghulam Mohammed lauded Truman’s, “able men with brains as well as hearts.”^^ ^
Moreover, Pakistan matched its words with deeds. The State Department’s assessment 
of Pakistan, “went firmly down the line for the American position on all important 
questions”.^ ^^  Karachi waited till May 1948 to establish diplomatic relations with 
Russia, and till March 1950-to exchange ambassadors. In contrast to India, Pakistan. 
helped Chiang’s generals and refugees when they left China and recognised Mao’s 
government only after Britain had done so in January 1950.^^  ^Even Liaquat’s 
acceptance in 1949 to visit Moscow, did not alarm Washington. Americans knew that 
Pakistani officials were eager to fulfil their visits to America. Iskander Mirza arrived 
only days later seeking arms. Requests for military exports and economic aid 
continued to pour at the Karachi embassy.
America’s commitment to South Asian regionalism, thus impartiality, marginally 
tilted in Pakistan’s favour given its military weakness. Of the 249 armoured vehicles 
and 40,000 to 60,000 tons of ammunition Pakistan was allocated at partition, Pakistan 
had none of either a month later.^^  ^Therefore, when the Kashmir related arms 
embargo was lifted in March 1949, and to offset the, “existing disparity in military 
strength between the two Dominions”, Washington approved London’s request to 
transfer 200,000 rounds of 75mm American ammunition to Pakistan and only 50,000 
rounds to India.H ow ever, Pakistan’s firm categorisation within the anti-communist
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narrative enabled Washington to expedite attaching meaning to and faintly engage 
Karachi. Subsequently in March 1949, Pakistan, and not India, received arms for the, 
“maintenance of internal security and freedom from Communist domination”.^ ^^  
Further, Zafrullah Khan and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali’s reception in November 1949 
in Washington was notably friendly, while Acheson reminisced with them about 
Nehru’s dire trip.^^° Such anti-communist profits only marginally eased Pakistan’s 
disappointment with America because despite Karachi’s unequivocal open support for 
nearly every American policy, except to Palestine, Pakistan had otherwise little to 
show for its chameleon performance while Nehru still grabbed American headlines.
Simultaneous 1:0 the categorisation and attachment of Pakistan within the anti­
communist narrative, Washington also became involved in the Middle East, important 
only as an anti-communist war resource. America’s focus on the Middle East, which 
began in earnest during World War Two, intensified in 1949.^ ^^  America ranked the 
region as of major strategic importance, an assessment built on oil and mihtary 
strategy.^^  ^In 1945, the Persian Gulf supplied seven percent of the world’s oil. By 
1950, it supplied sixteen percent.^^  ^Known world oil reserves increased by sixty 
percent during the war, with nearly all growth in the Middle East, leaving it with half 
the world’s known oil reserves. Furthermore, Middle Eastern oil was easily extracted 
and transported for Europe’s economic recovery.^ "^^  In 1947, American oil concerns 
were sensitised by oil shortages from coincidental strong demand in reindustrialising 
Europe and the booming domestic economy.^^  ^Oil’s strategic value grew as anti­
communism intensified. Forecasts suggested that if war broke out, Russia would 
desperately need Middle Eastern oil.^ ^^  Though less gravely, the same was said of the 
West,
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“If, during a major war, the United States and her allies are deprived of 
the oil reserves of the Iran-Near and Middle East area, it is highly 
improbable that other sources can supply the United Stats military and 
economic requirements together with those of her possible allies.”^^ ^
The Middle East’s secondary value was military. In preparing for war. Defense 
planners prioritised protecting Britain, controlling Western Europe and retaining the 
Middle East.^^  ^The use of strategic air power was introduced in late 1945, for which 
access to Middle East bases was vital. Operation CALDRON in November 1946 
stressed the Middle East’s strategic importance. Plans for an unexpected global war in 
June 1946, operation FINCHER, prioritised the Middle East, especially the Cairo- 
Suez area from where bombers could destroy more Russian cities and oil refineries 
than anywhere else.^^  ^The Suez base, Okinawa and Britain constituted America’s 
three strategic bombing bases in operation BROILER. '^^  ^HALFMOON in May 1948 
and OFFTACKLE in November 1949 also emphasised the Middle East while 
DROPSHOT from early 1949 upgraded Suez.^ "^ ^
Despite the Middle East’s growing priority for Washington, there were parallels 
between America’s lack of access in South Asia and the Middle East. Since 1918, 
London had maintained extensive interests in the Middle East, owning the world’s 
largest oil refinery at Abadan, southern Iran’s oil fields, maintaining airfields in 
Transjordan, Iraq and Cyprus, holding troops in Aden, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia 
and owning the Suez base.*^" London was determined to maintain its presence and
France had left the region in 1946 having failed to re-impose itself, while Italy relinquished Libya.
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dominance in the region, especially Suez, which guarded imperial communications 
and transportation routes. Indeed, London prioritised the area second only to itself.
As in South Asia, and despite the region’s growing value, the White House and State 
Department were uninterested in the Middle East and relied on Britain to uphold 
Anglo-American interests in the region.^ "^  ^Washington maintained only small bases at 
Dhahran and Bahrain and a tiny regional naval presence, while America’s oil interests 
were amicably agreed with Britain in a series of interwar agreements viz Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Saudi.^"^
The growing anti-communist value of the Middle East accompanied an increasing 
American concern about the West’s position in the region. Britain’s deterioration in 
the Middle East, especially in Iran and Egypt, provoked American focus from late 
1948.^ "^  ^In Iran, the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (‘AIOC’) was in 
dispute with the Majlis. The AIOC had negotiated its concessions in 1933 to run till 
1993, giving Iran a humiliating profit for its oil. The Majlis rejected the 1948 
supplemental increase to 25%-30% of the profits, and also a revised offer in 1949.^ "^  ^
Meanwhile, Egypt demanded Britain’s departure in January 1945. The Anglo- 
Egyptian treaty of 1936 had sanctioned Britain’s presence in Egypt, at core of which 
was the Suez base - a huge array of military installations and stores, and road, rail and 
air infrastructure. In 1945, Britain stationed 200,000 troops there and focused on 
Egypt as the centre of its Middle East plans. '^^  ^Bevin offered phased withdrawal, but 
demanded maintaining air defence and basic forces in peacetime in Suez and the right 
to return in the event of war -  all of which Cairo rejected.^ "^  ^The West’s position also 
deteriorated with Israel’s creation, uniting even the Saudi Wahabis and Hashemites 
Iraqis and Transjordanians, enemies since 1924, against the West. Truman’s
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recognition of Israel eleven minutes after its independence infuriated Arabs who 
through the Arab League projected hostility against Israel and Britain/"^^
Still, and despite the region’s importance and the West’s difficulties, America had 
paltry appetite for the Middle East. Acheson’s request to Congress for US$100m to 
protect Saudi oil for American corporations was refused in October 1945. Five years 
on, and given Europe’s requirements, McGhee counselled Truman against military 
obligations in the region unless Turkey, Saudi or Iran neared communist defection.^^° 
In August 1949, only after strong British pressure did the JCS plan troops for the 
Middle East in the event of war.^^  ^Washington instead preferred to keep Britain in 
the area and use its extensive facilities, despite nearly all the Middle East countries 
wanting either a military alliance or arrangement with America. From 1948, Turkey 
demanded a strong American military commitment that was declined despite 
America’s use of Turkish airfields.^^  ^Acheson honoured Iran’s US$500m aid request 
with only US$12m.^^^
This resistance gradually eroded with the growing application of anti-communist 
categorisation and discourse for the Middle East, as well as British weakness. In 1949, 
with considerable reluctance, America’s involvement grew in the Middle East with 
complex talks about Middle East responsibilities taking place with Britain in 
November.^?"  ^Britain, France and America agreed the Tripartite Declaration of May 
1950 to control Arab-Israeli tensions. One State Department paper boldly asked in 
March 1950, “Should the United States associate itself in security arrangements 
bilaterally or multilaterally with Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia or other countries 
of the NEA area?”^^  ^That such questions were represented was a considerable
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change, even if Washington’s eventual response did not. America ruled out 
involvement in any Middle Eastern pact, such as it did in a November 1949 
conference and then again in March 1950, because of a combination of local 
crosscurrents, and inadequate cognition and interest.^^^
With Pakistan placed within the anti-communist narrative, and the Middle East slowly 
necessitating American anti-communist commitment, Washington located Pakistan 
within the Middle East. Engaging Pakistan, for when America would eventually 
categorise and attach meaning to it, required geography. If Pakistan could not be 
engaged in East Asia after Nehru blocked South Asia’s narrative enactment, 
Washington’s only practical engagement of Pakistan in the anti-communist narrative 
was through the Middle East. Initially, America did not locate Pakistan in the Middle 
East. Despite Forrestal’s concerns about Russia’s threat to Middle East oil, his diaries 
did not mention Pakistan for their defence.^^  ^However, after 1948, with the anti­
communist meaning of Pakistan and concern mounting about the Middle East, 
Pakistan infrequently featured in America’s analysis of the Middle East, initially as its 
outer rim, and specifically in the extreme repercussions of Arab-Israeli politics, in 
which it thus became part of the Muslim world.^^  ^Hence, Pakistan’s discussion in 
America’s Middle East strategy paralleled the coincidence of Karachi’s increasingly 
evident anti-communist categorisation and American Middle East concerns. In 1949, 
White House analysts who argued for closer relations with Pakistan cited its 
proximity to Russia, the Gulf, and its military and Muslim credentials.^^^ In 
November 1949, McGhee recommended aid to Pakistan based on its strategic 
importance in the Middle East.^^° In March 1949, the JCS suggested that.
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“From the military point of view, the countries of South Asia, excepting 
Pakistan have, under present and prospective conditions, little value to the 
United States.. .The Karachi-Lahore area in Pakistan may, under certain 
conditions, become of strategic importance. In spite of tremendous 
logistic difficulties, this area might be required as a base for air operations 
against central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the 
defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas.”^^ ^
In June 1949, Pakistan was one of many countries mentioned in a discussion on 
whether Middle East countries should be included in NATO.^^  ^The State Department 
in planning aid for Pakistan proposed in February 1950,
“The purpose of military assistance to Pakistan at this time is to achieve a 
psychological effect by assuring Pakistan of our willingness to provide 
reasonable support on reimbursable basis.... Only token assistance is 
proposed.”^^^
Support for Pakistan’s location in the Middle East from British quarters was scant, but 
that which was there was amplified in Washington. In January 1950, William Barton, 
Knight Commander of the Indian Empire, supported Pakistan’s inclusion in a Muslim 
belt to protect oil.^ "^^  This was supported by Major A E G  Davy, the Nawab of 
Bhopal’s advisor, who forwarded his report ‘The Strategic and Political Importance of 
Pakistan in the event of War with the USSR’ to American officials, which argued that 
in the event of global war. Western Pakistan needed to be developed as a base, since it 
occupied the, “most vitally important strategic position on the face of the globe.”^^ ^
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Pakistan’s transition from East Asia to the Middle East was not entirely incongruous. 
Buzan incorrectly states that Pakistan’s cultivation of its Middle East and Islamic 
links began in the 1970s.^^  ^Having protected the Muslim identity from Hindu 
encroachment, Pakistan felt a natural affinity with the fellow members of the Ummah. 
Jinnah stressed to US officials as early as February 1946 that India’s Muslims were 
affiliated with the Arab states.^^  ^In November 1946, the State Department recognised 
precisely the same relationship.^^^ In May 1947, Jinnah impressed upon American 
o i^ficials, Pakistan’s role as a Muslim country.^^  ^A major Islamic economic 
conference gathered in Karachi in late 1949 while Feroze Khan Noon, touring the 
Muslim world, forwarded a note to America’s Ankara embassy, “The Mussulmans are 
against Communism. We the Mussalmans of Pakistan have no Ambassador in 
Moscow nor is there any Russian Ambassador in Karachi.”^^®
With America’s placement of Pakistan in the Middle East coinciding with Nehm’s 
rejection of India’s role in America’s narratives, America inadvertently dissected 
South Asia. Pakistan became more Muslim and less Asiatic. Not only was India 
quarantined from both East Asia and the Middle East, but South Asia as a cognitive 
instrument was henceforth synonymised with India by the Truman administration. In 
1948, Pakistan and India had regularly featured in America’s analysis of Asia. 
However, in a policy review in November 1949, Pakistan was classified with the 
Muslim world, aside from India and Asia.^^^  The State Department’s policy paper on 
Pakistan in 1950 explained,
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“With regard to Pakistan’s endeavour to assume leadership of a Middle 
East Muslim bloc, it may in time become desirable critically to review our 
concept that Pakistan’s destiny is or should be bound with India.
In the NSC’s report on the Far East in December 1949, there was no mention of 
Pakistan but was of India,^^  ^A policy review of Asia noted,
“The Moslems, particularly in Pakistan, are an important element in the 
area but, as their orientation is chiefly toward the other Moslem states of 
the Near and Middle East, they are less likely than India or Japan to play a 
leading role in South and East Asia.”^^ ^
Likewise, the JCS’s assessment of South East Asia’s defence in April 1950 made no 
mention of Pakistan.^^^ However, though the first Truman administration located 
Pakistan within the Middle East, the latter was still not a sufficiently demanding 
priority, nor was Pakistan’s anti-communist cognition especially deep rooted or firm. 
Throughout Truman’s first administration, Washington neither committed to the 
Middle East nor engaged Pakistan, Some planners such as McGhee recognised the 
danger in this but most did not consider a defection in the region likely and in any 
case the budget was aheady stretched. They did not believe that there was an 
immediate need to commit to the Middle East by engaging Pakistan by providing it 
arms. Venkataramani’s suggestion that on 5^  ^May 1950, the day of Liaquat’s arrival 
in Washington, arms supplies left for Pakistan is thus highly questionable, especially 
since he offers no supporting evidence whatsoever.^^^
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRUMAN PART II: KOREA -  A COGNITIVE CATALYST
The advent of the Korean War, with implications for the anxiety from the communist 
threat, catalysed the internalisation, bipolarisation and protection of American anti­
communist identity narrative as well as consequently its greater geographic 
application to understand the globe. Therefore, the coincidence of American concerns 
about the Middle East and its understanding of anti-communist Pakistan, which had 
originated in late 1948, became especially acute after June 1950. Washington’s fears 
about the communist threat escalated in the Middle East, while its understanding of 
Pakistan as an anti-communist ally became more defined. As a result, and concerned 
by the continued British inability to arrest the West’s decline in the Middle East, 
Washington placed Pakistan as a central country in its defence plans for the region 
through the Anglo-American Middle East Command. To settle Pakistan’s geographic 
transfer from South Asia to the Middle East and in part also to immunise the former 
region from communism, Washington re-energized its focus on settling Pakistan’s 
disputes with both India and Afghanistan.
Failure to resolve these marked a period of narrative frustration for America. Not only 
did communist potential persist in Kashmir and Pushtunistan but Pakistan was re­
located back into South Asia by virtue of its border standoff with India from July 
1951, a cognition that the British, who could not see Pakistan as a Middle Eastern 
state, locked into the MFC’s development, thus denying America its anti-communist 
engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East. The final source of narrative firustration 
came from India’s continued refusal of its roles within America’s narratives.
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necessitating an awkward yet incomplete coming to terms with Indian independence -  
one that was complicated by Ambassador Bowles.
However America’s frustration calmed somewhat in 1952. After the border tension 
eased in October 1951, Pakistan again shed its South Asia associations. Meanwhile, 
America lost faith in the continuingly unsuccessful British policy in the Middle East, 
and took greater interest with corresponding access to arrest the region’s 
communisation. At the hehn of an increasingly unilateral policy to the Middle East, 
Washington reintroduced Pakistan to the area’s defence and brought Karachi to the 
precipice of engagement. That this was not followed through, reflected not Realist 
calculations of power, in which Pakistan would have scored abysmally poorly, but an 
inadequacy of time. By the time America arrived at this precipice, Truman’s 
presidency was in its concluding days.
Korea -  A Cognitive Catalyst
In June 1950, North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel to invade Sotith 
Korea. The resultant war transformed Washington’s categorisation, attaching meaning 
and engagement of the world. It also, and not events in 1951 as Cohen suggests, 
marked the ‘turning point’, intensifications of pre-existing trends, in American policy 
to Pakistan.^ The Korean War had a double impact on America’s political cognition.
First, it demonstrated the strength and threat of the communist alterity thereby 
necessitating sharp reassertion and protection of the anti-communist narrative. Even 
before the war, anti-communist identity was already acutely subscribed to across
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America with Nitze arguing that, “the cold war is in fact a real war.”  ^Alger Hiss was 
convicted for peijury in January 1950, while in February McCarthy burst onto the 
map and Klaus Fuchs was arrested. After the Russian bomb in 1949, the US had 
expected greater Russian risk appetite but not Korea’s, “naked, deliberate, 
unprovoked aggression”.^  North Korea, seen as a Russian pawn, confirmed 
communist Russia’s threat, despite Moscow’s extensive conciliatorily efforts to 
discuss the war.^ Acheson announced that, “Communism has passed beyond the use 
of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and 
war” and in December 1950, Truman declared a national emergency. ^
The threat to anti-communist identity narrative triggered tighter subscription across 
America to its identity and narrative and polarised its discourse. In this fashion, after 
the war, when the American self was questioned and existential uncertainty amplified, 
the demand for clearer meaning within the anti-communist narrative reached new 
peaks in the “anticommunist delirium”.^  Bipartisanship deepened. While the 
Rosenbergs were arrested in July and August 1950, Republican senators battered 
Marshall and Life magazine demanded the supposedly insufficiently anti-communist 
Acheson’s sacking.^ The attack on Acheson reached such heights in December 1950 
that Acheson was advised by Truman, “since my enemies had not taken kindly to a 
certain reference to Christian principles, I might find the same ideas expressed more 
acceptably in the Koran.”  ^As part of the bipolarisation, communists were 
monolithicised, hence abandoning Truman’s attempt since October 1949 to divide 
China and Russia.^
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Before June 1950, Washington had lived, albeit uncomfortably, with New Delhi’s 
neutralism. In December 1949, though annoyed with Nehru’s neutralism, Washington 
even entertained the prospect of profiting from Indian neutralism in the Cold War as 
a, “bulwark against communist expansion.”'° Korea changed this tolerance given the 
polarisation of anti-communist identity for within this intensification, neutralism 
suffered, ‘Neutrality is illusory in the context of East-West tensions”." Having been a 
mere annoyance, neutrality became according to Acheson a, “shortcut to suicide”, or 
according to Bradley, “the suicide of neutralism”, while MacArthur wrote his last 
report favouring Japanese neutrality in June 1950.'^
Whereas the Truman administration was responsible for the politico-military 
reconstruction of communist Russia’s narrative anxiety, once accepted, public opinion 
demanded the protection of anti-communist narratives through communism’s 
elimination. Limits could not be set to affirming self-location or re-enacting self- 
identity’s manifestation in anti-communist crusades. Having asked of Americans to 
support the quest, in calls such as the Truman Doctrine, to reaffirm their Americanism 
through anti-communism, the Korean War marked a high point for the popular 
involvement of that identity narrative. Once the identity narrative anxiety was 
objectified, the public demanded precisely the commitment that had been 
demonstrated in all victorious American wars from 1861 to 1945 - overwhelming 
force. Hence, despite MacArthur’s apocalyptic visions of a third world war and his 
insubordination, he received a rapturous applause before Congress and a national that 
reception was, “nothing short of cataclysmic, the public outpouring religious”.'^
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Korea’s second impact was it augmented the application and scope of the anti­
communist categorisation and discourse, encouraging America to use the communist 
grid of intelligibility more extensively on a worldwide level to make sense of political 
reality. Korea’s impact was in fact global, “From the beginning Acheson was 
convinced that the North Korean attack was part of a Soviet ‘grand design’”.E v e ry  
major American base and embassy was warned, “Possible that Korea is only the first 
of series of coordinated actions on part of Soviets. Maintain utmost vigilance”. The 
first report at the NSC meeting immediately after the attack surveyed Russia’s global, 
not regional, military preparation.^^ Growing global scrutiny to communist 
opportunities increased resources, which in turn fuelled an even more ambitious 
global scrutiny. NSC-68, Acheson’s objet before June 1950, gained currency
just as Acheson’s influence declined. NSC 68/4 demanded US$140bn for national 
security in 1951 and 1952 for a programme that was evidently global given that 
Washington expected the Korean War to last only a few months.
With greater global anti-communist cognition, America’s anti-communist engagement 
intensified. National security goals in NSC 114/2 reflected a renaissance in 
strengthening global anti-communist positions. Acheson abruptly accepted German 
troop participation in Europe’s defence and pushed NATO members to rearm.^® He 
also rammed through the Japanese treaty over the JCS’s objections and anti-Japanese 
wartime sentiment.^^ For peripheral areas. Congress passed the Mutual Security Act 
in 1951, stipulating that American foreign aid could only be directed to, “strengthen 
the firee world in its resistance to Communism.” East Asia was suddenly prioritised. 
Acheson, the Anglophile, concluded that US forces could not be withdrawn fi'om 
Korea, not even strangely enough for a European emergency.^^
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Pakistan and the Middle East
With policy’s post-Korean militarisation, the bipolarisation and protection of anti­
communist identity narrative and the globalisation of the anti-communist grid of 
intelligibility was manifested in the Middle East. Washington feared a Russian attack 
on the Middle East with Korea used as a mere distraction.^^ Truman instinctively felt 
that Iran would be overrun.^^ McGhee added that, “a re-evaluation of our Middle East 
plans is called for in the light of the US program for increased military stature and 
preparedness.”^^  Washington exhaustively analysed Russia’s options in the Middle 
East, and the implications for the Middle East in the event of global war.^^ Having de­
prioritised the Middle East in early 1950, the JCS changed their position in October -  
aware that if Russia invaded, “Israeli and Arab Armed Forces would be incapable of 
defending their countries even with the aid of Western Forces presently in the area.”^^  
Hence, the conclusion, “affirmative United States action is required to safeguard our 
vital security interests in the Middle East”.^  ^With greater anti-communist 
categorisation and discourse, the Middle East’s representation grew from oil and 
military strategy, to also protecting Greece, Turkey and Iran (the ‘GTI investment’), 
as a signal to the third world, and even as an African gateway.^^
America’s rendezvous with the Middle East continued to contrast with Washington’s 
regional detailed unfamiliarity -  reflected in America’s cognitive flux of the Middle 
East. Despite America’s vigorous attempt to categorise the Middle East within the 
anti-communist narrative, which in 1952 alone was reflected by at least eight analysis 
papers and nine major conferences, Washington failed to congregate on a single
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defined strategy to the Middle East/° This partially reflected America’s continued 
lack of access to the region. London and especially Washington still wanted to 
maintain British responsibility for the Middle East, for which America had no 
intention to make, “any military sacrifice”. '^ In October 1950, Army Chief of Staff 
General Colhns reminded London,
“The US Chiefs consider that Middle East is a British responsibility in 
case of a hot war, at least during the first two years of such a war ... our 
activity and interest in the area during the Cold war period should not give 
rise to any misunderstanding on this”^^
In any case, Washington was distracted by Korea and the military pushed to focus 
exclusively on Korea, Indochina and NATO. Collins explained, “We are kidding 
ourselves and kidding them (Arabs) if we do anything which indicates we are going to 
put forces in that area. The forces to do that are just not in sight.”^^  The Defense 
Department in particular was reluctant to go beyond limited advisory, sales and 
training programmes to the Middle East.^ "^  The Cairo Conference of fifty-one 
American diplomats in March 1950 reaffirmed the 1949 Istanbul Conference’s 
decision to discourage, “any Near Eastern regional defense pact.”^^  Washington 
declined various requests for a regional pact, “the creation of a regional arrangement, 
pure and simple, of the Near Eastern countries offers no solution”.^  ^Even Turkey, a 
lynchpin given its airfields, its role in containing Russian submarines to the Black Sea 
and its strategic position, had its requests for formal structure shelved again.^^
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Meanwhile and initially, with Washington stunned by Korea, there was little 
immediate change in cognition and engagement of Pakistan. As the application of 
anti-communist narrative and the need to protect narrative mounted, America’s 
categorisation and engagement of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative 
increased. The growing anti-communism prior to the Korean war was already lending 
to this trend. America’s cognition of South Asia increased, leading McGhee to 
advocate a US$200m aid package for South Asia, “India, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
constitute the only countries on the borders of the USSR and its satellites for which 
there is no programme of United States economic assistance.”^^  Undersecretary James 
Webb strongly supported McGhee while Nitze added, “the need is stronger than the 
memorandum indicates”.^ ^
However after, “the crisis in Korea,... our policy had become somewhat more 
positive and we have taken an increased interest in their (countries of South Asia) 
military strength”.^ ® A bipolar anti-communist narrative encased South Asia for the 
anti-communist narrative, the struggle of the USSR and the jftee world was transferred 
to Asia. Washington was not only concerned about a direct Russian onslaught but also 
feared, “the Chinese Communists might move next in extended aggression to the 
South Asia areas.”'*^ By January 1951, the threat to America’s anti-communist 
narrative had inspired Washington to readjust its position for the subcontinent, “the 
time has come to pursue our objectives in South Asia with more vigor.”^^  Training 
programmes for South Asian languages were expanded, area specialists for South 
Asia were recruited or retrained, foreign observations bases increased, and Pakistan 
and India were regularly dropped into official speeches. Intelligence analysts were 
given further resources to scrutinise South Asia for communism more closely while
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military officers from South Asia were offered training programmes in America to 
nurture pro-Western sympathies/^
Meanwhile, Pakistan continued its anti-communist façade by for instance supporting 
America’s Korean War analysis as a Russian invasion, even though it refused Capitol 
Hill’s request for troops for the UN, on the pretext of its own security against India.^ ’ 
With Washington attaching meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative 
as an ally, a sustainer of narrative, and Washington’s concerns about the Middle East, 
the fashion before the Korean War of placing Pakistan in the Middle East and separate 
from India, hastened in late 1950,
“We had no confidence in the effectiveness of Egypt’s influence, and, 
looking elsewhere for leadership, we were bound to think of Pakistan, 
which was the most progressive and capable of the Muslim countries”/^
The State Department policy paper noted that Pakistan,
“has signed treaties of friendship with Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and 
sponsored conferences for Muslim countries, i.e. the World Muslim 
Conference, and the Islamic Economic Conference. Pakistan cemented its 
ties of friendship with Iran in 1950 by entertaining the Shah. Its stature 
among Muslim countries has grown. In the light of Pakistan’s present 
orientation to the West, and its active cooperation with the countries of the
' Liaquat Ali Khan had no interest in the Korean war and was in any event annoyed with the UN for its 
passivity in Kashmir
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Middle East, we should encourage its participation in problems common
to the Middle East”."^^
Foggy Bottom and Whitehall agreed that Pakistan was one of the most capable 
countries to protect the region from Russia."*^  The Economist described Pakistan as, 
“the strongest and most stable Muslim state.”^^  The State Department noted in July 
1951, “Pakistan has the military manpower which could assist Near East countries in 
blocking Russian aggression"/^ Pakistan became a nucleus in Washington’s defence 
of the Middle East, “With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended. Without 
Pakistan, I don’t see any way to defend the Middle East.’’^ ° Warren suggested that the 
US ask, “Liaquat what practical assistance he needs to reinforce his mil and industrial 
posture to assist in defense of Middle East’’.^  ^While Washington took comfort from 
Pakistan’s Islamic God fearing faith, McGhee even wanted Pakistan to pro-actively 
stabilise the region by resolving the Palestinian problem .The JCS, excitedly drunk 
by Pakistan’s potential troop contribution, enjoyed delusions that Pakistan, “is 
proposing to adopt the Arab language’’.^ ^
Forty American policy officials focusing on South Asia assembled in February 1951 
reached two major conclusions - to encourage regional economic development and 
“recognition of the potential military importance of Pakistan with respect to the 
defense of South Asia and the Middle East.’’^ '^  The conference recommended that 
America, “bring about an early build-up of Pakistani ground forces assisted by the 
provision of military equipment to Pakistan.’’^  ^In February 1951, another conference, 
the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul noted the potential 
benefits of Pakistan’s involvement in the Middle East, which, “presents possibilities
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jfrom the economic, social and political viewpoints, as well as from the point of view 
of regional security, which should be encouraged.”^^
Having attached meaning to Pakistan as anti-communist ally in the Middle East, 
Washington’s engagement of Pakistan expedited with the West’s worsening situation 
in the region throughout 1951, by the end of which the governments and peoples of 
Turkey, Iran, Greece, Saudi, Syria and Egypt detested the British/^ In November 
1950, with anti-American sentiment and anti-British riots as background, Cairo again 
demanded Britain’s immediate evacuation from Egypt and Sudan.^* Washington 
worried about the Arab redirection in the Cold War,
“the United Nations resolution condemning Communist China as an 
aggressor in Korea, shows that only Lebanon, Israel and Iraq supported 
the resolution, with Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi abstaining.”^^
Acheson, McGhee and Nitze were especially perturbed that neutralism’s associating 
with indigenous communism.^® Acheson especially feared a communist coup in Iran 
after it concluded a trade agreement with Russia in November 1950, and blocked 
Voice of America broadcasts.
America initially planned its anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle 
East through the Northern Tier, a concept that gained currency in 1951. Before June 
1950, America had considered as its primary defence of the Middle East, amongst 
other options, encouraging a Northern Tier of Greece, Turkey and Iran.^  ^Acheson’s 
‘outer ring’ in 1950 and Olaf Caroe’s ‘Northern Screen’ in 1951 had articulated
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precisely this concept.^^ One advantage of it was that it avoided Arab-Israeli 
crosscurrents including the growing American Jewish lobby in Congress, since 
neither the Arabs nor Jews were directly involved. It also avoided using Western 
troops, which Congress and the Pentagon especially objected to.^  ^Consequently, after 
June 1950, as America intensified its anti-communist focus on the Middle East and 
the Middle East itself slid further into anti-Westemism, Washington initially 
gravitated towards the Northern Tier as the Middle East’s optimal anti-communist 
defence.
Pakistan’s anti-communist credentials ensured its prominence during these early 
ruminations. A conference of US officials in February 1951 at Istanbul concluded that 
Pakistan should be encouraged to defend Iran and that, ‘Turkey and Pakistan should 
be encouraged to form an axis of cooperation on Middle Eastern matters”.^  In 
Washington, McGhee supported this conclusion, as did General Omar Bradley, the 
JCS chairman, who wanted Pakistan armed as Turkey was.^  ^In March 1951, Truman 
asked Congress for US$415m of military aid for the GTI states, of which Greece and 
Turkey had just joined NATO, and all of which might form the Northern Tier.^  ^In 
April, McGhee raised Pakistan’s inclusion in the Northern Tier, “The contribution 
that Pakistan could make was obvious and would probably be the decisive factor in 
ensuring defense of the area.”^^  The following month, America initiated discussions 
with Britain for what became known as the Middle East Command (‘MEC’ or 
‘MECOM’). Though this diverged JBrom the Northern Tier, in that Britain inserted 
Egypt as the lynchpin, it continued to reflect America’s categorisation of Pakistan as 
an anti-communist state in the Middle East. Pakistan, without being aware of it, was 
mentioned in the opening meetings.^* The MEC was initially envisaged as a Western-
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dominated Middle Eastern planning and coordinating organisation without permanent 
forces in which American, British and French officers would lead non-permanent 
Turkish, Pakistani and Egyptian troops.^^
Dispute Settlement Revisited
The intensified internalisation and protection of anti-communist identity and the 
spread of the anti-communist narrative arena, gave a new dimension to America’s 
treatment of Pakistan’s conflicts. In January 1950, the NSC’s Statement of Policy on 
South Asia had barely mentioned any conflict resolution goals for American policy.^® 
However, in the aftermath of Korea, one American official in discussing the Kashmir 
conflict, advised his British counterparts, “The pressure of the world crisis no longer 
left us with the time to work out a gradual solution”,^  ^The revival of America’s 
conflict resolution interest in Pakistan had specifically two aspects that were 
crystallised in a revealing analysis by a State Department official in September 1951,
“military conflict would afford to USSR choice of volunteering to assist 
India in a movement to secure Asia for the Asiatics or could support Pak, 
thereby rallying loyalty of Muslim world.”^^
The first aspect, which did not involve Afghanistan, was to complete America’s 
detachment of Pakistan from South Asia, meaning India, and thereby allow America 
to fireely give expression to its ongoing anti-communist cognition of Pakistan by 
engaging Karachi in the Middle East. Acheson’s impatience over Kashmir paralleled 
America’s cognitive placement of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative and
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geographic location in the Middle East -  preceding the mildest Russian interest in 
Kashmir itself by more than a year. There were various facets to this detachment. 
Washington recognised the sensitivities of both India and Pakistan to each other. 
Analysts were aware that Pakistan was, “willing to make a significant contribution to 
the defense of the Middle East provided its fear of Indian attack can be removed.”^^  
Hence, one facet was Pakistan’s unwillingness to partake wholeheartedly in 
America’s anti-communist engagement without protection. Another facet was that 
Americans also recognised that an Indo-Pakistan war would interrupt any American 
engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East’s defence.^ "*
Resolving the Kashmir dispute was not the only mechanism considered to effect 
Pakistan’s detachment from the South Asia for alternative mechanisms were assessed. 
In February 1951, a large gathering of American officials with responsibilities in 
South Asian policy recommended that consideration be given towards offering 
military reassurances to Pakistan in the event of Indian attack.^^ Another mechanism 
consisted of offering a collective security programme to Nehru, which would emerge 
still-born in the atmosphere of Indian independence, thus releasing Washington to 
engage Pakistan in the Middle East. Both were rejected -  the former for the carte 
blanche nature of the commitment that Karachi could and probably would easily 
exploit; the latter for Nehru’s likely livid reaction.^^
The second aspect of America’s conflict resolution interest viz Pakistan originated 
with the intensified application of anti-communist categorisation and discourse for 
Kashmir and Pushtunistan, and as such involved both India and Afghanistan. As was 
the case before June 1950, America remained unconcerned about a communist
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military invasion of either India or Pakistan during the Korean War/^ However, by 
November 1950 and treating South Asia more acutely within the anti-communist 
narrative, American officials expressed concern that Indo-Pakistan tensions, “creates 
situation favourable Soviet intrigues and subversion"/^ Washington felt that the 
Kashmir conflict limited Pakistan’s, “ability to carry forward economic development 
programs’’ resulting in, “firuitful soil for Communist doctrines’’/^ The Kashmir, 
“settlement seemed to be one of prerequisites for restoration normal political and 
economic conditions in SA.’’^ ° Washington feared that war over Kashmir would 
create regional disorder, which would foster communist growth in India, probably 
with Chinese assistance which,
“might open the way for a Communist seizure of power in parts or all Of 
India. In addition, war would have a serious adverse effect on US relations 
with both countries, and would probably deprive the US of potential air 
bases in Pakistan and of important raw materials fi*om India.’’^ '
Consequently, Washington’s policy to Pakistan in 1950 and 1951 continued the trend 
of the first Truman administration and was dominated by efforts to resolve Pakistan’s 
tensions with India, and to a lesser extent with Afghanistan -  neither of which neared 
settlement. Having ignored the Pushtunistan dispute throughout the first Truman 
administration, Washington suddenly took interest in it in November 1950. In spite of 
being overwhelmed with Korea, Acheson unexpectedly offered to act as ‘go-between’ 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, notwithstanding his disinterest and ignorance in 
the conflict’s specifics.
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However, America’s major conflict resolution focus in South Asia remained on 
Kashmir, given its impeding Pakistan’s transition from South Asia to the Middle East, 
and its perception in Washington as South Asia’s greatest communist vulnerability. 
Before June 1950, the Kashmir talks had ground to a halt after India refused to 
implement the UN resolutions of January 1949. Despite various UN effort, including 
mediation by Security Council President, General McNaughton, in December 1949 
and by the Australian diplomat, Owen Dixon, in July 1950, there was no progress on 
either the demilitarisation or plebiscite. This lack of progress, accompanied by an 
Indo-Pakistan trade boycott as background, caused immense frustration to America.
In January 1950, Acheson appealed for McNaughton’s powers to be expanded by the 
UN and for the UN to pressure India to abide by the resolutions.^^ One American 
official, reflecting this aggravation, bluntly demanded from his British counterpart, 
“positive action now”.*^
After Korea’s initial distraction, the deepening anti-communist identity narrative and 
its search for potential communist sources acutely focused Washington on Kashmir 
more intensely than ever before. From late 1950, Acheson encouraged raising further 
the tempo of the UN’s efforts by trying to resuscitate the Kashmir talks.^  ^Meanwhile, 
and in chorus, he also threatened India by announcing that he would take all 
outstanding irresolvable matters to the Security Council, and in the process prickling 
Nehru’s independence sensitivities.^^ The Ceylon Conference of American officials in 
February 1951 recommended exactly this.^  ^That month, a jointUK-US resolution 
adopted at the UN advocated using UN troops in demilitarised areas and referring any 
unresolved issues to arbitration. By April 1951, Acheson gave this idea further 
expression, wanting the UN to, “establish machinery work out detailed specific
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recommendations for solution, and then adopt res containing such 
recommendations.”^^  That the conflict’s substance continued to remain 
inconsequential should be reiterated. Acheson hoped for a quick-fix partition of 
Kashmir and a plebiscite in the Vale and paid little attention to the Office of the Legal 
Adviser who noted Kashmir’s ongoing legal ambiguity given that the,
“execution of an Instrument of Accession by the Maharajah in October 
1947, could not finally accomplish the accession of Kashmir to either 
Dominion, in view of the circumstances prevailing at that time.”^^
Frustrated Narratives
Real American narratives especially after Korea, specifically in the American mission 
and the American anti-communist meta-narrative, demanded Pakistan and India 
conform to specific meanings and engagements that would confirm America’s own 
portrayal and identity of itself and provide existential stability. Washington wanted to 
pacify Pakistan’s conflicts with its neighbours to detach Pakistan from India and stifle 
opportunity for communist growth. Ideally, it also wanted to engage Pakistan, having 
given it meaning and geographic location through the anti-communist narrative, 
within the Middle East as an anti-communist ally. Finally, Washington hoped that 
India would subscribe to America’s anti-communist and missionary narratives and 
assume its role in America’s future and romanticised story. During the two years after 
Korea, Washington achieved none of these aims, hence marking a period of extended 
frustration of identity narratives.
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Pushtunistan and Kashmir: Dogged Endurance
Washington failed to resolve Pakistan’s conflict in South Asia, therefore failing both 
to complete Pakistan’s detachment from South Asia and to immunise the region from 
communism. Karachi rejected Acheson’s offer to help resolve its dispute with Kabul 
by acting as go-between.^° Paralleling Nehru’s obstinacy in Kashmir, Pakistan 
demanded that before any dialogue, the Durand Line be re-affirmed as the legitimate 
border by Afghanistan or America. Though Washington privately supported 
Pakistan’s claim, it would not publicly endorse it since this would nullify the 
dialogue.^* Pakistani diplomats referred to Afghanis as “those blackmailers” and 
refused to even accept the existence of a problem with Kabul. After the subsequent 
failure in Acheson’s conflict resolution attempt, he changed tactics in early 1951 to 
immunise the region from communism.^^ Acheson resorted to Marshall’s earlier anti- 
conununist policy towards Hyderabad and Junagadh - conflict suppression, “there is a 
serious question whether keeping the Pusthtoonistan issue alive would not harm 
Afghanistan by creating conditions leading to Soviet intervention.”^^  Acheson pressed 
Afghanistan unsuccessfully to stifle the conflict, even after successfully co-opting 
Muslim states, which, keen on establishing the primacy of state above ethno-national 
tribe, were generally supportive of Pakistan and similarly pressed upon Kabul. "^^
American attempts in Kashmir were similarly unsuccessful -  the prime responsibility 
for which resided with Nehru. The joint UK-US resolution in February 1951, which 
Pakistan accepted, infuriated Nehru who, in not being consulted prior to the 
resolution’s submission, felt Indian independence challenged.^^ Nehru repudiated the 
resolution, which also instructed a UNCIP representative to demilitarise Kashmir
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within three months, failing which, to proceed to imposed arbitration.^^ Nehru 
therefore refused to accept the representative. Senator Frank Porter Graham, in such 
capacity.^^ Most observers expected Kashmir to elect to join Pakistan; the Indians 
were not about to hold a plebiscite, which they might lose. Washington’s suspicions 
of Nehru’s intentions dated to February 1948 when he insisted that the pro-Indian 
Abdullah remain in power during the plebiscite period and the UN’s supervisory 
powers be restricted.^^ These suspicions grew with Indian delays in implementing the 
UNCIP resolutions in 1949 and Nehru’s rejection of the truce on dubious 
technicalities that led to the resolutions’ collapse. By September 1949, Washington 
and London were convinced that, “Nehru was incapable of a reasonable approach to 
the Kashmir problem.”^^  For instance, McGhee and Hickerson blamed,
“the intransigent attitude of India which has been primarily responsible 
during the past year for holding up progress toward demilitarization of 
Kashmir and final settlement within the framework of UNCIP 
resolutions.” ®^^
Nehru complicated matters in October 1950 by supporting the All-Jammu and 
Kashmir National Conference’s resolution, which moved Kashmir closer to Indian 
ascension. Then, when the major hurdle on Kashmir in 1952, the proportion of troops 
on either side of the ceasefire line after demilitarisation, was almost agreed in March 
1952, India almost scuttled the progress by demanding unusually high force levels. 
Graham, unable to secure India and Pakistan’s agreement on a plebiscite administrator 
in April 1952, then received Pakistan’s concession of a four-to-one troop ratio after 
demilitarisation in exchange for immediate progress towards the tasks of the
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Plebiscite Administrator, which was again rejected. India’s rejections throughout the 
summer of 1952 led to America’s exasperation while Nehru enjoyed sweet revenge, 
given the prevalent feeling in India that American pressure in Kashmir was a function 
of New Delhi’s independence in the Korean war. °^^
An array of observers blamed Nehru for obstructing a resolution. The Brazilian 
delegate at the UN, Ouro-Preto, noted it was, “as plain as nose on your face” that 
India was blocking the Kashmir reconciliation.Attlee and Australia’s Robert 
Menzies blamed the failure of the informal January 1951 Commonwealth talks on 
Kashmir On N eh ru .N eh ru  refused to reduce India’s troops in Kashmir before a 
plebiscite as per Dixon’s suggestion, yet, “Dixon could not support Nehru’s fear of 
attack from Pakistan.”^^ Nehru rejected a joint Burmese-Indonesian offer and an 
Australian offer to help resolve K ashm ir.Canada blamed India too.'®  ^Even the 
Indian military privately suggested they would agree a settlement if allowed to by 
Nehru since, “in spite of the official line of the Indian political leaders, the military 
officials are very concerned about the Communist threat”. By the end of 1951, one 
Australian minister commented that, “Mountbatten was the only one left in London 
who favoured India.” °^*
In fact, Nehru was unprepared to allow Kashmir to leave the young and 
heterogeneous union, and was aggressively trying to avoid demilitarisation.
Gradual realisation of this annoyed Acheson immensely, for the India position.
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“may well be interpreted as meaning that while GOI does not intend fol 
through its commitment under UNCIP ress, in order not take onus for 
scrapping them, it prepared talk around them indefinitely.” '^®
New Delhi, through a naïve American ambassador in Chester Bowles, actually 
wanted Washington to propose alternative solutions on Kashmir. Convinced that the 
Indians were trying to avoid a plebiscite and furious at Bowles for not seeing it, 
Hickerson of the State Department, reflecting Washington’s deep anger with India, 
noted that Nehru wanted Graham to say to Pakistan,
“Let’s forget my demilitarisation program which the Security Council 
directed me to work out, and let’s forget two UNCIP resolutions to which 
you and the Indians agreed and upon which the Security Council long ago 
put its blessing. I have got an idea for partitioning the state and for a 
plebiscite in the Valley, and I hope you and the Indians will agree to it. If 
you don’t agree. I’ll not only have to report that I can’t get agreement on 
my demilitarisation program but also that you would not agree to my 
alternative proposal.”' ' '
Anger with India on Kashmir reached boiling point in May 1952,
“If India is sincere in its expressions of a wish for a settlement via 
partition, it must in the nature of things come forward with some sort of 
specific proposals. The pressure is on India because of its own record, and
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has been for some years now, to give some convincing evidence of a
genuine intention to do its part in settling this dispute.”^
In contrast to the Indian position, Graham reported, “Pak auths were prepared 
consider nearly any measure necessary to solve Kashmir question subject only to non­
jeopardy Pak security”.L ik e w ise , Acheson noted, “Pakistan has proved more 
cooperative than India.”^^"^ The McNaughton report in February 1950 was accepted by 
Pakistan and rejected by India. In August 1950, Pakistan overcame sizeable political 
obstacles and accepted Nehru’s earlier proposals in June, which Nehru then himself 
bizarrely rejected. In September 1951, Graham was, “pleased with Pak attitude on 
demilitarization of Azad Kashmir.”'E ig h t  months later, Acheson noted the, “GOP 
has accepted all 12 proposals.. .Paks over three year period have consistently agreed 
to various UN suggestions for settlement”."^ Pakistan was willing to accept an 
independent arbitration on the truce stalemate by the Plebiscite Administrator 
designate but when Truman wrote to both prime ministers urging agreement to the 
commissioner’s suggestion, Nehru rejected it.
Despite the frustration with India and satisfaction with Pakistan, and America’s 
locating Pakistan within anti-communism in the Middle East, Washington did not 
consider publicly supporting Pakistan on Kashmir. Neither the anti-communist 
narrative nor Pakistan’s cognitive placement in the Middle East could support such 
partiality. The former gave meaning to Pakistan as an anti-communist, not as an anti- 
Indian state and with respect to the latter, India hardly ever featured in the Middle 
East. Therefore, when Liaquat asked that since Pakistan’s potentially providing troops 
for Korea would constitute an irrevocable tie to the West, would America then
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commit itself to Pakistan in Kashmir, Acheson responded that if Pakistan troops 
meant India’s alienation, then his answer was no.”  ^Similarly, in February 1952, 
Washington reiterated to the embassy in India, “Primary US consideration is 
maintenance strictest neutrality as between India and Pakistan”.*’*
Pakistan and the Middle East II
America’s second narrative lustration originated in Pakistan’s two-staged removal, 
abetted by failure on the Kashmir talks, from America’s preferred engagement of 
Pakistan within the Middle East. Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated throughout early 
1951 so much so that by July, the two countries stood off on the Punjab border. 
Washington was alarmed by India’s ninety thousand troops positioned a few miles 
from forty-six thousand Pakistani troops.”  ^The high tension hauled Washington back 
into focusing on Indo-Pakistan relations after it had retracted from Kashmir since the 
failure of the UN resolution of February, and also into geographically re-locating 
Pakistan in South Asia. Washington, acutely aware of Pakistan’s association with 
India throughout July and August, sought to ease tensions. Indeed, the Indo-Pak 
tension was sufficiently important to compel the commissioning of a full and resource 
intensive National Intelligence Estimate in September.*^®
Consequently, America’s anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, 
delicate and inadequately rooted given Washington’s relative unfamiliarity with both 
Pakistan and the Middle East, the latter reflected in the continual policy assessment, 
suddenly halted. Pakistan, re-located into South Asia, was totally removed in the 
autumn of 1951 from America’s Middle East defence plans, drawing General Bradley
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to wonder, “I don’t know how far we could get with Pakistan until the Kashmir 
problem has been solved. If we give military aid we will find ourselves in trouble with 
India.”*B radley’s thoughts were shared by a National Intelligence Estimate in 
September which suggested that in the event of war with India, “Militarily, war would 
almost certainly remove any early prospect of Pakistan’s joining in plans for defense 
of the Middle East against a Communist attack”.
However, despite this disengagement, America’s denotation of Pakistan as an anti­
communist state in the Middle East did not alter. Instead, Kashmir, more than a 
thousand miles away from any (conventional) Middle East state, became a Middle 
East problem for its implications for Pakistan’s detachment from South Asia, and 
featured as the central issue in a paper titled, ‘Alignment of US-UK Policies in the 
Middle East’.*^  ^As a result, resolving the Kashmir issue was prioritised further still 
and Acheson immediately intensified the search for a solution. In August, he asked 
America’s UN representative to scan the UN for alternative ideas and lateral thinking 
to resolve the impasse.*^ "* Notwithstanding the British responsibility, eleven days 
later, he contemplated a “shot-gun” approach to Kashmir. Acheson even invited 
Asian states unilaterally without consulting Washington to, “make independent and 
apparently spontaneous approaches to the parties” and, “to take a fresh look at what 
might bring about agreement between the two parties.”*^  ^Weeks later, he urged 
Graham to persist in his negotiations and raised the issue of granting to him greater 
resolution powers.
Against this milieu, Graham’s definitive solution in September to the UN magnetised 
Washington’s attention.Graham  produced a twelve-point proposal for
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demilitarisation to which he added a thirteenth point, which called for arbitration on 
further disputes/W ritten in Geneva, to help preserve his impartiality, the proposal 
initially placed a ninety-day deadline for absolute demilitarisation and for a plebiscite 
administrator to be appointed immediately thereafter/W eeks later, Graham revised 
the plan to allow Pakistan four thousand civil police on its side and for India to have 
eight thousand military troops on its side/^^ Though Graham submitted his report to 
the UN in October and was instructed to resume his negotiations, his efforts proved 
by the year-end to be inconclusive/^^
Despite this failure, Washington maintained pressure towards a resolution into 1952. 
In America, the anti-communist identity narrative continued to polarise and be 
internalised, while its application on Kashmir and South Asia gained definition. 
Russia’s first participation in Kashmir, in Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik’s February 
1952 speech in the Security Council against Graham’s plebiscite offer, and in favour 
of Kashmir’s constituent assembly deciding Kashmir’s ascension, gave Acheson 
considerable anxiety. Washington felt that, “Sovs and commies are intensifying 
their activities in and on borders of subcontinent”. As a result, the US increased its 
observer presence in the UN Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan in February 
1952.^^  ^Further, as the CIA raised the possibility of an Indo-Pakistan war, Truman 
and Acheson continued their strong support for Graham’s e ffo rt.W h en  talks 
stalemated, American pressure increased notably,
“we consider it of the greatest importance that Dr Graham continue in the
Kashmir case.. .Failure to settle the dispute during the next few months
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may well lead to hostilities in the subcontinent which would ultimately
benefit no one but the Communist bloc.”^^ ^
While America temporary relocated Pakistan into South Asia, albeit simultaneous to 
its location in the Middle East, and shelved it from its Middle East plans, American 
concerns in the Middle East deepened. In March 1951, Tehran followed Cairo and 
officially demanded Britain’s immediate w ithdraw al.The Majlis nationalised the 
AIOC and chose nationalist Mohammed Musaddiq for prime minister. London, 
furious, plotted his overthrow, hatched numerous covert operations and considered an 
in v a s io n .In  September, Iran seized the Abadan complex and military confrontation 
seemed imminent.^ '^® Iran’s daily 660,000 oil barrels constituted one-third of the 
Middle East’s oil output, making Iran the main supplier of aviation gas and oil to 
American and British regional air forces. Washington feared Iran becoming 
communist given its poor harvests and financial corruption and rumours abounded 
that Moscow was preparing its own solution to the Anglo-Iranian c lash .B esides the 
persisting British disputes with Egypt and Iran, even Iraqi popular sentiment 
demanded Britain’s evacuation from Iraq.
With this anxiety, America raised its involvement for as Acheson noted, the Middle 
East was explosive and in prime condition for Russia to exploit. Even though 
Acheson generally disliked developing countries controlling their own resources, he 
pushed Britain for concessions in Iran.^ "^ "^  McGhee eventually secured some 
concessions, as well as American loans and aid to Iran.^ "*^  Averell Harriman spent 
several weeks on shuttle diplomacy from July between Tehran and London, though 
Britain’s offer to share profits equally yet maintain control of oil production and
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marketing was rejected and the talks collapsed in A u g u s t.A s  with Tito however, 
Washington underestimated nationalism and overestimated communism for Musaddiq 
had no communist affinity. Nor had Russia the capacity or intent to purchase and 
transport Iranian oil.*"^  ^“British intransigence, not revolutionary nationalism or 
aggressive Soviet probing, endangered access to Persian Gulf oil.”'"*^
The MEC, as an instrument to arrest the West’s precarious Middle East position, 
assumed fresh importance and urgency. The immediate hope was that it would enable 
the transfer of Suez to a British MEC chief, in return for which, Egypt, after having 
joined the MEC, would achieve Britain’s exit from Suez and receive military aid.^ "*^  
The Pentagon’s treatment of the MEC as an exclusively military structure was hence 
lack in g .T h e  immediate MEC agenda was, as Acheson recognised, a solution to the 
Anglo-Egyptian political dispute.^A  State Department paper noted that the MEC 
addressed,
“more a political problem than a military one and the United States seeks 
through the Middle East Command to gain active cooperation with the 
West in the defense of the Middle East on a cooperative basis.”^^ ^
Washington’s cognition of Pakistan as primarily a Middle East country had not 
changed during this, the MEC’s planning stage, when Pakistan was also re-absorbed 
into South Asia, thus making Pakistan a state of two regions. For instance, in August 
1951, McGhee pro-actively encouraged Ghulam Mohammed’s work towards Islamic 
economic co-operation.N or had Pakistan’s location within the anti-communist
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narrative altered, which was reflected in the administration, Congress and the US 
press’s support of Pakistan.
Given Britain’s desire to arrest its regional decline through the MEC, which required 
American participation for credibility and resources, London and before Pakistan’s 
border tension, at first worked with America’s cognition of Pakistan in the Middle 
East and thus accepted Pakistan’s inclusion in the MEC. Indeed, London so 
desperately relied on the MEC to arrest its regional decline, that it even traded 
supporting Turkey’s inclusion into NATO for Turkey’s agreement to participate in the 
MEC, a deal that infuriated Foggy Bottom.
However, critically for policy to Pakistan, London neither viewed Pakistan through 
the anti-communist narrative nor felt compelled to engage it within the Middle East. 
Britain only accommodated to America’s view of Pakistan as a Middle East asset to 
seduce American support for the MEC since London could not separate Pakistan from 
India as Washington had, being more sensitive to Pakistan and India’s perceived 
realities -  in which each side gravitated the other’s fram ew ork.For instance, in 
April 1951, the British Joint Services Mission wanted Pakistan and India to defend 
the Iraqi-Persian line.^^  ^Britain was also more aware of the intensity of India’s 
reaction to any such engagement and cautioned Washington about isolating India by 
offering security and aid to Pakistan. Finally, Britain also better appreciated 
Pakistan’s distance from the Middle East. London not only feared that Egypt, Turkey 
and Iran might resent a Pakistani attempt at regional leadership but was also sceptical 
as to whether Pakistan could provide leadership to the Muslim world given the ethnic, 
cultural and lingual barriers between it and the Arabs. *
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When America suspended engaging Pakistan in the Middle East due to the border 
tensions, and relocated it simultaneously in the Middle East and South Asia, London’s 
domination of the MEC’s development squeezed Pakistan from the Anglo-American 
Middle East strategy. After the Indo-Pakistan border tensions subsided by October 
1951 and Pakistan emerged out of South Asia, the Pentagon and Truman sought to re­
engage Pakistan in the Middle East by re-introducing Pakistan to the MEC. However, 
with Britain in control of the MEC and planning at an advanced stage, London 
rejected America’s suggestion to accordingly re-engage Pakistan, and instead offered 
introducing Pakistan to the MEC for a later undefined date.^^° Washington had no 
intention of questioning Britain for America, “continues believe UK shld bear major 
responsibility” for both the Middle East and South Asia.^^  ^Therefore, the first MEC 
list of participants in October 1951, which included America, France, Britain, Turkey, 
New Zealand, South Africa, Australia and Egypt, did not even mention Pakistan as an 
associate member. Indeed, Pakistan was not mentioned in the MEC throughout the 
final quarter of 1951 and the NSC’s year-end report about Middle East strategy, 
anchored as it was by the MEC, similarly made no mention of Pakistan.
Pakistani leaders, desperate for aid and Western security, made several overtures to be 
included in the Middle East discussions. Until Liaquat Ali Khan’s mysterious 
assassination in October 1951, Pakistan had demanded American weapons and a 
commitment on Kashmir in return for Pakistan joining a Western backed Middle East 
organisation.A fter Liaquat, Pakistan’s policy changed. Former foreign secretary 
Ikramulah’s discussions with McGhee days after Liaquat’s death revealed that 
Pakistan no longer made contingent its joining a pro-Westem alliance upon American
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support for Pakistan against I n d i a . Similarly, Zafmllah Khan’s conversation with 
Acheson the following month unusually made no mention of Kashmir. In fact, 
Ikramullah actually marketed Pakistan to America, “Pakistan was interested in the 
defense of the Middle East... it was so natural that the concept would not require 
‘selling’ to the Pakistanis’’.'^  ^Karachi’s anger with its removal from the MEC, 
meaning not receiving aid, consequently ran deep,
“the time was past for words, Pakistan wanted action.. .you must make up 
your mind about Pakistan.... If Pakistan does not get assistance from the 
West, the Government’s position will be grave. Pakistan may turn away 
from the West”.'*’
India and Asia
While America failed to eliminate South Asia’s conflicts and was denied an anti­
communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, the final American narrative 
frustration stemmed from India’s refusal to conform to its place in both the 
missionary and polarised anti-communist narrative categorisations and discourses. 
Initially, as the Korean War broke out, Washington was relieved with Indian policy, 
which supported the early America position on Korea, including the Security 
Council’s resolution on 25"^  June, “The Indians were becoming more and more 
realistic about Asian developments”.'^  ^As a result, during the war’s early weeks, 
Nehru received extensive praise in the American press.A cheson, encouraged by 
Nehru’s maturing support for America, even wanted to develop a forum for greater 
independent Asian involvement in K o rea .O n e  State department official noted.
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“The countries of South Asia now realize more clearly the aggressive 
intentions of Communist dominated governments.. .India and Pakistan, in 
particular, now see their own differences in better perspective.”^^^
But such hopes about India proved fallacious. Henderson rejected Acheson’s 
suggestions for an Asian involvement knowing full well Nehru’s commitment to 
independence and India’s to anti-Americanism.^Nehru, whose views on foreign 
policy stood unchallenged especially after Patel’s death, saw Korea as a civil matter, 
at tangent to the interpretation from the anti-communist discourse. His proposal in 
July 1950 offered a Security Council seat to Mao’s China, at tangent to the missionary 
and anti-communist narratives, a cease-fire and a North Korean troop withdrawal. 
Acheson described such interventions as, “a terrible headache” and dismissed the 
initiatives as fiivolous peace mongering.^^^ That the American ambassador, the 
maverick Bowles, encouraged Nehru was however not apparent to Washington,
“Since no word of approval or disagreement came from Washington in 
response to my report of conversation, I urged Nehru a few days later to 
propose a new basis for a peaceful settlement among the UN, North 
Koreans and Chinese... This he did.”^^"^
Instead, Acheson was furious at seeing the pro-communist Defence Minister Krishna 
Menon’s hand underlying Indian intervention. Though tensions with Nehru eased 
with Mac Arthur’s military success in the autumn of 1950, Nehru’s mediation severely 
antagonised Washington throughout the conflict. He publicly requested
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Washington to refrain from the thirty-eighth parallel and abstained in the UN 
resolution supporting Korea’s reunification in October. When American forces 
crossed the thirty-eighth parallel with flippant talk of atomic bombs, Nehru was 
incensed and muted his criticism only due to India’s food shortages. After China 
invaded Korea, Acheson wanted China brandished as an aggressor but an Indian 
effort to appoint a three-man group to determine the basis of the ceasefire and to make 
recommendations to the UNGA succeeded instead in December. Most Asians 
viewed American involvement in Asia as imperialistic, and agreed with Nehru who,
“did not for a moment believe that Communist China had invaded Korea 
because it aggressive designs against that country. It had intervened in 
Korea, in his opinion, because it was convinced that the United States was 
intending to use Korea as a base for the subsequent invasion of China 
itself.”*''*
Nor did Nehru share Washington’s anti-communist analysis beyond Korea. In 
Indochina, Americans portrayed their dilemma as a choice, “to support the French in 
Indochina or face the extension of Communism over the remainder of the continental 
area of Southeast Asia and possible farther westward”. In contrast, Nehru 
dismissed, “Indochina actions as not being clear evidence Chinese aggressiveness, 
explaining support Ho Chi-Minh forces had not yet involved any actual Chinese”. 
Similarly, while the Senate ratified the Japanese Treaty in March 1952, Nehru 
rejected it because it kept America in Japan and did not recognise Beijing and even 
encouraged Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia to follow suit.^ '^ Few areas were outside 
Nehru’s remit, “it was an extremely dangerous thing for the Western powers to
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furnish Western Germany with arms. Such action might well frighten Germany’s 
neighbours to the East and kindle a war.”^^  ^Furthermore, Nehru’s sensitivity to 
independence persisted so much so that in April 1951 he refused Washington from 
overseeing its own aid distribution in India, a standard requirement Congressional to 
ensure proper aid use. ^
Against a backdrop of Indian obstinacy in Kashmir and India’s refusal to partake in 
America’s narratives, American frustration with India grew, “India’s attitude toward 
the United States position with respect to Japan is neither balanced nor objective.”* 
Nehru was criticised by American officials for his naivety and immaturity, meaning 
his unwillingness to use the anti-communist categorisation and discourse. Given 
Nehru’s profile in the third world, American officials were circumspect of criticising 
Nehru, and instead preferred to drip complaints to a compliant media. The 
Washington Post riled, “Never has Mr Nehru’s neutralism shown such a bias, a bias in 
the Russian direction”. The Chicago Tribune titled an editorial, “Nehru, Battling for 
Stalin”.* The New York Times attacked him as the, “voice of abnegation”, while 
others called him the Hamlet of Asia.*^  ^Though India’s Commonwealth ties, and 
especially Britain, endeared it to the West, the British High Commissioner in India 
noted in October 1950, “Indo-America public relations have reached a ‘new low’”.*^ ^
While policymakers and Congress increasingly dismissed India as unworthy, 
Washington could not ignore the second largest country in Asia and thus risk the 
continued integrity of America’s mission and anti-communism. The mere existence of 
a Chinese communist government. North Korea’s invasion and Indochina’s 
deterioration crystallised by the Vietminh offensive of September 1950, were each
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categorised and attached meaning within American anti-communist and missionary 
cognition/S ince Americans assumed these events were directed by Moscow, it was 
America’s anti-communist narrative above and beyond the missionary narrative that 
was most threatened, reasserted and thus privileged to understand India. Washington’s 
policy options to India were consequently uncomfortably restricted by the possibility 
of India being re-categorised outside of the anti-communist narrative, as a communist 
anomaly. This threat had three interrelated principal sources - economic instability, 
indigenous Indian communism and direct Russian control.
America’s fear for India’s economic instability evolved in late 1950 and became 
particularly prominent in 195l/^° In December 1950, IndiaTequested two million 
tons of grain, with the State Department noting, “The present threat of famine in India 
promises to create conditions ideally suited to the subversive activities of the 
Communist Party of India”.^ ^^  The administration assessed the implications of giving 
aid exclusively within the anti-communist narrative. ^ By mid-1951, intelligence 
assessments concluded that India’s massive economic dissatisfaction left a reasonable 
chance that India would turn com m unist.India’s loss was a harrowing prospect for 
Asia. NSC 98/1, approved in January 1951, emphasised the potential politico- 
psychological damage more than the military, “The loss of India to the Communist 
orbit would mean that for all practical purposes all of Asia will have been lost”.*^"^
In 1952, two political concerns complemented those derived from India’s economy. 
Within India, the election in January gave sufficient material to both those optimistic 
and pessimistic about India. Congress, or more accurately Nehru, won 364 out of 420 
seats. However, this represented only forty-five percent of the national vote.
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Socialists merged with the KMPP and Communists (5.1%) to take 21.5% of the vote. 
Communists emerged strong in Hyderabad, Madras, West Bengal and Travancore - 
the latter was especially worrying given it enjoyed India’s highest literacy rate.*^  ^A 
study in October 1952, ‘Consequences of Communist Control over South Asia’, 
concluded, “Overt efforts of Communists to exploit their successes in the national 
elections in India left no doubt in the minds of government leaders as to Communist 
intentions”.W ash ing ton ’s second political concern was its perception of direct 
Russian control represented in Moscow’s shifting attention to Ind ia .R ussian  offers 
to supply industrial equipment, support India’s position on Kashmir and further 
economic relations were carefully noted by America throughout 1951 and 1952.^^^
Washington’s inability to dismiss India, coupled with Nehru’s determination to 
demonstrate Indian independence on a range of world issues, forced Washington to 
uncomfortably categorise and apply meaning to India outside of American bipolar 
anti-communism and missionary narratives. Given the post-Korea insecurity and 
bipolarisation of narratives, this was a difficult and reluctant process, and was clearly 
demonstrated as such in Truman’s first discussion with Bowles after the latter was 
appointed ambassador to India in October 1951. Truman directed Bowles, “The first 
thing you’ve got to do is to find out if Nehru is a Communist. He sat right on that 
chair and he talked just like a Communist”.^ ®® Neutralism within the Cold War itself 
became a curiosity for Americans with many explanations offered. Nehru’s 
personality was extensively studied, as for instance, it was by Graham who insisted 
that it was, “the single most important factor in any negotiations on the Kashmir 
dispute.” ®^^
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Resultantly, throughout 1951, while the embassy continued to press New Delhi to see 
the communist threat, Washington came to partial terms with Indian neutralism by 
opening space within anti-communist bipolarity. Intelligence estimates of India in 
mid-1951, separately supported by State Department officials, noted, “India can be 
expected to follow a policy of neutrality in the event of a third world”.^ ®^ In August 
1951, Foggy Bottom prepared a paper on ‘Means to Combat India’s Policy of 
Neutralism’. T h e  CIA followed this with an extensive intelligence-wide analysis of 
‘India’s position in the East -  West Conflict’ Notwithstanding this recognition of 
neutralism, policymakers were still irritated with India for seeking to build a neutral 
third force, which scolded the West.^°  ^This awkward cognition, made more difficult 
by a Congress and media that would not see beyond bipolarity, engendered a 
frustrating engagement of India. Subsequently, Washington’s confr'onting of Indian 
neutralism did not manifest beyond vague policy recommendations.
Despite the growing but uncomfortable acceptance of Indian neutralism, Washington 
also continued to persist in treating India simultaneously through anti-communism, 
even if reluctantly not its bipolar variant, yet nevertheless a cognition easier to 
translate to specific policy. In 1951, Washington and New Delhi entered an agreement 
on the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, enabling India to procure military hardware on 
a reimbursable basis and in 1952, America sold to India fifty-four C-119s for 
US$48m and two hundred Sherman M4AF tanks for US$19m.^°^ However,
America’s major anti-communist engagement of India reflected America’s major anti­
communist concern about India -  its economy. Acheson, strongly supported by 
American officials, helped India’s economy to alleviate the prospect of indigenous 
communism developing. Two significant opportunities arose to accordingly engage
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India within the anti-communist narrative/^^ In late 1950, India had a food shortage 
after the summer’s floods and a subsequent drought destroyed 2.6m tons of grain. 
Henderson forecast above a million deaths from famine.^®^  In November, India 
informally requested America for a million tons of grain either as gift or on credit. 
After Indian cabinet ministers pressed Nehru, Mrs Pandit advised that her brother 
was, “willing to accept” American aid providing it was unconditional. In December, 
she formally requested two million tons of grain, which even Henderson described as 
an absolute minimum need.^ ®^  Washington sited the problem within the anti­
communist narrative, hoping to contain “Communist Imperialism”.^ ®^ With 
communist-inducing depravation on India’s horizon, the administration requested 
Congress in February 1951 for two million tons of grain aid, a request for which 
Acheson gave operational priority and Truman lobbied vigorously.^* ^
However, when the request was presented to Congress, despite rapid approval by the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, legislative action stalled. Congress and the media 
could only understand India as a friend or enemy of communism, and refused to 
accept Nehru’s place within the former so much so that that Henderson was unsure if, 
“Congress would be willing approve dollar aid program of sufficient magnitude.” *^^  
Nehru’s independent policy, magnified under the lens of Asian turbulence, did not 
reside within a bipolar anti-communist narrative. Many Congressmen were infuriated 
by India’s veto of the UN resolution branding China an aggressor in Korea.^*  ^With 
the famine starting properly in April 1951, delays in turn angered independence- 
sensitive Indians into threatening to retract their request, news of which toughened 
Congress’s mood.^ *"* Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, asked, “What are the Indians going 
to do for us?” Lodge added, “I just haven’t got any faith at all that there is going to be
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any gratitude or appreciation or anything else”.^ ^^  Senator Tom Connally, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned McGhee, “you are going to have 
one hell of a time getting this thing through Congress"/^^
In contrast, liberal activists, including civil rights leaders, whose conceptual flexibility 
extended beyond a bipolarised anti-communism, and many of whom were committed 
to placing India within the missionary narrative, lobbied Congress for aid. On 4^  ^
January 1951, the ‘American Emergency Food Committee for India’ was formed, 
whose influential members included Eleanor Roosevelt, Pearl Buck and Walter 
White, and was supported by many newspapers. Even The Washington Post, which 
had been a sharp critic of Nehru, insisted that, “Hunger and politics do not mix and 
any attempt to associate them would do this country incalculable harm in Asia”.^ ^^
In April, the Senate offered the sale of million tons of grain and a grant of another 
million tons. However, Washington’s standard terms of grant aid required distribution 
supervision, which annoyed Nehru, as did Congressional discussion demanding that 
India export monazite sands to America. Nehru’s anger was reflected in his heated 
radio broadcast on 1®* May 1951, which in turn led Congress to delay matters more.^^  ^
Acheson recognised the damage being caused by this vicious circle especially after 
Russia offered to New Delhi a small but very well received aid package in March 
1951. Finally in May, a desperate Nehru agreed terms with Congress for a 
US$189.7m loan, less restrictive than a grant, and notably below Nehru and Truman’s 
request even if it enabled the first grain shipments to leave for India in August.^
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The entire event confirmed to Nehru his suspicions of America. Nehru found it 
humiliating, “to wait in this way for favours to be bestowed on us”.^ ®^ " “Many 
Indians had become convinced that we wanted to take political advantage of their 
suffering”.^ ’^ Russia in contrast had responded immediately, by sending 50,000 tons 
of wheat, being only 2.5% of the American contribution, and generated considerably 
more goodwill. Even before the grain left America, Nehru reasserted Indian 
independence by criticising the Japanese treaty. The Truman administration was in 
turn upset with India, especially furious with Nehru’s comments on the treaty, while 
McGhee, Grady and Bowles, supporters of aid to India, had their fingers burned.
The second opportunity to engage India within anti-communism arose in late 1952, 
and again demonstrated a similar tension between an Executive that reluctantly and 
partially accepted a neutral India, and a Congress that lived within severe bipolarity. 
The administration in Washington and Bowles wanted to increase long-term 
development aid to India and requested from Congress a minimum US$115m for 
India for 1953.^^  ^In May 1952, an interdepartmental committee even recommended a 
further US$ 125m since,
“The current political situation in India heavily underscores previous 
statements made by the Department regarding the interrelationship of 
economic development and political stability, the importance of India in 
the containment of communist aggression in Asia, and the need for early 
improvement of the Indian standard of living.”^^ ^
" This was particularly upsetting for Indians given their customs of charity and gratitude (‘Dana’), in 
which the donor is obliged to give to the recipient, and the recipient does not ask from a donor.
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Despite the extraordinary effort by Bowles to increase aid to India, further funds 
could not be obtained partly because of technical reasons of process and partly 
because of Congress’s budget restraints and its continued bipolar anti-communist 
commitment to understanding India. Indeed, Congress actually reduced the aid to 
India from US$115m to US$77m in June and then in July to US$34m.^ '^* Nonetheless, 
this aid, unilaterally arranged and unconditional, did not infringe on Indian 
independence and which is why Nehru thus noted that, “aid from America has been 
given to us from the very best of motives and without strings of any kind. For this 
reason we welcome this assistance.”^^  ^By the eve of Eisenhower’s election, 
sweetened by this aid allocation, American relations with India bad improved 
considerably. The most important contributory factor to this improvement was 
however Chester Bowles.
Chester Bowles
The delicate nature of American-Indian relations demanded sensitive official touch, a 
tact and diplomacy rare amongst American ambassadors. Henderson’s diplomatic 
touch was unusual even by this comparison, “Henderson detested Nehru and Nehru 
knew it.”^^  ^fri October 1951, Chester Bowles, the New Dealer, replaced Henderson. 
More than any other American administration official in the twentieth century, except 
perhaps John Kennedy, Bowles crystallised America’s categorisation of India within 
America’s missionary narrative. A definition of ‘ambassador’ is, “a diplomatic 
minister of the highest order: a messenger or agent”.^ ^^  The representation of one state 
to another is implicit in this. In the case of Bowles, he became simultaneously 
America’s ambassador to New Delhi and New Delhi’s de facto ambassador to
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Washington, doing, “more than any other American to interpret America to India and 
India to America”.^ ^^  Such was his value to India’s representation that after Truman’s 
presidency. Madam Pandit took the unprecedented step to even lobby Eisenhower to 
retain Bowles as ambassador/^^
Initially part of the America First Committee that opposed intervention in the war, 
Bowles was convinced that America’s future lay neither in Europe’s empires nor 
outside the American continent. He insisted that the American mission, represented 
by Roosevelt’s New Deal, needed to be fulfilled first in America.^^® Bowles’s, 
“concern in the 1930s when he was a non-interventionist, the ‘America First’ period, 
was to keep~the beacon alight here while the world went into darkness”.^ ^^
After the war however, Bowles became deeply committed to continuing the American 
revolution outside of the continent through economic aid.^ ^^  Indeed, he viewed aid as 
a moral obligation within America’s mission, its most outward and rewarding 
component.^^^ In this transformation, Bowles changed not his subscription of the 
mission but its narrative end,
“I am deeply convinced that the American Revolution, refreshed and 
strengthened and for the first time focussed on world affairs, can become 
a powerful political, social and economic force affecting the lives of every 
man, woman and child in the world.”^^"^
“Bowles, with his eyes opened by India ... becomes a major proponent of the export 
of American benevolence to serve and save mankind.”^^  ^If Thompson exaggerates
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India’s role in Bowles’s transformation, it is only in that India itself did not induce 
that change, but acted as a catalyst to expedite Bowles’s particular pre-existing 
narrative dynamics. Bowles, who had seldom expressed interest in India before 1951, 
demonstrated his conversion to exporting America’s mission after China’s 
revolution.^^^ In fact, it was this disruption of missionary narrative that compelled 
Bowles to intensely categorise India within the mission’s future, leading to 
comparisons of not only India with the America of the early nineteenth century but 
also and repeatedly between India and China, “India stood in 1952 where China had 
stood in 1945”.^ ^^  Bowles promoted India’s as the next Frontier, as the next stage of 
America’s self-affirmation. After his ambassadorial assignment, Bowles wrote,
“I believe that the heart of Asia and the key to her future lies in the billion 
or more peoples who live in the largely uncommitted nations.... The 
strategic, geographic and political centre of this area is India”.^ *^
Having thus categorised India, Bowles was determined to engage it as America’s next 
missionary step and his enthusiasm with India blossomed. The Yale alumnus 
developed excellent relations with the Indian administration especially Nehru, and 
was the first American official to conduct a serious effort to understand Nehru’s 
worldview. He travelled across the country, sent his children to an Indian school 
consisting of only twenty-five tents, an unprecedented choice for a Western diplomat, 
advised Indians on how to lobby in America, served rotis, parathas and Iasi at the 
dinner table and conveyed the message that America cared about India. His 
‘Ambassador’s Report’, written in 1953, was less a recollection of his assignment and 
more a marketing to Americans of his cognition of India. The former marketing
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consultant, ambitious enough to once consider himself a presidential candidate, 
intelligently used the dominant anti-communist cognition to sell his understanding of 
India within the mission to the American people,
“if democratic India ever fails, and if a Communist civil war ever breaks 
out there, the West would spend billions to save India from communism..
One would think that the time to aid India is now while she is saving 
herself, and while her chance for success is good.”^^ ^
Not only did Bowles ingeniously locate America’s mission within the anti-communist 
categorisation and discourse, but he reminded Americans of the origin of civilisation’s 
westward mission in the, “common ancestry of most of the European peoples and the 
Aryans of India is a well-established fact... the people of India are closer to us than 
are most of the peoples on the Asian and African continents.” "^*® Nehru’s neutralism 
thereby assumed a wholesome spirituality, “Hinduism's emphasis on the diversity of 
truth” in which,
“Buddha's voice and those of innumerable Hindu prophets also whisper in 
the ears of modem Indians that nothing is all good or all bad. In India's 
non-involvement in the Cold War and in her attitude towards the West and 
Russia, ancient themes are still at work”.^ "**
To this, Bowles imparted and marketed India’s perspective with the sort of political 
gravity explained in Pedersen’s ‘action theory’.
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“when Nehru speaks on world issues, right or wrong, he expresses not 
only his own conviction but also the yearnings and the attitudes of the vast 
majority in free Asia and in Africa.... I am convinced that what Nehru 
says, most free Asians think.... We will have to come to terms with this 
Asian mind if we are to avoid adding dangerously to our already long 
series of failures in that part of the world.
Hence Bowles pursued an unremitting and extraordinary campaign throughout 1952 
to secure aid for India. He demanded an aid package of US$250m annually, not to 
induce India into the West, but as a somewhat costly demonstration of American 
tolerance, which would eventually draw India to the West. Though Truman and 
Acheson partly agreed with Bowles’s concerns about India, Congress did not.
Truman, a lame duck president, rejected approaching Congress. The reduction of aid 
in February 1952 meant India’s grant allocation for 1953 fell to US$70m. For Bowles, 
this was a, “blunder of extremely serious proportions”.^ "^  ^When in July 1952, 
Congress reduced the foreign aid budget by sixty percent, and India’s allocation to 
US$34m, Bowles was shocked, “the news hit like ton of bricks”.^ '^ '^
Bowles’s zealous commitment to fulfilling the American mission in India and his 
exaggerated assessment of his assignment’s remit, led him into direct conflict with 
Washington. Congress was already suspicious of Bowles outside of matters India and 
in the Senate hearing for his confirmation, Bowles had to defend himself, “I have 
never run away from the word ‘capitalist’. I am a cap i ta l i s t .H is  pro-Indian 
interpretation, unique amongst American officials, also attracted censure. After Nehru 
controversially rejected the Japanese treaty, particularly upsetting given America’s
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US$190m agriculture loan to India, Bowles was the only American official who could 
report positively on India, “every top Indian official with whom I have talked has 
gone out of his way to condemn the Soviet Union”.^ "^^
Furthermore, he was the only American official who thought that Nehru “desires early 
settlement” on Kashmir or that India would win a plebiscite. "^^  ^Bowles’s vigorous 
defence of India’s Kashmir policy earned him notoriety. His advocacy of partial 
partition followed by a Vale-wide election, which was Nehru’s preference and 
ignored all previous UN resolutions on Kashmir, infuriated Washington, “I should 
appreciate your critical analysis of Indian motives in talking to you about partition, 
while apparently maintaining silence, except on one occasion, in talks with 
Graham” "^*^ As expected, Bowles soon noted his isolation and complained, “For some 
reason, our views on this whole question have been pretty much disregarded, and I 
can’t quite figure out why.” "^*^ Yet, nearing his assignment’s end, even Bowles agreed 
on Kashmir with those who had strongly criticised India. In June 1952, when Pakistan 
agreed a four to one troops ratio on the Kashmir border, contingent on the 
demilitarisation being followed by the plebiscite administrator’s immediate 
appointment, Bowles noted, “it is difficult to see how Nehru can turn down this 
proposal”.^ °^ Hence, when Nehru did precisely that, Bowles was stunned, “Nehru is 
acting in a wholly unreasonable manner and will probably continue to do so”.^ ^^
Growing Interest
Throughout 1952, Washington’s interest in the Middle East intensified. The NSC 
warned Acheson that Western influence was fading, while nationalist neutralisms
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were mounting.^^^ Aside from events in French Tunisia and North Africa after the 
French arrested Bourguiba, Britain’s difficulties continued. In Iran, London 
embargoed Iranian goods, froze Iranian assets, threatened any company trading with 
Iran and sabotaged Iranian assets.^^  ^Washington was especially annoyed with 
London’s ‘rule or ruin’ policy especially after Musaddiq satisfied officials in 
Washington during his October 1951 visit that he was not a communist.^^"  ^After 
separate plans against Musaddiq by the Shah to sack him and by the British to 
assassinate him failed and backfired in 1952, and while economic pressures swelled in 
Iran after the British sanctions, America feared that Britain was pushing Iran to 
communism and lost faith in British policy.^^  ^Lovett advised that the situation,
“is running swiftly toward even more extreme and irresponsible anti- 
Westemism and dangers of a coup d'etat, whether by the communists 
alone or in combination with the National Front, are more serious than 
had been believed.”^^ ^
Nor did Anglo-Egyptian relations improve. Egyptian demands for British evacuation 
from Egypt and the granting to Farouk the title of King of Sudan, were never met. In 
January 1952, fighting erupted near the canal and spread beyond, ignited by the 
British bombing a police station that killed fifty Egyptians. Acheson’s attempts to 
encourage Britain to negotiate were unsuccessful since Eden would not leave Suez, 
compromise on Sudan or evacuate British troops.^^  ^In fact, Truman actually had to 
prevent Churchill from attacking Egypt. Then in July, Major General Mohammed 
Naguib overthrew Farouk and Egypt was aflame with anti-British sentiment. Yet as
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with Iran, the new Egyptian leadership declared its pro-American attitude and quickly 
developed amicable relations with Washington.^^^
Resultantly, America’s concerns about the communisation of the Middle East 
ballooned. Paul Nitze, the NSC 68’s principal author, and director of the Policy 
Planning Staff advised that the Middle East’s fragility was an invitation for Russian 
expansion especially since other regions were relatively secure.^^  ^One important 
manifestation of this was noted in an NSC paper in April 1952,
“the danger in this arena to the security of the world arises not so much
 from the threat-Of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability,
anti-western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism that could lead to 
disorder and eventually to a situation in which regimes orientated toward 
the Soviet Union could come to power”.
Another manifestation was the possible alliance between communism and Arab 
nationalism,
“There is a continuation of the gradual deterioration of the free world 
position in the Middle East.. .the tides of neutralism and nationalism, with 
which communism has successfully allied itself with to an increasing 
degree, continue to rise”.^ °^
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Likewise, the sixth UN general assembly in April demonstrated the unwillingness of 
Arab countries to support Washington, “these representatives, it became clear, were 
not anxious to align themselves with either party”.^ ^^
Not only did the Western position decline but also London’s solution to its problems 
in the Middle East stalled in the summer of 1952. Arab distrust of the MEC was 
assiduous.^^^ Egypt’s rejection of the MEC meant that all other Arab states, except 
Iraq, also rejected it. Britain’s unsuccessful yet desperate attempt to place Iraq as the 
Arab lynchpin was painfully transparent to Washington.^^^
“Egypt, not Iraq, is the key to this question and that no other Arab state 
would be willing to consider participation in the Middle East Defense 
Organisation until the present difficulties between Egypt and the United 
Kingdom are settled.”^^"^
Washington waited with decreasing hope on MEC, until it accepted in late 1952 that 
there was no chance of Egyptian cooperation against Moscow through the MEC until 
Britain evacuated Suez.^^  ^The MEC’s impending death drew out sharper American 
criticisms, which had hitherto been withheld. An interdepartmental group sarcastically 
asked how, “six states not indigenous to the area (plus one Middle Eastern state that 
has joined NATO) will succeed in gaining the confidence and support of the Arab 
peoples.”^^  ^Integral to this new critical perspective was a greater acceptance of the 
negative impact of Britain on America’s policy in the Middle East, demonstrated by a 
State Department memo which noted the disadvantages of America’s relationship 
with the British,
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“It is hard for many Americans, unless they have recently visited certain 
parts of this area, to realise how general and deep-seated is the distrust and 
in some cases hatred for the British and French.. .The US is increasingly 
being put in the same imperialist category”.^ ^^
Growing Access
Criticism of the British management of the region combined with the sustained and 
concerning anti-communist focus to act as an impetus for the growth of American 
access to the Middle East. The State Department had been aware of Britain’s military 
weakness and fragile economy well before its difficulties in the Middle East. In June 
1949 Cripps announced the possibility of, “a complete collapse of sterling” and 
Britain’s reserves exhausting after twelve months.^^  ^Such weakness explained why,
“the UK, which has the primary responsibility for the defense of the area, 
lacks both manpower and resources successfully to defend the area and 
has no plans for defense of Saudi Arabian oil field and the Dhahran Air 
Base.”“ ’
In December 1950, the State Department noted, “It is noteworthy that even the 
defense of the Suez area is, according to the British, beyond the probable capability of 
the UK and Commonwealth.”^^® From late 1951, there emerged a growing feeling in 
Washington that though the region was still a British responsibility, direct 
involvement was necessary if the Western position was to be maintained.^^^ Britain’s
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failure, in the steady collapse of the MEC merely resurrected and reinforced existing 
doubts,
“The defense of the Middle East is primarily a UK responsibility. As we 
understand it, however, capabilities available to the British are wholly 
inadequate to defend the Middle East against Soviet aggression and it 
appears that they are adequate to provide the minimum requirements for 
even the shortest line of defense east of the Suez canal.”^^ ^
Nitze, at the forefront of those who felt London was discrediting Washington, 
argued that support for the MEC only propped the British position.^^^
Consequently, and despite meek resistance by the Pentagon to committing US forces 
and troops, stretched because of NATO and Korea, America assumed an increasingly 
active role in the Middle East in 1952.^ "^^  By January, even the JCS had accepted in 
principal the use of limited American troops in the region to demonstrate Western 
commitment.^^^ In August, the JCS agreed to the State Department’s advocacy of 
more flexible forces for peripheral areas including the Middle East.^^  ^Two months 
on, while recommending that the British temporarily persevere in the region, Acheson 
instructed that alternative arrangements beyond the MEC be assessed to preserve 
Western influence.^^^ By November, Washington had taken, “primary responsibility 
for political and military action to forestall Iran’s falling to communism” and 
authorised plans for Iran’s inclusion into a regional defence arrangement.^^® Even the 
Defense Department, normally the most reluctant to engage the Middle East, while 
restating Britain’s responsibility for the Middle East, stated:
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“we must in all honesty recognize and attempt to reassess
-  the growing military weakness of the UK made more difficult by her unsolved 
crises in Iran and in Egypt and
-  the increasing unpopularity and distrust of the UK on the part of the 
governments and the people of the area.”^^ ^
Indeed, the underlying assumptions of a National Intelligence Study which was 
completed a week before Truman’s last presidential day, indicated that Washington 
was preparing to takeover from London not only in Iran, but also in Egypt/^° Truman 
only held back from pursuing the ascendancy because of the termination of his 
presidency.
The Precipice o f Engagement
Given that Washington had since 1949 located Pakistan in the Middle East, and had 
since 1951 sought to engage it in that region, America’s growing access to the Middle 
East precipitated its growing access to Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan continued its 
anti-communist theatrical performance. Zafrnllah Khan told Acheson that Pakistan 
was trying to help Britain in Iran, and was encouraging Arab countries to join the 
MEC.^^  ^As a result, those background whispers in Washington from early 1951, 
especially from those more willing to apply an anti-communist prism on Pakistan, 
which urged a deeper and more independent engagement of Pakistan, moved towards 
the centre of America’s discussion about Pakistan.^^  ^By the same token, Henderson
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advised McGhee that America should assume the lead in its self-representation in 
Pakistan and India.^^  ^State Department officials such as McGhee increasingly 
inclined towards their Pentagon counterparts in advocating an independent American 
approach to Pakistan, reflecting the firm anti-communist cognitive placement of 
Pakistan?^"  ^In respect of conflict elimination, having already realised that Britain’s 
lead on Kashmir was, “completely devoid of ideas as to possible solution”,
Washington was similarly no longer prepared to work behind the persistently failing 
British/^^
With America’s growing concern and access to the Middle East, the Truman 
-administration eventually left office on the brink of engaging Pakistan within the anti­
communist narrative in the Middle East. The first step to engaging Pakistan was its 
réintroduction into America’s Middle East defence planning and especially the MEC. 
This process paralleled the decline of both American confidence in Britain and 
Britain’s influence in the Middle East, and the continuing concern about the Middle 
East. Having been absent for more than three months, Pakistan was included in 
Washington’s long-term Middle East plans in January 1952.^^  ^State Department 
officials throughout the first half of 1952 re-planned their Middle East strategy with 
Pakistan’s inclusion.^^^ McGhee hoped, “We cld look forward to time when Pakistan 
wld make real contribution MEC bearing in mind had by far greatest military 
potential any country east of Turkey”.^ ^^  NSC 129/1, the policy statement in April 
1952 towards the ‘The Arab States and Israel’, firmly endorsed Pakistan’s inclusion in 
the MEC.^^  ^That same month, a joint State-Defense assessment concluded that 
Pakistan, “would contribute significantly to the military and political strength of the 
Organization”.^ ^^  Foggy Bottom hoped, “the military strength of Pakistan might
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become effective as a stabilising factor in the Middle East.”^^ ' In May, Nitze, who 
emphasised America’s need for direct involvement, offered Pakistan as a viable 
solution to London’s weakness.^^^ Warren also applauded Pakistan in the Middle East 
context,
“the foremost objective of Pakistan in encouraging the kind of 
organizations of which we have been speaking can be summed up in one 
short phrase: political and economic stability in the Middle East.”^^ ^
When Byroade returned from a Middle East tour and reported to Truman, Pakistan 
was the first issue that Truman raised/^^ Pakistan also met the military key’s concern 
because in answer to General Bradley’s question about the Middle East, ‘This is a 
very important area and it is highly desirable to do something about its defense. The 
question seems to be: Where will the stuff come from?”, at least Pakistan offered the 
required infantry numbers.^^^
In contrast to the autumn of 1951, Britain, with its precarious situation, quickly 
reconciled to Pakistan’s inclusion into the Middle East to conciliate American 
partialities.^^^ Britain’s standing amongst Arab Muslims was disintegrating quickly 
and antagonising yet another Muslim country was only undesirable. London’s Middle 
East concerns were so frantic that the MEC was changed to the Middle East Defence 
Organisation (‘MEDO’) for supposed psychological appeal.^^  ^Hence, London’s 
invitation to Pakistan to join MEDO in consequence aimed only to generate 
indigenous Muslim and American support for the increasingly lifeless body.^^*
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However, as before, London did not split South Asia, as could Washington so when 
London reaccepted Pakistan into MEDO, it also tried to include India.^^^
With MEDO’s gradual death, Washington reassessed strategies towards the Middle 
East/°° The main problems in organising the area’s defence were Iranian military 
weakness and political instability, Egyptian non-cooperation and Washington’s 
resistance to using its own troops/°^ One idea of Nitze’s to overcome these, which 
was briefly flirted with, was a defence of the Suez base, Saudi, Bahraini and Kuwaiti 
oilfields, by using Pakistani, Turkish and eventually Iranian troops. This would enable 
an independent American approach from Britain’s and did not require American 
troops.^®  ^However, it was another Nitzean idea, drawing on the discussions before 
the MEC, to extend the Truman Doctrine to Iran that paralleled Truman’s adopted 
Middle East s t ra tegy . In  the autumn of 1952, America’s strategy to the Middle East 
re-converged again on the Northern Tier. Though America originally envisaged the 
Northern Tier’s key members as the GTI states, it also prioritised Pakistan, prized for 
its troops and not its bases, in the initial discussions and excluded non-Muslim 
Greece.^®  ^Furthermore, Iran’s weakness meant that the, “Pakistan-Turkish relation in 
particular could be very beneficial as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East and that 
Pakistan should explore all means of moving closer to Turkey.
America, in detailing its engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, again removed 
Pakistan from South Asia.^°  ^For instance, in October 1952, National Intelligence 
Estimate ‘Control of South Asia’, noted that South Asia’s communisation, “would 
precipitate the rapid transfer of much of Southeast Asia to Communist control”. 
However, the study made no mention of the impact of South Asia’s potential
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conversion on the Middle East, despite America’s intricate involvement of Pakistan in 
the latter, thereby implying Pakistan’s removal from South Asia/^^ Accordingly, 
Washington lost interest in Kashmir as it detached Pakistan from South Asia, 
although this disinterest was also partly fuelled by the talks themselves stagnating/^^ 
Nehru became even less compromising after having relied on Abdullah’s strong 
support in Kashmir, he then developed a rift with the Kashmiri leader/^^ In 
November, Nehru blocked discussions on Kashmir and suddenly demanded that all 
Pakistani troops leave Kashmir, thereby terminating talks.
Likewise, America de-prioritised Pakistan’s dispute with Afghanistan even after 
American officials observed growing Russian influence in Kabul, “earlier estimates of 
relative Soviet non-interest in this country to be in need of radical revision.”  ^ In 
August 1952, Moscow delivered an aide mémoire stating that France’s drilling for oil 
in northern Afghanistan would constitute an unfiiendly act. Despite this threat, Foggy 
Bottom insisted that, “The Department has no evidence to support the extreme 
position of our Chargé on the danger of Afghanistan’s falling into the Soviet 
camp.”^^  ^Washington ignored the strain in relations throughout 1952 even after 
Karachi imposed an economic blockade on Afghanistan at the year end, thus denying 
the West its primary trade and aid route to Afghanistan.^
America thus moved towards its first engagement of Pakistan within anti­
communism. In February 1952, the Truman administration gave Pakistan small 
amounts of military and economic aid under the Point Four Program and signed an 
agreement bringing Pakistan into America’s anti-communist mutual security program. 
Pakistani officials, who felt this was too little too late, also agreed to join MEDO in
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exchange for military aid.^ ^^  During the summer, Washington increasingly supported 
the principal of giving military aid to Pakistan. By November, the JCS recommended 
the allocation of military aid to select countries in the region including Pakistan and 
on the last day of the Truman administration, the Secretaries of Defense and State and 
the Director for Mutual Security recommended that there was a clear need for the US 
to make its interest in the Middle East and South Asia more explicit. It suggested that,
“The first instalments of substantial military aid to Pakistan should be 
supplied at an early date, provided this can be done in a manner which 
does not involve unmanageable problems with India.”^^"^
That this engagement was tentative was apparent. The Point Four Program aid was 
tiny and the recommendation of January 1953 envisaged contributions of only 
US$100m of military aid for the first year for South Asia and the Middle East, and 
US$250m of economic aid to South Asia.^^^  Moreover, the departing Truman officials 
at the end of the administration’s term had no intention of any major committed 
engagement of Pakistan, as Bruce advised, “under present circumstances there 
obviously can be no firm program for 1954 FY”.^ ^^  That the Truman government 
would only take America to the precipice of engaging Pakistan, having firmly 
understood it as anti-communist ally in the Middle East, without actually committing, 
reflected the inadequate time. By the time Washington mobilised towards engaging 
Pakistan, in the late summer of 1952, the Democrats knew that their twenty years in 
the White House would soon end. Truman, despite his animosity towards Eisenhower, 
was unprepared to commit the new administration with this new engagement.
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Pakistan: Strategic Weakness
The Truman administration’s delivering of Pakistan to this precipice, the anti­
communist engagement within the Middle East, to stabilise and protect the region was 
however fraught with weaknesses. The Pakistan army proudly exhibited, especially to 
American observers, the heavy Russian battleship brass bell that decorated, and 
continues to do so, the entrance hall of the army’s college at Quetta. That Pakistan 
had no role in its capture from the Red Navy was, in contrast, seldom advertised.^ 
Washington misread Pakistan’s commitment to anti-communism and the Middle East. 
Pakistan’s leaders and public were never concerned about communism nor did they 
primarily locate themselves within the Middle East. In this regard, Washington would 
have done well to learn about Pakistan’s chameleon abilities from The Economist, “an 
educated English-speaking Indian addressing a British and American audience is so 
often quite a different person from the same Indian rousing an Indian crowd”.^ ^^
India colonised Pakistan’s anxiety. America’s anti-communist cognitive framework 
failed to detect Pakistan’s own reality, with Washington’s senior policymakers failing 
to heed a variety of warnings. As early as December 1947, the JCS had forecast that,
“by the end of the decade they (Pakistan and India) will have rendered 
themselves (because of their mutual animosities and political, economic 
and social dislocations) even less capable of assisting the western powers 
in the event of war than was India during World War 11.”^^ ^
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In similar vein, Karachi was repeatedly furious with America for sending large-scale 
aid to India. More so, in July 1952, Pakistan’s requests for the purchase of US$200m 
of military equipment euphemistically appropriated the, “threat from the USSR, 
Communist China or from a possible future Communist India”.^ °^ London, deeply 
familiar with the cognitive framework of both countries, repeatedly warned America,
“The two countries seemed to be more preoccupied with the threat from 
each other than any from outside.... there was no guarantee that the 
equipment we might furnish the subcontinent would be used for the ends 
we desire”.^ ^^
Not only did America ignore Pakistan’s reality, but in valuing Pakistan exclusively 
through the anti-communist narrative, and including it in its Middle East defence 
plans, Washington paid little attention to specifically what or why it was engaging 
Pakistan for. Without being conscious of it, America had sought to engage Pakistan 
because Karachi supported the anti-communist story, providing existential ease and 
stability by confirming back to real America the stories with which it defined, trusted 
and located itself. This engagement was not a function of Realist-type assessment of 
policy, as the pursuit of national power, for had America done so, it would not have 
been attracted but been highly repelled by Pakistan.
Economically, Pakistan remained weak. On the eve of partition, only one of the top 
fifty-seven Indian companies was Muslim owned.^^  ^Pakistan had no equivalent to the 
TATA steelworks at Jameshedpur or the industrial belts west of Calcutta. After 
partition, ministers could not find homes in Pakistan, offices lacked chairs and
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desks/^^ Only Gandhi’s fasts gave Pakistan its due resources after partition, thereby 
preventing Karachi’s economic haemorrhaging. Despite its tiny economic base, 
Pakistan’s annual economic growth averaged only three percent throughout the 
Truman era, insufficient for the rapidly growing population.^^"  ^Pakistan faced food 
shortages in every of Truman’s presidential years except one.^^  ^The demonstration of 
Pakistan’s resource shortage and administrative mismanagement was cruelly 
underlined by events on 11^  ^September 1948, when the emergency ambulance that 
collected the dying Jinnah, broke down while the state’s founder suffered inside in the 
sweltering heat only to die hours later.^^^
Closely related to Pakistan’s economic weakness, was the issue of defence, which 
absorbed a crushing seventy percent of Pakistan’s government expenditure fi*om 1948 
to 1950.^^  ^However, even this proportion did not give a military potency to defend 
the Middle East. Despite the JCS’s looking to Pakistan to provide troops, Pakistan had 
very limited military and troop capabilities.^^^ Ayub bemoaned the intentions of 
politicians and his colleagues who repeatedly wanted to strike India with the country’s 
thirteen tanks, which had each about forty to fifty hours engine life in them to face the 
Indian army.^^  ^In April 1949, Americans felt that not only that Pakistan could not 
defend the NWFP against Russian invasion, but every forecast prepared by US 
officials on an Indo-Pakistan military war predicted Pakistan’s military collapse.^^® 
For instance, in 1949, the CIA predicted that war, “would result in the disappearance 
of Pakistan as a political entity”.^ ^^  Similarly, a National Intelligence Estimate in 
September 1951 suggested.
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“In a long war (with India) Pakistan would almost certainly lose East 
Pakistan (containing 60 per cent of its population) and major Punjab areas, 
and its economic and political stability - even its very existence - would 
be threatened.
Finally, in respect of political stability to the Middle East, Pakistan was hardly an 
island of solidity, “Perfectly sensible people. Brigadiers and Generals, would go about 
bemoaning their lot. Each one of them was a Bonaparte, albeit an unhappy one” in an 
environment that, “produced fantastic ideas and ambitions in people.”^^  ^In 1945, 
Jinnah, talking to Sindh’s Governor, Sir Hugh Dow, about Sindh’s politicians, stated, 
“he could buy the lot of them for five lakhs of rupees, to which I replied I could do it 
a lot cheaper.”^^"^ Pakistan’s political culture had changed little for the better after 
partition."’ A May 1949 report fi'om the US embassy in Karachi noted the cut-throat 
political environment in Pakistan where politicians were loyal “only to their self- 
interest”, and where, “Any marked decline in the power or prestige of the camp in 
which they happen to be working will find them scurrying for another where the 
weather may be fairer.”^^  ^A government employee assassinated Liaquat Ali Khan, 
possibly the last financially unsoiled leader of Pakistan, in 1951 and the investigating 
Scotland Yard detective noted the lack of co-operation by the Pakistan authorities in 
his inquiries. Hence when State Department officials continued their bloated praise of 
Pakistani stability. Ambassador Warren in Karachi finally critiqued them in April 
1950, “The statement that, ‘Pakistan has demonstrated a high degree of internal 
stability and vitality’ must be accepted with certain reservations.”^^ ^
It is not surprising that in Shaukat Siddiqui’s ‘Khuda Ki Basti’, themes of corruption, inconpetence 
and political stench still preponderate Pakistani politics
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CHAPTER FIVE
EISENHOWER PART I: DULLES AND THE ENGAGING OF PAKISTAN
America’s change of government in 1953 inducted a practitioner with an unusually 
bipolar and rigid commitment to the anti-communist identity narrative. John Foster 
Dulles was particularly able to understand, and thus keen to engage, the ostensibly 
anti-communist Pakistan. Notwithstanding MEDO’s brief revival, Washington 
engaged anti-communist Pakistan in the Middle East, through the Northern Tier, a 
process which Dulles protected, culminating in America’s military aid pledge to 
Karachi in 1954. Early tensions originated not from Pakistan’s ornamental joining of 
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (‘SEATO’), but in America’s failure to 
translate engaging Pakistan in the anti-communist narrative into policy specifics. 
Furthermore, there was a gulf between senior officials, who understood Pakistan 
within anti-communism, and policy operators, who were attuned to Pakistan’s 
existence beyond anti-communism and could not understand, and hence engage it.
Dulles’s firm engagement of Karachi contrasted with his distance from India, which 
did not fit into his bipolar anti-communist narrative. However, middle ranking 
officials did find space and within the missionary narrative to give meaning to India. 
Still, Dulles’s cognitive suspension of India was privileged, which contrasted with an 
engaged Pakistan, and thus the arrest of South Asia, including its conflicts, as a 
meaningful concept for America. However, Nehru’s angry reaction to the aid to 
Pakistan forced Dulles to re-examine his bipolar anti-communist prism, for Dulles 
recognised that Nehru otherwise would inadvertently be pushed to Moscow and 
therefore when pressed, Dulles too found space beyond bipolarity for India, though 
not outside of anti-communism.
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The first Eisenhower term, like the entire Truman presidency, was a tale of two halves 
in policy to Pakistan. From late 1954, America’s anti-communist narrative protection 
and reassertion relaxed. This was accompanied by a severe jolt to the Northern Tier, 
the instrument to effect Pakistan’s engagement. The Baghdad Pact in January 1955 
enraged Arabs and vexed Israel, eroding two American anti-communist aims -  
harnessing Arab nationalism against Moscow and resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute to 
protect the area from communism. With this mechanism cracked, Washington 
retracted its engagement of Pakistan by attempting to reduce its aid commitment -  an 
attempt that failed and only infuriated Karachi and embarrassed Washington.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s anomaly neighbours gained meaning by the end of 
Eisenhower’s first term. In late 1954, China and America clashed, eliciting 
Washington’s middle ranking officials to turn again to India to surrogate America’s 
missionary narrative. Furthermore, America’s aid commitment to Pakistan triggered 
Russian interest in India and Afghanistan, initiating greater American anti-communist 
focus on the latter pair. Consequently, to prevent India’s communisation, America 
opened further space within its anti-communist prism, and tentatively sought to 
engage India, still cognitively detached from Pakistan, even though it was unable to 
reverse the poor American-Indian relations. Washington also sought to increase aid to 
Kabul and pressed it and Pakistan to resolve their differences, though given the 
minimalism underlying both policies, also without success.
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Adjusting the Subject: John Foster Dulles and the Polarising of Meaning
Dwight David Eisenhower’s election to the presidency inaugurated few dramatic 
shifts in American policy. The rhetorical refusal to recognise the ‘enslavement’ of 
Eastern Europe, in ‘liberation’ and ‘rollback’, did not originate in the 1952 
Republican convention placards which read, “Containment is defensive, negative, 
futile and immoral; countless human beings to a despotism and Godless terrorism.”  ^
Not only did the administration later abandon ‘rollback’ and ‘liberation’, but both 
concepts were mere re-statements of Truman’s policy. Acheson, Nitze and Lovett had 
earlier wanted to rollback Russia’s frontiers to its 1939 border by controlling 
communism in the peripheries while Europe’s heartland strengthened.^ In 1948, 
Kennan had emphasised manoeuvring the Russian bear back into its cage while in 
January 1949 NSC 20/4 had sought the reduction of Russian influence in the satellite 
states.^ Even the ‘Domino’ theory, later synonymous with Eisenhower’s policy to 
Vietnam, originated in Truman’s State Department, “if Indochina falls, very likely all 
of Southeast Asia may come under communist domination.”  ^Truman was thus 
justified in reminding the electorate before November 1952 that Eisenhower had 
supported all his major policies.
However, Eisenhower’s administration differed with Truman’s on two issues. First, 
was the shift in focus between Europe, America’s continued priority, and Asia. The 
European Defence Community (‘EDC’), and German rearmament and integration into 
a Western defence system still vexed the new administration. Eisenhower remained
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committed to the EDC to secure Germany’s contribution to the West’s defence and 
reduce America’s burden.^ While Supreme Allied Commander, Europe during 1951- 
52, Eisenhower pushed hard for the EDC and then as president sent Dulles and 
Stassen in February 1953 on a European tour to encourage its ratification.^ 
Washington’s commitment to Europe, through NATO and its American supreme 
commander, an institutional structure and a fully integrated staff paled the paltry later 
American commitments to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.
Still, SEATO’s mere creation in 1954 reflected a greater focus on Asia than had been 
given by Truman. This focus was in part due to the immediacy of circumstance for 
with European politics grinding to a stalemate, the Asian Cold War seemed fluid. 
Days after his election, Eisenhower flew to Korea and prioritised an armistice -  
eventually signed in July 1953. The worsening Indochina conflict and China’s 
communist existence inclined attention towards Asia, as did Republicans’ consistent 
criticisms of Truman’s policy on Asia during the election campaign. Senior 
Republicans Taft and Knowland even prioritised Asia, as America’s future, over 
Europe, America’s past.^ The focus on Asia also reflected Eisenhower and Dulles’s 
familiarity with the region. Dulles had orchestrated the Japanese peace treaty during 
1950-51 while Eisenhower had been posted in the Philippines under MacArthur fi'om 
1935 to 1939, visited China in 1938 and 1946, and briefly assumed the military 
position of Deputy Chief for the Pacific and Far East in 1942.^
The second key difference with the Truman administration was John Foster Dulles. 
Dulles brought to governance an unusually rigid bipolar and religious categorisation 
and discourse. The former trait, reflecting a greater insecurity, provided Dulles with a
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more pronoimced means to define and locate himself and his reality. Dulles was not a 
naturally confident man, either in youth or adulthood, as was Eisenhower. His 
categorising and attaching meaning to within identity narratives hence demanded 
greater clarity and certainty to ground his existential ease. Lawyers, like bankers, 
seldom develop conceptual flexibility. Professional engagement continually demands, 
as a precondition, stable firameworks and certainty, which reinforce existing 
categorisations and discourses and destroy dexterous and de-gravitated thought. Yet 
even compared to the lawyers who Dulles worked with prior to entering politics, 
“Dulles was never guilty of complex or sophisticated legal formations.”  ^The 
Secretary, who rarely saw ambiguity, was forbidding and unapproachable, and tended 
to require data firom his staff and officials simply to confirm pre-existing views.
Dulles’s self-certainty and intolerance to other perspectives was especially so in 
international politics, where he was acutely sensitised to a superior claim. His 
grandfather, John Watson Foster, and uncle Robert Lansing, were both former 
Secretaries of State. The effect of this heritage was reinforced by Dulles’s status as 
the leading Republican on foreign affairs since 1944, having officially advised four 
Secretaries of State over a lengthy apprenticeship. The combination of a rigid 
cognitive framework and certainty in foreign policy had implications for the particular 
nature of his American narrative and Dulles’s highly bipolar political reality and 
policy. In one of his first acts as Secretary of State, Dulles advised his officials, we, 
“are being attacked by a political warfare which is as hostile in its purpose and as 
dangerous in its capabilities as any open war”, which meant that nothing less than 
“positive loyalty” was “tolerable at this time”.'  ^His words left a bad taste with the 
professional diplomats.^^
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Added to his certainty and bipolarity was a strong Christian identity. Dulles was, “the 
only religious leader, lay or clerical, ever to become Secretary of State” with the 
exception of Edward Everett. After Dulles rediscovered religion, secularised 
Calvinism, in 1937 at an Oxford seminar, he held a succession of offices in the 
Presbyterian Church including as Chairman of the Federal Council of Churches in 
1940, which represented twenty-five million Protestants.^"  ^With this Christian 
identity, came Christian narrative categorisation, discourse and engagement, “For 
many years it never occurred to me that the Christian Gospel had any practical 
bearing on the solution of international problems.”  ^^  In fact, Dulles placed Christian 
narrative central to understanding and engaging world affairs. His speeches were 
religiously titled, ‘Spiritual Bases of Peace’, ‘A Diplomat and his Faith’ and 
‘Christian Responsibility’.^  ^It was thus that Dulles could describe the corrupt, 
incompetent and ruthless Chiang and Rhee as, “these two gentleman are the modem 
day equivalents of the founders of the Church. They are Christian gentlemen who 
have suffered for their faith.”^^  Needless to say, not everyone appreciated this 
discourse; Churchill for instance described Dulles as, “a Methodist Minister”, whose, 
“bloody text is always the same.” *^
Dulles’s rigid bipolar categorisation and discourse, and personal identification with 
Christianity accentuated his Americanism anxiety from communism, “Soviet 
Communism starts with an atheistic. Godless premise. Everything else flows from 
that premise”. Dulles was one of the earliest converts after the war to protecting the
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anti-communist narrative.’ God spoke through Dulles, there existed a moral law, 
which, “has been trampled by the Soviet rulers, and for that violation they can and 
should be made to pay.” °^ Dulles, who deeply internalised America’s anti-communist 
identity, was so perturbed by communism that he portrayed it as inherently and 
systemically sinful, “men are created as the children of God, in His image. The human 
personality is thus sacred and the State must not trample on it.”^^  As a result, Foster, 
as Eisenhower affectionately knew him, understood and dealt with political reality 
exclusively within the anti-communist narrative, relying on Stalin’s 'Problems of 
Leninism’ with its paranoid worldview to guide his assessment of world politics.^^ 
Thé book, memorised and added to the Bible and his grandfather’s 'Diplomatic 
Memoirs’ as his three-volume gospel for foreign policy, was often preferred above 
intelligence reports to understand Russian policy.^^ Thus for instance, despite the 
differences between China and Russia, which Washington was aware of and 
■ intelligence analysts repeatedly stressed, Dulles’s bipolar and rigid anti-communism 
led him to, “treat the Mao Tse-Tung regime for what it is, a puppet regime.”^^
The political environment that Dulles operated within was especially conducive to his 
particular use of anti-communism. During this, the high era of Americanism 
conformity through anti-communism, polarised anti-communism gripped 
Washington. While the influential '4-H Club’ shared Dulles’s worldview, HUAC 
enjoyed its most successfiil years in 1953 and 1954.^  ^" While Senator Taft wanted to 
repudiate the wartime agreements with Russia, McCarthy’s assistants searched 
American libraries for the thirty thousand plus books supposedly written by
' Dulles had himself warned to, “check the tendency to identify one’s personified state with deity” and 
to “check the tendency to identify the other nation personality with evil” in, “War, Peace and Change” 
" The ‘4-H Club’ consisted of Humphrey at Treasury, Hoover at State, Hughes at Budget and Hollister 
who oversaw foreign aid
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communists?^ In 1954 Congress passed a Communist Control Act and the phrase 
‘under God’ was added to the Pledge of Allegiance. Conservative Republicans forced 
Bowles’s removal from India.^  ^The Senate even upheld Walter Smith’s nomination 
as Under Secretary of State, despite his service as the CIA’s head and then as 
ambassador to Russia.^^ While James Dean could rebel only without a cause in 1953, 
Disney pursued the Americanisation project with the excavation of Disneyland, with 
its romanticist hegemonic ideals in Main Street, Frontierland and Mark Twain’s 
Riverboat. The Old Guard’s pressures to deepen the communist onslaught were 
defused only by Stalin’s death in March 1953, which would have made such move 
seem particularly callous.^^
To address the issue of American identity narrative anxiety, Dulles, a unilateralist, 
and critical of Truman’s containment policy, which he thought would militarise 
American society and bankrupt the economy, demanded energy and replenishment of 
American narratives.^® Dulles felt that containment was defensive, inadequate and not 
a solution to communism. His long foreign policy essay, which he prepared for 
Eisenhower in the summer of 1952, developed two doctrines to re-energise real 
America’s narratives and place America on the offensive in the Cold War. The first 
was a global military defence, by creating a ‘community punishing force’, “There is 
one solution and only one: that is the means to retaliate instantly against open 
aggression by Red Armies”.^  ^ Communist Russia needed to be pressured, “If there is 
no pressure, purges can occur, organizational wounds can be healed at leisure, and the 
despotism can go on.”^^  This arms length approach, Dulles’s ‘pactomania’, relied on 
American allies and was reflected in the greater emphasis on Mutual Security 
Assistance.^^
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The second concept was Liberation. Dulles neither defined liberation as war nor 
support for internal revolutions, which is how it was interpreted by Europeans who 
resultantly saw Dulles as a, “fire-breathing warmonger who would obliterate Europe 
with hydrogen bombs in order to firee Poland and so gain votes in Hamtramck.” "^^ For 
Dulles, liberation was synonymous with moral and spiritual dynamism, integral to the 
origins of real America’s story of itself, “Vigor, confidence, sense of destiny, belief in 
mission, all had led to the growth of the American Republic firom feeble and humble 
origins to great power.”^^  Dulles made faith and purpose essential to liberation, 
without which, despotism would continue, “The first thing I would do would be to 
shift firom a purely defensive policy to a psychological offensive, a liberation 
policy”.^  ^As Schlesinger and Rovere described the impact, “unilateralism has become 
the new isolationism. Got it alone; meet force with maximum counterforce”.^ ^
Given that Dulles was however not the administration’s principal official, before 
assessing policy to Pakistan, it is poignant to therefore clarify his relationship with the 
president. In December 1941, General Marshall had told Brigadier Eisenhower,
“the Department is filled with able men who analyze their problems well 
but feel compelled always to bring them to me for final solution. I must 
have assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later what 
they have done.”^^
Eisenhower’s management style tracked precisely this ethos. Government was 
delegated to outstanding people such as Charles Wilson, head of General Motors, the
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world’s largest private company, who became Secretary of Defense. Likewise, 
Eisenhower delegated foreign policy to Dulles, who himself had little pretence to 
control or usurp policy. In fact, Dulles always kept Eisenhower informed about policy 
matters and when Eisenhower was ill, Dulles was uncomfortable making important 
decisions.^^ Within this evident subordination, Ambrose’s portrayal of Dulles as 
Eisenhower’s mere “messenger boy” is nonetheless grossly inaccurate."^ ® If during the 
first term Eisenhower oversaw foreign policy, it was, as Adams suggested, Dulles 
who, in dealing with detail, gave that policy its shape."^  ^ Indeed, Dulles firmly directed 
foreign policy execution during the first Eisenhower term, especially outside of 
Europe, the only area where Eisenhower was less inclined to delegate.
Engaging Pakistan
Dulles’s bipolarised and intense anti-communist categorisation and discourse looked 
favourably upon Pakistan’s persistent anti-communist direction, “You know that 
Pakistan and the United States have commonly supported the same views in the 
United Nations and that Pakistan was a tower of strength on the Japanese Treaty. 
Pakistan’s clarity within the anti-communist narrative drew Dulles’s immediate 
engagement, whose commitment to activism did, “need not await formal defense 
arrangements as condition to some military assistance to Pakistan.”^^  Immediately 
after Eisenhower’s election. The New York Times reported Pakistan’s imminent 
inclusion into America’s defence system."^ "^  Years later, in 1958, an American 
ambassador to Pakistan claimed that, “the military program to Pakistan was launched 
as a political measure designed to induce Pakistan to join regional security pacts’’."*^ 
This was inaccurate since Dulles, and other hard-line anti-communists, sought to 
urgently engage Pakistan within anti-communism irrespective of pacts and before the
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Arab rejection of MEDO. Pakistan’s request for emergency wheat aid in February 
1953 was rapidly assessed, approved and completed with US$75m of wheat sent by 
June. Democratic Senator Richard Russell explained during the deliberations, “In my 
own scrutiny of the foreign-aid programs, I propose to be much more generous with 
nations whose friendship to us is unquestioned.”^^  House Representative Adam 
Powell noted,
“Pakistan has demonstrated its dedication to the ideals of democracy and 
from its birth as a new nation has drawn inspiration from the United States 
in its efforts to resolve its problems.”^^
Yet, as under Truman, engagement with Pakistan was again delayed by another 
MEDO resurgence.^^ America’s analysis of the Middle East had not altered 
significantly after Truman’s term. NSC 155/1 in July 1953 noted the West’s 
continuing decline in the Middle East, and the need for American, “responsibility, 
initiative, and leadership” including, “the right to act with others or alone”."^  ^Nor had 
America de-prioritised the region. Washington’s continued Middle East concerns 
were evidenced in May 1953 by Dulles becoming the first Secretary of State to visit 
the region and by NSC 155/1, which was more detailed and proactive on Middle East 
defence than Truman’s NSC 129/1 had been. MEDO’s rebirth was conceived in the 
Anglo-Egyptian settlement on Sudan in February 1953, after which London and 
Washington again hoped that Egypt would lead MEDO.^° This time, the outstanding 
issue was London wanting to retain the base’s management including authority over
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the property, whereas Egypt wanted undiluted sovereignty.’" Dulles subsequently held 
back engaging Pakistan for fear of disturbing the prospect of an Anglo-Egyptian deal 
navigating Egypt to lead MEDO.
It was for MEDO then that Dulles flew in May to the Middle East. He first tried to 
woo Naguib by offering to build the Aswam Dam and,
“Egypt is the country in the Middle East which under the leadership and 
guidance of the Prime Minister, contains the promise of a great future.... 
the US would be prepared to consider making the Egyptian Army a real 
force in the world”.^ ^
However, Dulles’s hopes for MEDO were shattered on the tour’s first day. Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, told Dulles that MEDO was, “definitely out of 
focus”.^  ^Naguib added, “Egyptian public opinion is alarmed and afraid whenever 
they hear of entering into a pact regarding Middle East defense involving the US and 
the UK.”^^  Nasser told Dulles, “‘nobody’ would now accept the statement that the UK 
can be genuine allies of the Arabs.” "^* With the Anglo-Egyptian talks at stalemate, 
Nasser added, “I can’t see myself waking up one morning to find that the Soviet 
Union is our enemy. We don’t know them. They are thousands of miles away from 
us.”^^  Dulles left Cairo disheartened, “situation in Egypt more serious than 
Department generally has recognized... almost impossible to over-emphasize the 
intensity of this feeling.”^^
As a sweetener for the ongoing Anglo-Egyptian talks, Eisenhower gave US$10m in economic aid, 
US$1 Im of military sales to Egypt, and offered to train fifty Egyptian pilots without payment.
244
The rejection was pan-Arab. Syria’s General Shishakli warned, “confidence among 
Arab peoples for the United States was now nearly lost because of our past support 
for Israel.”^^  Lebanon’s Chamoun advised, “The only answer in Egypt.. .is complete 
evacuation of the British.... not even Iraq would dare sign a treaty with the British.” *^ 
Iraq’s Madfi focused on America’s support for Israel in Palestine while Jeddah was 
obsessed by Britain’s occupation of the Buraimi islands.^^ Dulles concluded that the 
Arabs, “engrossed with their problems with the British and with the Israeli and so 
forth” were unconcerned about the communist threat, they, “were too lacking in 
realization of the international situation.Forty-eight hours into his tour, Dulles 
concluded, “MEDO at present does not have a chance.”^^
In contrast, Pakistan re-emphasised its support for the anti-communist narrative. 
Dulles arrived in Pakistan on 22"*^  May 1953, and was immediately impressed by their 
“spiritual spirit” and their potential as a “dependable bulwark against Communism.”^^  
The Secretary wrote back that Pakistan was the, “one country that has moral courage 
to do its part in resisting communism” and offered fiiendship which, “exceeded to a 
marked degree that encountered in any country previously visited on this trip”.^  ^
Ayub, whose anti-communist performances had been well rehearsed, “seemed aware 
of the global aspect of the present day conflict between the Communist and non- 
Communist worlds.”^^  While Ayub and Iskander advised that the, “US has wasted too 
much time on Arab states”, Dulles petitioned Congress for aid to Pakistan,
“One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere 
firiendliness which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States, I was 
greatly impressed with their outstanding understanding of world politics. I
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am convinced that they will resist the menace of communism as their
strength permits.”^^
Having clearly defined Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative, America 
immediately planned engaging Pakistan within the Middle East, a process which 
began even before Dulles returned. His first three questions to Ayub focused on 
Pakistan’s military needs, its bases and its 250,000 strong armed forces, which in the 
region were second only to Turkey’s 330,000.^^ After Dulles’s return, support to 
engage Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative reached crescendo levels 
amongst the more vociferous anti-communists, as demonstrated by Richard Nixon, 
“Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for.”^^  Washington, resuming 
from where the Truman administration had departed, quickly re-committed to engage 
Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative to defend the Middle East.
However unlike during the Truman administration, the Northern Tier was the chosen 
policy instrument to effect this engagement.^* On Washington’s political horizon 
since 1951, it had been recently recommended to Dulles by Iraq’s Saad, who cited the 
1937 Saadabad Defence Pact of Turkey, Iran and Iraq, as a pre-cursor.^^ Washington 
felt that in contrast to Egypt, Saudi and other Arab states, the Northern Tier countries 
were, “feeling the hot breath of the Soviet Union on their necks... and were 
accordingly less preoccupied with strictly internal problems or with British and 
French imperialism.”^^  On June, within a week of Dulles’s return, the NSC 
concluded.
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“the present concept of a Middle East Defence Organization .. .was not a 
realistic basis for present planning... the US should concentrate now upon 
building a defense in the area based on the northern tier, including 
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey”.^ ^
Unlike in the previous discussions of both MEDO and Acheson’s Northern Tier, 
Dulles gave Pakistan a central role in his Northern Tier,
“In order to assure during peace time for the United States and its allies 
the resources (especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and 
their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey 
and Pakistan”.^ ^
In fact, Turkey and Pakistan constituted for Dulles the Tier’s geographic “two strong 
points” and accordingly, encouraging and supporting a Western-backed Turco- 
Pakistan alliance became the nucleus of American strategy in the Middle East.^  ^
Senior policymakers supported Dulles’s engagement of Pakistan. The JCS and Wilson 
formally supported giving military aid to Pakistan.^ "* A NSC Planning Board met in 
December 1953 and also supported equipping Pakistan for the Northern Tier.^^
If Dulles was at ease with the support for his policy from Washington, he was still 
sensitive to the earlier failure of MEDO -  which he saw in its association with the 
West, Pakistan’s exclusion from MEDO, and Britain’s competing Middle East 
agenda. Consequently, Dulles protected the engagement of Pakistan and the Northern 
Tier’s development, which was carefully reflected in his precisely managing both
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processes. So tightly was this orchestrated that even Karachi complained about the 
lack of information given to it - Ghulam Mohammed enlightened Americans by, 
“declaring he is neither beggar nor pawn.”^^  Karachi only received a basic sketch of 
the Northern Tier plans on 29*^  December 1953, almost six months after the US had 
decided to engage Pakistan through it, and it was two months later that final plans 
were sent to Karachi.^^
The first of the three dimensions to Dulles’s protection was Washington’s resistance 
to overt involvement in the Northern Tier, thereby limiting its Western association. 
American policy insisted that the Tier should, “grow from within”, with America “as 
far in background as possible.” *^ Dulles hoped that the “indigenous character 
arrangements should make it easier for other Middle Eastern countries associate 
themselves.”^^  Furthermore, bilateral agreements between the regional parties were, 
“more modest, more realistic, and more apt to produce results.”*® Any request for 
military aid by Pakistan would therefore only be favourably received after the Turco- 
Pakistan treaty, the first stage of the Northern Tier, was completed.*^ Even at a later 
stage, America wanted Turkey or Pakistan to lead the discussions with fran and Iraq.*  ^
Interestingly, Pakistan hampered this protection by demanding American aid before 
signing a Turkish alliance, “the Governor General put it on the ground that he had 
nothing to talk about that was of any use to Turkey until he was assured of military 
assistance by the US”.*^  That Karachi made this position flagrantly public caused 
Dulles considerable irritation.*"^
The second dimension of Dulles’s protection aimed to insulate the engagement of 
Pakistan from India. It was from this underlying motive that Byroade drew inspiration
248
for his alternative suggestion that America engage Pakistan and militarily equip it on 
the pretext of Karachi’s involvement in the Korean War, if a token contribution was 
offered.^^ It was also with this protection in mind that Washington conceived the idea 
of Pakistan’s alliance with Turkey, to minimise the political repercussions upon India 
of aid to Pakistan,
“We think best way would be in form of support for some sort of regional 
defense cooperation.... to minimize political repercussions and maximize 
Pakistan area defense contribution.. .This would show that intent of US 
aid is to strengthen area defense against outside aggression rather than 
-take sides in disputes within area such as those that exist between Pakistan 
and her neighbors.”^^
The third dimension and one which reflected Washington’s increased activity and 
ability to understand Pakistan and the Middle East within the anti-communist 
narrative, was America’s unilateralist approach to protect its engagement from British 
interference, “To tie ourselves to the tail of the British kite in the Middle East.. .would 
be to abandon all hope of a peaceful alignment of that area with the West.”*^  Dulles 
extended the late policy of the Truman administration by consciously excluding the 
UK from its plans for Pakistan and the Middle East.'^ Washington first informed 
London about discussions of military aid to Pakistan in October 1953 and only in 
December did the Foreign Office learn the depth of America’s involvement.^^ 
Similarly, a respectable debriefing for London was only offered in January 1954, after 
the details had been agreed and on the basis that it, “be made clear to the British and
Washington’s growing application of meaning on the world stage meant that notwithstanding nuclear 
cooperation through the McMahon Act of 1952, differences with Britain arose on China, Korea, 
Indochina, the EDC and the Middle East.
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French that they are only being informed of (not consulted about) the military aid 
aspect of the problem”.*^
American anti-communist narrative anxieties intensified when Russia detonated a 
hydrogen bomb in August 1953, which had also the effect, if only for a few months, 
of raising Pakistan’s strategic value. Washington lacked sufficient B-36s, America’s 
intercontinental atomic bomber, thereby bringing focus to potential bases near Russia. 
The NSC’s ‘Basic National Security Policy’ in October 1953 recommended,
“The effective use of strategic air power against the USSR will require 
overseas-bases on foreign territory... Such bases will continue indefinitely 
to be an important additional element of US strategic air capability and to 
be essential for the conduct of our military operations on the Eurasian 
continent in case of general war”.^ °
By the same token though more specific to Pakistan, in December, an American 
newspaper article mentioned,
“As a base for strategic bombers, Pakistan’s airfields, modem and 
numerous, are within easy reach of Soviet Central Asia, including the Ural 
and Siberian industrial areas far distant firom US bases in the 
Mediterranean and Arabia.”^^
This led observers to believe, however inaccurately, that Washington intended to 
acquire bases in Pakistan, to which China, Russia and India protested.^^
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This strategic distraction had little impact on the Northern Tier’s development 
however. In November 1953, Turkey and Pakistan agreed, in principal, a defence 
pact. The agreement, and Turkey in particular, became the backbone of America’s 
defence in the Middle East and the Northern Tier’s lead.^  ^In January, Eisenhower 
agreed to provide military aid to Pakistan to, “increase the strength and stability in the 
Middle East.” "^^ NSC 5409 in February 1954, which superseded NSC 98 of January 
1951, enshrined America’s new policy to Pakistan by confirming its support for 
Pakistan’s greater participation in a common firont against communism and for the 
equipping of Pakistan’s military.^^NSC 5409 was strongly supported by all US 
ambassadors to South Asian countries,
“zY was the consensus that while India can and will cause difficulties for 
the United States in the region this should not deter us from pursuing 
policies we think important, such as military aid to Pakistan.. .all o f those 
present agreed with the decision to give military aid to Pakistanl"^^
On 2"^  April 1954, Pakistan signed the ‘Agreement for Friendly Co-operation’ on 
defence matters with Turkey, thus beginning the Northern Tier, with Iraq targeted as 
the next state.^  ^On 19^  ^May, Pakistan and America signed a Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement, which, while giving the administration discretion only to 
supply military aid to Pakistan, strangely enough obligated Pakistan to defending 
America. In October, America specified its supply commitment, by pledging to 
supporting force objectives for five and a half army divisions (four infantry and one 
and a half armoured brigade divisions), covering 40,000 men, and to provide six
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destroyers, six minesweepers and six air squadrons -  a total military aid package 
costing US$171m, for completion within three and a half years. Added to a further 
US$105m of economic aid, the package went some way to help Ayub build Pakistan’s 
army to combat India and usurp control of Pakistan.^^
Just as Pakistan’s engagement through the Northern Tier settled, Washington’s 
attention turned towards South East Asia. After the Korean War calmed, Eisenhower 
and Dulles focused on Indochina and China -  encouraged by the China lobby, which 
warned against recognising China and any Munich-type settlements in Indochina.
The French position in Vietnam dwindled from March 1954. °^* The Dien Bien Phu 
crisis, a psychological blow disproportionate to its military merit, frightened Paris in 
May 1954 to swiftly agree to, what Washington viewed as, surrender terms to the 
communists. Publicly, Eisenhower expressed satisfaction about the Geneva 
settlement for Vietnam, despite Congress’s evident rage, “American foreign policy 
has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal”. Privately, he and 
Dulles were deeply concerned about communist growth in the region and had no 
intention to support the accords. Not only did they refuse to sign the treaty but they 
also broke its terms by sustaining Diem and then encouraging the corrupt and 
incompetent though anti-communist leader to avert the stipulated elections.
Washington’s response to Vietnam and Geneva was SEATO.*^  ^In April 1954, the 
NSC agreed to organise a regional defence group including America, Britain, France, 
Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. No mention was made of 
Pakistan at the first meetings. Indeed, Pakistan did not feature throughout the early 
stages of SEATO planning despite more than half of its population bordering
252
B urm a/H aving  placed Pakistan in the Middle East in order to engage it in the anti­
communist narrative, Washington excluded Pakistan from Asia.
Yet in July 1954, Pakistan joined the Manila Conference and in September it signed 
the SEATO treaty. A variety of tactical reasons explain this seemingly sudden 
geographic reversal. Britain wanted to arrest SEATO’s image as a white man’s club 
and strongly advocated Pakistan’s inclusion, “Pakistan’s association with SEATO 
gives appearance more genuine Asiatic character”. Washington also feared the 
consequences of rejecting Pakistan’s repeated advances to join. Pakistan was thus 
invited to SEATO purely for political cosmetics. Indeed, even in Pakistan there was 
little debate or recognition of its joining SEATO. Ayub’s retrospective suggestion, 
“that Pakistan had no reason to join SEATO at all. Perhaps the main consideration 
was to oblige the United States,” is remarkable if for no other reason than that Karachi 
had an extensive history of trying to involve America with itself. Yet the irony of 
Pakistan’s superficial inclusion was that SEATO was the only treaty that ever 
committed America to defending Pakistan, even if it was only against communist 
aggression at Washington’s convenient unilateral determination.^
In any case, America’s commitment to SEATO was very limited. Dulles clarified that 
actions under the treaty would apply only against communism, which Pakistan 
expressed concern with, and that SEATO members would not receive aid other than 
that agreed bi-laterally.^^^ The Pentagon ensured that SEATO lacked backbone for 
there would be.
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“no commitment by the United States to support the raising, equipping 
and maintenance of indigenous forces and/or to deploy US forces in such 
strength as to provide for an effective defense of all of the national 
territory of each signatory is implied or intended. ...the United States 
should not enter into combined military planning for the defense of the 
treaty area with the other Manila Pact powers nor should details of the 
United States unilateral plans for military action in the event of 
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia be disclosed to the other 
powers... In the event general war should develop, US forces will be 
deployed... to strategic areas considered more vital than Southeast 
Asian
Meanwhile, Washington continued its anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the 
Middle East and welcomed the continuing pro-Western character of the Ghulam,
Ayub and Mirza government. In October 1954, Bogra visited Washington, where 
Columbia University’s President, Grayson Kirk, described him as a, “sworn foe of the 
totalitarians” and a “warm friend of the United States”.^  Meanwhile, Bogra insisted 
on nudging the Indian ribcage, “The neutral has no mind of his own. God gave us a 
mind and we must use it to come to conclusions.”  ^ Pakistan also maintained its anti­
communist credentials. At the Colombo Conference of South Asian countries in April 
1954, Pakistan forcefully argued for the recognition of communism as equally 
threatening as coloniaUsm, and in July, banned its Communist Party.
American senior policymakers’ exclusive application of anti-communist 
categorisation and discourse for Pakistan contrasted with its less successful
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application by those at policy’s operating level. Policy operators, those most involved 
with detail and implementation, were more sensitive to a Pakistan in its own anti- 
Indian reality, and outside of the anti-communist narrative. Consequently, such 
officials could not apply meaning to Pakistan, suspecting its anti-communism was 
only an upper crust synthetic phenomenon, and thus remained uncomfortable with its 
engagement. That senior policymakers engaged Pakistan firom and in the discourse 
that they did was in part because Pakistan’s involvement in the Northern Tier was 
never referred to the NSC’s analysis staff, with their prolonged work and extensive 
circulation.^ For instance, CIA analysts were acutely aware of the futility of 
Pakistan’s meaning within the anti-communist narrative.^In fact, the Pakistani 
public was probably more anti-Western than it was anti-communist. Mohammed Ali 
had to calm infuriated crowds when rumours abounded that Pakistan had given bases 
to the Maulana Bhashani’s powerful United Front accused the government of 
mortgaging the homeland to America and demanded repudiation of the US treaty 
while the East Bengal Provincial Assembly denounced the pact with America.'
These operating level officials were also more aware of the issue of Pakistan being a 
liability, and not an asset, in the Middle East. Pakistan’s pohtical polemics were 
reflected in Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed’s imposing of governor’s rule on 
East Pakistan and in September 1954, when Bogra failed to complete a constitutional 
coup. A CIA report of March 1955 outlined the Pakistan government’s, “lack of 
organized political and popular support’’. Furthermore, Karachi’s economy was poor. 
Surveys in 1954 by H J Heinz and then by the State Department outlined bleak 
pictures of Pakistan’s economy. In August 1954, Washington even sent to Pakistan
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emergency food to help relieve a f lo o d /T h e  weak economy in turn eroded 
Pakistan’s military,
“Even with substantial Western military aid, Pakistan could probably 
furnish few if any troops for early employment outside the subcontinent in 
the absence of a comprehensive settlement with India. The shortage of 
qualified officer and administrative personnel and the lack of an adequate 
logistic organisation would make difficult any sizable increase of present 
forces, which are small even for their primary mission of defense of 
Pakistan’s borders”. ^
As a result, at the end of 1954, Washington confronted two cognitive cleavages. The 
first resided within senior policymakers and reflected the engagement of Pakistan 
within the anti-communist narrative in the Middle East in contrast to Pakistan’s 
inability to contribute to the Middle East’s defence. Pakistan’s specific role in the 
Northern Tier or in the defence of the Middle East was never made apparent. As early 
as October 1954, simultaneous to Washington’s committing the US$276m package to 
Pakistan, one State Department official hoped that, "'‘Eventually, we hope Pakistan will 
be enabled to play an important role in Middle East area defense”(emphasis added).^^  ^
In short, Washington’s senior echelons failed to bridge the transition from attaching 
meaning to engaging Pakistan within anti-communism, into specific and strategic 
advantage in the Middle East. Assistant Secretary of Defense Struve Hensel reported 
after visiting Pakistan in February 1955 that no American, “had any clear idea of the 
part Pakistan was expected to play in the defence of the Middle East or whether that 
role would be developed into an important one.”^^ ^
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A second cognitive cleavage that filtered policy was between senior policymakers and 
policy operators, who were unable to place Pakistan within the anti-communist 
narrative. Despite senior policymakers’ enthusiasm for Pakistan, in early 1954, 
Brigadier Harry Meyers’s assessment of Pakistan’s military needs sketched Pakistan’s 
force objectives at a total cost of only US$45.85m.^^^ Meyer’s proposals, as expected, 
“disturbed” senior policymakers. In August, another policy operator. Brigadier 
Wilham Sexton, head of MAAG, confirmed Meyer’s recommendations, this time 
with more dramatic consequences -  Ayub was “broken hearted” and “dejected”.
This inconsistent application of anti-communist discourse instigated inconsistent 
engagements of Pakistan, forcing Washington to apologise to Ambassador Hildreth 
about the, “confusing situation” in policy to Pakistan. John Jemegan, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, 
explained that senior policymakers wanted a significant package for Pakistan, 
reflecting their attaching strong meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist 
narrative. However, that discourse had not reached the operating level.
Both these cleavages annoyed Karachi. While Pakistan was relieved about the 
alhance, it was unaware of its specific anti-communist assignment even after 
receiving the aid commitment. From July 1954, Ayub persistently asked America, 
“What do you expect of us; how do we fit into your overall planning?”^^  ^Hildreth 
noted that Pakistan was increasingly firustrated by the vagueness about its Cold War 
role, a symptom of Washington’s keenness to engage Pakistan within anti­
communism but without clarifying for what specific purpose. The second cleavage, 
between senior policymakers and policy operators was exasperated by Pakistani
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leaders having convinced themselves that they would receive a large military aid 
package despite US officials having never intimated that this was forthcoming. The 
magnitude of American aid, largely a responsibility of policy operators, immensely 
disappointed Pakistani officials, more than it did American policymakers, and started 
as early as April 1954, when the 1955 MDAP fimd contained no aid to Pakistan 
because Washington had prepaid the 1955 allocation in 1954.^^^
Suspending Anomalies
Dulles’s bipolar anti-communist categorisation and discourse found Indian non- 
alignment particularly difficult to contend with. Having once described Bolshevism as 
the product of the Devil, the only thing for Dulles more abhorrent than containment, 
which left people to the Devil, was non-alignment - a refusal to recognise the Devil. 
Nehru did precisely that at a time when America was awash with theories about the 
(communist) manipulation of the human personality through ‘brainwashing’, 
advertising and subliminal m essages.D ulles’s personal interaction with Nehru prior 
to 1952 had already been difficult. In January 1947, Dulles publicly complained that 
communism was influential in the interim Indian government, which Nehru 
vociferously refuted. Nor had Nehru had endeared himself to Dulles. Three years on, 
Nehru, “an utterly impractical statesman” rejected Dulles’s prized Japanese Treaty. 
More recently, Nehru encouraged Egypt to shun MEDO.'^^ Republican William 
Knowland, who assumed the Senate’s majority leadership position following Taft’s 
death in July 1953, supported Dulles and criticised Nehru’s lack of realism while 
another Congressman noted, “India’s voting record in the United Nations as far as the 
United States is concerned is not very palatable”.
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Since Eisenhower barely glanced at South Asia until 1955, and with Dulles at the 
helm of policymaking to South Asia, Washington scarcely engaged a non-categorised 
India. Dulles in actual fact preferred not to address the Indian cognitive anomaly. On 
the Korea commission, Dulles did not want, “India, as India all too often seemed to 
consider it necessary to be ‘more neutral’ toward the Chinese Communists than 
toward the UN,” and succeeded in avoiding India at Geneva much to Nehru’s 
annoyance. Nor had Dulles planned to visit India after Pakistan and was dissuaded 
only by the outgoing administration. His first interaction as Secretary with India
was to settle the surplus property transferred to India in 1945, meaning Washington 
demanded US$32.5m from New Delhi.^^  ^George Allen, “usually an accurate and 
objective reporter”, and “unlikely to adopt Bowles’s missionary approach to 
diplomacy” replaced the pro-Indian Bowles as ambassador in May 1953.^^  ^Bowles’s 
US$200m Mutual Security commitment to India for 1954 was then reduced to 
US$140m.'' Dulles, whose only concern was whether such reduction would reduce the 
amount allocated to Pakistan, overruled Bowles, Byroade, and Nitze, “I doubt that this 
amount is either justified by the facts or could be justified to the Congress.”^^ ^
However, Nehru, Asia’s leading spokesman, governed an India, which for many less 
bipolar anti-communist officials, resided within America’s missionary narrative.
For instance, the intelligence community, which conducted the first study of South 
Asia in June 1953, did not express discomfort with Indian neutralism. Furthermore, 
junior State analysts advocated closer relations with India, “It is the largest country in 
free Asia and potentially it could be a powerful force on the side of the free world.”*^ ^
'' The Republican Congress reduced this further to US$110m 
Henry Byroade was the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African 
Affairs wMe Paul Nitze was then the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
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Thus, the compromise of NSC 5409, the first Eisenhower policy paper on South Asia, 
between India’s locations within the bipolar anti-communist and missionary 
narratives. In the short term, Dulles gave ground, India’s “neutral position may have a 
short-range value to both South Asia and to the free world, giving South Asia the time 
in which to develop its strength”. Within this cognition, economic aid to India, 
normally prepared by middle-ranking officers, was forecast to rise from US$1.5m in 
1954 to a significant US$86m in 1956, compared to US$16m to Pakistan for 1956.*^  ^
However, the overall American long-term aim echoed Dulles’s placing India within a 
bipolar anti-communist framework, “South Asia must be made to realize that its 
ultimate choice lies with the Kremlin or the West.” "^^^
America’s ongoing intense engagement of Pakistan and Dulles’s cognitive suspension 
of India meant the continued entombment of South Asia as a geographic concept. 
Persson wrongly suggests that Pakistan in 1953 was ascribed importance by senior 
policymakers in the context of South Asia.^ "^  ^NSC 5409 distinctly treated India in 
Asia separately from Pakistan in the Middle East. With South Asia buried, American 
did not recognise its tensions. When Jemegan was asked in January 1954 about the 
reactions of countries in the region to Pakistan’s possible association with America, 
he interestingly omitted India.M ansingh claims that Washington mortgaged 
friendship with India for a top-secret base in north Pakistan. This analysis is 
vulnerable for two reasons. First, the U-2’s development was authorised in November 
1954, after the commitment to Pakistan, and base rights were not discussed with 
Pakistan throughout Eisenhower’s first term.^ '^  ^More importantly, Washington had 
largely detached Pakistan from South Asia and India. There was in Washington little 
recognition of Mansingh’s trade-off between India and Pakistan so when Dulles
260
advised Nehru that he had no plans to agree a relationship with Pakistan, which could 
be, “looked upon as unneutral” to India, he did so with a mixture of hope and belief 
that Pakistan was apart from South Asia/'*^
In contrast to this view of Pakistan, as detached from South Asia, intelligence analysts 
from their first analysis of Pakistan, placed it in South Asia,
“a military assistance agreement between Pakistan and the West would be 
resented by India... The destinies of the states of mainland South Asia are 
closely linked.... The primary external mission of each force is defense 
against the other".
This view received some, if ineffective, support. Before aid was announced, the CIA’s 
assessment of granting or denying military aid to Pakistan focused on repercussions in 
India, not the Middle Bast.^ "^  ^Bowles added, “There is no doubt whatsoever that India 
will be deeply resentful.”^^® The sudden tilt towards Pakistan alarmed London,
George Allen, and the South Asian Affairs staff in Washington who noted,
“any assistance (to Pakistan) would have to be on the premise that we had 
considered India’s cold war and hot war importance and had decided that 
the smaller and much weaker country of Pakistan was more useful to 
us.”'''
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Their commitment to India’s place within America’s mission was symbolised by 
practically all of the four thousand American missionary communities in India 
opposing US military aid to Pakistan.
Y et with the senior policymaking view prevailing, principally that of Dulles, 
Pakistan’s conflict with India, having dominated Truman’s policy to Pakistan, 
attracted trivial focus in the NSC 5409 South Asia study. The Princeton alumnus 
who went on to the Sorbonne and George Washington Law School, and became 
Time’s ‘Man of the Year’ in 1954, misled Nehru and later Zafrullah Khan of his “very 
great interest” in K ashm ir.O nly  briefly did Dulles explore Kashmir. In April 1953, 
he sent Paul Hoffinan, formerly of the Ford Foundation, to India and Pakistan -  and 
that too to discuss only Kashmir’s immediate partition.D ulles’s unilateralism was 
clearly in evidence, with Washington only informing London of the mission after it 
had started, “since it is likely that word will now filter back to London”. Hoffinan’s 
mission was however unproductive. The first day of talks, 25^  ^July, was dominated 
by a, “lengthy historical monologue by Nehru which began pre-Alexander Great” and 
had “not reached British period by end day”.^ ^^  From then till 1956, Washington 
ignored Kashmir so much so that in 1954, Acting Secretary of State Smith admitted 
that the US knew, “next to nothing” about ongoing developments in Kashmir.
Venkataramani and Arya argue that America’s aid to Pakistan wrecked the Kashmir 
talks. This claim was supported in 1956 by a junior State analyst, “solution of the
question failed when rumours of substantial American assistance to Pakistan were 
broadcast”. This assertion however resides on blemished soil. By the summer of 
1953, Pakistan and India had indeed made mild progress on Kashmir, the pinnacle
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being Nehru’s bravura reception in Karachi in July. However, it is unlikely that 
America’s engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, manifested in military aid, 
itself destroyed that progress. The Kashmir talks ground to a halt before Pakistan 
knew of American aid. By August 1953, Indo-Pakistan relations had, “sunk to all time 
low as far as Pakistan is concerned.”^ T h a t same month, Nehru blocked further 
progress in Kashmir by sacking Abdullah on false accusations of conspiring with 
Washington to create an independent Kashmir. Seven months on but a month 
before the American-Pakistan treaty, Hildreth noted that Kashmir, “now where it was 
in 1949”.^ ^^  American aid neared the horizon after the Kashmir talks had already died.
Dulles, while hopeful that Pakistan was excluded from South Asia, expected aid to 
anger India, but hoped to, “ride out the storm without fatal effect on US-Indian 
relations”. However, the aid package to Pakistan, rumoured in India at a bloated 
annual US$250m, came upon existing difficulties between New Delhi and 
Washington.^^^ Republican Congressmen had criticised Nehru throughout the 1952 
campaign, and Dulles’s commitment to pursue the Cold War aggressively frightened 
Indians. The American thermonuclear bomb in November 1952 and ‘rollback’, did 
not comfort Indians who feared US bases in Pakistan on Eisenhower’s election. 
Tensions persisted into 1953. In May, Adlai Stevenson’s meeting with Abdullah led 
Nehru to suspect that America offered Abdullah independence in return for aid and 
base rights, which although fabricated, “practically every high Indian official and 
writer has become firmly convinced o f Fu r th e rm or e ,  an Indian-American air 
transit agreement stalled, differences over Korea persisted and a sharp dispute broke 
out over India’s export of thorium nitrate, an atomic material, to China in July. 
Therefore, even before 1954, Indian-American relations were brittle.
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It was then not surprising that the American-Pakistan treaty made Nehru livid,
“Pakistan becomes practically a colony of the United States... The United 
States imagine that by this policy they have completely outflanked India’s 
so called neutralism and will thus bring India to her knees. Whatever the 
future may hold, this is not going to happen”. (McMahon -  pgl72)
Relations after the treaty deteriorated so rapidly that, “The US ambassador did not 
deem our relations with India sufficiently friendly to warrant his asking clearance for 
entry of the Flagship (USS Pittsburgh)” while Vice Admiral Wright received, “only 
the bare minimum of the customary courtesies from the Indian officials”. Nehru 
refused permission for US aircraft in Indochina to use Indian airspace and in March 
1954, asked US nationals of the UN observer group in Kashmir to leave, “No person”, 
he wrote to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, “coming from that country can be 
considered as disinterested or impartial by us”.^ ®^ Hammarskjold felt Nehru’s 
precedent would wreck the UN’s observer system.
Nehru’s anger reflected selective amnesia. He was wrong to blame US aid to Pakistan 
for increasing India’s military expenditure or inviting the Cold War into South Asia. 
The American-Indian Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was effective from 
March 1951, three years before America’s military aid to Pakistan. Furthermore, India 
spent a sizable thirty-five percent of its budget on defence prior to the American 
military aid commitment to Pakistan. Indeed, prior to February 1954, India had 
purchased significantly more military equipment (US$36.3m) from Washington than
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had Pakistan (US$26.5m).*^^ Finally, the Indian concern with US military aid to 
Pakistan contrasted with India’s own extensive attempts since before Pakistan’s 
creation and thereafter to secure American aid and military exports/
Despite Nehru’s anger and amnesia, Dulles was unprepared to nudge India as an 
anomaly to the anti-communist narrative and remained highly patient with India. In 
this restraint, Dulles evidently acknowledged an existence beyond bipolarity, albeit 
one that he was only prepared to contend in India’s case given the potential 
consequences of its communist affiliation in the Cold War. Russian foreign policy had 
changed after Stalin’s death. Stalin had never accommodated to India or any path 
outside the Marxist-Capitalist fi-amework, seeing India as part of the Commonwealth 
and hence a Western s t o o g e . I n  contrast, Stalin’s successors jettisoned the two 
camps theory and moved to a flexible approach to the Third World, a development 
that was recognised by Washington’s analysts. The first high-level indications of 
Russia’s altering perception of India came in August 1953 when Malenkov, Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers in the Supreme Soviet, expressed hope for continued 
improvement in Indo-Russian relations.
With rumours in India of a tripartite non-aggression pact among China, Russia and 
India, the Secretary’s tolerance towards a third way was extensively tested by tensions 
over aircraft rights, and thorium nitrate and Beryl exports. In July 1953, India 
exported to China two tons of thorium nitrate, which had many uses including for 
atomic energy. However, India had signed the Battle Act with America in 1951, 
which barred it firom exporting the material, amongst others, in return for American 
aid. Two tons was trivial in atomic contexts and Indian officials, who had inadequate
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export Controls over restricted materials, had committed an honest oversight, “Nehru 
admitted that prior to call from Deshmukh he had never read text Battle Act and had 
not been aware of full implications Section 103 There were also logistical
complications since the US realised the problem only after the transaction had been 
completed and the cargo was on a China-bound Polish ship.^^^
However, difficulties began when Nehru changed his tone, “India had never agreed to 
attachment of political strings to aid and repeated that he could not accept the 
conditions of Battle Act as binding on India.”^^  ^In contrast, lower ranking Indian 
officials continued to accept that America’s request that India affirm future oversights 
would be avoided by implementation of stringent procedures was reasonable.^*® Nor 
was Nehru helpful. When Allen asked Nehru if he would advise Washington before 
any future affirmative decision were taken to exercise India’s sovereign right to ship 
restricted materials to barred areas, thereby again breaking the Battle Act, “Nehru 
stared at ceiling for full minute, smiled and turned to Ambassador Donovan, who was 
present, and asked if he had ever been to Thailand before.”^
Dulles’s acceptance of space within bipolar anti-communism was reflected in his 
conciliatory handling specifically in that he did not want to implement the Battle Act 
and thereby block American aid, thereby pushing India to communism, and sincerely 
emphasised that, “US Government exploring all possible means avoiding aid 
termination this single transaction.” *^^  Washington even absorbed the insulting 
comments of an Indian official who incorrectly stated that India had, whatever the 
case may be, never asked for American aid in the first place. ^ *^  Dulles stretched legal 
definitions using verbal acrobatics to find a way of meeting American demands
266
against Nehru’s sensitivity on Indian independence. One such example was to argue 
that since India “had not ‘knowingly permitted’ the shipment, “no violation calling for 
the termination of aid has occurred,” though in this case, the gymnastics would not 
insulate against future Indian contraventions.^U nab le  to obtain India’s commitment 
to a treaty that it had only signed two years before, an exasperated Dulles sought in 
September 1953 to instead purchase India’s entire thorium nitrate export.
Washington’s other anomaly in South Asia within the dominant anti-communist 
narrative was Afghanistan. In contrast to India, which could not be ignored given its 
role within the mission, itself renewed by India’s role in le tiers monde, and Dulles’s 
reluctance to nudge it-to communism, Washington tould not cognate Afghanistan 
within any identity narrative and ignored it throughout 1953. Dulles not only leap­
frogged Kabul during his tour of the Middle East, but failed to mention it in any 
speech. He went so far as to advise that he would not be interested in Afghanistan 
even if Kabul turned communist .Thus,  the Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute was also 
ignored to the extent that Afghani protests allowed them to be, as Ambassador Ward 
explained, “I see little advantage injecting ourselves this quarrel pending tangible 
indication GrOA genuinely interested in settlement.”  ^ Continuing in this spirit, 
Dulles took six weeks to respond to Ward’s analysis in July of the Pushtun dispute, 
and only offered meek and arms length cheer for conflict resolution.
Subject - Object Flux: Analytical Vacillation
From mid-1954 to 1955, both the policymaking subject and the Pakistan object 
underwent significant change. On the subject side, the intensity of anti-communist
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identity, the application of its narrative categorisation and discourse and the need to 
enact and protect its narrative, waned. McCarthy’s influence faded after the summer 
of 1954. The Senate’s censure of him paralleled a distinct calming of American anti­
communism, of which an integral part was America’s reaction to its own anti­
communist excesses. Though anti-communists insisted that the tougher communists 
remained, “numbers mean nothing”, and that for every one card-carrying member, at 
least ten remained hidden and despite private anti-communist groups continuing their
work such as ‘Americans Battling Communism’, grave doubts surfaced about anti-
190commumsm.
Americans questioned the^eliability of the anti-communist campaign, especially of its 
informers, which in turn encouraged federal courts to limit powers to seek 
‘subversion’. Scandals such as the Mullen case in 1954 when John Mullen 
demonstrated that he was labelled a communist because he reported bribery at a coal 
operator in Pennsylvania, tarnished the anti-communist movement.^^' Likewise, 
Harvey Matusow, a regular witness in communist trials, revealed that most of his 
testimonies were fictitious. The Ford Foundation gave the New York Bar Association 
funds to examine the legality of the security programmes, while the judiciary, under 
Earl Warren, dealt a number of legal blows to the anti-communist campaign, starting 
in 1955 and culminating in a series of knockout decisions in June 1957. The 
heightened anti-communist environment that had been so conducive to Dulles’s anti­
communist cognition and enactment, had notably diluted.
On the object side, America’s instrument to engage Pakistan, the Northern Tier, was 
severely shaken. In October 1954, Turkey initiated a Turco-Iraqi defence treaty that
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was signed in January 1955 as the ‘Pact of Mutual Cooperation’ (the Baghdad Pact), 
thereby furthering the Northern Tier. Washington maintained public distance from the 
Pact, but strongly supported it in private by giving military aid to Iraq.^^  ^In December 
1954, Dulles had encouraged American officials to,
“use every suitable opportunity discretely encourage and foster earliest 
Iraqi association with the (Turkish-Pakistani) Pact or conclusion of 
bilateral arrangements with either party.”^^ ^
However, Iraq’s accession to the Northern Tier cut across various Arab nationalisms. 
Nuri, an antircommunist, was-also an Anglophile and hence already unpopular 
amongst A r a b s . I n  November 1954, Turkey’s Bayar had warned America that 
Iraq’s inclusion into the Northern Tier would bring Arab political baggage.
Similarly, a US Chiefs of Mission conference concluded that Iraq’s inclusion and 
Egypt’s exclusion from the Northern Tier would anger N a s s e r . I n  fact, Egypt felt 
threatened by the Northern Tier even before Iraq joined it, with the Cairo press 
portraying it as an anti-Arab League conspiracy.London, upset by America’s 
engagement of Iraq, forecast that if Iraq joined the Northern Tier, Egypt would try to, 
“whip up Arab nationalist feelings, leading to internal troubles in Iraq and the 
overthrow of Nuri’s government”.’ *^ Even the JCS, the least culturally aware arm of 
American policy, advocated limiting the Turco-Pakistan pact to avoid Anglo-Egyptian 
and Arab-Israel differences.’^^
Dulles did not heed the warnings for the Pact which transformed Middle East politics 
and was, “the most significant turning point in Arab politics since the 1948 war. It
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shattered the Arab system”. That the Pact was followed by Israel’s attack on Egypt 
in February 1955, which killed thirty-eight people, heightened Arab emotions.^®  ^
Egypt’s Foreign Minister said, “many Arabs will believe pact has been ‘fomented by 
the West’ and is Western effort to destroy Arab unity.” °^^  Meanwhile, Faisal,
“lost confidence in the West. To regain it you (America) should drop this 
plan, strengthen and have confidence in Arab unity, work directly with 
Arab states and not behind the scenes through Turkey.
Arabs damned the Pact, which, “threaten the existence of the Arab League and expose 
Arab nationalism to grave dangers”.^ ®'* Saudi, Egypt and Syria placed their armies 
under unified command in March, which led to the ‘ESS’ alliance.^®  ^The Pact even 
prompted a Russian - Egypt alliance.^®^  The American press further annoyed Egypt. 
The New York Times hailed the Pact as an Anglo-American victory against Nasser.^®^  
Nor was Nuri helpful; at the League’s conference in January 1955 he stormed, “I have 
been given hell and now I am going to give you double hell.” °^^
Dulles was, “surprised at the vehemence of the Egyptian attack on Iraq’s action”.^ ®^ In 
fact he had optimistically felt that.
“even if such action by Iraq should result in the break-up of the Arab 
League.. .the Northern Tier would provide an alternative centre of 
attraction round which the Arab states might group themselves.”^^®
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During the spring of 1955, Washington realised the Pact was, “taken by Egypt as a 
direct challenge to its dominant role Arab League councils and as an indication that 
the US and UK no longer regarded Egypt as the key Arab country.”^^  ^Additionally, 
the Pact cut across Arab-Israeli tensions, resolution of which had been prioritised to 
avoid Russia linking with the Arabs and prevent communism from breeding among 
Palestinian r e f u g e e s / Y e t ,  the Pact excluded Israel’s membership until Iraq 
recognised it and, the “Israeli Government did not agree with theory that association 
of Arabs with Turkey would bring benefits to Israel”, reflected in Israel’s attack/^^
In the midst of these flared reactions, London converted the Pact as a mechanism to 
maintain its influence, as it had hoped from MEDO. Initially, Britain opposed the 
Pact, which overlooked its renegotiation of Iraqi bases/^^ Eden however accelerated 
the Pact after the ageing Nuri Said was re-elected in September 1954, stirring British 
hopes that the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi agreement, expiring in 1957, could be easily 
renegotiated/^^ London joined the Pact in April 1955, annexed to which was a new 
Anglo-Iraqi agreement/^^ Britain thus wanted the Arabs and America to join and 
reaffirm Britain’s surprising regional resurgence, “there is immediate need to give 
renewed momentum to the Pact”/^^
As a result, Washington’s Middle East strategy became ensnared between British 
pressure and the commitment to the Northern Tier on the one hand and Arab 
nationalism and an Arab-Israeli resolution on the other. Joining the Pact would satisfy 
the Northern Tier states; abandoning it would satisfy Israel, Egypt, Saudi and Syria.^’  ^
Originally, Washington wanted to protect the Pact much the same way that it had
Washington and London jointly pursued Project Alpha from November 1954 to resolve Israeli- 
Palestinian and more general Israeli-Arab tensions
271
protected the Turco-Pakistan agreement, by not joining it lest the impression be given 
that the West imposed the Pact.^^  ^But by April 1955, Washington made contingent its 
joining on both Arab anger and Arab-Israeli tensions easing. Persson suggests that the 
latter goal was prioritised over the Northern Tier but this ignores a considerable body 
of evidence, such as offered by Nigel Ashton, which demonstrates Washington’s fears 
about Arab nationalism’s association with communism.^^®
Dulles was subjected to considerable pressure, nearly all of it originating within the 
continuation of anti-communist narrative, to join the Pact.^^  ^Admiral John Cassady 
recommended, “earliest possible adherence by US to the Pact is essential to its full 
capabilities,^ and perhaps even to the survival of the Pact.”^^  ^Other defence officials 
strongly supported adherence, “if the US does not join the Baghdad Pact, there are 
signs the Pact may disintegrate.”^^  ^A State-Defence committee recommended joining 
the Pact and even giving it US$300m annually for five years.^ "^^  All American 
ambassadors to the Northern Tier states repeatedly recommended Dulles to commit 
America to joining the Pact.^^  ^Britain and the other Pact states henceforth maintained 
this pressure throughout Eisenhower’s presidency. As early as May 1955, Turkey 
was,
“discouraged, and increasingly perplexed, by what seems to them an 
inexplicable indifference on our part toward Middle East defense.... 
puzzlement arises from contrast our present indifference with earlier 
fervent support ‘northern tier’ concept”.^ ^^
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Despite this pressure and as he had with India, Dulles feared that the imposition of 
bipolarity might inadvertently drive Arab nationalism to communism. However 
uncomfortable it was for the Secretary, when confronted by a sizable loss within the 
anti-communist narrative, he preferred to restrain his cognitive bipolarity than follow 
it to its logical conclusion. Rather than send Arab nationalism to communism, Dulles 
again opened space beyond bipolarity. His thoughts were mirrored in National 
Intelligence Estimate 30-4-55 in November 1955, which suggested that by 
Washington joining the Pact, Egypt and Syria would become closer to Russia.^^  ^
Dulles warned Wilson,
 “adherence would be widely interpreted in the Arab world as a move
against Arab unity and the action would thus seriously undermine our 
position in several states where we are endeavouring to exert useful 
influence in solving the area’s basic problems.”^^ ^
Furthermore, Dulles considered it, “not feasible for the United States to join the 
Baghdad Pact until there was a relaxation of tension between the Arab states and 
Israel.”^^  ^By joining, he feared that the Arab-Israeli tension would stalemate, invite 
communism on the Arab side and encourage communist growth in the refugee camps. 
In any case, Dulles felt, “the Baghdad Pact was dealing about 90% with politics” and 
it did, “little to reduce the area’s vulnerability to Soviet aggression.”^^  ^Clearly,
Dulles had strong reasons within the anti-communist narrative, however 
uncomfortable to his bipolar framework, to refrain from adherence. He did not 
abandon the anti-communist narrative, but again suspended its bipolar application to 
achieve an eventually anti-communist result.
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In this approach, Dulles was strongly supported by Eisenhower, who especially 
wanted to avoid pushing Nasser to Moscow and hoped that Nasser would eventually 
support an Arab-Israeli resolution and lead Arab nationalism against communism.^^' 
The president tried to reconcile tensions by secretly sending Robert Anderson, a 
confidant, to meet Nasser and Gurion.^^  ^Anderson’s failure due to Israel’s fears about 
its Arab neighbours and Cairo’s post-Czech confidence, only inaugurated a new 
policy to improve relations with Egypt, project ‘Omega’ fi-om March 1956/^^
Dulles contended with the pressure to join the Pact through a three-pronged strategy. 
First, he tried to satisfy Pact members by increasing aid, sending an observer to the 
first Pact Council meeting in November 1955 and allowing State Department officials 
to regularly meet Pact state ambassadors. Dulles also sent high-level officials to the 
April 1956 Pact meeting and joined the Pact’s Economic and Counter-Subversion 
Committees in 1956, though neither demanded grave commitments.^^"  ^Second, Dulles 
vehemently pursued an Arab-Israeli resolution from March 1955; George Allen for 
instance advised London that if additional countries joined the Pact, a settlement 
would be more difficult.^^  ^Further and hence Dulles’s response that nothing was to, 
“encourage any of Israel’s immediate neighbours to enter the Turco-Iraqi Pact”.^ ^^  
Third, he sought to placate Arab nationalism by keeping Arabs out of the Pact. The 
State Department, as early as March 1955 said, “Adherence of additional Arab states 
at this time to Turk-Iraq Pact will not be sought by US directly or indirectly.
Dulles pro-actively discouraged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan firom joining though Iran, 
a non-Arab state, did join in October 1955.^^^
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Notwithstanding this immediate damage limitation exercise, America’s overall 
strategy in the Middle East lay shattered,
“we lack a comprehensive political-military strategy for the defense of 
Middle East... There is accordingly an urgent need for us to re-examine 
the problems of Middle East defense and our own capabilities of 
contributing solution.”^^ ^
This was compounded by the Pact countries themselves being unaware of their 
particular roles, evidenced by America’s country-specific programs being 
implemented without an overall fi'amework.^ '^® By June 1955, Dulles recommended,
“I feel that we must pursue a more arduous and expeditious reappraisal of 
our policies and plans than ever. I therefore propose that we begin at once 
to analyze each of the problems facing us in this area and formulate 
policies.”^^ ^
Throughout 1955, the problem of the Middle East’s defence resultantly gave severe 
stress to Washington, reflected in NIE 30-55, ‘Middle East Defense Problems and 
Prospects’, in June, followed by the Department of State Position Paper on ‘Defense 
of the Middle East’ in July and NIE 30-4-55, ‘The Outlook for US Interests in the 
Middle East’ in November.^"*  ^Eisenhower retrospectively noted, “no region in the 
world received as much of my close attention and that of my colleagues as did the 
Middle East.” '^*^  Dulles’s difficult troubles in the Middle East were embellished 
further first by the region’s rate of political change.
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“Dulles stated that events were moving so fast in this area that he was 
finding himself obliged to make decisions and that he would prefer to 
make these decisions with more guidance than it might be possible to get 
fi*om the Planning Board and the National Security Council.”^^
If all this was insufficient headache, it was later compounded by ominous 
developments in 1955. First, was the prospect of Arab nationalism’s communisation 
after the September Czech arms deal with Egypt, which re-ignited an Arab nationalist 
outpouring and, “opened a new theatre of operations in the East-West struggle”.^ ^^  
Then Britain became openly hostile to Cairo after Egypt pressured Jordan to remain 
out of the Pact in December 1955 and General Glubb was abruptly sacked as 
commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion in March 1956. Glubb’s dismissal, largely a 
domestic issue, shocked London, which blamed Nasser.^ "^  ^As a result, Dulles noted 
with some annoyance that the, “the British are tending to run away with it”, thereby 
pushing Arab nationalists further towards communism. "^^  ^Yet America’s difficulties 
continued. Egypt recognised China in May 1956, and in July, Dulles’s tolerance to 
bipolarity’s restraint hit its limit as he withdrew the offer to fund the dam, finally 
pushing Nasser to Russia.
Pakistan -  Diminishing Engagement
During the Eisenhower administration’s first two years, under Dulles’s direction, 
Washington had engaged Pakistan in the Middle East through the Northern Tier. In 
doing so, America located Pakistan aside fi-om Asia. When Karachi officials noted
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that Admiral Radford had mentioned that Pakistan had an important role to play in 
SEATO, itself a paper tiger, Radford explained that,
“he really did not remember making such a statement.... if he did much 
such a statement in substance, it no doubt was in reply to questions asked 
by newsmen and not an ‘off the cuff declaration of Pakistan’s importance 
to SEATO.”“ *
With the Northern Tier, the instrument to translate America’s engagement of Pakistan 
within the anti-communist narrative into policy, so shaken in the aftermath of the 
Baghdad Pact, America re-assessed its method of engaging Pakistan -  though not the 
anti-communist categorisation and meaning applied to Pakistan. The origins of this re­
assessment can be traced to before 1955. As early as July 1954, Hildreth 
recommended that,
“we believe our investment should be scrutinised with unrelenting care. 
Prospects of returns must be compared with those expected fi'om India 
and jfrom Pakistan’s Middle East neighbours.... let us carefully reappraise 
what we can and should do in Pakistan over a several year period.” "^*^
However, the juddering of the Northern Tier brought to an end America’s translation 
of Pakistan in the Middle Eeist. Thereafter, Pakistan was barely mentioned in 
America’s Middle East strategy, and its role in the Northern Tier was gradually 
marginalized. Criticism of this engagement through the Tier, took various forms. 
Robert Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense, wanted to know, “what we are
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buying and what we are getting for our money”.^ °^ In February, General Sexton noted, 
“Admiral Radford favoured increased military strength in Pakistan, but no one 
seemed to know precisely why except Pakistani obviously made reliable fighting 
soldiers.”^^  ^NIE 52-55 in March 1955 noted that, “Pakistan is unlikely to do much 
more than keep its head above water and will probably be a recurrent petitioner for 
economic assistance” and would not, “commit any more than token forces outside 
Pakistan territory unless its armed forces are considerably strengthened, its economy 
improved, and its fear of India greatly reduced.”^^  ^A report by the Joint Strategic 
Plans Committee acknowledged the large gap between the Pentagon’s original hopes 
for Pakistan and the ongoing assessments about its potential contribution in the 
Middle East. The committee itself in fact saw no prospect for Pakistan to contribute to 
the Middle East’s defence.^^  ^During talks among Britain, Turkey and US in early 
1955 on the Middle East, Pakistan was ignored with London also insisting that 
Pakistan could not contribute defending beyond its borders.^ "^^
Dulles, reluctant to engage Pakistan in the Middle East, also did not want to 
encourage Pakistan in the Middle East lest it present another huge military demand.^^^ 
However, given Washington’s role in originating the Tier, encouraging its members 
to join and America’s credibility invested in it, the US was compelled to continue at 
least a semblance of engagement of Pakistan within the Tier and hence as a Middle 
East state.^^  ^By joining the Northern Tier and SEATO, Pakistan became the only 
local state in two Western defence arrangements. Dulles feared the adverse 
repercussions in not only the Middle East but worldwide if Pakistan expressed 
dissatisfaction with its American alliance.^^  ^Therefore, on the issue of Pakistan’s 
accession to the Pact, completed in September 1955, Washington did not object even
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if the only reason Dulles had in favour of Pakistan’s joining was inconsequential to 
America’s new geographic location of Pakistan.
With Arab nationalism’s reaction to the Baghdad Pact impeding America’s placement 
of Pakistan in the Middle East, America’s engagement to Pakistan consequently 
diluted. Though America broadly continued to categorise and attach meaning to 
Pakistan within the anti-communist identity narrative, its engagement of Pakistan 
through the Northern Tier was counterproductive precisely to that same narrative as 
applied in the Middle East. As a result, the Pentagon pursued two policies to limit the 
extent of its engagement of Pakistan. The 1954 October Aide-Mémoire had, “created 
triple obligation, namely time element, equipping SVi Divisions and 171 million 
dollars.” The Pentagon decided to acknowledge only the last element of this 
commitment.^^^
The Defense Department delayed the completion of the aid commitment. Immediately 
after the Pact was signed, the programme to Pakistan was extended from three and a 
half to five years.^^° This timetable was thereafter in fact repeatedly extended. In 
August 1955, the MAAG chief forecast that the programme might extend to thirteen 
years.^^  ^ In January 1956, he noted that it would take approximately fifteen years.^^  ^
By March 1956 only US$21m of aid out of an estimated total of US$300m had been 
delivered, and that too after a brief increase following Egypt’s Czech arms deal.^^^
Hildreth, furious at the delays, was, “at a loss at to what could be told them 
(Pakistanis) by way of explanation”.^ '^* Oblivious to the effect of the corrosion of the
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Northern Tier, the instrument to effect America’s engagement of Pakistan in the 
Middle East, the “deliberate slowdown” left Hildreth confused?^^
“we do not adequately understand of US policy Pakistan or Washington 
has radically different appreciation of factors here.. .Any US plans based 
on prospect of significant contribution to general political stability and to 
security arrangements Middle East Southeast Asia will require drastic 
revision”.^ ^^
The Pentagon’s diluted engagement of Pakistan not only delayed the aid programme’s 
completion but also reduced its magnitude. Only a month after making the 
commitment, the MAAG team concluded that US$171m would not cover the force 
commitments that the US had promised.^^^ In July 1955, the Army forecast that these 
force commitments would in fact cost US$301. Im.^^  ^The JCS staff then suggested 
using the US$171m as a ceiling, knowing full well it would not meet the force 
goals.^^  ^In September, this ‘amendment’ was approved by the JCS despite MAAG 
informing the JCS that the new budget would allow for only two infantry divisions at 
reduced strength and one armoured division at limited combat strength.^^° On 29*^  
September, days after Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, Hildreth rewarded Ayub 
with news that America had effectively halved its commitment to Karachi.^^^
Washington’s diluted engagement, crystallised in aid delays and the attempted 
reduction of military aid, led to tensions, which dominated relations with Pakistan 
during 1955 and 1956, and hardly constituted an American-Pakistan ‘honeymoon’ 
period as Shahi describes the period.^^  ^Throughout the summer of 1955, Pakistani
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criticism of American aid was strong and widespread. Radford heard extensive 
complaints during his visit to Pakistan, and advised that the aid’s overall impact upon 
relations with Pakistan might actually be negative.^^  ^Ayub alarmed the US consul- 
general in Lahore by saying that he, “cannot trust the Americans’ word.. .I’ve stuck 
my neck out for the Americans. But now I can’t go on doing it, because you have 
gone back on your word”.^ *^* In November, Ayub in discussions with Congressman 
Clement Zablocki, accused America of bad faith, repeating the accusation publicly in 
The New York Times which particularly perturbed Washington.^^^
Tensions were exasperated by Pakistan’s continued commitment to the anti­
communist narrative, hoping to generate enough meaning for Washington to thereby 
engage Karachi with by way of offering security and aid. While India insisted at 
Bandung that, “colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily 
be brought to an end,” Bogra defended the US and insisted on including Russian 
control of Eastern Europe into the agenda.^^  ^Furthermore, in the UN, Pakistan voted 
with the US at the Suez and Hungary crises.^^  ^While Pakistani newspapers mourned 
their country having been sold for a “mess of porridge”, Karachi was increasingly 
annoyed that neutralism had, “paid off’ for India and Afghanistan.^^^
Concerned about its credibility, Washington decided that it had to keep Ayub content, 
being especially worried about the implication for its Middle East strategy from the 
negative publicity from his sense of betrayal.^^  ^To prevent Pakistan’s anger 
damaging American credibility and fiirther rupturing the Northern Tier, Dulles 
addressed the issue of diminished engagement by increasing the aid allocation to 
Pakistan.^^® State Department officials thus urged their Defense counterparts.
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“In view of the current Soviet efforts to increase their influence in the 
Middle East, I think it is very important we do everything we can to keep 
the confidence of countries like Iraq and Pakistan which are committed to 
our side... I hope the Department of Defense will give most careful 
consideration to supplying some additions to the assistance program for 
the Pakistan Army.”^^ ^
In December 1955, Dulles finally raised the US$171m ceiling figure. McMahon 
correctly notes that the change was, “most certainly not based on any revaluation of 
Pakistan’s intrinsic importance to the United States”.^ *^  Force goals, and not budgets, 
would determine the magnitude of US miUtary aid to Pakistan. By March 1956, these 
costs had increased to US$350m. Two months later, they stood at US$400m -  more 
than double what America had committed only eighteen months earlier.^^^
Re-Seeing Anomalies
Having been largely an undercurrent since 1949, the missionary narrative’s 
categorisation and discourse application on India underwent a renaissance in late 
1954, at the core of which was China. America’s focus intensified on China, hence 
reminding America of its missionary narrative’s mpture. The administration was 
already predisposed to treating China harshly. While Project Solarium, from May to 
October 1953, recognised political bipolarity’s end, America felt greater anxiety from 
China than from Russia.^^  ^China’s denial of the missionary narrative, and by 
converting to America’s alterity, left a stinging taste with Republicans. Eisenhower,
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“had a particular dislike of the Chinese Communists” and considered China’s fall as 
the “greatest diplomatic defeat” in American history/^^ Dulles was equally amenable, 
refusing to shake Chou En-lai’s hand at the Geneva Conference/^^
The Quemoy and Matsu conflict with China in late 1954 probably brought America 
closer to general war than anything else during Eisenhower’s presidency/^^ In 
September, China shelled Nationalist positions on Quemoy, an island held by Chiang 
but adjacent to China. By October, Mao seemed ready to launch an invasion while 
coastal battles continued. The Chinese build-up continued in November, made worse 
by harsh prison sentences to American POWs of the Korean War, which enraged the 
American public. In January 1955, the situation continued to deteriorate as Chiang 
promised an attack on the mainland “in the not distant future” and in April called for a 
“holy war”, followed by aggressive naval activity on the Chinese mainland coast.^^^
Dulles described Beijing, “an acute and imminent threat... dizzy with success” and 
compared Mao to Hitler.^^  ^America signed a security treaty with Chiang in 
December 1954 and in January 1955, expecting a Chinese invasion. Congress passed 
the Formosa Resolution, a blank cheque for Eisenhower to defend Formosa, the 
Pescadores and related positions.^^° American warplanes flew over China in March 
while the JCS requested permission to bomb the mainland.^^  ^General John Hull, 
Commander in Chief for the Far East, described, “a serious likelihood that the 
situation would progress rather swiftly to that of general hostilities with Communist 
China” in which case, atomic weapons would be used.^^  ^Dulles felt there was, “at 
least an even chance” of war, “a question of time rather than a question of fact.”^^  ^
Dulles, Chiang and Radford wanted to use atomic weapons while Nixon redefined
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tactical atomic weapons as, “conventional and will be used against the targets of any 
aggressive force.”^^"^ The conflict, which lasted till April 1955, was pervasively felt 
across America. In 1955, Disney’s ‘Lady and the Tramp’ depicted Oriental looking 
dogs as the wily, duplicitous and troublemaking villains who estranged Lady and 
endangered the baby.^^  ^The animation movie’s chief villain was interestingly a breed 
of cat called,‘Yellow Peril’.
The acute public and government anxiety echoed China’s rupture of the American 
missionary narrative. With this narrative sensitised and necessitating reassertion and 
protection, Washington again turned to India, as it had in 1949, with resurgent hope 
that India would finally surrogate China’s role. Since 1951, middle ranking State 
Department and intelligence officials, both of whom viewed India outside of bipolar 
anti-communism and through the missionary narrative, had marginal concerns about 
India’s poor economic growth, particularly its inadequate machinery, high population 
growth and trade deficit.^^  ^With narrative anxiety from China drawing middle 
ranking analysts to impart greater meaning to India within the missionary narrative, 
comparisons between India and China, particularly their economic development, 
became increasingly recurrent.^^  ^NSC 5409, packed with such comparisons at the 
behest of such officials, noted India’s competition to, “satisfy the basic needs of their 
peoples within a democratic framework are being tested against developments in 
Communist China.”^^ * It added that,
“The outcome of the competition between Communist China and certain 
South Asian countries operating within a democratic framework, as to 
which can best satisfy the needs of peoples, will have a profound effect
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throughout Asia.. .Communist imperialism elsewhere in Asia gives 
special urgency to progress in the solution of South Asia’s 
problems.. .Communist China appears to be moving forward through 
totalitarian methods, the peoples of South Asia may turn to communist 
leadership and methods for a solution of their own problems.”^^ ^
Two years on, the embassy in India noted that India was, “in competition with 
Communist China in the sense of demonstrating the superior capacity of democracy in 
Asia”.^ °° However, despite the comparisons, Washington did not expect an Indo- 
China split, and therefore nor a significant opportunity to engage India accordingly,
“India will go to great lengths to win Red China’s fiiendship...India’s 
leaders are drawn to Communist China by legendary bonds of fiiendship 
and culture, and by psychological ties arising fi-om the fact that the 
Chinese as a colored race and as Asians, have asserted themselves against 
theWest.”^ '
India and China had resolved differences over China’s 1950 takeover of Tibet, by the 
Sino-Indian agreement of April 1954, and in June, Chou en Lai made a successful trip 
to India. Though India’s military and Patel repeatedly warned Nehru of China’s 
threat, Nehru was, as would later prove unwise, disinterested, “In fact, the Chinese 
military will defend our Eastern fi-ontier.” ®^^ Furthermore, Eisenhower’s commitment 
to a balanced budget and his electoral pledge of ‘trade not aid’ limited the aid to India 
and thus India’s narrative comparisons with China remained mere abstracts. Though
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NSC 5409 emphasised India’s economic development and drew extensive 
comparisons with China, it did not outline specific programmes for India.
Simultaneously and in competition, there was also the growing application of anti­
communist narrative categorisation and discourse upon India after mid-1954,
“South Asia has been receiving marked attention perhaps to a degree 
sufficient to support the surmise that the Soviets and the Communist 
Chinese have reached some agreement on the line within South Asia that 
demarcates their respective spheres o f ‘influence’ or responsibility.” ®^^
By early 1955, with Khrushchev surpassing Molotov in foreign affairs, the Kremlin’s 
focus intensified on India. In February, Russia committed to building a US$91m 
modem steel plant in India. In June, Nehm took a large team to Moscow where 
Khrushchev affirmed support of Panchsheel, Nehru’s Five Principles with China and 
an alternative approach to world order, and backed India both on Kashmir, and 
against Portugal on Goa. In late 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India in a 
highly publicised trip and were received by a crowd of two million in Calcutta alone. 
Russian offers of aid, were music to Indian ears, “We are ready to share with you our 
economic and scientific and technical experience.” ®^"^ Millions of Indians chanted 
Hindi Russi bhai bhaf' as Indian relations with Russia improved into 1956,
“Nehru received a uniquely warm reception in Moscow and signed a joint 
communiqué with Bulganin calling for strengthened relations between 
their two countries in the economic and cultural fields as well as in
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scientific and technical research. Arrangements for the Indo-Soviet steel 
mill project proceeded apace and Soviet assistance was also proffered in 
the fields of atomic energy, non-ferrous metals industries, coal mining and 
oil exploration.” ®^^
US policymakers were convinced that Russia had changed the Cold War’s locus, and 
was aiding neutrals to undercut America’s alliances. Washington viewed this 
rapprochement with concern,
‘‘The Free World is faced by a problem which will become increasingly 
serious in proportion to the success of Soviet bloc efforts to intensify 
economic penetration of the area. Soviet bloc economic influence in India 
is indicated by the Bhilhai steel plant in India, arrangements to train 
hundreds of Indian technicians in the USSR, offers of long-term loans 
and, technical assistance and expanded trade.” ®^®
A Briefing Paper prepared by the Office of South Asian Affairs in January 1955, 
stated,
“there seems no doubt that the Soviet Union and its European Satellites 
and ComChina have recently increased the tempo and scope of their 
efforts to supplement political penetration of South Asia with economic 
penetration. This is particularly true with respect to Afghanistan and India.
The realisation of the seriousness of this economic offensive has been 
heightened by the firee world’s military reverses in Indochina”.^ ®^
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Not only did America apply greater meaning, albeit with conflicting implications, to 
India through its missionary and anti-communist narratives, but Washington was also 
confronted, by India’s growing neutralist expression, giving greater definition to 
existing policy. Indian independence’s prime manifestation came in Indochina where 
Nehru criticised the Eden-Dulles proposal of April 1954 for regional collective 
security and both the French and the US for fighting against the communist 
Vietnamese.^®  ^India even issued its own panacea to Indochina’s problems, the ‘Nehru 
Plan’, which divided Indochina between the Vietminh and South Vietnam, ended 
French sovereignty, followed by a five year transitional period without foreign 
interference, all of which would be monitored and enforced by the five ‘Colombo’ 
powers (Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Ceylon). Panchsheel became Indian 
foreign policy’s touchstone and was lobbied at Bandung. India also gatecrashed the 
Geneva peace conference with its most controversial representative, Krishna Menon, 
whose anti-American views had been well circulated since before Indian 
independence.^"'
Though the growing application of missionary categorisation and discourse to 
comprehend India was not subscribed to by senior policymakers, the application of 
anti-communist narrative was. Within the latter, a debate precipitated about whether 
to privilege the bipolar and rigid framework, or to find cognitive space beyond, 
however temporary and difficult. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs, resided in the former and strongly discouraged American aid to 
an unfiiendly state. Another State Department official objected to aid to India because
Menon had a habit of antagonising people and was described by one Indian journalist as “our Mr 
Dulles”.
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of, “Mr Nehru’s consistent support of the Communist position and his opposition to 
US policy”.^ °^  Congress too adopted a bipolar anti-communist approach for India. 
Eisenhower’s request for US$70m of development aid for India in 1956 was reduced 
by US$20m. Senate Majority Leader Knowland explained, “It would be bad if the 
impression got around the world that we reward neutralism”.^ ®^ Hubert Humphrey’s 
attempt in July 1955 to restore some funds was crushed in the Senate by 68-16. 
Congress’s anger with India for its not supporting the anti-communist narrative was 
clearly widespread, not helped by Nehru’s contacts with China and Russia.
Eisenhower was however amongst those who preferred a third way for India, one 
which coincided with America’s application of missionary narrative on India and 
personally took the lead in expanding aid to India, which he advocated at an NSC 
meeting in December 1955.^ ^^  Dulles, though much more reluctant to go beyond a 
rigid bipolarity, followed his president’s lead and explained to the Senate,
“We believe that India’s own great effort should be supported so that its 
plan for economic development will succeed. We should remember that 
among free nations there is room for diversity of views. We should not let 
our wish to help the people of India be swayed by temporary differences, 
however important. It is essential that we continue to help, if for no other 
reason than to save our enlightened self-interest”.^ ^^
With the administration’s principal policy official, loyally supported by his lieutenant, 
Washington initially planned engaging India in 1955 within the anti-communist and 
missionary narratives.
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“our substantial economic aid program for India and our information and 
cultural efforts to improve United States -  Indian relations have in a sense 
become holding operations rather than means of extending our 
influence.”^
To this effect, various policy options were considered. Eisenhower requested 
Congress in 1955 to fund a US$200m Asian Development Fund, with a large 
proportion for India. In June, Hoover recommended that Tata’s request for an Ex-hn 
loan of US$90m to expand its steel plant be favourably considered, even if US$75m 
was eventually given.^^  ^There was also an extensive aid program for fertilizer and 
tube wells, which increased Indian food production in 1955 by 400,000 tons. 
Washington continued to import Beryl from India despite not needing it.^ ^^  While 
Dulles instructed the embassy in India to, “emphasise the common ground in our 
objectives”, Eisenhower, at the prompting of senior officials in August 1955, invited 
the Indian leader to America.^
Relations with India however remained ambivalent in Eisenhower’s first term. India 
refused to allow the printing of The New York Times overseas edition in India and 
closed down American information centres except those at the embassy and consular 
offices.^^  ^Nehru himself was paranoid about supposed US intelhgence activities, 
which neither Eisenhower nor the embassy in India were aware of.^ *^  American civil 
aircraft rights were cancelled in January 1955. Only after the Spirit of Geneva in July 
1955 did relations show signs of improvement.
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“The atmosphere of US-Indian relations improved during the period under 
review. Nehru’s criticisms of US collective security policies were less 
emotional than in other periods, and the Indian press moderated itself....
These trends did not however indicate any marked rapprochement on the 
major points at issue-international Communism and colonialism”.^
The net effect at the year end was still finely balanced - while General Taylor was 
received graciously in India in December 1955, the State Department reported three 
months later on its position in India, “No progress was made towards imposing the 
Western position relative to that of the Communist Bloc and deterioration may have 
taken place.”^^ °
One final point of interest in America’s relationship with India was the continued 
presumed detachment between India and Pakistan. Only in March 1956, when Dulles 
arrived in New Delhi, did he leam about a certain if perverse unity to South Asia. Jean 
Joyce, formerly of the US embassy, and then a Ford Foundation representative in 
India observed that,
“no one but no one thinks that (the) Dulles trip here did any good 
whatever in improving Indian attitudes toward the US or its policies....
The only possible good that may have come out of the trip was that Dulles 
may have gotten at least a glimmer of the intensity of Indian feeling on 
arms to Pakistan”.^ ’^
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Despite this, Washington demonstrated little appetite to locate Pakistan and India 
within a single South Asia. Having been detached from South Asia, and then the 
Middle East, Washington had no convincing reason to re-categorise Pakistan into 
South Asia or with India. Hence, there were few implications for Pakistan at this stage 
of America’s re-understanding India. Most importantly, America was still not 
interested in conflict resolution.^^^
Simultaneous to the altering meaning of India, the application of anti-communist 
categorisation and discourse also changed Washington’s understanding of 
Afghanistan. The Turco-Pakistan Pact induced extensive Russian focus on Kabul,
“the USSR almost certainly views the cumulative effects over the last year 
of the Turk-Pakistani agreement, the initiation of military aid programs 
for Pakistan and Iraq, the strengthening of the Western position in Iran, 
and the settlement of the Suez dispute as a setback for Soviet interests in 
southwest Asia.”
Indeed, this was reinforced by Kabul’s own military insecurity. Afghanistan had not 
purchased any foreign ammunition whatsoever since 1948. Thus and understandably, 
“following the granting of US military aid to Pakistan, the Afghan Government began 
to come under heavier pressure”.^ ^^  Military aid to Pakistan forced Afghanistan 
towards Russia.^ "^^  By June 1954, Afghanistan had accepted extensive Russian aid 
included the.
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“erection of oil storage tanks, grain storage, milling and a bakery.
Apparently it now proposes to move into roads, more oil and gasoline 
storage, possibly pipeline construction etc. All evidence points to the 
probability that the Soviets will move quickly.
Hence, America’s concern, “There should be an appraisal by the appropriate US 
military authorities of the importance of Afghanistan both direct and indirect to the 
US”.^ ^^  American analysts felt that the increased Soviet attention to Afghanistan was 
part of a general effort to counter recent Western (particularly US) gains in the Middle 
East-South Asia area.^^  ^America’s growing anti-communist focus on Afghanistan 
was reflected in NIE 53-54 of October 1954, “Soviet attentions to Afghanistan, 
particularly in the form of technical and economic assistance, have increased 
markedly within the last year.”^^ * Yet this contrasted with the hitherto lack of 
American aid to Afghanistan, which in October 1954, had foreign exchange reserves 
of only US$2m.^^^ Total American aid forecast for 1955-1958 for Kabul prior to the 
growing Russian pressure on Afghanistan, was only US$10.2m, adding to the measly 
US$2.9m given in 1953 and 1954.^ °^
With this growing anti-communist concern on Afghanistan, Washington focused on 
Pakistan in late 1954 both to encourage Kabul’s economic development and contain 
its communism by conflict resolution of Pushtunistan.^^^ Initially, the dispute attracted 
little American attention.^^^ Though NIE 53-54 referred to it, it was not an important 
theme, at least until 1955.^^  ^America’s involvement in the dispute remained reactive 
and responsive to Afghan lobbying. While exerting only meek pressure to improve 
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in late 1954, Washington instead focused on aid to
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Afghanistan to protect the anti-communist narrative.^^"  ^However, even this issue was 
linked to Pakistan as Dulles hoped that in providing economic aid, he would also 
encourage better Afghan-Pakistan relations -  a view which both local ambassadors 
shared/^^ America hence decided, using the precedent of the Saar in Southern 
Europe, to increase economic, not military, aid to Afghanistan.^^^ America’s first 
major suggestions in this regard, were transport and communication related -  to 
integrate Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran through better communications/^^
In early 1955, Dulles concerns about communism in Afghanistan had not eroded 
against a miUeu of America’s ineffective minimalist aid/^^ Despite the lack of 
success, Dulles, “for one did not believe in quitting in a case like this. He wanted a 
program to save Afghanistan from Soviet control.”^^  ^As a result and having decided 
against increasing aid contributions to match Russia’s, NIB 53-54, in its outlook for 
Afghanistan, focused more on Pakistan-Afghani tensions than almost any previous 
assessment of Afghanistan.^ "*® Likewise, Dulles emphasised that, “Department’s 
primary concern at moment is to do whatever possible prevent further serious 
deterioration Pak-Afghan relations with possible dangerous consequences peace sub­
continent.”^^ * Washington was especially concerned about the closing of the Pakistan 
border, which Karachi had long been threatening, and which, “would result in 
strangulation Afghan economic life and in causing Afghans turn evidently to 
Soviets.”^^^
However, despite this concern, and again as had been the case through much of 
Truman’s administration, Washington was not interested in a deep involvement in the 
Pushtunistan dispute, “Department agrees your view US should not attempt role of
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mediator in Afghan-Pakistan dispute.” "^*^ Washington’s tension between its preference 
for non-involvement and the growing concern about communism became more 
apparent. On the one hand, “The Secretary said it did not make much sense to just sit 
around doing nothing and let Afghanistan pass by default into the control of the 
Soviets.” "^^  Further, “Strides made by Soviets towards position of dominance in 
Afghan affairs makes more urgent than ever development counter ties between 
Afghanistan and Western world. .. .Accordingly US Government hopes for high level 
meetings between two at earliest possible moment.”^^  ^Yet on the other hand merely 
encouraging and prodding the two parties towards a resolution, such as was the case 
in Eisenhower’s letter to King Zahir in December 1955, was a wholly ineffective and 
effortless approach that satisfied only Washington’s desire to maintain distance from 
Kabul.^ ‘“
Hence, American policy did little to arrest the decline Afghanistan-Pakistan relations 
throughout 1955, notwithstanding a brief thaw in September, which lasted only until 
late October when Pakistan resurfaced the ‘One-Unit’ issue. In November, Pakistan 
placed an economic embargo on Afghanistan, which put pressure on Kabul to turn to 
Russia. Unwilling to increase aid to Kabul or commit itself to resolving its dispute 
with the pro-American Pakistan, it was thus that the CIA demonstrated continued 
serious concerns about Afghanistan, “if the present trend continues, the Soviet Union 
will probably be able within the next few years to influence effectively as well as 
economic policy.” "^^^
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CHAPTER SIX
EISENHOWER PART II: PAKISTAN AND THE LOSS OF MEANING
Whereas Dulles’s framework dominated the first term, the growing imprint of 
Eisenhower’s framework filtered through by 1956 and prevailed in the second term. 
Central to this divergence was Eisenhower’s personal confidence that enabled a 
greater conceptual flexibility beyond bipolar and rigid identity narrative structures, 
especially anti-communism, to create and protect the self, and from which to 
understand and engage reality. Eisenhower was also strongly committed to economic 
development, tying it closely to the American missionary identity.
This combination linked the long-standing cognition by middle ranking officials to 
India, outside of bipolar anti-communism, and within the missionary narrative, to 
policymaking’s apex for Eisenhower comprehended India within the missionary 
narrative, a cognition reinforced by another clash with China in 1958. Thus, helped by 
Eisenhower’s strong relationship with Nehru and fearing a second rupture of the 
missionary future, by way of India’s economic crisis, Washington engaged India with 
extensive aid. In contrast, with the parallel Russian focus on India, those officials who 
persisted in cognising via the anti-communist narrative, frustratingly dehberated if its 
bipolar or flexible variant should be applied.
Focus on India’s economy and its mihtary spending to combat Pakistan, lent towards 
re-locating Pakistan, excluded from the Middle East, back into South Asia -  as an 
anomaly to the missionary future. Furthermore, Ike’s focus also spotlighted Pakistan’s 
economic weakness. There thus emerged three tensions in policy to Pakistan. First, 
was the US’s discomfort with Pakistan’s economic weakness and its bloated military.
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Second, was Washington’s increasingly costly engagement of Pakistan in the Middle 
East despite its re-cognition with India. Finally was Pakistan’s use of American aid 
against India, thereby disrupting the missionary narrative. Having acutely felt these 
tensions after Pakistan forced Washington against India in the UN over Kashmir, 
America sought to resolve the Indo-Pakistan disputes, thereby reducing Pakistan’s 
military and its demands for Northern Tier weapons, which would be used against 
India. However, Nehru’s unwillingness to reconcile Kashmir denied America from 
placing policy to Pakistan on this sound footing.
Notwithstanding this, during Eisenhower’s final two presidential years, Pakistan lost 
meaning to America, first as an anomaly to the missionary narrative in India by virtue 
of thriving American-Indian relations which were no longer held back by the thorn of 
Pakistan. Second, and more critically, Pakistani frustration with America primarily 
over precisely the magnitude of that engagement and aid to India was vented in an 
increasingly anti-American rhetoric -  thereby confirming Pakistan’s departure from 
the anti-communist narrative, the only way that America had made any meaningful 
sense of Pakistan.
Dwight David Eisenhower and Narrative Reconfiguration
Whereas the Republican administration’s first two years of policy to Pakistan were 
characterised predominantly with Dulles’s identity narrative framework, being rigid 
and bipolar anti-communism, by 1956 America had transitioned to Eisenhower’s 
contrasting structure. A central difference between the two policymakers lay in 
Eisenhower’s personal confidence and security. From childhood, Eisenhower was a
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self-assured and outgoing individual; as an adult, his, “storehouse of energy and 
warmth was sensed, felt, communicated to everyone around him.... Among most 
men, Eisenhower inspired confidence.”  ^His personal success in World War Two, 
even if overstated, merely reinforced that confidence, as Marshall told ‘Ike’,
“You have completed your mission with the greatest victory in the history 
of warfare... You have commanded with outstanding success the most 
powerful military force that has ever been assembled.”^
From this confidence, originated Eisenhower’s conceptual flexibility beyond the 
prevailing cognitive bipolarity. Strong personal security reduced his need for rigid and 
pervasive identity narrative subscription and application, such as needed by Dulles to 
provide stability and meaning. For instance, whereas General “Patton was dogmatic”, 
Eisenhower tended to qualify his observations and statements.^ Conceptual depth and 
self-confidence indeed strengthened his ability for self-criticism and reflection, “no 
one has a monopoly on the truth and on the facts that effect this country”.^  
Furthermore, the sort of crisis that characterised rigid cognitive frameworks did not 
appeal to Eisenhower, “I have so often been through these periods of strain that I have 
become accustomed to the fact that most of the calamities that we anticipate never 
really occur.”^
This suppleness underlay Eisenhower’s ability to empathise. When in 1954, Cutler 
suggested pressuring Ceylon to stop exporting rubber to China, a trade that was vital 
to Colombo’s economy, Wilson’s proposed solution reflected appalling insensitivity, 
“rubber made an awful smell when you had to bum it”. Eisenhower slammed the
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suggestion, furious for, “allowing a bunch of damned idiots to force us into policies 
with respect to trade that were absolutely foolish.”  ^Empathy gave Eisenhower an 
immense ability for teamwork, leadership and getting along with people, reflected in 
his West Point football training sessions and by his being one of the very few people 
who was liked and respected by both MacArthur and Marshall/ His conciliatory 
approach helped establish smooth relations with the British during the war and 
secured him the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.' Similarly, 
Eisenhower changed his second inauguration speech from wanting to, “guide and lead 
all other people who love freedom” to, “walk with those who love freedom.”^
Eisenhower’s final significant difference with Dulles was his emphasis on economic 
development and repulsion of war. Eisenhower re-defined and deeply internalised the 
American missionary identity narrative, a point stressed in his second inauguration 
speech as, “a historical struggle for a new freedom: freedom from grinding poverty.”  ^
During his presidency, the Treasury Secretary and the Director of the Budget were 
automatic invitees to NSC meetings, while all policy papers were required to have 
budgetary appendices. Early policy made clear that, “excessive government 
spending leads to inflationary deficits or to repressive taxation” which undermined 
American security. Such budgeting was reinforced by his distaste for war. 
Eisenhower, whose first combat experience came only in 1942, and whose military 
campaigns were mediocre, doubted
“whether any of these people, with their academic or dogmatic hatred of
war, detest it as much as I do”. Others had not “seen bodies rotting on the
‘ Eisenhower’s conciliatory approach also had led to problems such as his agreeing the Darlan deal in 
North Africa in November 1941, for which he was extensively criticised.
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ground and smelled the stench of decaying human flesh. They have not
visited a field hospital crowded with the desperately wounded.”^^
Decades later and after his tenure as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger compared his experiences as an historian with those as a policy 
practitioner, and noted that while the former, he underestimated the role of personality 
in policymaking.^^ This impact is well demonstrated not only in Dulles but also in 
Eisenhower, for the latter’s combination of personal ontological security and 
conceptual suppleness, inducted a need for meaning and certainty through narrative 
categorisation and discourse that was more relaxed than Dulles’s and of the prevailing 
American cognitive fabric. The most important and critical policy translation of this 
was Ike’s demonstrated lesser internalisation and exercise of anti-communist narrative 
to understand and engage the world. Stated differently, Eisenhower did not rely on the 
anti-communist narrative to secure himself or his reality with. That he was a product 
of his era meant that, as with all real Americans, he remained suspicious of 
communism. But in his case, it was little more than that and not an identity that 
sustained reality and defined the self. Combined with his ability to empathise and his 
prioritisation of development over war, Eisenhower from the post-war breakdown in 
Russian relations remained uncomfortable with the centrality and dominance of anti­
communism in America.
Until 1955, Eisenhower oscillated between his scant appetite to understand the world 
through anti-communist narrative, and its intense application and use across America. 
On the one hand, his inaugural speech riposted communist Russia, “the forces of good 
and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history.... freedom is
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pitted against slavery, lightness against the dark.”*^ On the other, in the same address, 
he emphasised conciliation, “science seems ready to confer upon us as its final gift, 
the power to erase human life firom this planet.”^^  Correspondingly, Eisenhower’s 
early slant to the Kremlin reflected a fine balance of caution and optimism. When 
Malenkov announced after Stalin’s death, Russia’s readiness to settle matters 
peacefully with America, Eisenhower was unsure how to respond. Strongly 
encouraged by Churchill, Ike reciprocated throughout 1953, “There are new 
governments in two great countries. The slate is clean -  now let’s begin”. I n  April, 
Eisenhower gave his ‘The Chance for Peace’ speech,
 “The cost of one heavy bomber is this: a modem brick school in more
than thirty cities... This is not a way of life at all, in any tme sense. Under 
the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron...
We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is tme and 
total.”'®
In June, Eisenhower criticised McCarthy when he told students, “Don’t join the book 
burners.... Don’t be afraid to go in your library and read every book.” ®^ His ‘Atoms 
for Peace’ speech in December stressed limiting atomic energy for peaceful aims.^*
These overtures clashed with the fierce pressure from McCarthy, Republicans, Dulles, 
Adenauer and the prevailing American political climate to enact and protect the anti­
communist narrative.^^ Responding to this and partly uncertain of his own policy 
direction, Eisenhower demanded impossible proofs of Russian goodwill, including 
releasing POWs held since 1945, signing the Austrian treaty, a Korean armistice.
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settling Indochina and Malaya, uniting a free Germany and freeing Eastern Europe. In 
any case, in January 1954, Molotov reaffirmed the suspicions of Cold War warriors 
that Moscow was not ready for concessions by refusing to sign a treaty with Austria 
and wanting to link it with a German peace treaty.
The ‘Spirit of Geneva’ conference in July 1955 marked a significant détente of the 
anti-communist narrative in American policymaking, and the ascendancy of 
Eisenhower’s more agile cognitive framework, beyond bipolar anti-communism. With 
the Korean armistice and the Austrian treaty completed, Eisenhower, “came to 
Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom from war and rumors of war.”^^  
Though there  ^were no agreements on the agenda or on Eisenhower’s offer of mutual 
inspection of military sites, Geneva’s atmospherics altered the Cold War." Integral to 
this success was Eisenhower’s personal confidence, reflected not only in his ability to 
empathise and work with people, but more importantly and specifically in his 
willingness to categorise, attach meaning and engage outside of the anti-communist 
narrative. Even Le Monde, the French newspaper of anti-American disposition, 
proclaimed Eisenhower’s reputation, “as the kind of leader that humanity needs 
t o d a y . T h e  New Look softened as nuclear war for Eisenhower became race suicide 
and Khrushchev denounced Stalin for his crimes in June 1956 - described by even 
Dulles as a, “permanent shift of direction”.^  ^In the fine arts, anti-communism’s 
conformist pressures also eased - Barnett Newman even became a hero for his 
abstract expressionist exhibition in 1958.^^
“ The agenda at Geneva consisted of German reunification, European security, disarmament and 
détente
310
The previous chapter made mention of the relationship between Eisenhower and 
Dulles. Given the elucidation of both their frameworks, the contrast is briefly 
considered. Eisenhower did not subscribe to Dulles’s insecurity from communism or 
his relative crudity and had misgivings about ‘Liberation’ when it was popularly 
accepted at the Republic convention in 1952, referring to it only when prodded by the 
Republican National Committee.^^ Understanding it in similar fashion to how Europe 
understood it -  meaning war over Eastern Europe, and not as a commitment to renew 
American narratives threatened by communism, he told Dulles to always caveat its 
use with ‘peaceful means’.Eisenhower also had difficulty with Dulles’s rigid 
bipolarity. For instance, though he agreed with most of Dulles’s policy paper in 1952, 
he_suspected the massive retaliatory responses in the event of minor attacks, “To my 
mind, this is a case where the theory of ‘retaliation’ falls down.”^^
Nor did Eisenhower subscribe to Dulles’s immersion into (bipolar) anti-communist 
identity narrative to locate self and reality. Malenkov’s statements about ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ at Stalin’s funeral were described by Ike as, “startling departures” with 
potential for détente, and demanded a positive approach to peace.^° In contrast, 
Dulles, relying on Stalin’s ‘Problems of Leninism’, emphasised the chapter on 
‘Tactical Retreats’, and saw opportunity to further anti-communist narrative 
engagement by pressuring Russia, “I can say we have evaluated these speeches, but 
we do not receive any great comfort”.^ ’ It was Dulles who firmly insisted on the 
severe criteria to judge Russian intent and caveated Eisenhower’s ‘The Chance for 
Peace’ speech, by emphasising that détente depended on Russian deeds not words.^^
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The Geneva talks in 1955 not only marked Eisenhower’s growing command of 
detailed policy, but also crystallised the contrast between the two officials. In a 
cartoon firom Herblock’s Here and Now, published just before the talks, a grumpy 
Dulles marked ‘Dulles Doubts’ looks annoyingly at a vibrant Eisenhower, marked 
‘Eisenhower Optimism’, both on their way to the Geneva summit, saying, “Yes, We’ll 
Be There, Rain And Shine.”^^  As he left Geneva, Dulles noted, “Well, I think it is a 
little premature to talk about the ‘era of good f ee l i ng sW he rea s  Eisenhower 
celebrated Geneva, Dulles feared the effect of destabilising America’s nucleus 
identity narrative,
“Geneva has certainly created problems for the free nations. For eight 
years they have been held together largely by a cement compounded of 
fear and a sense of moral superiority. Now the fear is diminished and the 
moral demarcation is somewhat blurred.... We must assume that the 
Soviet leaders consider their recent change of policy to be an application 
of the classic Communist manoeuvre known as ‘zig-zag’ -  i.e., resort to 
the tactics of retreat... ‘to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite’ 
(Stalin)»/^
Finally, just as America’s environment of 1953 was highly conducive to Dulles, that 
from late 1956 was favourable to Eisenhower. Disney even co-opted the pride and joy 
of a potential holocaust in a Disneyland TV Show with a feature on ‘Our Friend, the 
Atom’. With this détente, inspired in part by the Spirit of Geneva, and as Ike’s 
effectiveness increased, that of Dulles diminished, “In word and deed Dulles seemed 
unable to articulate any purpose beyond preventing a further expansion of
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Communism.”^^  Too cognitively rigid to understand the world outside of America’s 
anti-communist narrative, Dulles stuck to the right, ignoring the extensive openings 
with Russia and was consequently criticised throughout the second administration, 
being reduced to a comparable ineffectiveness that Acheson had been after Korea, 
albeit for quite opposing reasons.^^
The American Mission and Resurrecting 'India '
Since Eisenhower did not subscribe in any substantive way to the anti-conununist 
identity, he relied on other real American identity narratives to categorise and attach 
meaning, which in the case of India, was through its other privileged narrative -  the 
American mission. Eisenhower, who felt that Nehru and Mao were Asia’s two main 
leaders, re-categorised, attached meaning to and engaged India within America’s 
mission. One advantage in this understanding of India, which had strong latent 
support amongst middle ranking officials, was India’s stature in the Third World, an 
arena that might later constitute a further stage in the missionary narrative. Since the 
last concerted attempt to engage India within the missionary narrative in 1949, India 
had emerged as the premier representative of the Asian-Afiican or ‘Bandung’ 
region.^^ Glimmers of Eisenhower’s locating India within the mission were noticeable 
well before it translated into policy. Though Eisenhower felt India’s concern over aid 
to Pakistan was, “a nuisance”, he led assurances to Nehru that the aid would not be 
used against India and emphasised its purpose for regional anti-communist security.^^ 
In April 1953, Eisenhower accepted India’s inclusion as a member of the Korean War 
commission, annoying Dulles and the JCS, neither of whom could make much sense 
of India.^° Eisenhower’s increasing cognition of India within the mission towards the
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latter part of his first term coincided with the vocal emergence, within the diminishing 
anti-communist environment, of prominent others who shared his understanding/^ 
Chief amongst them was a fiiend of Nehru’s, John Sherman Cooper, former 
ambassador to India and John Kennedy, who were elected to the Senate and House 
respectively in 1956/^
India’s growing categorisation and meaning within the missionary narrative was 
assisted by Eisenhower’s ability to emancipate India firom its categorisation within the 
anti-communist narrative by outright rejecting its bipolar reading and creating 
legitimate space within anti-communism for neutralism, “The President reiterated his 
belief that in some instances the neutrality of a foreign nation was to the direct 
advantage of the United States.”^^  The advantage of this also extended into his 
concerns for economic development, for Eisenhower accepted neutralism partly to 
keep fi*om military alliances and wasteful defence spending.^ A few months later, he 
explained for those less able to share his understanding of India, the cruder material 
benefits of this cognition,
“we were better off with India following its policy of non-alignment than 
were she to join up actively on our side, with the consequent added burden 
on the American taxpayer and 2000 miles more of active firontier.”^^
His lead was extensively followed, linking as it did for the first time a pool of middle 
ranking officials supportive of India within the missionary narrative to 
policymaking’s summit, and was evidently reflected in the ease with which neutralism 
permeated policy, “It was no longer a very important or unduly held view that PM
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Nehru was some kind of ‘fellow-traveller or crypto-Communist'"/^ In the same way, 
the Operations Plan for India in July 1957, and in contrast to NSC 5409 in 1954, did 
not demand that India align with the West."^ ^
In 1956, Eisenhower, sensitised to the Third World after Suez and Hungary, had the 
opportunity to reach to Nehru. Though Menon and Dulles clashed over Suez, Nehru 
was surprised by Eisenhower’s condemnation of the Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy. 
Nehru and Eisenhower also criticised Russia over Hungary, albeit with differing 
public intensity. These pleasant jolts were followed by Nehru’s visit to Washington, 
delayed by Eisenhower’s earlier ill health, in December 1956. In 1954, Madame 
Pandit had suggested that American-Indian tensions would ease if Nehru and 
Eisenhower met informally. Though many Americans approached Nehru’s visit 
cautiously, especially Dulles, her advice was markedly accurate and the visit proved 
very successftil."^  ^Eisenhower and Nehru connected well, inaugurating strong 
American-Indian relations throughout the second Republican term. Nehru described 
Eisenhower as, “a truly great man” while Eisenhower empathised with Nehru’s 
independence for India’s development and as a reaction to Western arrogance."*  ^Such 
was the success that the Indian Parliament even established an Indo-American 
Friendship Society to mark the visit.
Facilitated by this rapport, America’s categorisation of India within the missionary 
narrative was reinforced by Beijing’s increasingly militant and Marxist 
fundamentalist approach, which later led it to accuse Russia of social imperialism. 
China’s vociferous expression again aggravated the wound in America’s missionary 
narrative, earning Beijing promotion as Washington’s primary enemy. In 1957, while
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the CIA expressed concern about increasing Chinese influence in Asia, Eisenhower 
placed tactical nuclear weapons in Taiwan/^ The Agency’s reports concluded that 
Russia wanted détente and was trying to restrain China and by 1958, there even 
emerged a Russo-American ‘community of interest’ against China/^ During the 
August 1958 Jinmen crisis, which, though lasting only six weeks, was more intense 
than the Quemoy scare, Dulles and the JCS repeated their requests to strike China 
with tactical nuclear weapons.’"
As a result and throughout Eisenhower’s second term, comparisons of China and the 
Indian missionary surrogate therefore became more direct and frequent,
“China’s tacit yet certain rivalry with India is one of the basic facts of 
Asian politics.... The outcome of the race could have a very considerable 
effect on the other and much smaller Asian countries.”^^
India was promoted to, “the leading political contender with Communist China in 
Asia”.^  ^In May 1959, Gray asked if India was, “a counterweight to Communist China 
or was India to be a successful example of an alternative to Communism in Asia”. 
Though Eisenhower categorically denied that India could counterweight China, given 
India’s non-alignment and the huge financial cost of supporting such a counterweight, 
Washington effectively saw India as precisely that, if only to counter the disturbance 
to America’s understanding of its own identity. For instance, China intruded regularly 
in discussions between Eisenhower and Nehru and during the NSC meetings, such as 
in May 1959, where India as usual was discussed predominantly against the
According to Wang Bingnan, China manufactured the crisis to arrest Khrushchev’s détente with 
Eisenhower.
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background of China/^ Even India’s Ambassador Chagla, borrowing Karachi’s 
chameleon talent, spothghted, “an economic race was taking place between India and 
Communist China”.^ ^
The opportunity to engage India within the missionary narrative, crystallising it to 
policy, came in India’s economic crisis in 1957. India’s first five-year plan (1951-56) 
had focused on food production and distribution. Its second five-year plan (1956-61) 
was a US$14.9bn industrialisation plan to raise economic output by twenty-five 
percent, but had an investment deficit forecast at above US$2.5bn.^^ The magnitude 
of this deficit can be gauged by comparing it to India’s total inward investment fi'om 
1948 to 1952 of only US$115.9m.^*
At first and throughout 1956, most American officials agreed in principal to aid the 
plan but there was neither consensus nor urgency on a program.*'  ^However, as India’s 
meaning within the missionary narrative became more prominent, Washington first 
digested the seriousness of India’s economic problems in December 1956. Before 
Nehru’s visit, even Indian ministers pleaded with Eisenhower to actually initiate 
discussions of aid with the far too proud Nehru, for a, ‘“moment of history’ has 
arrived which if seized and exploited, can give US much firmer anti-Communist and 
anti-Red China counterpoise in India.”^^  By early 1957, India’s economic problems 
had ballooned. Rising defence and raw material costs, and food production shortfalls, 
left a huge foreign exchange gap. In January, India seemed perched on disaster. The 
prospect of another missionary narrative rupture in India’s economic failure gave 
policymakers acute anxiety, “A failure of the Plan which resulted in a severe cutback
Washington had a sound track record in aiding India, having given from 1952 to 1957, US$343m in 
economic loans and grants, US$57m in technical grants and US$550m of commodity loans.
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and a slowing down of the economy could have catastrophic results on the stability of 
democratic institutions in India.” ®^ America’s new policy to India in January 1957, 
NSC 5701, emphasised the,
“risks to US security from a weak and vulnerable India would be greater 
than the risks of a stable and influential India. A weak India might lead to 
the loss of South and Southeast Asia to Communism”.^ ^
India’s economic health came to embody America’s missionary identity’s future. 
Indeed, between May 1956 and October 1960, an impressive four National 
Intelligence Estimates were completed on India’s economy alone,
“A) Essentially, our objectives center about need for India to have stable, 
non-communist government, economically sound and favoring free world, 
which will give hope for building an Asian bulwark against challenges of 
international communism, especially Communist Chinese strength and 
ideology. B) Economic growth in India is essential to India’s future ability 
fill that role.”^^
By November 1957, the issue of aid to India had intensified from political background 
to centre stage.^^ The New Delhi embassy warned,
“If outside assistance is insufficient or too late and India fails substantially 
to continue its early progress and improve its people’s lot, not only will it 
suffer a severe, perhaps decisive, blow to its political and ideological
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foundations, but Red China and its totalitarian system will emerge with
added prestige and influence in Asian countries.” "^^
With India’s categorisation in the mission in ascendancy and the five-year plan near 
collapse, Washington tentatively planned engaging India by explicitly assessing how 
to aid it. That Washington broadly accepted that a neutral state of the Cold War 
should receive substantial aid marked a watershed in pohcy. In February 1957, 
Assistant Secretary of State for the NBA, William Rountree and Ambassador Bunker 
recommended giving India US$800m - US$lbn to fill the foreign exchange gap. The 
administration considered a variety of aid sources, including rolling the annual Export 
Credit Agency (‘ECA’) debt servicing of US$350m, seeking legislation to increase 
the DLF specifically for India, supplementing PL-480 agreements, increasing IBRD 
lending and securing German aid.^  ^Foggy Bottom officials and New Delhi staff 
lobbied Dulles to appeal to Congress. However, America was in a mild recession and 
the public wanted tax cuts so Congress reduced Eisenhower’s request for a 
Development Loan Fund (‘DLF’) of US$500m for 1958 and US$750m for 1959, to 
US$300m and US$625m respectively.^^ In any case, neither Dulles nor Congress 
could attach substantive meaning to India within America’s mission.
While America deliberated, India’s economy deteriorated further. The 1957 monsoon 
failed and reduced the rice crop, while the West’s mild recession reduced India’s 
export earnings. Bunker advised, “I have frankly never seen the 001 so deeply 
concerned and worried about anything since I have been here.”^^  India was 
sufficiently worried and relations with Eisenhower sufficiently improved that Nehru 
sent his cousin, Braj Kumar (‘B K’) Nehru, the Ministry of Finance’s senior civil
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servant on permanent assignment to Washington in June to expedite and increase 
aid.^  ^In May 1957, B K advised that India’s foreign exchange was US$3bn short.
Even after all aid included, it was still US$lbn short and, “by the end of September 
India would be face to face with disaster.”^^
Finally, in January 1958, Washington offered a US$225m loan, a US$150m Ex-hn 
loan, and a US$75m DLF grant. In August, Washington convinced the IBRD, UK, 
Germany, Canada and Japan to provide US$350m for India’s foreign exchange crisis. 
However, to salvage the ‘hard core’ of her development program, US$500m- 
US$800m was still needed from the US alone.^ ® Congressmen Keimedy and Sherman, 
strongly committed to understanding India within the missionary narrative, introduced 
a resolution calling for further aid to India,
“to join with other nations in providing support of the type, magnitude, 
and duration adequate to assist India to complete successfully its current 
program for economic development.”^^
By May 1959, America policy to India demonstrated a marked urgency to engaging 
and protecting the missionary narrative.^^ Washington even strongly considered 
India’s request to finance a variety of public sector projects and surprisingly even help 
build a 150MW atomic power plant.^^
Within engaging America’s missionary narrative through India, the surprise election 
of an Indian Communist Party-led coalition in Kerala in March 1957 caused particular 
irritation to Washington and remained a prominent background for policy to India.^ "^
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Washington treated Kerala as a communist satellite state, “Calls by US officials 
visiting or stationed in Kerala on the Chief Minister and other cabinet members 
should be kept to an absolute minimum.”^^  America was also concerned about 
communist activity in Bengal where Calcutta’s communists were prominent, by the 
recent weakening of the Congress Party and an increase in the Communist Party’s 
strength/^ Despite the Kerala government’s dismissal in July 1959, concerns persisted 
in response to communists securing gradually larger number of votes and voting 
percentages in the late 1950s7^
Meanwhile, India warmed to America. Nehru’s growing ease with Indian identity 
lessened his need for its pronunciation, “Nehru privately, if not publicly, appears to 
have become somewhat more sympathetic to the US on some issues.” *^ In any case, 
unlike Acheson, Henderson and Dulles, but similar to Bowles, Eisenhower, who was 
a popular personality in India since 1953, did not behave as Nehru’s superior.^^ New 
Delhi even opened its books to American inspectors on the sensitive issue of Indian 
defence spending, an unimaginable prospect only a few years back and unlike the 
second five-year plan, Nehru directly approached Washington for the third plan 
beginning in 1961.^ ® Nehru also began to view China hostilely, being especially upset 
by Chinese actions in Burma, Nepal and Tibet.*  ^Sino-Indian territorial boundary 
disputes dating firom 1947 became a serious issue in 1957-58, especially after the 
Dalai Lama’s arrival in India.^^
Contained by America and India’s respective cognitions and urgencies, the rapport 
that Eisenhower and Nehru had established in 1956, became especially strong from 
1957. Eisenhower wrote to Nehru,
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“I believe that because you are a world leader for peace in your individual 
capacity, as well as a representative of the largest of the neutral nations, 
your influence is particularly valuable in stemming the global drift toward 
cynicism, mutual suspicion, materialistic opportunism and, finally, 
disaster.”^^
Likewise, on hearing that Nehru may retire, America’s thirty-fourth president 
encouraged India’s first prime minister to continue to serve, “it would indeed be a 
misfortune perhaps for us all, if at what may prove to be a critical, formative period, 
your own influence were not actively present over any really protracted period.”*^  
Eisenhower’s discussions with Nehru, and unlike with Ayub, covered global issues. In 
December 1956, the pair discussed the Middle East, Hungary, German reunification, 
the Cold War and détente, and China.*  ^In September 1959, they discussed issues of 
European security, the UN, Africa and global disarmament.^^ In September 1960, 
their agenda consisted of the potential transfer of the UN to Berlin, Congo, 
disarmament, the structure of the office of the UN Secretary General, an African UN 
bloc, the OAS, the EC, Khrushchev’s attack on the UN and Sino-Soviet relations.^^ 
Only London and Bonn were privy to more intimate and far-reaching discussions with 
Eisenhower.
While the missionary narrative dominated America’s understanding of India, the 
application of anti-communist categorisation and discourse, albeit as an undercurrent, 
also intensified around India. Russia’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (‘ICBM’) in 
August 1957, which led to ‘gaps everywhere’, and Sputnik in October 1957, shook
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America and cast the impression that the Third World was vulnerable to Russian 
influence. Furthermore, from 1953 to 1958, Russia-India trade increased from 
US$1.6m to US$94.6m, while Russia gave to India almost US$400m of aid.^* In 
India’s third five-year plan’s planning stage, Russian aid forecasts to India ranged 
between US$650m and US$lbn.^^ That such economic aid cut across American 
theories of poverty-related communist growth seems not to have been questioned. A 
paper prepared by the embassy entitled, ‘The Soviet Economic Offensive In India’ in 
May 1959 noted,
“facts are available from several sources, which leave no doubt as to 
Soviet intentions in India, and reveal a Soviet economic warfare program 
of broad scope and considerable magnitude.. .They will give India 
‘anything it asks for’ for development under the third Five Year Plan.” °^
Those officials who understood India within the anti-communist narrative offered an 
inconsistent policy, reflecting the tension between cognising India within a bipolar 
against a more lithe structure. Thus on the one hand, India became a battleground in 
which the US massively increased its propaganda.^' Nixon and Dulles supported 
increasing aid to India,
“it is feared that if the second Five Year Plan fails they may extend their 
power to the more populous and strategically situated province of 
Bengal.. .the chances of chaos and a Communist advent to power in the 
sub-continent would be vastly increased.”^^
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Yet on the other hand, Dulles still had difficulties in locating India on America’s side 
in bipolar anti-communism and in sustaining space for neutralism, a cocktail which 
triggered a seemingly schizophrenic engagement of India,
“The impact on Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan will be great -  they will be 
deeply offended if we give major aid to India while they are so much in 
need, when they have been supporting us while India has been working 
against us.”^^
Indeed Dulles advised Ayub that, ‘The United States does not like to give aid to 
neutrals”.^  ^Throughout his term in office, Dulles remained highly uncomfortable, 
unlike Eisenhower, in sustaining a third position within the anti-communist narrative 
-  a finstration expressed for example in his bombastically accusing the Indian 
ambassador of using American aid to build military strength against Karachi.^^ Thus 
the Dulles -  Eisenhower split in pohcy to South Asia, which was discernible over 
Kashmir. Eisenhower sympathised with Nehru’s anxiety about Kashmir, “if they build 
the boundaries along religious lines, he is in a hole.” In contrast, Dulles sympathised 
with Pakistan’s concern about India trying to undo Pakistan, “The Sec agreed but the 
trouble is that the Pakis think that position strikes at the existence of Pakistan -  they 
are trying to undo Pakistan.”^^  Though this tension persisted until Dulles’s death, the 
Secretary, to his credit, nonetheless faithfully executed Eisenhower’s policy to India, 
by for instance facilitating Eisenhower’s invitation to Nehru.^^
Dulles’s difficulty in accepting a third way within anti-communism, which could 
expedite America’s understanding and engagement of India within the missionary
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narrative, was extensively shared in the legislative and executive. Congressman 
Malone insisted that Nehru was a communist, “who does not even know it.” *^ In 
1956, a clause to the mutual security bill ending all aid to India fell short by only three 
votes in the House.^^ Treasury Secretary Humphrey, who kept to a bipolar anti­
communist configuration, wanted to ignore India all together.Eisenhower objected 
to Humphrey’s concerns about aiding India, “it was fatuous to imagine that private 
enterprise alone could achieve India’s economic objectives”.R o b e r t  Anderson, the 
next Treasury Secretary pointed that,
“Aid to India will be a very hard proposition to sell, because their 
behaviour has beenwery offensive on the Communist issue, and because 
they have gone out of their way to insult us on many occasions.”*®^
Two years on, Eisenhower argued against Frederick Mueller, Commerce Secretary 
and Gordon Gray, NSA Adviser. Mueller expressed concern, “private industry in this 
country would not look with favor on financing the socialization of industry in these 
uncommitted nations, nor should we use taxpayers’ money for this purpose.” ®^^ He 
added that aid to India was exclusively for government projects, “which had the effect 
of putting the recipient government into business. This amounted to socialism.”  ^^  
Eisenhower again defended India, not only was there, “a certain amount of socialistic 
activity mixed into American free enterprise” but,
“experience with US private enterprise investing in underdeveloped 
countries had not been too happy.. .If the US stayed out of the public 
sector of the Indian economy, this sector would be left to the USSR”.^ °^
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Pakistan: Re-Cognition
While India was gradually given meaning to within America’s missionary narrative, 
Eisenhower’s ascendant framework also had implications for Pakistan. Having been 
unsuccessful in engaging Pakistan within the Middle East, America geographically re­
located Pakistan into South Asia with India. One nub of this relocation was not anti­
communism but America’s concerns about India’s economy. NSC 5701 noted the 
relationship between India’s economic difficulties and its military spending to meet 
America’s military aid to Pakistan,
“India’s foreign exchange problem is aggravated by imports of military 
equipment. Indian officials have indicated that about US$200 million in 
foreign exchange was spent for military purposes in FY 1957-1958 and 
that something under US$400m is projected for the last three years of the 
Plan period.. .the defense budget rose to US$640 million in FY 1958-59, 
i.e., about 35 percent of the ordinary budget.” °^^
B K similarly warned that India’s economic forecasts would only hold if, “the USG 
did not give additional arms to Pakistan.”^Therefore, to fulfil its missionary 
narrative, America categorised Pakistan, simultaneous to its continued categorisation 
within anti-communism, in the missionary narrative -  albeit as an Indian incidental 
and partial anomaly.
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Complementing this, Pakistan also catalysed its own geographic re-location into 
South Asia by more vocally expressing its political reality. Karachi’s involvement in 
the two Western security regimes was in intent not anti-communist, but firmly anti- 
Indian. Ayub won support for the MSA and the Baghdad Pact only by portraying 
them as anti-Indians treaties.^®  ^Mohammed Ali told Zhou En Lai at Bandung that 
Pakistan’s membership of SEATO was not directed at C hina.Pakistani officials 
told Moscow that American military aid was not for use, “against Soviets but because 
of their difficulties with India.”^^ ° Similarly, Pakistan raised Kashmir and 
Pushtunistan at the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi in March 1956, and received 
support by way of recognition of the Durand line and calls for an early Kashmir 
settlement through a plebiscite Likewise, at a Baghdad Pact meeting, Nuri, “turned 
to Kashmir issue and expressed his conviction that Kashmiris should be allowed 
determine their own destiny pursuant right of self- determination.”^
The Eisenhower administration first recorded Pakistan’s fixation with India in early 
1955 even if it was not deeply registered,
“Pakistan regards the Indian threat as much more serious to Pakistan than 
the Russian or Communist China threats. The Pakistan Army is now 
deployed along the Indian border and all tactical and strategic planning by 
the Pakistani centre on Indian problems as having first priority.”^
It was however in March, after having already engaged Pakistan to the tune of more 
than US$350m, that Dulles confessed he, “never appreciated before the full depth” of 
the Indo-Pakistan relationship.^Still, translating Pakistan’s re-location into South
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Asia was a fractured process. At one end, ambassador to Pakistan, James Langley 
noted, “the overall problem is not India, or Pakistan, but the sub-continent, and should 
be treated as such” and the State Department added, “every Pakistani increase in the 
military expenditure had been justified in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian 
military development”. O n  the other, Eisenhower proposed in December 1956 that 
the, “United States will deal with Pakistan quite separately from its policies towards 
India”.A dditionally , a progress report on NSC 5409 in January 1957 implicitly 
understated the intensity of the Indo-Pakistan connection, “Pakistan and Indian 
military forces improved in quality, and the defense of the Free World was 
strengthened thereby”. *
Eisenhower’s emergent direction of policy also instigated emphasis on Pakistan’s 
economy. The intelligence community and middle-ranking State officials had 
maintained a strong economic focus of Pakistan since 1953.^^* In October 1954, the 
Heinz mission’s extensive study of Pakistan’s economy led to an emergency 
US$105m foreign exchange package. In that same month, middle-ranking State 
Department officials stressed building Karachi’s economy so it could support its own 
military needs. By 1956, Eisenhower’s pro-active economic approach was 
permeating policy’s core. NSC Action 1550, in May 1956, directed that no 
commitments involving expenditures be undertaken without executive approval, that 
any such commitments accord with policy, that relevant fimds be clearly available, 
that the recipient use such fimds efficiently and that timetables be outlined.A gainst 
this background and Pakistan’s continuing economic deterioration, Washington’s 
focus on Karachi’s economy gradually intensified during the second Eisenhower 
term.*^ ^
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Tension
Throughout the Eisenhower years, the notion of credibility became an increasingly 
important constituent of America’s policy, especially because of the New Look upon 
which Western Europe rested its defence. Adenauer had only American credibility 
to ease his anxieties about whether Washington would use its nuclear arsenal to 
defend Europe. Europe demanded control of atomic weapons, by transferring them 
to NATO commanders and the use of tactical weapons granted to the corps level. The 
only way to persuade the Dutch defence minister, Cornelius Staf, or his German 
counterpart, Franz-Josef Strauss otherwise and of their security against Moscow was 
through American credibility.
That credibility became especially vulnerable in the Middle East. Suez squeezed 
America’s manoeuvrability by bonding Arab nationalism with Moscow. Russia, 
which had no relationships in the Middle East before 1939, sought joint regional 
responsibility with America after Suez.^^  ^Washington worried that, “Soviet prestige 
and influence in certain Near Eastern countries, particularly Syria and Egypt, has 
attained threatening proportions.”^^  ^Confironted with a vibrant communised Arab 
nationalism, but restrained in its options by its commitment to the Pact, Washington 
reconsidered strategy.Tensions were partly reconciled in December 1956 by the 
Middle East Resolution (the Eisenhower Doctrine), a flexible and broad-based 
resolution for the Middle East, to deter communist aggression in the area. To this, 
fi-om early 1956 to 1958, Eisenhower also encouraged Jeddah to rival Cairo and 
pushed Britain to settle the Buraimi dispute, and possibly circumvent Nasser.
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Nevertheless, these attempts to arrest the West’s decline failed/ In August 1957,
Syria signed an agreement with Russia, expelled three American diplomats and 
appointed a communist sympathiser as its army chief/^^ Washington mistakenly 
assumed Moscow was establishing a satellite, which, Henderson insisted, would lead 
to the loss of the Middle East.^^° In Febmary 1958, Syria and Egypt launched the 
United Arab Republic, which Dulles at first categorised as a communist adventure/ 
Finally, Faisal replaced the American sympathetic Saud. Washington, uncertain about 
Nasser’s relationship with Moscow, was on the defensive, “the UAR, with Soviet 
support, has seized the initiative in the Arab unity movement, which is the most 
dynamic political force in the area”/^^ Difficulties were compounded by the continual 
regional fluctuation, which America was unable to grasp,
“the President had recently stated that this review should not be completed 
until he determines that evolving conditions in that area make feasible the 
adoption of a new long-term policy toward the Near East.”^^ ^
At the end of 1957, America’s strategy for the Middle East was, as it had been after 
the Baghdad Pact’s signing, a wreck. The Middle East policy statement, NSC 5428, 
had in September 1957, “hardly a paragraph in the entire document, which fulfils the 
criteria of acceptability and accurate reflection of the current situation.”^
Without alternative strategy and given America’s tenuous position, Washington 
feared it might be left in the Middle East with the, “choice of either using force to
Britain’s retraction spread beyond the Middle East. In June 1957, Ceylon forced Britain to leave its 
base in Trincomalee.
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maintain our position in the area or seeing it disappear entirely.”*^  ^Though the US 
still refrained from joining the Pact for fear of antagonising Saudi, Israel, and Nasser, 
it prioritised satisfying Pact members, the only stable pro-American group in the 
re g io n .A s  a result in March 1957, Washington joined the Pact’s military 
committee, and was represented by the prominent General Nathan Twining, who in 
August became the JCS chairman, and in January 1958, Dulles himself attended the 
Pact’s Ministerial Meeting which was fortunate since, at this meeting, if, “the United 
States had not undertaken a very active part in the proceedings and accepted a very 
positive role, the whole thing would have fallen apart,”^^ ^
Therefore, and given the vulnerability of American credibility in the Middle East, in 
answer to why America could, “not take a complete new look at our military 
assistance program for Pakistan”, one official rightly emphasised American 
credibility, “we had made a commitment to Pakistan with respect to this program, and 
that from a political point of view we were obliged to live up to the commitment.”  ^
The preservation of credibility, represented in America’s outmoded military 
engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, underlay three tensions in American 
policy to Pakistan. The first was America’s focus on economic development, inspired 
by Eisenhower, which contrasted with Pakistan’s economic weakness and military 
obesity.^' The ICA reported in February 1957, “The armed forces presently consume 
nearly 70 percent of current central government revenues... threatens the 
development of the longer-range political, economic and even military strength of the 
country”. Langley continued this stream.
 ^E Benoit’s analysis in 1973 of the positive correlation between defence spending and economic 
growth in South Asia is noteworthy. The argument made in, “Defense and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries” was that the armed forces used under-utilised or unutilised economic resources.
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“Military strength, without a sound economic and political base, does not 
constitute real strength in South Asia or elsewhere. It is time to rethink our 
approach to the Pakistan problem.... A more comprehensive review, 
however, is called for, which gives greater weight to developing Pakistan 
as a strong viable ally of the US rather than concentrating on building of a 
military force which may not have vis-à-vis Communist bloc a value in 
proportion with its cost both to Pakistan and the
Langley, at the forefront of the exploration of this tension, jfrequently cited and related 
Pakistan’s economic crisis and fat m ilita ry .H e  added that,
“the only reason why Pakistan able to keep going is US aid.. .Military 
strength, without a sound economic and political base does not constitute 
real strength.... It is time to rethink our approach to the Pakistan 
problem”.
Nor did Washington hold out much room for Pakistan’s economic improvement. The 
embassy reported that Pakistan was barely keeping afloat due to its heavy military 
burden and that, “Pakistan offers little or no help for viability in the foreseeable 
future”.P a k is ta n i officials hardly offered comforting news when for instance in 
July 1957, Suhrawardy presented to Eisenhower a long list of aid needs to, “avoid 
starvation, revolution, inflation and chaos”. I n  any case, according to Pakistani 
foreign minister, Zafrullah Khan, “it was Pakistan’s belief that the ‘beggar’s bowl’ 
should never be concealed.”'E isenhow er thus concluded that the military
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commitment to Pakistan was, “perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could 
have made... It was a terrible error but we now seem hopelessly involved in it.” "^^^
The second tension that American credibility underlay was Washington’s re-location 
of Pakistan out of the Middle East, against Washington’s increasingly costly 
engagement of Pakistan as a Middle East state. Throughout Eisenhower’s second 
term, US policymakers excluded Pakistan from the Middle East. Hoover’s detailed 
plan on the Middle East, presented to Eisenhower in November 1956, hardly 
mentioned P ak istan .T he  State Department’s report in December 1956 and another 
one ten months later on American progress in the region made no mention of 
Pak istan .N S C  5801 in January 1958, America’s first policy definition in the 
Middle East in Eisenhower’s second term, was dominated by Russia, Arab 
nationalism and Israel, without mention of Pakistan. Neither of NSC 5801’s 
replacements in NSC 5820 in October 1958 and NSC 6011 in July 1960, made 
reference to Pakistan.Bespoke foci and studies on Pakistan similarly ignored the 
Middle East. NSC 5909’s goals for Pakistan and the May 1959 National Intelligence 
Estimate assessment of Pakistan did not mention the Middle East, and nor did 
Ambassador Rountree’s brief for Pakistan.
Only the Pentagon, incensed by the New Look’s budget reductions and cemented into 
an anti-communist framework, emphasised Pakistan’s cognition and engagement in 
the Middle East, without ever precisely outlining Karachi’s role.’^^  General Lemnitzer 
felt.
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“the State Department approach does not afford adequate consideration of 
the Soviet military threat.. .in the light of the current threat against the 
Baghdad Pact nations he considered the present level of Pakistan forces 
essential.”^
The Pentagon, which saw the South Asian arms race as a symptom, not a source of 
tension, concluded, “Pakistani military forces and programmed aid are essential to 
maintain what is considered minimum US defense objectives in this area.”^^  ^Defence 
analysts complained that reducing Pakistan’s military would reduce South Asia’s 
defences.However, the military supported Pakistan’s role in the region almost 
exclusively on a non-mihtary basis by insisting in NSC 5701 and NSC 5909 that, 
“Pakistan, as a major Muslim power, can exert a moderating influence on the extreme 
nationalism and anti-Western attitudes of the Arab states.”^^  ^The Pentagon’s strategic 
case was thus paradoxically exclusively a political one.
Despite America’s exclusion (notwithstanding the Pentagon) of Pakistan from the 
Middle East, America’s cost of engaging Pakistan in the Middle East was sizable and 
painfully growing. In June 1956, the Prochnow Committee reported that Pakistan’s 
five and a half divisions would cost America US$505m to build, and a further 
US$765m-US$l.lbn to maintain during 1958-1960. Washington had to meet these 
costs, since Pakistan, “would be unable to maintain the military establishment or to 
develop its own economy.”^ M o re  concerning was that Pakistan’s demands grew in 
higher specifications B-66 bombers, military infrastructure, territorial guarantees and 
in August 1957, much to Washington’s ache, ‘phase two’ of its military aid, for
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matters, “separate and distinct from their requirements deriving from their 
responsibility under the Baghdad Pact”.^ ^^
Langley, referring to the Middle East, was understandably fed up by the conflict 
between the, “strategic role Pakistan forces vis-à-vis Soviet threat on which we have 
been seeking clarification several occasions, so far unsuccessfully,”, meaning its 
redundancy in the Middle East, and the huge cost of engaging Pakistan in that 
reg ion /H aving  read General Truman’s report in 1957 forecasting that Pakistan 
could hold out from an India, let alone Russia, attack for only a month, Langley 
acutely doubted the Pentagon’s assessment of Pakistan’s contribution,
“I wonder if we have not collectively developed certain generalizations 
about Pakistan and then proceeded to accept them as gospel truth without 
sufficient periodic scrutiny. For example, I was told that Pakistan 
constitutes a cornerstone of US foreign policy in this part of the world, 
that Pakistan is the anchor of the Baghdad Pact and of SEATO, that the 
Paks are strong, direct, friendly and virile, and that Pakistan constitutes a 
bulwark of strength in the area, etc. What concerns me is that all this is in 
real danger of being wiped out if something is not done to arrest the 
deterioration in many aspects of Pakistani life”.^ ^^
The third and final tension in American policy was Pakistan’s use of precisely this 
very reluctantly given American military aid against India -  hence jeopardising 
America’s missionary narrative enactment. The difficulty lay not merely in America’s 
recognition of Pakistan’s political reality, though somewhat that too, but specifically
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and primarily its extension, being Pakistan’s actual harnessing of American aid 
against the missionary narrative. Although India reconciled to the completion of the 
military aid program to Pakistan, it still let it be known that the program wedged 
Indian-American re la tions.Ind ia’s fears were exasperated by not knowing the 
program’s magnitude, which was kept unusually veiled, and which led it to suspect at 
one stage that Washington might even build atomic bases in Pakistan.
Throughout 1956, Pakistan blatantly advertised its military focus on India. After 
India acquired seventy Canberra bombers firom Britain, Pakistan demanded urgent 
supply of bombers promised in October 1954 to miUtarily balance South Asia.^^  ^
Similarly, American aid to India in 1958 left Pakistan, as Ayub explained, with a 
“serious security position” that then demanded further military aid, “more related to 
the threat fi'om India than threats firom other sources.”’^  Though occasionally Karachi 
argued its case more sophisticatedly, such as in August 1957, when it sought more aid 
without which it would be unable to, “contribute to area’s defense against Communist 
aggression unless it was also able to defend itself against India,” Washington felt a 
pinch fi'om Karachi’s primary m otive.Langley cynically wrote to Washington,
“I can only assume that this Pakistani fixation on India rather than on 
USSR was thoroughly taken into account when present policy of military 
aid to Pakistan was instituted in 1954.”^^ ^
America’s fears about de-railing India firom within the missionary narrative were 
compounded by budgetary constraints, as expressed by Percival Brundage, Director of
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the Bureau of the Budget, “the more military assistance we give to Pakistan, the more 
assistance India in turn will expect from us.”^^ ^
Conflict Resolution
The sharp point to these three tensions struck when Pakistan dragged America to 
support its position in Kashmir in the UN against New Delhi in early 1957. 
Throughout 1956, Karachi became immensely antagonised by events leading to the 
Kashmir Constituent Assembly’s eventual ratification in November of the Kashmiri 
Maharajah’s instrument of accession of 1947, which thus made Kashmir an integral 
part of India. As a consequence, from early 1956, Pakistan vigorously pursued the 
reaffirmation of previous UN declarations, especially those stressing Kashmir’s 
undecided status and promoting its urgent resolution through a plebiscite. Right 
through 1956, Ayub, believing that the Hindus were, as were the Afghanis and in fact 
all those who opposed him, fickle and susceptible to pressure, demanded that 
Washington, its ally of two alliances, pressure India on Kashmir.
In contrast, Washington had avoided Kashmir throughout Eisenhower’s first term 
reflecting its detachment of Pakistan from South Asia, and was reluctant to change 
for, “our interest avoid insofar as possible playing leading role which would incur 
wrath both sides”. While NSC 5701 noted that, “A mutually acceptable resolution 
of the Kashmir issue and the early resolution of other differences must be an 
important aim of US policy”, it neither emphasised that America assist the conflict’s 
resolution nor offered considered thought to its resolution.Even when Pakistan 
brought Kashmir to the UN, Washington remained only reactive, hoping the problem
337
would dissipate. By late 1956, America however found itself trapped by Pakistan’s 
insistence on taking Kashmir through the Security Council, which hit improving 
relations with India. On 24^  ^January 1957, despite repeated private American pleas, 
Pakistan forced Washington to support two successful Security Council resolutions 
that affirmed previous Kashmir resolutions and the plebiscite solution. A third 
resolution on 28^  ^February, which Pakistan introduced, and called for the sending of a 
UN force and the Council’s President to Kashmir, was blocked by Moscow on India’s 
request. This was followed by a fourth and successful resolution that called only for 
the Council’s president to visit Kashmir.
With Graham running out of ideas and in an effort to resolve the three tensions, now 
sternly felt, Washington sought to reconcile Pakistan’s disputes with India - hoping 
that by doing so, Pakistan’s military demands from America’s engagement of 
Pakistan in the Middle East would reduce, its militarisation would ease and help 
improve its economy, and Pakistan would have less incentive to use Northern Tier 
armaments against India, thus shielding India’s place in the missionary narrative.
As a first and instinctive step, in January 1957, Washington decided not to further 
military aid to Pakistan beyond the committed program, described as the “mutual 
suicide pact”, and instead encourage Pakistan to develop its economy.
However, given that nearly all middle-ranking State Department officials and 
intelligence analysts concerned with South Asia shared Langley’s assessment that the 
sub-continent had interlocking problems and that a military cap itself was inadequate 
to address America’s three woven tensions, in the late summer of 1957, Washington 
explored a fuller resolution. Thus the next consensus was for an immediate Indo-
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Pakistan arms race halt followed by resolution of Kashmir and also the second major 
Indo-Pakistan dispute, being the Indus water dispute, which had hitherto been under 
exclusive IBRD auspices since 1954.^ "^^  This latter dispute focused on the six Indus 
rivers, which constituted sixty percent of Pakistan’s total agriculture water usage, but 
were given to India at partition/" Pakistan was highly concerned by India’s threat to 
divert the waters if an agreement was not reached on the river flows, a threat 
reinforced by India building the Rajasthan canal, which could strangle Pakistan/
By the autumn of 1957, America’s proposal settled on its third and final evolution. In 
October, the NEA’s South Asia experts developed an integrated plan for the region. 
They proposed that Washington defuse Indo-Pakistan tensions by simultaneously 
addressing Kashmir, the arms race and the Indus water dispute in what came to be 
known as the ‘single package’ so lu tio n .I t was the Eisenhower administration’s first 
serious attempt at resolving the Indo-Pakistan tension, for which Eisenhower was 
especially keen on, “there is no inconvenience at which I would balk”.^ ®^ Meanwhile, 
Dulles, increasingly playing the role of the president’s faithful policy executor and 
less the role of policy creator, especially after his role in the Suez debacle, instructed 
Langley to dissuade Karachi from re-approaching the Security Council because of the, 
“basic contradiction between proceeding with US package proposal and SC 
consideration”, the latter which would again annoy Nehru. Both American 
ambassadors approved this secret attempt to seek settlement of the major issues.^ *® 
Interestingly, the State Department’s conflict resolution drive necessitated reassurance 
for the Pentagon who still viewed Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative.
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“We are convinced that the development of the economic strength of both 
countries is an essential part of the defense of the subcontinent as well as 
the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO areas.”^^*
America, comfortable with its cognition of India and Pakistan, excluded London from 
the single package process. In part this reflected London’s reluctance to engage the 
Third World immediately in the aftermath of Suez. Yet America presented the 
package deal to London six months after its conceptualisation and after the details 
were finalised. And when it did so, Washington invited London not for its expert 
assessment or to facilitate matters, but to help pay for the river agreement’s 
implementation.'^^ In turn, London, insulted by its exclusion and determined to 
maintain vestiges of its imperial-era prestige, flouted Washington’s attempts to 
restrict arms to the region, on the basis that it could not deny supplying arms for cash 
payment from a Commonwealth state.W ashington was expectedly incensed, “UK 
attitude to supply arms and equipment to India or Pakistan (except submarine for cash 
on barrelhead) seems to us to ignore political facts of life in subcontinent.”'^ ^
The single package solution was presented in May 1958 in Eisenhower’s offer to 
Ayub and Nehru to assist conflict resolution.Specifically, Ike offered to send a 
special ambassador to facilitate a package solution.Pakistan responded positively 
within minutes. Noon’s only caveat being that the representative be neither a Jew nor 
a C a th o lic .In  contrast, two weeks on, the Brahmin, “had not yet thought the 
problem through”.T h r e e  weeks further still, Nehru rejected the offer, “We have 
always been of the view that a settlement of our various issues with Pakistan can only 
be arrived at satisfactorily by direct contacts between the two countries.”'^"
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Washington was angry at this response, which crippled Eisenhower’s hopes for 
reconciling the three policy tensions with Pakistan, and placing policy to it on a sound 
footing. That Nehru should have responded as so was not surprising. A month into his 
ambassadorial post in New Delhi, Bunker had advised that Nehru had no interest in 
holding a Kashmir plebiscite.Similarly, only weeks before Eisenhower’s offer, 
Graham described India’s attitude as, “We stand behind our engagements but Kashmir 
is already part of India, in our constitution, and issue is settled.”^
Diminishing Cognition
Having removed Pakistan from the Middle East in 1955  ^America’s understanding of 
Pakistan underwent a further two-stage destabilisation, a process that diminished 
America’s categorising of and attaching meaning to Pakistan. Any engagement of 
Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative necessitated a geographic arena to 
translate engagement into policy specifics. During the second Truman and first 
Eisenhower administrations, the threat of communism in the Middle East coincided 
with Pakistan’s categorisation and meaning within anti-communism, thereby inducing 
America’s anti-communist engagement of Pakistan within the Middle East. However, 
after 1955, America retracted this geographic location of Pakistan, though not 
Pakistan’s categorisation within anti-communism, and instead bound Karachi to South 
Asia, albeit as an irritant obstacle to India’s role within the missionary narrative, 
which in turn had been reinforced by Pakistan’s increasingly noted anti-Indian 
expression.
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After Nehru blocked America’s attempt to resolve the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the 
rapid improvement in American-Indian relations, crystallised in Eisenhower’s visit to 
India in 1959, a “brilliant success”, eclipsed Pakistan’s impediment to India’s role in 
America’s missionary narrative. During the final two years of the Eisenhower 
presidency, the thorn of Karachi became increasingly immaterial, even as an anomaly, 
to America’s enactment of missionary narrative through India. Thus began an 
extended American cognitive destabilisation with respect to Pakistan, being another 
geographic re-Iocation of Pakistan, this time from South Asia and into a geographic 
suspension.
The centrepiece of this was America’s understanding and engaging of India. 
Throughout Eisenhower’s final two years, America moved beyond merely 
categorising and attaching meaning to India within the missionary narrative, to 
aggressively engaging it. This in turn reflected the deteriorating Sino-American 
relations,
“Asia is given new prominence by the rapid growth in Chinese 
Communist power. The likelihood that this growth will intensify the threat 
posed to Free World interests in Asia over the next decade underlines the 
desirability of developing in India a successful alternative to Communism 
in an Asiatic context.”^
NSC 5909, only weeks later, emphasised the growing impact of the challenge, “Asia 
and Afiica will be watching and comparing what the Indian and the Chinese 
Communist regimes are achieving for their peoples.”*Likewise, the first item of
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discussion in the first NSC discussion paper for two years on South Asia in May 1959 
was ‘India’s Role in Asia’/^^ While the CIA even used Indian soil for covert 
operations against China, Christian Herter’s discussions with Nehru, in October 1960, 
orbited around China/
Washington was determined to enact its missionary narrative, the story of its progress 
of mankind through India by monopolising its development. When India bought 
twelve MI-4 helicopters from Russia in 1960, Washington flurried to stop the 
transaction by selling hugely subsidised American helicopters.'^^ In reference to the 
Pakistani acquisition of Sidewinder missiles, an item denied to even some of 
America’s allies, und ten F-104s, Eisenhower saw, “no reason why we should not sell 
similar equipment to the Indians, and in fact thought we should do so.”'^ * Washington 
signed a US$239m PL-480 agreement with India in November 1959, another 
US$1.28bn PL-480 and a C-119 aircraft contract in May 1960 and included US$350m 
for India in the USSlbn DLF request for 1960.'^^ Bunker supported a flood of Indian 
requests including, “every possible effort be made to assist India in atomic power 
plants and also seek steadily to expand close US-Indian cooperation in all atomic 
matters”, while Herter strongly supported the Atomic Energy Commission’s mission 
to India in February 1960 to evaluate supporting its atomic ambitions.^ ®®
The continued improved relations also resonated from coincidental Indian concerns. 
Aside from the ongoing economic unease, China still worried Nehru.^®' Sino-Indian 
relations deteriorated after China’s suppression of a Tibetan revolt in March 1959, 
and the Indian decision to grant asylum to Tibetans. In 1959, India felt that China was 
building a road in Indian territory, leading to armed patrols clashed along the border.
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During talks in 1960, China demonstrated little appetite for compromise leaving 
Nehru to recognise the collapse of his China policy. Beijing’s demand for an 
additional ten thousand square miles of Indian territory profoundly disturbed Nehru 
especially since China needed space, had a strong military capability and a political 
appetite for war.^°^
“Nehru said he was not afraid of the USSR... However the ChiComs were 
a different matter. He was not sure what ChiComs might do given the fact 
that it has always been a national trait of China to be expansive whenever 
the Chinese were confident as they seemed to be now.” °^^
While Nehru, in fear of China, delighted Eisenhower by insisting that aid to Pakistan 
was, “a matter of the past”, Pakistan’s re-location from South Asia into a geographic 
suspension accompanied the second and critical American cognitive destabilisation of 
Pakistan.^'" Karachi’s exit from the anti-communist narrative disabled Washington 
from categorising and attaching meaning to Karachi, which meant Washington failed 
to understand and resultantly engage Pakistan.^ ®^  Subscription of the anti-communist 
identity had already weakened in America, which was reflected in Eisenhower’s 
successful push for détente from the summer of 1958 and especially after September 
1959 when Khmshchev visited America. The superpowers moved towards arms 
control agreements, agreed cultural agreements and in 1958 exchanged national 
exhibitions that led to Nixon opening Gorki Park in Moscow.^®  ^The continued easing 
of anti-communist identity, and specifically the need to enact and protect its narrative, 
may however not have mattered significantly since America was already committed
This was assisted by the military aid programme to Pakistan coming to a conclusion in July 1959
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to a variety of anti-communist structures, institutional and cultural, had it not been for 
the effect of Pakistan’s own effective exit from the anti-communist narrative.
Unlike the ambassadors to Pakistan of the first administration, James Langley’s 
appointment in 1957 brought an official who gave especially detailed attention to 
Karachi’s dominant reality -  one that did not involve anti-communism.^®^ Hence, the 
second administration was even more aware than the first of a Pakistan beyond the 
anti-communist narrative, and one that continued to stress an anti-India focus, “Qadir 
frankly stated India and not Soviet Union is the enemy in eyes of average 
Pakistani.” ®^^ In the same way, NIE 52-59 in May 1959 noted, “Both Pakistan’s 
leaders and the mass of its people have tended to assess practically every development 
in foreign policy in terms of their own ‘cold war’ with India.” ®^^ At the CENTO 
meeting in October 1959, Eisenhower’s discussions with Pakistani Foreign Minister 
Manzur Qadir focused exclusively on fridia.^ ®® Other than the conceptually listless 
Pentagon, only Ambassador Rountree, who replaced Langley in 1959, and following 
in Bowles’s footsteps in India, naïvely assumed that, “sometimes it appears that 
Pakistan’s concern over India exceeds her concern over defense vis-à-vis international 
communism.”^^®
In Eisenhower’s final two years however, not only did America develop greater 
awareness of Pakistan’s anti-Indian reality, but Pakistan itself walked out of the anti­
communist narrative by assuming an increasing anti-American posture.'* Pakistan had 
many minor grievances against Washington. Ayub was annoyed by America’s 
emphasis on economic development, which detracted from the general’s plans to
“ Senator Fulbright had advertised in Congress since early 1954, the persistent anti-American theme in 
Pakistan society, though without much success.
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dominate Pakistan politics, and was imaginatively reinterpreted as interference in 
Pakistan’s internal affairs. There was also a growing body in Pakistan that used 
Washington as a scapegoat for Pakistan’s economic weakness. The opposition 
especially used the American alliance to beat the Karachi government.^* ^  At a more 
populist level, Pakistan’s public strongly supported Nasser for his standing to the 
West and rejected Israel -  hence making America the people’s enemy. Further, 
Washington’s refusal to engage Pakistan within the Northem Tier, or any other 
security structure, denied Pakistan the security against India it had sought from a pro- 
Western policy. Even the military aid programme, clumsily managed especially in the 
attempt to reduce the 1954 agreement, proved counterproductive. Finally, there was 
the growing influence of the anti-American Ghulam Farooq, chairman of the 
influential PIDC industrial complex.
Karachi’s primary complaint however originated in Washington’s cognition and 
engagement of India within the American mission. Pakistani leaders incessantly 
complained about the substantial and growing American commitment to neutralist 
India that contrasted to the reluctant and detracting engagement with pro-Westem 
Pakistan.^*  ^Pakistan was extremely distressed that while it stood with the ‘free 
world’, non-committed India got a ‘free-ride’.^ *^  Pakistan leaders strongly criticised 
Washington for impairing its security and Qadir noted, “there were so many 
advantages in a neutralist posture.” *^"* Pakistan claimed, “American aid to India saved 
India’s foreign exchange which in turn was used to buy arms from the UK or 
USSR”.^ *^  Alarmingly for Pakistan, the US worked towards reducing only Pakistan’s, 
and not India’s, since despite most of India’s troops nestled on the Pakistan border.
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America hoped that India was, “maintaining its present forces as a deterrent to Red 
China rather than only as a counter to the alleged military threat from Pakistan.”^^ ^
These frustrations fuelled Pakistan’s leaders to shed their anti-communist guise, a 
chameleon act which had not delivered the results that Karachi had expected,
“Pakistan officials and public opinion earnestly believe the best way to get most from 
US is to emulate example of Afghanistan, India and Egypt and try to play both 
sides.”^^  ^As early as 1957, Pakistan leaders threatened their departure from the anti­
communist narrative by pursuing a neutralist policy if America did not support its 
Kashmir resolutions in the U N / I n  this vein, a March 1957 State Department memo 
noted, “Many Pakistanis during the last year and a half have become increasingly 
disillusioned with their country's Western ties and increasingly vocal in their 
advocacy of a more independent foreign policy”/ I n  June 1958, the US embassy 
reported, “pressures were already growing in the country to turn to the Communist 
bloc”/^° One especially upsetting aspect of this was Pakistan’s relationship with the 
Chinese nemesis. Hildreth expressed concern at the favourable impression made by 
Chou en Lai on Pakistani officials and noted that the Pakistani prime minister even 
had an autographed picture of Chou prominently displayed on his desk.^^^
The fine line between a policy within anti-communism but bordering neutralism and a 
vocally anti-American policy was often breached, and noted in America. Prime 
Minister Noon’s harsh speech in March 1958 against the US, threatening to “embrace 
communism” unless America gave more assistance, was badly received in 
Washington. The following month, Langley reported the, “severe beating the United 
States has been taking here”.^ ^^  By June 1960, anti-Americanism feeling was so
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strong that Rountree recommended that US air force personnel dependents leave 
Peshawar immediately?^^ By then, the very few Pakistani newspaper editorials 
favourable to Washington were nearly all written by CIA plants?^"  ^American 
tolerance for this type of Pakistani hostility was severely stretched as Ali Khan 
Qizilbash, Pakistan’s delegate to SEATO, humiliatingly learned. Qizilbash criticised 
the supposedly inadequate American aid to Pakistan, only to be confronted by a 
furious American official who,
“asked Qizilbash to state exactly how much assistance Pakistan is actually 
receiving from the United States. He was somewhat embarrassed to admit 
that he had no idea of the extent of US aid and was quite impressed when 
I informed him that in Mr Noon’s own words, the United States is 
supplying almost 40% of the Pakistan Government’s total annual 
expenditure.”^^ ^
Those Americans who remained fiercely committed to the anti-communist narrative, 
such as Nixon, persisted in accordingly understanding Pakistan, which was, “the one 
sold pro-US country in the area. It would be unwise to consider reducing assistance to 
Pakistan without remembering what the Soviets are doing.”^^  ^However, Karachi’s 
double coup in October 1958 reinforced Washington’s diminished meaning of 
Pakistan within the anti-communist framework. Mirza proclaimed martial law with 
Ayub as Chief Martial Law Administrator, who then retired Mirza three weeks later to 
assume the presidency himself. With this, Pakistan’s teetering claim to Western 
narratives was dealt a blow, a “semblance of democracy was replaced by a semblance 
of dictatorship”.^ ^^  Ayub’s military dictatorship stood in stark contrast to Nehru’s
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democracy. By 1960, Washington had not only dislocated Pakistan from India, but no 
longer categorised or attached meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist 
narrative.
Diminishing Engagement
America’s lack of cognition of Pakistan after its departure from the anti-communist 
narrative, instigated a diminishing of engagement. Notwithstanding the attempts of 
Pakistani politicians to drag America into its politics, such as when Suhrawardy asked 
Langley to indicate that he, Suhrawardy, would support Mirza’s presidential bid, 
Washington distanced itself from Pakistan in much the same way that Dulles had 
from India in 1953.^ ^* Pakistan’s double coup generated only mild interest in 
Washington, “foreign policy issues are not directly involved in the present crisis”.^ ^^
In March 1958, the DLF had only two projects, amounting to US$10m, near approval 
for Pakistan.^^° When Ayub, Qadir and Minister for Finance Mohammed Shoaib 
visited Washington in January 1959, only secondary tier officials in Deputy Under 
Secretary of State Henderson, Assistance Secretary of Defense Irwin, General 
Lemnitzer and Langley, met them.^^  ^Though Ambassador Rountree and the Pentagon 
emphasised Pakistan’s value, Ayub correctly noted the predominance of the critical 
stand against Pakistan in America.^^  ^American second thoughts about Pakistan thus 
began not under Kennedy, as Shahi suggests, but in Eisenhower’s second term.^^^
One expression of this diminishing engagement with Pakistan was in the growing 
demands to reduce military aid to Pakistan. Even accepting Congress’s desire to 
rectify its balance of payments deficit partly by reducing aid through Mutual Security
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programmes from US$2bn to US$1.4bn, “Congressional criticism of military aid to 
underdeveloped countries tended to center around Pakistan”.^ "^^  From late 1958, with 
Pakistan increasingly difficult to place within anti-communism, Congress became 
averse to engaging Pakistan.^^  ^The pretext often used to effect this disengagement, 
meaning predominantly reducing military aid, was the vogue economic development. 
For example, in April 1959, Senator Fulbright noted, “I hope the Administration will 
shift the emphasis from military aid to economic aid in places like Pakistan.”^^  ^The 
following year, a State Department official noted, “we have become keenly aware of 
the fact that unless Pakistan is to remain forever a pensioner of the US it must achieve 
at least a substantial measure of economic efficiency.”^^  ^However, despite this and 
though NIE 52-59 on Pakistan and NSC 5909, both in May 1959, focused on 
Pakistan’s economy, Washington had no plans to aid Pakistan’s economy.^^*
Karachi’s second five-year plan (1955-1960) of US$4bn, prioritised in 1958 and 
requiring US$1.6bn from foreign donors, was largely ignored in America.^^^
With America’s geographic suspension of Pakistan, as well as its inability to 
categorise and attach meaning to Karachi within America’s identity narratives, 
especially anti-communism which America had historically and exclusively used for 
Pakistan, Washington again sidelined the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Initially, America 
did keep the package solution alive, portraying Nehru’s rejection as a technical delay 
and advising Karachi, “We are now engaged in talking with Nehru as to methods of 
procedure... What is now going on is precisely how we had envisaged conversations 
might go.” "^^° However, Nehru’s assisting Pakistan’s detachment from South Asia and 
Pakistan’s persistent setting outside of the anti-communist narrative eroded 
Washington’s drive towards resolving the conflicts. In 1959 and 1960, Eisenhower
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maintained only unspecific and vague pressure upon Pakistan and India to 
reconcile?"^  ^A November 1960 PPS paper on Kashmir concluded that, “the United 
States should continue to refrain from taking an initiative with the two parties.” "^^  ^
Washington also reduced its focus on the Indus river, though this was already 
effectively concluded by the IBRD in March 1959, with final details settled in 
September 1960.^ '^  ^Given the World Bank’s lead in the Indus solution, there was thus 
little American focus on conflict resolution in 1959-1960 except Eisenhower’s 
commitment of US$516m over ten years to fund the cost of the US$1.03bn river 
agreement.^ '^ '^  *
Ironically, though perhaps because of America’s lack of involvement, Indo-Pakistan 
relations improved from mid-1959. Pakistan no longer felt so secure having learned of 
America’s increasingly limited enthusiasm to engage it while the, “Sino-Indian 
dispute, improved stability of GOP and increasing stature of Ayub have caused 
Indians to rethink some of their prejudices and to become more rational about 
Pakistan.”^^  ^In December, Ayub and Nehm met to discuss border incidents while 
Ambassador Chagla speaking on Indo-Pakistan relations commented, “he had never 
known a time when these relations had been better.” "^^^
Though anti-communism had lost much of its intensity during the second Eisenhower 
term, it still remained a prominent identity of real America. Consequently, 
Afghanistan’s reluctant but very pronounced drift to communism in 1959 drew 
American attention, which in tum re-focused American attention on Pakistan’s 
conflict with Afghanistan. From late 1956, Washington had remained removed from
* The eventual agreement, as expected, gave to Pakistan the three western rivers o f Indus, Jhelum and 
Chenab and to India, the three Eastern rivers of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej,
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both Afghanistan and Afghan-Pakistan relations. However, that changed in late 1959. 
Shortfalls in Afghani crops in late 1958 invited considerable Russian aid.^ "^  ^Russia’s 
penetration into Afghanistan ignited Washington’s application of anti-communist 
narrative categorisation and discourse on Kabul, and was reflected in a lengthy State 
Department study in September 1959 that classified Afghanistan as “emergency 
action area”, requiring Washington to, “bear all our economic and diplomatic 
resources to thwart Soviet ambitions.” "^^  ^In that same month, an interdepartmental 
‘Afghanistan Action Group’ (‘AAG’) was created, as was a National Intelligence 
Report completed, entitled, ‘Outlook for Afghanistan’, which predicted that, “The 
USSR will almost certainly attempt gradually to tighten its grip on Afghanistan”/^^
Afghanistan’s growing immersion into anti-communist narrative activated anti­
communist engagement through two policies. First and in fact the dominant 
discussion was increased economic aid to Afghanistan. The AAG focused on 
economic matters and not conflict resolution while Ambassador Byroade similarly 
prioritised the insufficient Western aid and Russia’s proximity to Afghanistan above 
the impact of Afghanistan -  Pakistan tensions on communism’s attraction in Kabul.^^  ^
Russia had given US$300m of aid to Afghanistan since 1954, in contrast to American 
aid since 1952 of only US$150m, of which none was sent after 1956 and much of 
which had in any case been mismanaged.^^’ There was little appetite in Washington to 
seriously change this aspect of policy even if much was discussed about the type of 
aid that might be considered. Consequently, Byroade noted, “Since we unwilling 
make economic political and military commitments necessary to win kind of 
competition Soviets have initiated, US objectives are and must be cast in minimal 
terms.”^^ ^
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The second policy was the resolution of Pushtunistan and therefore did involve 
Pakistan?^^ America’s growing concern about Afghanistan’s communisation occurred 
simultaneous to Ayub’s arresting several politicians including Pushtun nationalists 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdul Samad Khan and Ayub’s reaffirmation of the ‘one- 
unit’ West Pakistan, thereby solidifying Pakistani control over Pushtun tribes, which 
infuriated Kabul. Though Washington continued to see little validity in Afghani 
claims for Pushtunistan, it encouraged Pakistan to improve relations with Afghanistan 
in an effort to limit Russian influence in Kabul. Dulles, fearing a communised 
Afghanistan threatening the Baghdad Pact and American policy in the Middle East, 
privately encouraged Ayub to release the Pushtun leaders and soften on Kabul.^^^ 
From the late 1958 to mid-1959, Washington increasingly pressed Ayub to dialogue 
with Kabul and calm tensions by, for example, offering a propaganda truce.^^^
However, with Nehru-like obstinacy and in contrast to his predecessor Mirza,
“Ayub’s attitude towards Afghanistan ... profoundly discouraging.”^^^ As far as Ayub 
was concerned, “Daud was very stupid, and that that was the key to the situation” and 
he was inclined “to let Afghans stew in their own juice”.^ ^^  The general, who had 
graduated firom the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, recommended that 
America not show any weakness to Afghanistan.^^^ When Rountree pointed out that 
Pakistan should take the, “initiative in improving relations with Afghanistan” to 
protect the “fi-ee world”, Ayub instead suggested that the US should, “give 
Afghanistan ‘shock treatment’ of informing leaders that if their policies remained 
unchanged US would withdraw all support.”^^  ^Qadir, who further outlined his 
president’s message, wanted America to cut aid to Afghanistan unless it adopted a
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more cooperate attitude. He argued that Kabul’s royal family would submit to such a 
threat since otherwise, Russia would eventually dissolve the monarchy itself.^^^
Meanwhile, Ayub’s, “indifference to increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan” 
helped reinforce America’s ongoing cognition of Pakistan outside of the anti­
communist narrative. Washington advised its Kabul embassy in June 1959,
“Present GOP attitude re Pushtunistan seems inconsistent with its concern 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan allegedly poses for Pakistan as expressed 
by Qadir and other GOP officials particularly in SEATO and Baghdad 
Pact forums”^^ ^
Eight months later, those concerns became more evident,
“USG seriously concerned over apparent divergence US and GOP policies 
towards Afghanistan. USG firmly believes ‘tough’ policy by GOP will 
only drive Afghans more firmly into Soviet fold.. .previous attempt in 
1955 by GOP to bring Afghans to heel through economic pressure failed 
and was followed by Afghan acceptance large scale Soviet economic and 
military aid”.^ ^^
Despite the brief improvement in Pakistan-Afghan relations in early 1959, by June 
and with Baud’s return from Switzerland, and Russia’s offer to build a major 
US$80m highway and resume further aid, those relations again worsened.^^"  ^The road
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was the first major Russian grant assistance to any country outside the Communist 
Bloc. Byroade despairingly noted,
“trend of events is running against us here and unless this trend can be 
halted Afghanistan will become de facto Soviet satellite... Nothing could 
be as effective in reversing this trend as a rapprochement with Pakistan 
which can only be brought about if tensions over Pushtunistan are 
eased.”^^^
By late 1959, Washington was gravely concerned that Afghanistan would become a 
Russian satellite. When Eisenhower visited Kabul for a few hours in December 1959, 
he landed on an airfield built by Russia, escorted in by Russian MIGs (although with 
Afghani pilots) and landed on airfield with parked Russian bombers given to 
Afghanistan.^^^ However by then, Washington had lost confidence, and also interest, 
in achieving a settlement. The Ayuh-Naim talks in January 1960 were largely 
unsuccessful, and their failure only increased tensions and led to significant border 
skirmishes in late 1960. With this failure, America’s ambassadors to Karachi and 
Kabul, supported by Herter, advised Eisenhower that,
“we had not found any acceptable new approach that we might make.... it 
would not be helpful at this time for the United States to intervene in the 
‘Pushtunistan’ controversy .... we should continue quietly to discourage 
further hostilities.”^^ ^
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Eisenhower agreed. When Naim hoped to entice him in September 1960 by stressing 
that relations with Pakistan were worsening, Eisenhower retorted that the Afghan- 
Pakistan tension, “was not one in which outsiders should mix themselves”.^ *^ 
Throughout the second half of 1960, Washington abstained from Pushtunistan.^^^ 
Furthermore, Byroade was no longer confident that Afghanistan could maintain its 
neutrality even if it wanted In July 1960, Moscow committed US$500m for 
Afghanistan’s second five-year plan starting in 1961, constituting the plan’s entire 
foreign exchange requirement, and further funds were made available for other 
projects.^^  ^Byroade consequently reported, “that unless some such approach as above 
can be devised it is opinion this Embassy that we cannot expect much longer to be 
able accurately refer to Afghanistan as neutral nation.”^^  ^Hence during the 
administration’s final months not only did the US avoid engaging Karachi and 
Pushtunistan, but also refrained from Kabul.
And the Ghost o f John Foster Dulles
In April 1959, Christian Herter replaced Dulles, who died of cancer the following 
month as Secretary of State. Despite America’s diminishing cognition of Pakistan, 
and attempts to accordingly diminish its engagement, Washington could not 
disengage Pakistan. For this, John Foster Dulles’s engagement of Pakistan in 1954 in 
the Middle East, through the Northem Tier and Baghdad Pact, haunted American 
administrators through till John Kennedy’s election and beyond.
In July 1958 Brigadier Abdel Karim Qassem’s nationalist soldiers replaced Iraq’s 
Hashemite royal f ami ly .The  bedrock government of Western policy in the Middle
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East disintegrated against a sloppy coup, shocking the West/^^ Qassem had no 
regional or family network at his disposal and relied on the few local communists 
instead for support/^^ Eisenhower, nervous by the communisation of the Middle East, 
sent three thousand and five hundred troops in July to Lebanon, an effortless way to 
reassert American presence and impress Nasser, Sand other Arab nationalists, as well 
as Moscow.^^^ Not only was America alarmed by the coup but Nasser was too 
showing real concern over the communist penetration of the Middle East/^^ 
Washington, with the exception of Dulles, thus hoped for closer relations with Nasser 
and, complemented by an Anglo-Egyptian détente firom May 1959, again trailed 
Nasser as the indigenous anti-communist warrior.
The Iraqi coup also caused anxiety among the Baghdad Pact countries. In fact, the 
coup was such a shock that Pakistan and Turkey mourned the loss of Iraq comparable 
to a sibling’s death and grimly re-assessed their own governmental stabilities and the 
threat of Nasserite, communist or other radical ideas.^^  ^The Pact countries 
consequently again appealed to the US for security. Their call this time landed on 
fertile soil. Supported by his brother in the CIA, Foster continued to understand the 
member countries, including Pakistan, within the anti-communist narrative,
“Dulles thought that the United States would have to step up economic 
and military assistance in the Baghdad Pact area, which is under greatly 
increased pressure. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan fear that they now lie 
between two hostile areas - the USSR to the north and the Arabs to the 
south.” *^'’
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A week later, Dulles emphasised to Eisenhower, “it is absolutely necessary that we 
give some special reassurance to our support for Iran, Turkey and P a k i s t a n . A t  the 
London meeting of the Baghdad Pact in July 1958, Dulles engaged them through anti­
communism by pledging to cooperate in the defence of Pact members and began 
bilateral defence agreements with them, which were eventually signed in March 1959. 
These agreements were however, “pursuant to existing Congressional authorization”, 
which embodied in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, therefore limited America’s 
obligations only to communist aggression, and meant that the commitments were only 
re-emphasises of existing policy, even if publicised as otherwise.^^^ America’s 
renewed interest, even if superficially effected, inspired a revival in the Central Treaty 
Organisation (‘CENTO’), the new name for the Pact after August 1958, and reflective 
of Baghdad’s withdrawal fi*om the Baghdad Pact in that month.
Iraq’s fall rejuvenated debate in Washington on whether to join CENTO. The 
argument for joining was strengthened by CENTO’s detachment from the Middle 
East after Iraq’s exit, thereby protecting the organisation from Arab nationalism and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.^^  ^Thus, NSC 5820, America’s policy statement for the 
Middle East in October 1958, made no mention of CENTO.^ "^^  Some of the central 
officials had still not changed their opinions on CENTO since 1955. All American 
ambassadors to the CENTO countries supported America’s joining either the 
command structure or the organisation. While the JCS felt, as expected, “that a 
command structure was a ‘question of keeping CENTO a l i v e . C E N T O  members 
expressed exasperation on the issue of American support for the command structure 
or America j oining CENTO,
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“Iran and Pakistan.. .have revealed high degree frustration and 
disillusionment.... high-ranking officials have said they felt US policy 
treats regional members as if they children, and that US gives lip service 
to CENTO but more and more clearly reveals US heart not in it.”^^ ^
In contrast, Eisenhower still had doubts because of CENTO’s inclusion of Britain and 
thus its potential image as an instrument of imperialism in Suez’s afrermath.^^^ Ike 
was also concerned that joining would raise expectations of American aid, which 
would probably be military in nature. Furthermore, Eisenhower and the State 
Department, except perhaps Dulles, had become aware of the realities of the CENTO 
countries, such as Pakistan, and their motivations for drawing in America.^^^
Within this resurgent debate, Eisenhower neither attached meaning to Pakistan within 
the anti-communist narrative nor located it as a Middle Eastern state. American 
discussions about the region continued, as they had since 1955, to exclude Pakistan.
In the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi coup, there was no mention of Pakistan, but 
was of Iran, Turkey and Iraq in discussions with Britain on the new Middle East 
crisis.^^  ^In fact, America’s cognitive dislocation of Pakistan from the Middle East 
continued through to Eisenhower’s final days in office. Eisenhower consciously 
categorised Pakistan as a second priority in the Middle East.^^°
However, with the concept of credibility continuing its ascendancy in the currency of 
American policy and Washington’s resurgent concerns about the Middle East, policy 
to Pakistan remained bound as before, “It was important that none of the regional 
CENTO nations be permitted to become fiustrated.”^^  ^NSC 5909 emphasised that
359
Pakistan should be kept satisfied during this difficult period in the Middle East.^^  ^
Furthermore, in 1957, Washington had constructed electronic facilities near Peshawar, 
and airfields near Lahore and Peshawar for U-2 flights to monitor Russia. Though 
Bowles exaggerated the point when he suggested that the U2 flights gave Ayub a 
“political hammer lock” on US policy to South Asia, Pakistan had value to America 
as an espionage centre that other CENTO members did not.^^ ^
It was against this background that Pakistan demands for military aid in 1960 were 
heard. Pakistan wanted more weapons, more aid, more modernization and faster 
delivery all of which Washington felt, “would tend increase Indo-Pakistan tensions”, 
and was at odds to an American cognition of Pakistan which neither recognised its 
anti-communism nor its location in the Middle East.^ "^^  In May 1959, Ayub presented 
visiting Secretary of Defense McEhoy with a list of military needs, including F-86s, 
F-104s and Sidewinders.^^^ In doing so, he emphasised that though the CENTO 
studies indicated that Pakistan needed 395 jets, his programme was much more 
‘modest’, being only thirty-five new F-86s and the modernisation of their existing F- 
86s.^ ^^  To further sell such demands, Ayub, who was concerned about détente, 
emphasised the anti-communist narrative and Pakistan’s role within it.^ ^^  He told 
Eisenhower in December 1959, that we should not “drop our guard” against Russia, 
“Tactically, the Soviet Union wishes to relax tensions temporarily in order to gain 
further opportunities.”^^  ^Realising the implications for America’s engagement after 
its self-removal from the anti-communist narrative, Pakistan’s desperate attempts to 
recoup its anti-communist meaning by stressing the Chinese or Russian communist 
threats, fell on barren State Department soil.^ ^^
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The Defense Department though continued to understand Pakistan within the anti­
communist narrative and locate it in the Middle East, thereby supporting aid to the 
jittery Karachi government, which might otherwise tum to Russia. The JCS 
reaffirmed Pakistan’s continued importance for America’s global strategy and that, 
“Currently established JCS Strategic Force Objectives for Pakistan are considered the 
minimum essential for the stated purposes.” ®^® Pakistan defence support for 1961 was 
proposed at US$107m, constituting nearly half of America’s proposed economic aid 
for Pakistan of USS245.2m.^°^ Rountree firom late similarly continued to attach 
meaning to Pakistan as an anti-communist ally and resisted cuts in mihtary aid to 
Pakistan, “austere nature MAP and fact we may desire and require Pakistan military 
contribution within fi-amework our mutual collective security interests and 
obligations.” ®^^
Oddly, their intense case for providing military aid to Pakistan was still political and 
had little military substance. For example, the JCS paper prepared for Herter in 
October 1960 argued for aid exclusively on the basis of the political repercussions felt 
by other CENTO members and Pakistan’s potential affiliation with Moscow.^®  ^
Rountree’s summary of the case for aid, identical to that posed by the Pentagon, made 
no mention of Pakistan’s military value,
“Having thus assisted Pakistan to develop its defense establishment, we 
have no acceptable alternative, it seems to me, but to continue to provide 
sufficient military and Defense support aid to protect our investment, 
which is considerable, not only in financial but also in strategic and 
foreign policy terms” ®^"^
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This lack of military basis was reflected in the Pentagon’s contradicting force goals 
for Pakistan. In May 1959, the Pentagon had no less than three sets of competing 
force goals for Pakistan,
a) MAP force goal and JCS ‘Strategic’ force goal -  5!4 divisions.
b) Approved BP force goal ‘for planning purposes’ -  8 divisions.
c) At the BPMC meeting in the fall of 1958, our military representatives 
reportedly concurred in a proposal for 6 divisions as a BP force goal.” °^^
Without being able to geographically locate and then categorise and attach meaning to 
Pakistan, the State Department and White House had long sought to retract engaging 
Pakistan. Langley continued to strongly lead the opposition to the Pentagon’s attempt 
to re-engage Pakistan within anti-communism in the Middle East until his final days 
as ambassador,
“I would like to suggest that the Department of Defense conduct a 
thorough review of its purely military objectives in Pakistan. I can find no 
indication that such a fundamental strategic reappraisal in connection with 
the Pakistani military program -  at least to the point of restated 
conclusions -  has been conducted since the inception of our present 
course of action, which was inaugurated with the Aide-Mémoire of 
October 10,1954.. .Subsequent to such a strictly mihtary reappraisal, I 
assume that we would wish to inject political and economic 
considerations, some of which might be overriding.. .Is our main objective
363
nonetheless committed America’s engagement of Pakistan in the form of military aid 
against a backdrop of the Middle East while placing the onus of Pakistan’s military 
reduction on Karachi alone,
“the US should continue, beyond completion of the 1954 commitment, to 
extend military aid to Pakistan at the minimum level necessary to prevent 
the deterioration of the Pakistan military capability achieved through 
assistance programs”^^ ^
Hence, while Dillon could only direct the modest immediate aim as, “an agreement 
between India and Pakistan to freeze their forces at present levels”, he accepted that 
unless Indo-Pakistan tensions eased, and given the haunting legacy of Dulles’s 
Northem Tier, it would be impossible for America to reduce its engagement of 
Pakistan/°^ Indeed, by now, Eisenhower believed that the goal of reducing military 
aid to Pakistan and Pakistan’s armed forces remained only a “pious hope”.^ °^ The 
only compromise belatedly offered to the State Department was in the new policy, 
enshrined in NSC 5909, which was approved in August 1959. While it emphasised 
that the current American military aid program should continue, it also added that any 
attempt to increase these should be strongly resisted and Pakistan be impressed upon 
the need to moderate its military.^
Despite the extensive debate on military aid to Pakistan leading to NSC 5909, the 
policy was largely unsuccessful. For one, Pakistan was determined not to let it 
succeed by demanding that Washington not merely help maintain and mildly 
modernise Pakistan’s defences but also significantly build them. These demands, with
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the accompanying tension in Pakistan-American relations, became increasingly 
persistent in Eisenhower’s last year of office.^^  ^When Eisenhower visited Pakistan in 
December 1959, he rejected Ayub’s forceful request for Sidewinder missiles and a F- 
104 squadron, both of which represented state of the art military technology/' When 
in January 1960, Ayub again petitioned Eisenhower for the missiles and aircraft, 
Eisenhower, concerned about Ayub’s publicising disappointment with America, gave 
marginal ground by instead offering a smaller number of Sidewinders and a few radar 
bombsights. Then when Ayub pressed again in March, Eisenhower, finally 
exasperated eventually gave ten F-104s albeit in utmost secrecy/A lm ost a year 
after his death, Dulles continued to haunt Washington for his use of anti-communist 
narrative to understand and engage Pakistan, especially through the Northem Tier, 
once institutionalised, had become a highly effective fulcrum used by Ayub against 
which a credibility conscious Washington could offer little resistance.
There was bitter aftertaste even to this. Despite Eisenhower’s relaxation of this policy, 
one that already had courtesy of the Pentagon tilted towards Pakistan, NSC 5909 
failed to maintain Pakistan’s allegiance to the West. Karachi increasingly questioned 
its ties to the West, which not even a bilateral agreement of co-operation in March 
1959, arrested. Aside fi^ om the mounting anti-Americanism in Pakistan, the U-2 affair 
in 1960 stmck a salient chord in Karachi for during the episode, Ayub stuck firmly 
with Eisenhower as a last demonstration of Pakistan’s role in the anti-communist 
narrative, and argued that the incident had made Pakistan into an accomplice, thereby 
increasing its insecurity, for which it subsequently deserved more aid and
*' Alarmingly for Eisenhower, neither requested item was a mediocre piece of weaponry. The 
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commitment from America. Pakistan fears heightened when it learned that 
Khrushchev mentioned after the U-2 incident, “Where is this place Peshawar? We 
have circled it red on our maps.”^^"^
However, Eisenhower failed to ingest Ayub’s final act. In the aftermath, and with this 
final rejection, Karachi, after thirteen years of finstrated expectations, totally 
abandoned its anti-communist performance. A US embassy analysis noted that the 
Pakistani leaders, “expressed a diminution in confidence in America’s ability to act 
quickly, decisively, and competently in a crisis.”^Amer i ca ’s ally opened talks with 
Russia in June 1960 and received a US$30m loan for technical assistance and oil 
exploration from Moscow. Simultaneously, as Indo-China relations deteriorated, 
Pakistan protected its anti-Indian identity narrative by warming relations with China, 
causing Washington severe political constipation, Eisenhower thus left John Kennedy 
with the wrecked policy and cruel paradox of a Pakistan that was engaged through 
two anti-community security structures, with American credibility tied, and recipient 
to in excess of a billion dollars of aid, yet which nonetheless was edging closer 
towards not only Moscow but the pariah state of China and thereby especially likely 
to fimstrate Kennedy’s long standing commitment to understanding and engaging 
India as part of America’s missionary narrative.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The first of the two striking features of the identity narrative approach is its qualitative 
insight of American policy to Pakistan and in contrast to the Realist framework, 
which provides little explanation as to the first three of the four stages of American 
policy to Pakistan. Hans Morgenthau, whose text, Tolitics Among Nations' 
represents the most lucid summary of IR Realism, insists that international politics is, 
“a struggle for power”. ^ Yet a detailed study of the primary documents relating to the 
first stage of American policy to Pakistan, being from before its partition to 1949, 
reveals not only the absence of Realist-type power calculations by Americans in 
respect of Pakistan, but also an inadequate understanding of and interest in Pakistan -  
neither of which rest easily in Realism’s competitive environment and pseudo- 
objective reality.^ Why, for instance, assuming a cold-blooded Hobbesian arena, did 
Washington not exercise its considerable economic and military muscle, something of 
a power monopoly after the war, and rush to dominate or neo-colonise Pakistan?
The contrasting identity narrative version of this first phase produces a considerably 
more plausible report. Pakistan’s rushed creation gave huge cognitive challenges to an 
America that was already otherwise distracted by both the World War and its 
aftermath. Neither the concept of nor the term ‘Pakistan’ had resided in America’s 
consciousness -  neither in its narrative past nor future. This cognitive difficulty 
combined with Washington’s understanding of India, analogous to China, as a future 
step in America’s missionary story, to precipitate a sceptical and unwelcoming 
understanding of Pakistan before its creation. Once created, and given the continued 
cognitive difficulties of understanding what Pakistan was, America not only
375
maintained a considerable distance from Pakistan, but placed it alongside India, a 
treatment fortuitous for Truman, though not for later administrations, in that it worked 
within Karachi’s obsession with India. The only significant interest Washington 
demonstrated in Pakistan during this phase, was in Kashmir, and reflected America’s 
anti-communist identity narrative, and specifically concerns about communist 
expansion.
The Realist framework’s failure to explain the first phase is repeated in the second 
phase from late 1949 to 1952. Washington’s tilt towards Pakistan, which brought 
America to the precipice of an alliance, viewed within the Realist framework, fails to 
address why America sought to ally itself with a country besotted with economic and 
military weakness, as well as political polemics. That in doing so, it also infuriated 
Nehru, who by then had emerged as the leading statesman of the Third World, only 
compounds the explanatory difficulty.
The alternative proposed in this thesis is that Washington categorised and attached 
meaning to Pakistan within America’s dominant identity narrative, being anti­
communism after an extended theatrical performance by Pakistan’s leaders and the 
catalyst of Korea, which extended the anti-communist arena and internalised and 
polarised America’s anti-communist identity. Karachi’s reaffirmation of this story 
imparted to real America, support for its ‘real’ self, against the backdrop of 
modernity’s proliferation of identities and narratives, including the erosion of real 
American identities, as well as ontological security in an environment of considerable 
political unrest. That this internal battle of American identity was itself a corrosive 
undercurrent is perhaps not evident even if the preservation of the real American and
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his story remained a primary objective throughout the post-War era. Yet it was 
precisely these comforts jfrom Karachi’s chameleon political elite that drew real 
America, the American who also dominated the political establishment, to Pakistan, 
and encouraged America to extend and reinforce its anti-communist narrative through 
Pakistan’s inclusion in an anti-communist alliance in the Middle East. That Truman 
was unable to fulfil this was a function of inadequate time and Britain’s scant appetite 
to accept Pakistan’s anti-communist charade.
Much of the tension in the Realist explanation of this second phase extends into the 
third phase, from 1953 to early 1955, only with greater intensity. During this period, 
Washington, meaning Dulles who oversaw policy to Pakistan, ignored several 
warnings and signals not only about Pakistan’s weakness and its inability to 
contribute to the anti-communist cause, but also about Nehru’s vehement reaction if 
the US brought Karachi into its anti-communist alliance. In short, the Realist case for 
America to avoid Pakistan was considerable. Yet Dulles, not a naturally confident 
man, allied Pakistan not only through the MSA in May 1955 but also through 
SEATO. The thesis’s narrative based framework demonstrates that Pakistan’s 
conformity to the anti-communist narrative proved especially attractive to a 
practitioner who had a bipolar and fierce commitment to the American anti­
communist identity and narrative. Pakistan, unlike its neighbours, offered support to 
Dulles’s acute demand for greater definition of American self by clearly confirming 
the merit of the anti-communist narrative, reflecting Erikson’s cognitive trust or 
Giddens’s ontological security.
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It is only in the fourth phase, from early 1955 till 1960, that the Realist framework 
provides explanatory insight in US policy to Pakistan. It can thus be argued that 
Washington attempted an extensive though uncomfortable withdrawal from a weak 
Pakistan and towards an India that was increasingly positioned in competition with 
communist China. However, given that this framework’s only success lies in this 
limited period, the identity narrative explanation should also be addressed; and its 
consistent success for the first three analytical periods, it produces its own coherent 
account. Washington retracted from Pakistan because first the instrument to effect 
Pakistan’s engagement, the Northern Tier, was ruptured with the Arab reaction to the 
Baghdad Pact. This was followed by Pakistan’s relocation into South Asia, courtesy 
o f both India’^  economic difficulties and Pakistan’s continual Indian focus. Finally, 
and most importantly, Pakistan, frustrated with American aid to India and perceived 
inadequate aid to itself, withdrew from the anti-communist act by sounding off 
repeated neutralist and anti-American noises, the result of which was that America’s 
exclusive means to categorise, attach meaning to and engage Pakistan, being anti­
communism, self-destructively dissipated towards the final Eisenhower years. As a 
result, Washington’s not only had difficulties in engaging Pakistan, but it, without 
Dulles, no longer understood what Pakistan was.
The second striking feature of the narrative based approach is that the dialogue in 
American policy to Pakistan was fundamentally not between America and Pakistan, 
but within America and of American narratives. US policy to Karachi was in fact not 
a dialogue at all, but a monologue of American self-affirmation in which Pakistan was 
an almost incidental observer, albeit one that played to the important anti-communist 
tune. The extent to which Pakistan was marginal, beyond that specific tune, is a touch
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surprising. Throughout the period of consideration, Washington knew very little about 
Pakistan. Some of the blame for this may lie on the doorsteps of the Pakistani political 
elite, who repeatedly undervalued themselves when confronted by the West, ^ d  
demonstrated an understanding of independence that was neither political nor 
cerebral. For instance, on 9^  ^December 1956, Prime Minister Suhrawardy asked,
“The question is asked: Why don’t we (the Muslim countries) get together rather than 
be tied to a big Power like the UK or America? My answer to that is zero plus zero 
plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero”.^  As Venkataramani, poignantly asks, 
“What influence could a country rated as a ‘zero’ by its own Prime Minister hope to 
exert on big Powers to whom it attached itself as a camp-follower?”^
However, given that America’s categorisation and discourse search engines were a 
function of American narratives, Washington needed to know very little about 
Pakistan beyond its conformity or otherwise to those narratives in order to understand 
it. Pakistan itself was irrelevant, and only given meaning within the context of anti­
communism. Consequently, the pattern of ignorance about Pakistan in Washington 
was both consistent during 1947 to 1960, as it was on occasion, breathtaking. During 
Liaquat’s trip to America in 1950, in the midst of widespread applaud from politicians 
and media, a guest at a San Francisco gathering confused him with Nehru, and 
another referred to his delegation as a group of Palestinians.^ After including Pakistan 
into the Western security sphere. House Congressman Adam Powell from America’s 
most cosmopolitan state. New York, rose in July 1955 to, “send greetings to the 
country of Pakistan and to their Prime Minister, the Honorable Quaid-e-Azam 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah”, seven years after Jinnah had died.^ Moreover, Dulles noted 
of the forty-year old Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute, “the quarrel between Afghanistan
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and Pakistan had already been going on for hundreds of years, to which Admiral 
Radford added, thousands of years.”  ^In December 1959, Eisenhower, referring to 
Kashmir, the earliest and one of the prime American considerations relating to 
Pakistan, confessed to Ayub that he did not, “know the details of the dispute”.^
That India faired no better also reflected its own role within the anti-communist and 
missionary narratives. When the wife of Admiral Arthur Radford, Eisenhower’s 
designated chief of staff, sat next to Indira Gandhi’s husband at a dinner in India in 
November 1952, she expressed exultation at having finally met the great Mahatma -  
long since dead.^ When Truman learned that Chester Bowles wanted the 
ambassador’s job in Delhi, he explained, “Well, I thought India was pretty jammed 
with poor people and cows wandering around the streets, witch doctors and people 
sitting on hot coals and bathing in the Ganges”. I t  was thus, drawing upon the fable 
of one-eyed man in the land of the blind, that one Senator could designate himself as a 
specialist on India given his recent five-day trip to the country in 1957.^^
The tension that this led to was of course an American engagement of Karachi as an 
anti-communist state in the Middle East, which failed to conform to Pakistan’s own 
political reality. Having been carved out of India and in opposition to Hindu identity’s 
threat to Muslim identity, Pakistan’s centre of cognitive gravity was then and has 
perhaps since been more dominated by India than has America’s by anti-communism. 
Consequently, Washington’s engagement of Pakistan, sensitised by American 
narratives, had little interest in Pakistan’s perspective so long as it fit neatly into and 
reaffirmed the American story.
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